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Abstract
The project of defending vulnerable bodies, whose interior experience could only be known
through empathy, helped to develop nineteenth-century epistemologies of selfhood and otherness.
The struggles of authors who wished to represent the sufferings and experiences of others in texts
were influenced by changes in the understanding of perception and evidence (which have lately
received much attention as subjects of historical inquiry). In this project I explore the attempts
that were made by individuals and groups of individuals in the nineteenth century to ‘speak for’
individuals who were perceived as vulnerable: unable or less able, for some reason, to speak for
themselves. I examine the strategies by which these authors attempted to achieve a kind of
knowledge that amounted to sameness in difference with regard to the subjects for whom they
tried to speak. These strategies can be understood as attempts to negotiate the invisible (the
interiority of another individual) through the unseen, using sight in ‘non-sight’ to overcome
empirical barriers to knowledge of the ‘other’. I argue that in the nineteenth century, empathy
became a way of knowing, and a form of knowledge, and that the texts produced surrounding
nineteenth-century ethical and social reform movements are characterized by empathic discourse.
1Introduction:
Knowing, Seeing, Speaking the ‘Other’
In this thesis I explore what was distinctive about the way in which Victorians attempted
to understand and communicate the experiences of others. I argue that Victorian ethical
discourse was characterized by attempts to communicate empathic knowledge of subjects
as knowledge, rather than as fantasies intended for the purpose of the moral refinement of
the sentiments and the self. In this thesis, I will examine a selection of nineteenth-
century professional and popular texts, which attempted to speak on behalf of vulnerable
individuals and to present accounts of their (ultimately unknowable) interior experiences.
Each chapter will function as a case study, addressing texts drawn from the context of a
different ethical debate; each will carefully consider the strategies used by authors to
persuasively represent empathic knowledge. I demonstrate the ‘newness’ of what these
authors attempted to accomplish within the specific context of each reform movement,
and formulate arguments about the construction of these texts at the level of the
individual case study.
This introduction will discuss the definition of ‘empathy’, as well as the
components of empathy (knowledge, communication, and understanding; logos and
voicelessness; identity, self and other). I will consider trends in the history of perception
(and the scholarship of these trends), which affected the development of empathic
discourse in the nineteenth century. I will also discuss the meanings of representation
and advocacy, and the idea of ‘the other’. I will outline my thesis, explain my
2methodology as a historian of representation, and the principles by which I have selected
the texts I examine in each of my chapters.
The Victorian struggle to cross the boundary between self and other was
confirmed and, in effect, crowned at the turn of the twentieth century by the inauguration
of the term ‘empathy’. It was first introduced by German art theorists as einfühlung
(roughly ‘in-feeling’) in the 1870s. Vernon Lee is credited by the Oxford English
Dictionary as having named the concept in 1903, again in the context of art criticism.
Though it is certainly arguable that the earliest users of the word ‘empathy’ meant for it
to communicate an idea that was akin to the word ‘sympathy’ (which is a much older
word, having had its equivalent in ancient Greek), it is equally arguable that the new
word came into existence in response to a need for an alternative, to express something
different. The words ‘empathy’ and ‘sympathy’ have often been, and continue to be
used, interchangeably. Still, I argue that the term ‘empathy’, as opposed to ‘sympathy’,
reflects a more specific interest in the interiority, and ultimate ‘difference’ of the subject
(as ‘other’). This kind of ‘knowledge’ is never empirically attainable, as opposed to what
knowledge of the subject (in ‘sympathy’) could be really and tangibly summoned in the
self, based upon perceived commonalities and feelings of fellowship with the subject.
Though there have been many and varied attempts to define the word ‘empathy’, I
find Lauren Wispé’s concise declaration of the distinctions between empathy and
sympathy most helpful: ‘empathy is a way of “knowing”. Sympathy is a way of
“relating”’.1 Wispé attempts to clarify the distinction between sympathy and empathy as
a social psychologist, but she suggests that these terms can only be properly understood
1 Lauren Wispé, ‘The Distinction Between Sympathy and Empathy: To Call Forth a Concept, A Word is
Needed’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50 (February 1986), p. 318.
3within their historical context, specifically the context of a particular necessity that
resulted in the addition of the new word, ‘empathy’, first to the German and then to the
English language. The title of Wispé’s article, which includes the phrase ‘a word is
needed’, conjures a historical moment of insufficient language to suit new practices of
thought and expression. In this thesis, I will explore the practices of expression that gave
rise to the need for this new word by examining their representations. I examine such
expressive practices as are found in nineteenth-century texts that attempted to speak on
behalf of other individuals who were perceived to be suffering or vulnerable to suffering,
and whose experiences could not possibly be known by the authors of the texts. I pay
close attention to any special knowledge claimed or assumed by the authors of these texts
regarding the interior experiences of the subjects of whom they wrote.
Empathy can be very emotional, but it is not emotion. If, as Wispé suggests,
empathy is about ‘knowing’, the content of the knowledge produced is often emotionally
charged, not least because the circumstances which motivate one to try to ‘know’ the
unknowable difference of the other often likely to inspire strong feeling. This is, in fact,
what makes the emergence of the idea of empathy so central to the study of ethical
discourse: the perception of someone else’s suffering was, and is, a good reason to try to
understand and to represent the experiences of that individual. Since no one can ‘know’,
in the strictly empirical sense of the word, what someone else is feeling, there is likely to
be some disagreement about what it is really like to be the individual who is the subject
of empathic representations - especially in the context of ethical debates over the
treatment of individuals who are perceived as vulnerable in some way by the participants.
Arguably, the purpose of disseminating representations of the experiences of those who
4are suffering, exploited, or vulnerable in text would be (at least ostensibly) to persuade
readers of the ‘truth’ of this empathic knowledge. This goal, though, is hardly
incompatible with that of the solicitation of emotional responses to the knowledge
provided about the subject. The emotional response of the reader may even be an
author’s immediate goal in providing empathic knowledge of a subject, since a reader’s
emotional identification with the subject is likely to be a powerful incentive for
supporting a particular cause. It is, however, the distinction of empathy as a means of
knowing, and the strategies that authors use to construct a kind of knowledge through
empathy, that is the concern of this thesis. It is this element of knowledge that
distinguishes ‘empathy’ from ‘sympathy’ and related expressions, and which, I argue, is
historically specific and a characteristic of Victorian ethical discourse.
In each of my case studies, I establish how each text I examine, interacts with the
context of each ethical debate, producing meanings which function as knowledge, or even
as evidence, in the place of information that could not be empirically observed. I link the
authors’ discussions of what they could not personally observe or discover with aspects
of the respective ethical debates that could never be known by anyone, because the
authors themselves frequently make this connection. At times, this elision of the
invisible with that which was merely unseen was directly ordered by historically specific
and characteristically nineteenth-century modes of investigation and knowing, such as
systems of inspection, or the compilation of case studies in medical treatment. These
were arguably designed to ‘objectively’ produce a kind of knowledge that was deeper
than what could be gained by the simple application of any one person’s empirical
faculties. Other authors who operated from conventions (especially popular conventions)
5that allowed them to be more unapologetically subjective were, not surprisingly, more
emotional in their representations, but their strategies still approximated the production of
‘knowledge’ that was the goal of their ostensibly more objective counterparts. As I have
discussed, I do not view empathic knowledge as in any way divorced from emotion, and I
do not refrain from examining the way that these authors use emotional language,
particularly when they present emotion as a way of knowing, or claim some special
knowledge of their subjects for emotional reasons. I am specifically interested, however,
in examining these texts to discover the ways that these authors represented empathy as a
form of knowledge, despite the fact that the knowledge that they construct is likely to be,
and often meant to be, emotionally persuasive. I have selected a range of popular and
professional texts as a means of engaging with texts that were meant to be strictly
objective, as well as with those which were unapologetically emotional; many, of course,
are somewhere in between. By this principle of selection I mean to ensure that I survey
the construction of empathic ‘knowledge’ as strictly or loosely conceived as such.
In the contexts of the ethical debates I study, the relationship between
representation and reality could hardly be more crucial. The favoured reception or
dismissal of texts that represent the perspective of the vulnerable could have very real
consequences for the lives of the individuals who are represented in them. It is therefore
vitally important for the historian to try to determine how such representations have been
constructed, and in what context. To begin to do so, it is necessary to understand how the
idea of knowing and communicating someone else’s experiences came to be taken
seriously, as something more than just a fantasy. I argue that the explanation lies in the
6history of the understanding of the relationship between the imagination and the senses,
and of the role of the imagination in perception.
The acceptance of the imagination as an important factor in perception enabled
and encouraged individuals to ‘speak’ for other individuals despite the inexorable
contradictions at the heart of such communication. Over the course of the past twenty-
five years, many scholars have argued that during the nineteenth century, the human
senses came to be viewed as limited and flawed in their independent ability to supply a
person with a complete knowledge of reality and the world around him or her, whereas
the imagination came to be increasingly understood to play an important role in the
process of perception. Scholars have explored the implications of a shift in visual and
perceptual theory, from the earlier belief that the ‘truth’ was gained by more exclusively
empirical means to the Romantic embrace of the imagination as a crucial means of
‘filling in the blanks’ left by what our senses could not tell us, in terms of what this meant
for the discourses of science (most especially natural history), literature, and the visual
arts. This general argument serves as the point of departure for my thesis, in which I
explore the implications of this development in the understanding of observation and
perception for ethical discourse.2 I argue that this development enabled people to speak
and express on behalf of others in new and rich ways, and that ‘empathy’ was the name
that was eventually given to the imaginative production of new knowledge about
2The following works will be discussed shortly in greater detail: Gillian Beer, Darwin's Plots:
Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot, and Nineteenth-Century Fiction (London and
New York: Routledge, 1983); Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and
Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); Kate Flint, The
Victorians and the Visual Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); George
Levine, Darwin and the Novelists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); James
Krasner, The Entangled Bank: Visual Perception and the Representation of Nature in Post-
Darwinian Narrative (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Jonathan Smith, Charles Darwin
and Victorian Visual Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
7difference, as opposed to the exclusive production of feeling, sentiment, or sympathy
based upon commonality of experience. Information provided by the senses is, of course,
crucial in the construction (as well as the representation) of empathic knowledge, and
prior experience provides a crucial starting point from which to imagine another’s
perspective. Further, as I have said, empathic knowledge is frequently very emotional.
However, the use of the imagination as a serious tool in the production of knowledge
about difference, especially as a means of compensating for the limitations of the human
senses or empirical obstacles to understanding, is characteristic of empathic discourse,
though empirical knowledge, sympathy based upon commonalities, and emotional
responses may all contribute (and almost always do contribute) to the understanding of
someone else’s perspective as well.
In Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth
Century, Jonathan Crary argues that during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries in Europe, the imagination came to be embraced as an important part of the
process of perception; whereas before that time it had not been considered that the
imagination played any positive role in the acquisition of ‘real’ knowledge.3 As Gillian
Beer, George Levine, James Krasner, and Jonathan Smith have all noted, the acceptance
of the limitations of the human senses and the increased belief in the powers of the
imagination had significant implications for the discourse of science in the nineteenth
century, most saliently exemplified by the work of Charles Darwin [1809-1882].4 These
scholars have explored the influence of the resulting new mode of scientific discourse
3 Crary, Techniques.
4 In particular, see Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (London: John Murray, 1859); The
Descent of Man (London: John Murray, 1871); The Expression of the Emotions in Man and
Animals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965 [1872]).
8upon nineteenth-century literature and culture (and, in turn, the influence that literature
also had upon science).5
Kate Flint has studied the effects of accepting of the imagination as an important
part of perception on the art of the nineteenth century by closely considering the dialogue
between the seen and unseen within the mind of the nineteenth-century observer,
especially with regard to Pre-Raphaelite painting.6 Flint articulates the significance to
Victorian culture of the acknowledgment of the limitations of the human senses,
especially with regard to the sense of sight, as this sense was, and tends to be, privileged
over the other senses as the primary means through which humans acquire knowledge of
their surroundings. Through an exploration of discourses of ‘non-sight’ in artistic and
literary expression (such as blindness, as well as sight obscured, by dust in the eye), for
example, Flint demonstrates the way that Victorians embraced the limitations of the
human sense of vision (or a lack of sight) as a means of acquiring a deeper understanding
of the world than sight alone could provide. Other scholars have explored this kind of
imaginative vision in studying the relationship of Darwin’s science and evolutionary
narrative to the construction of Victorian works of fiction.7 I believe that the importance
of the kind of sight (within non-sight) that Flint discusses within the context of the
expression of the visual arts in the Victorian imagination can be traced beyond the
expression of understanding of interior (imaginative) visual processes to a veritable
‘opening up’ of human interiority to study, consideration, interrogation, and expression.
5 See Beer, Plots; Levine, Novelists; Krasner, Entangled; Smith, Visual Culture. For general studies of
Darwin’s life and works, see Adrian Desmond and James Moore, Darwin: The Life of a
Tormented Evolutionist (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994); E. Janet Browne, Charles Darwin:
Voyaging (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), and Charles Darwin: The Power of Place
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
6 Flint, Visual Imagination.
7 See Beer, Plots; Levine, Novelists; Krasner, Entangled; Smith, Visual Culture.
9That which was formerly ‘closed’ within the human interior was newly made available
through the notion that the limitations of the senses could be overcome through the
imagination.
I argue that ‘sight in non-sight’ inspired not only great works of science, art, and
literature, but also the creation of texts and stories that made use of the imagination in
order to represent individuals with little power to make themselves seen and heard.
Ethical discourse, just as many other forms of cultural discourse, was transformed and
changed during the course of the nineteenth century, and I argue that changes in visual
theory discussed by other scholars, with reference to the expression of knowledge as
processed by the imagination, also had crucial implications with regard to the way that
people considered and attempted to represent the experience of the ‘other’. I believe that
the discourse of empathy began to develop as changes in the understanding of perception
encouraged a persistent, if at times awkward, cultural foray into the realms of human (and
non-human) interiority. In this thesis, I explore the ways in which nineteenth-century
ethical discourse reflected the acceptance of the imagination as an important part of
perception. I show how the texts of Victorian ethical and social reformers reflect a
nineteenth-century belief in the possibility of overcoming the limitations of the human
senses and constructing knowledge with the aid of the imagination.
Crary positions the figure of the nineteenth-century ‘observer’ against an older,
strictly empirical (Cartesian) sense-data model, into which the processes of the mind and
imagination absolutely did not figure, except maybe as a hindrance.8 He traces the
decline of the Cartesian, or ‘camera obscura’ model of vision as a necessary condition for
the rise to prominence of ‘the observer’. According to Crary, the model of the camera
8 Crary, Techniques, p. 48.
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obscura was central to the Cartesian understanding of vision. René Descartes [1596-
1650] formulated the model of the camera obscura in order to avoid the subjective
impressions brought to the experience of vision by the human being attached to the eye.
Crary explains that whereas Descartes was troubled by ‘the uncertainties of mere human
vision and the confusion of the senses, the camera obscura is congruent with his quest to
found human knowledge on a purely objective view of the world’.9 For Descartes, the
disembodied eye was a more perfect tool for vision than the eye that was connected to a
human body and mind, since the pure transmissions of the eye could be compromised or
corrupted by other thoughts and feelings. Crary argues that as vision began to be
respected as a process of the mind rather than just of the eye, a new and more modern
understanding of vision as perception resulted in the adoption of the active observer as a
replacement for the model of the camera obscura and Descartes’ theories of vision.
Crary offers Johan Wolfgang von Goethe [1749-1832] as one of the first to look
inward and truly ‘see’. Crary demonstrates how Goethe’s ‘use’ of the camera obscura
deviated significantly from its purpose as he began to explore new territories of vision:
‘Goethe . . . abruptly and stunningly abandons the order of the camera obscura: “The hole
being then closed, let him look towards the darkest part of the room; a circular image will
now be seen to float before him”.’10 For Goethe, sight in darkness, where there is little or
nothing to ‘see’, or sight with closed eyes, demonstrated that a significant part of visual
knowledge came from within. The eyes and the senses, the processes of perception and
the production of knowledge, had meaning and truth in themselves, rather than
functioning as a means to truth that necessarily existed wholly externally to the observer.
9 Crary, Techniques, p. 48.
10 Crary, Techniques, p. 68.
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For Goethe, the eyes and the senses were imperfect; his proof of this was that despite the
acceptance of interior human processes as tools of vision, there were things that humans
simply could not see. Goethe gave, as examples of these, pure light and pure
transparence.11 It is important to note that Goethe was still able to discuss these as things
that he knew to exist. Goethe recognized that an important part of perception occurred
within the mind of the observer, and that far from being an impediment, the imagination
played a very important role in the process of human perception.
Romantic writers like Goethe were entirely fascinated by the imagination and its
processes and possibilities. While it is arguable, as James Engell suggests, that the
Romantic interest in the imagination was an inheritance of the eighteenth century, the
Romantics developed this interest into a veritable and passionate pre-occupation that
would serve to define the way that nineteenth-century thinkers and writers viewed the
world.12 Indeed, the processes of the imagination were appreciated with an almost
religious wonder during the early nineteenth century. Religion was transformed by the
value that was newly attached to the imagination. The late eighteenth century saw a
decline in Deism, which way of thinking had placed a great confidence in the empirical
knowledge of the world as a way of discerning the Divine power and plan. In place of
Deism arose a way of thinking about God and the meaning of life that placed a much
greater importance upon mystery and spirituality. One of the most prominent features of
Romantic religion was the sense of the inner life of the individual soul, which was at
once isolated and mysteriously connected with all its fellows, with God and all of
creation. In The Prelude, Wordsworth expressed the idea that the very ‘inward’ quality
11 Cited by Crary, Techniques, p. 71.
12 James Engell, The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1981).
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of life within the self that tended to isolate the experience of the individual self, was
really the spirit that connected everyone and everything: ‘the one interior life/Which is in
all things’.13 The imagination was the element that served to connect the ‘interior life’ of
one individual to every other. As Forest Pyle writes, ‘the imagination is the figure by
which Romantic texts address the disjunction between subject and society as well as that
between spirit and matter’.14 Thus, the imagination provided a way of knowing and
understanding the interior experiences of others, despite the fact that this goal was
empirically impossible.
Romanticism inherited from the eighteenth century an intense interest in
‘sympathy’, which term had served by itself since ancient times to refer to the
relationship of the self to the other. The eighteenth-century interest in sympathy,
however, was more of an interest in feeling than in knowing and understanding. This
was simply because there is really no way to know someone else’s interior experiences.
Such ‘knowledge’ can only be imagined. I do not claim to be able to identify, with
pinpoint accuracy, the precise moment of the beginning of empathy, either as an idea or a
practice, nor do I believe that it would be possible to do this for any idea with such a
complex development and meaning. I locate the beginnings of ‘empathy’ during the
Romantic period, not because people did not care or think about understanding ‘the other’
at any time before, but because it was at this time that literary and other artists began to
associate knowledge so intimately with the imagination that a ‘knowledge’ of what could
only be imagined could begin to be put forth as such. I consider, in fact, that eighteenth-
13 William Wordsworth, The Prelude, or, Growth of a Poet’s Mind, 1799, in Ernest de Selincourt (ed.),
The Prelude: Edited from Manuscripts, with Introduction, Textual and Critical Notes by Ernest de
Selincourt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926), MS RV 206, p. 525.
14 Forest Pyle, The Ideology of the Imagination: Subject and Society in the Discourse of Romanticism
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 1.
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century concerns about sympathy and compassion were absolutely crucial to the
development of the idea of empathy, and that the empathic discourse of the nineteenth
century can be viewed as part of a much larger historical movement to solve the problem
of how to understand and represent others. Eighteenth-century literature and philosophy
investigated many aspects of this problem. The discourse of sensibility and sentiment in
the eighteenth century were devoted to the exploration of the relationship between the
self and ‘the other’ and often used imaginative means to achieve and encourage
sensitivity and compassion for others.15 But was the moral refinement that was the goal
of such discourse really considered to be ‘knowledge’? Was not the focus of this
discourse the improvement of the self, based upon what could be summoned from within
the self, even if the reasons for wishing to improve the self were altruistic, rather than
selfish? I view the Romantic era as a turning point in the history of the attempt to
understand and represent others, since it was then that knowledge and evidence were re-
envisioned during this time as partly produced by the imagination. As a result,
knowledge began to function around the absolute constraints of what could be grasped by
the senses. Life, the earth, and its ancient secrets began to be theorized according to the
assembly of mere empirical clues through the use of the imagination during the
nineteenth century. At the same time, in a similar fashion, knowledge of subjects whose
bodies and experiences could not be apprehended empirically began to be represented in
legal, scientific, and medical (as well as popular and journalistic) texts.
15 See Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976 [1759]). On
eighteenth-century sensibility and sentiment, see John Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability: The
Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Janet Todd,
Sensibility: An Introduction (London: Methuen, 1986).
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I argue that the convergence of the Romantic obsession with the imagination with
the interest in sympathy that continued to develop from the eighteenth century, resulted in
a need to think about and express how the self could understand the other in a way that
reached out to the feelings and processes of the other, rather than in a way that was
restricted to the empirical confines of the self. Engell argues that in the early nineteenth
century, sympathy ‘becomes that special power of the imagination which permits the self
to escape its own confines, to identify with other people, to perceive things in a new way,
and to develop an aesthetic appreciation of the world that coalesces both the subjective
self and the objective ‘other’.16 In the nineteenth century, the tools of the imagination
supplied by the Romantic movement, and the relative freedom from empiricism that
resulted, enabled sympathy to become something else - and that at the close of the
nineteenth century, that something else would be named ‘empathy’. I would contrast
eighteenth-century sympathy with what would develop into empathy in the nineteenth
century by applying the central analogy of M.H. Abrams’ famous study of the emergence
of Romanticism, The Mirror and the Lamp.17 Whereas the goal of eighteenth-century
sympathy was to imitate or reproduce in oneself the feelings of another, in the nineteenth
century the goal was instead to understand or to illuminate that difference (between the
experience of self and other) as itself.
Engell also locates the beginning of empathy in the Romantic period, despite the
fact that there was no word in the English language to express it. He distinguishes it from
sympathy by contrasting the thoughts of Coleridge, who spoke of an imaginative union
between the perceiver and the object perceived, with those of eighteenth-century
16 Engell, Imagination, pp. 143-144.
17 M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1953).
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philosopher Adam Smith, who (as Engell concisely summarizes) ‘said that when we
sympathize with someone, we are actually working up our own feelings into duplicating
his’.18 Sympathy, then, in the eighteenth century (and indeed today) was a feeling that
could be replicated within the self, based upon perceived commonalities with the subject,
whereas by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, increased confidence in the
imagination and a less strict reliance upon the empirical powers rendered a certain
independence from commonalities in the pursuit of the experience of the ‘other’, and an
inaccessible and impossible ‘knowledge’ of the subject’s ultimate difference became, in
effect, the ultimate prize. Of course, any such ‘knowledge’ can only begin with the
perception of some kind of commonality, however imagined. Despite the fact that the
idea of empathy did not, and arguably still does not, function wholly independently in
practice from that of sympathy, I contend that from the period of the Romantic writers,
people began to express notions of sympathy/empathy in ways that were not strictly
bound by the empiricism of what the self could really ‘know’, but that would collapse
boundaries of self and other in order to transcend or get past the limitations of the human
senses. The authors whose texts I examine in this thesis engage with the problem of
collapsing empirical boundaries and work to collapse such boundaries in order that they
might try to understand and communicate the interior experiences of others. I begin my
study at the close of the Romantic period because I believe that the tools of imaginative
‘vision’ that gave rise to empathy were developed during this period, and that all
18 Engell, Imagination, p. 157.
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expressions of sympathy/empathy that have been made since the Romantic period have
reflected its pre-occupation with the imagination.19
During the Victorian era, the effects of the Romantic pre-occupation with the
imagination spilled over into virtually every sphere of thought and expression, including
science. George Levine calls Charles Darwin the most powerful ‘codifier’ of the
movement in science and history toward a greater dependence upon the imagination.20
He and Gillian Beer study Darwin, as an author and a scientist, alongside other scientists
who made significant use of the imagination in the formation of scientific theories, and in
dialogue with literary artists who seem to have influenced Darwin or who were arguably
influenced by his work. Like Goethe, Darwin and other scientists of the late eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries required their readers to try to ‘see’ with their eyes closed.
Darwin had to persuade people to try to imagine things that happened millions of years
ago, and changes that happened so slowly that they could never be apprehended by the
human eye.21
Despite the undeniable importance of the Cartesian model of knowledge and
vision, its decline in favour of the model of the imaginative observer heralded changes
that would afford great benefits to science, culture, and society. These benefits are
exemplified by the work of Charles Darwin. In many ways, it is now difficult to imagine
how knowledge and what could be considered to be evidence could be absolutely
restricted to that which could be proven directly through empirical evidence. Despite
19 On the association of Romanticism with the imagination, see Abrams, Mirror; Engell, Imagination; Pyle,
Ideology. See also Jerome McGann, The Romantic Ideology (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1983), for a study of the Romantic imagination as well as of the complexities of
Romanticism.
20 Levine, Novelists, p. 9.
21 See Darwin, Origin; Descent.
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marvellous advancements in technologies that have expanded the scope of our human
senses, we are well aware in the twenty-first century that many things that we claim to
know about are inaccessible at the level of direct sensory perception, even with the aid of
every instrument at our disposal. We push ahead with major developments, for example,
in psychology and quantum physics, without letting the lack of many types of empirical
information stand in our way. In a world strictly governed by Cartesian rules about
knowledge and evidence, much of what we know would not be considered knowledge.
Certainly, we would not be able to discuss evolution - or empathy - with any seriousness.
This is not to say that the decline of the Cartesian model of knowledge began in
the nineteenth century and continues to decline in a linear fashion today. Despite his
tremendous influence upon Western thought, Descartes did not enjoy complete
acceptance during own time, after his death, or throughout the eighteenth century. Nor
can we say that the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have been largely anti-Cartesian;
far from it. Rather, I argue, that the first and greatest upsurge in anti-Cartesian thinking
began in the nineteenth century, reached its summit in the middle decades of that century,
and inspired a fervent, pro-Cartesian reaction near the very end of the century, which
achieved a certain hegemony by the early decades of the twentieth century, despite
leaving us with a rich anti-Cartesian legacy.
The resurgence of Cartesian thinking at the turn of the twentieth century was
marked by the rise to prominence of behaviourism, which was mostly founded by the
cognitive psychologist Conwy Lloyd Morgan [1852-1936], in part as a reaction against
the works of Charles Darwin and George Romanes [1848-1894] concerning the study of
18
the minds of animals.22 The debate over animal minds will be discussed shortly in greater
detail, but for the purposes of this work it is important to first contextualize behaviourism
as essentially and polemically Cartesian; Morgan’s ‘canon’, as it has come to be known
(and to which strict behaviourists will always endeavour to adhere), was not new at the
turn of the century [1903], but was a fairly precise reiteration of the central argument
made by Descartes regarding the study of animals.23 Both arguments insist upon the
simplest explanation possible regarding the behaviour of animals and refuse to
acknowledge any possibility that animals may operate at a higher level of complexity
than can be proven by empirical evidence. Both Morgan’s and Descartes’ arguments
concerning animal minds have been classed as the application of the maxim of ‘Occam’s
razor’ (which advises that one should make as few assumptions as possible in the
explanation of scientific events) to the study of animal life.
What Morgan opposed in Romanes’ (and Darwin’s) work was primarily anecdotal
methodology, which could not be tested or controlled, because animals could not
understand or produce language.24 Neither Romanes nor Darwin invented this
methodology, which tended to try to understand the animal mind using the information
22 Conwy Lloyd Morgan was a comparative psychologist and philosopher who is perhaps best known for
his influential position regarding the empirical assessment of animal behaviour, to be discussed
shortly. See G.C. Field, J.F.M. Clark (rev.), ‘Conwy Lloyd Morgan’, Oxford Dictionary of
National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). On Darwin’s study of animal
minds, see Darwin, Expression. George John Romanes was an evolutionary biologist who was
particularly interested in the study of the evolution of mental life in both humans and animals. See
Roger Smith, ‘George John Romanes’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004). Romanes’ most important works include Animal Intelligence (London:
Kegan Paul, 1881) and Mental Evolution in Animals (London: Kegan Paul, 1883).
23 Conwy Lloyd Morgan, An Introduction to Comparative Psychology (London: Walter Scott Publishing,
1894). For a history of the division between behaviourism and ethology, see Robert Boakes,
From Darwin to Behaviourism: Psychology and the Minds of Animals (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984).
24 Like the study of animal minds, anthropomorphism, as a way of thinking about animals, is now
beginning to lose its fallacious stigma. See Robert W. Mitchell (ed.), Anthropomorphism,
Anecdotes, and Animals (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996).
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gained by subjective human experience. This was the way that ordinary people tried to
make sense of animal minds. The result was to produce a narrative from the information
that was available. Anecdotal evidence really was (and is) the only evidence for animal
minds, since animals lack language and cannot describe or explain their experiences.
That Victorian science was prepared to allow people to step beyond strict empiricism and
to utilize the imagination in order to study animal minds (alongside other ‘unprovable’
subjects of inquiry, like evolution) was favourable to the development of an ethical
discourse based upon empathy. This epistemology not only encouraged people to try to
speak for animals, such as working horses, but also for vulnerable humans, whose words
were ignored, doubted, dismissed, or otherwise disallowed.
Though dominant throughout the twentieth century, since the 1970s a group of
scientists have begun to reject ‘Morgan’s Canon’ as too restrictive. ‘Cognitive
ethologists’ like Donald Griffin have simply refused to make the assumption that
‘Morgan’s Canon’ demands, and have developed a new kind of comparative psychology
that allows for the existence of subjective experiences in the non-human animal.25
Cognitive ethologists insist that there is much to be learned about the animal mind,
despite the fact that its existence cannot be proven by direct empirical evidence. This
debate over behaviourism and the minds of animals is illustrative of the Cartesian and
anti-Cartesian forces that inform the struggle over empathy and the consideration of an
‘insideness’ that we all know to exist through personal experience, but which cannot be
communicated empirically, even through language. The history of the attempts that have
25 See Donald Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience
(New York: Rockefeller University Press, 1976); Animal Thinking (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1984); Animal Minds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). See also
Colin Allen and Mark Bekoff, Species of Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); The Cognitive
Animal (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
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been made to access and represent this ‘insideness’ in spite of its inaccessibility is also
the history of the construction and consideration of the unknowable - the ‘other’. It is
helpful to contextualize this struggle within the history of ideas as fundamentally a
struggle between Cartesian and anti-Cartesian modes of thinking. In this thesis I will
examine how, during a period of time characterized by trends toward subjective,
imaginative, and anti-Cartesian thought and discourse (as the nineteenth century has often
been), people attempted to defy empirical barriers to knowledge by attempting to speak
for others who were vulnerable and could not, for some reason, speak for themselves.
The ascendancy of the Cartesian mode of reason resulted in the dismissal of the
claims of the interior life upon the world outside the body, inasmuch as the interior life
could not be articulated. For dualism was also discontinuity; only the production of
knowledge could prove thought, and though humans were more than the sum of the parts
of their body and processes, it was their use of language, as expression of thought, that
proved this. Though the human spirit was thought to be in touch with truth in its
incorporeality, the truth of the world was considered to be external to the body,
measurable only by the production of knowledge that could be accessed as or by
language. What could be doubted, according to Descartes, had to be discarded. I argue
that it was as, and when, this model of knowledge began to lose influence in favour of the
possibilities of the imagination in the nineteenth century, that the ethical and social
discourse came to be characterized by the idea of empathy.
The central critique of the Cartesian model of knowledge (as propounded
especially, but not first or exclusively, by post-structuralist theorists) is essentially the
questioning of the primacy of logos as the determinant of thought and of the mind. The
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importance of the concept of logos to the philosophy of Descartes is demonstrated by his
relegation of animals to the category of ‘automata’. According to Descartes, since
animals could not use language in order to prove that they had thoughts, it could be
doubted that they have thoughts at all. Thus, Descartes considered animals to be nothing
more than machines designed to mimic the more complex actions of humans, and that as
such any consideration bestowed upon them was wasted.26 It is not surprising that
modern animal rights activists sharply impugn the Cartesian classification of animals as
automata, but they do not represent the first such critique, despite the great influence that
Descartes has had upon modern philosophy. In his own time, Descartes was harshly
critiqued by other philosophers for his refusal to consider the suffering of animals,
especially because it meant that he and his colleagues felt free to practice gruesome
vivisections upon animals without any regard or remorse for the agony they inflicted.27
A subsequent generation of philosophers saw one of its greatest thinkers, Voltaire [1694-
26 ‘These animal bodies can be considered as machines; and since they have been made by the hands of
God, they are incomparably better constructed, and have internal movements which are more
marvellous than any which can be invented by humans . . . if there were any machines which had
the organs and external shape of a monkey, or some other animal which lacked reason, we would
have no way of telling that they were not of completely the same nature as these animals. By
contrast, if there were any such machines which resembled our bodies, and imitated as many of
our actions as their nature allowed them to, we would still have two infallible ways of detecting
that, despite this, they were not genuine human beings. The first is that they would never be able
to put words or other signs together, as we do for revealing our thoughts to others. It’s easy to
imagine a machine which can utter words — and even one which can utter certain words which
are appropriate to physical events which cause changes in its internal parts. For example, if it is
touched in one place, it asks what you want to say to it; and if it is touched in another place, it
screams that you are hurting it; and so on. What it cannot do is to combine words in different
ways, so as to respond to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence —as even the most
dim-witted humans can do.’ Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting
One’s Reason and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences, Part V (1637), Paul Tannery and Charles
Ernest Adam (eds), Oeuvres De Descartes (Paris, 1897-1909), vol. IV, p. 56-57, George
MacDonald Ross (tr.) (1998) [online text]
<http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/GMR/hmp/texts/modern/descartes/discourse/discourse.html>.
27 Pierre Bayle [1647-1706], for example, led the sceptical reaction against Descartes in the late
seventeenth century. In 1692, Bayle published a list of criticisms of Descartes, which included a
rejection of the Cartesian view of animals as automata, in The Historical and Critical Dictionary
. . . Translated into English with Many Additions and Corrections Made by the Author (London:
C. Harper, 1710).
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1778], respond to Descartes directly regarding his classification of animals as automata
and his practice of vivisection; Voltaire considered Descartes to have been quite
monstrous.28 Carolus Linnaeus [1707-1778] also had trouble accepting that animals were
mere automata: ‘Surely’, Linnaeus suggested, ‘Descartes never saw an ape.’29
Perhaps the most significant dismissal of the primacy of logos came from Jeremy
Bentham [1748-1832] at the very end of the eighteenth century: ‘The question is not
“Can they reason?”, nor “Can they talk?”, but “Can they suffer?”’ This is possibly the
most direct critique of the relationship between language and the right to consideration
that has ever been posed. It is arguable that in thinking deeply about what should entitle
an individual to consideration in suffering, and in placing language (and voicelessness) at
the heart of the problem, Bentham was beginning to develop a discourse of empathy. At
the heart of the struggle of empathy is the ‘question of the animal’.
According to Jacques Derrida, Bentham’s proposal to change the logocentric
criteria by which humans are deemed to be worthy, and animals unworthy, of
consideration in their suffering challenged a long-standing and culturally entrenched
definition of the animal as primarily a being without logos:
the question will not be to know whether animals are of the type zōon logon 
echon, whether they can speak or reason thanks to that capacity or that attribute
implied in the logos, the can-have [pouvoir-avoir] of the logos, the aptitude for
28 Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet) [1694-1778], ‘A Reply to Descartes’ [1764], in Peter Singer and Tom
Regan (eds), Animal Rights and Human Obligations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976),
pp. 20-22. For a discussion of vivisection and antivivisection in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century Europe (with particular reference to Descartes), see Andreas-Holger Maehle and Ulrich
Tröhler, ‘Animal Experimentation from Antiquity to the End of the Eighteenth Century: Attitudes
and Arguments’, in Nicolaas Rupke (ed.), Vivisection in Historical Perspective (London: Croon
Helm, 1987), pp. 14-47.
29 Cited by Giorgio Agamben, in The Open: Man and Animal, Kevin Attel (tr.) (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2004), p. 23.
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the logos (and logocentrism is first of all a thesis regarding the animal, the animal
deprived of the logos, deprived of the can-have-the-logos: this is the thesis,
position, or pre-supposition maintained from Aristotle to Heidegger, from
Descartes to Kant, Levinas and Lacan). 30
It is important to note that, as Derrida points out, while Bentham’s challenge represents a
significant moment in the history of thinking about animals, it did not re-direct the
thinking of every philosopher who would succeed him. Still, it fixed the ‘question’ of
animals as primarily a dispute over the primacy of logos. This encouraged a re-
examination of ethics as shaped from a perspective of power instead of from a justice
innate to the human. This ‘justice’, of course, has no meaning outside of logos, and it is
the human capacity for such as reason and speech that gives the best (and only) proof of
its existence. Further, human justice (based, as it is, upon reason, and so exclusive to
humans) is quite capable of spinning ‘truths’ in denial. Voltaire, Bentham, and others
have questioned the rectitude of the absolute power of human over animal. Such
challenges demonstrate that there is something within human reason that is quite capable
of recognizing the element of denial in claims of essential human superiority based on
logos. Derrida continues his discussion of Bentham’s challenge: ‘Once its protocol is
established, the form of this question changes everything. It no longer simply concerns
the logos, the disposition and the whole configuration of the logos, having it or not . . . It
bears witness, manifesting already, as question, the response that testifies to a sufferance,
a passion, a not-being-able’.31 What Bentham, and later Derrida have really asked is
whether we don’t all already know the answers to the questions that cannot be posed
30 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Animal that Therefore I Am: More to Follow’, David Wills (tr.) Critical Inquiry,
28 (2002), p. 396.
31 Derrida, ‘Animal’, p. 396.
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without language. They suggest that the communication of pain and suffering as well as
the response to these are somehow beyond, or before logos.
Derrida argues further that Bentham’s words attempted to reverse the power that
is wielded by logos by turning the expression of ability to express a lack of ability,
powerlessness, or voicelessness, of which humans are all too aware:
The word can [pouvoir] changes sense and sign here once one asks ‘can they
suffer?’. . . ’Can they suffer?’ amounts to asking ‘can they not be able?’ And
what of this inability [impouvoir]? What of the vulnerability felt on the basis of
this inability? What is the power at this heart of non-power? . . . Being able to
suffer is no longer a power, it is a possibility without power, a possibility of the
impossible. Mortality resides there, as the most radical means of thinking the
finitude that we share with animals, the mortality that belongs to the very finitude
of life, the experience of compassion, to the possibility of this non-power, the
possibility of this impossibility, the anguish of this vulnerability and the
vulnerability of this anguish.32
There is power at the heart of non-power, as Derrida suggests. It is the power of the
vulnerable and the suffering to excite empathy and to provoke action in others. This
power, as all power, is negotiated. However, it must also be said that such power (at the
heart of non-power) is often rendered impotent as easily as one shuts ones eyes. Many of
the subjects for whom others attempted to speak in the texts I examine were kept away
from observers who might have been moved by the sight of them, especially if these
might have been further inspired to move against those who were viewed as responsible
for the oppression and suffering. There were those who, for profit, or some other
32 Derrida, ‘Animal’, p. 396.
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benefit, denied this power by becoming hardened against it, and who encouraged others
to either become hardened against it, to ignore it, or to become convinced that
circumstances were not what they seemed to be. It is even arguable that those who had
something to gain, and who were close to the individuals who were suffering, were likely
to use their proximity to the situation to be the ones to speak for these individuals, in
order that they might have diffused the concerns of others, and to convince them to look
the other way.
It is important to consider that although non-human animals give the perfect
illustration of power at the heart of non-power because they lack language, language is
not power in itself. The powers of language are not always effective against oppression;
a person’s voice can be stifled. To silence a person who could otherwise speak out about
finding themselves in some circumstances of non-power, is to render them less able to
negotiate these circumstances. Without words, we all occupy the position of the
vulnerable animal; the animal reminds us that language, just as the power at the heart of
the non-power which attends an animal’s lack of language, can be taken away, denied,
ignored, or otherwise rendered impotent. Ultimately, the animal shares with us the
voicelessness of our own interiority.33
Empathy is not only about animals. It is, however, very much about the
voicelessness we share with them. This voicelessness is not the same thing as a lack of
language - for one can have a voice without language - but it is the very same as our
awareness of a world beyond language, and beyond what language can express. Our
knowledge of vulnerability is at heart an awareness that there is that there is something in
33 For a study of the consideration of the (human) inability to speak in the nineteenth and early twentieth
century, see L.S. Jacyna, Lost Words: Narratives of Language and the Brain, 1825-1926
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
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ourselves beyond logos. This something more is more ourselves than our reason, our
thoughts, or our words, but these are our only means of defending it.
Certainly it has happened that humans have sometimes been treated as if they
were voiceless, without logos, ‘like animals’. Traditionally, the taboo of equating people
with animals has provided a safeguard against the deprivation of logos that is the heart of
all human vulnerability. As this taboo was long reinforced by theological rules and
conventions, it is hardly surprising that such general anxiety followed Charles Darwin’s
pronunciation of the continuity of species in the mid-nineteenth century. In doing so,
Darwin removed the safeguard of the definition of humanity as a distinct and superior
classification of creation. Whereas language had once provided confirmation of the
special gifts that God had bestowed upon mankind as created in the image of the divine
(as such, able to create, articulate, and communicate the ideas that comprised thought),
what was to link human to human, in sacredness and safety, when human was ultimately
animal?
Michel Foucault argues that ‘man’, as a subject for possible study and
understanding, was invented only in the eighteenth century, in part as a result of the
development of theories of subjectivity that allowed for a more self-reflecting
consideration of language and its limits.34 Giorgio Agamben further explores the origins
of the study of ‘man’, suggesting that the concomitant invention of ‘humanity’ allowed
for the existence of the animal-in-man, which separated elements of civilization in
humanity as could be distinguished from man-as-animal: ‘the anthropological machine of
the moderns . . . functions by excluding as not (yet) human an already human being from
34 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, Alan Sheridan (tr.) (New
York: Vintage, 1970).
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itself, that is, by animalising the human, by isolating the nonhuman within the human’.35
Thus, some humans could be portrayed as more ‘animal’ or closer to ‘the animal’ than
others. As humans began to be viewed as having evolved alongside all other living
creatures on earth, it became increasingly plausible to view groups of humans as having
achieved different levels of humanity, especially with regard to their proximity to western
culture and ideas about ‘civilization’. Darwin demonstrated the way that other human
beings could be viewed as closer to ‘wild’ nature than to civilized humanity in a well-
known passage from his letters, where he juxtaposed a description of his response to his
first encounter with a ‘savage’ with an expression of longing for the comfort of the high
culture of home:
I have seen nothing which more completely astonished me than the first sight of a
savage. It was a naked Fuegian, his long hair blowing about, his face besmeared
with paint. There is in their countenances an expression which I believe, to those
who have not seen it, must be inconceivably wild. Standing on a rock he uttered
tones and made gesticulations, than which the cries of domestic animals are far
more intelligible. When I return to England, you must take me in hand with
respect to the fine arts. I yet recollect there was a man called Raffaelle Sanctus.
How delightful it will be once again to see, in the Fitzwilliam, Titian's Venus.
How much more than delightful to go to some good concert or fine opera.36
Beer has interpreted this passage as Darwin’s attempt to negotiate ‘a sense of fascinated
helplessness at finding himself unable to interpret the profound difference of the
35 Agamben, Open, p. 37.
36 Charles Darwin to C. Whitley, 23 July 1834, in F. Darwin (ed.), The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin,
3 vols. (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1905), p. 227.
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[Fuegian]’.37 Unable to conceive of any commonalities between himself and the Fuegian
beyond that of species, Darwin pondered the meaning of the absolute difference between
self and other in light of his surprising inability to relate to an individual of his own
species. The Fuegian, of course, would not have been able to relate to Darwin any better
than Darwin could relate to him. The event seems to have highlighted for Darwin the
inaccessibility of interior experience; without reference to a common culture, Darwin
could not feel sympathy for the Fuegian. There was only ineffable difference.
Particularly interesting for the purposes of this study is Darwin’s contrast of the
Fuegian’s expressions to those of a domestic animal, which, as part of civilization, are
‘far more intelligible’. The classification of people and animals became far more
complex as humans were acknowledged to be animals themselves. Since the eighteenth
century the world had become considerably ‘smaller’ as a result of colonization and
global networks of trade and information, so that there was increased awareness among
Britons that there were people who inhabited distant parts of the world who were vastly
different from themselves. With the decline of the theological imperative that insisted
upon a vast classificatory divide between humans and animals, humans whose lives were
so very different from Europeans as to have been difficult for them to understand were
easily classified as representative of the animal within the human.
I argue that Agamben’s argument can be extended to include members of
nineteenth-century western society who tended to be classed more as subjects for study
than as candidates for the humane exchange of information or participants in a
conversation. I refer to the subjects about whom the authors of the texts I study in this
project endeavoured to understand and whose experiences they attempted to write about.
37 Gillian Beer, Open Fields: Science in Cultural Encounter (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 25.
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These individuals operated with limitations upon their powers of expression, whether for
reasons that we might accept today as having been ‘real’ (for example, children, who
would have lacked the more sophisticated powers of expression of adults), or wholly
imposed by culture (as women who were bound by modesty not to speak of
gynaecological ailments). In some cases, namely, those of people with mental ailments,
it is more difficult to determine whether the barriers to communication were grounded in
a genuine incapacity, or wholly or largely fabricated. I choose to study the attempts that
were made to speak for such people who could not speak for themselves alongside the
attempts that were made to speak for non-human animals, as the project of representing
the unknowable experience of the ‘other’ is essentially the project of seeking to solve the
‘question of the animal’. Indeed, it is important to align the study of empathy between
humans with that of empathy between humans and non-human animals because the latter
serves to illuminate the full range of possibilities and pitfalls that empathy presents to the
prospect of communication and representation, even when there is no absolute lack of
information to be acquired by an exchange of language.
In The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), Darwin examined
non-verbal expressions across species in an attempt to document the external
manifestation of ‘states of the mind’.38 In his introduction, Darwin argued against the
practice of separating the study of humans and animals as if they were completely distinct
and independent from one another: ‘With mankind some expressions, such as the
bristling of the hair under the influence of extreme terror, or the uncovering of the teeth
under that of furious rage, can hardly be understood, except on the belief that man once
existed in a much lower and animal-like condition’. Darwin explained the importance of
38 See Darwin, Expression, p. 13.
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accepting that humans are animals in the context of challenging theological opposition to
evolution, which insisted that man was created independently from animals. However,
not much time would pass before the scientific community would begin to reject the
study of animal minds. In the 1880s, George Romanes, who was influenced by Darwin,
is considered to have written some of the most important of nineteenth-century works
about this subject.39 However, soon after this, studies that focused upon the continuity
between human and animals were rendered obsolete, never to be taken seriously again
until the late twentieth century. As we have seen, Conwy Lloyd Morgan insisted that if
animals were even possessed of minds (in other words, if they had feelings or judgment,
or operated by any means other than according to instinct), this could not be proven and
so could not be considered an appropriate subject for scientific inquiry. Once again,
humans were designated something different and ‘more’ than all of the other animals on
earth, distinguished by the possession of a mind that all other animals could be assumed
to lack.
The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals discusses only the physical
manifestation of the state of the mind, without relying upon language as a source of
information.40 As well as sketches of subjects, Darwin relied heavily upon the new
technology of photography to document particular manifestations of different
expressions. Photography was a new technology of vision that no doubt seemed to
promise a new level of objectivity to one who wished to capture and document a
39 See Romanes, Animal Intelligence, Mental Evolution.
40 See Thomas Dixon, From the Passions to the Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological
Category (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), for a compelling account of the
movement from a primarily theological understanding of the emotions to the consideration of the
emotions as physical phenomenon contained wholly within the body. Dixon argues that this shift
in the way that people thought about and discussed emotion was one that began in the late
eighteenth century and was complete by around 1850.
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scientific subject. Of course, the complexity of the medium was soon revealed.41 Vision,
like language, is ultimately incapable of making an objective study of the interior life. It
is perhaps unsurprising that Darwin chose, late in his life, to study something as elusive
as the expression of emotion, since Darwin was always interested in studying aspects of
life that were not easily grasped by the human senses. I argue that the acknowledgement
of the limits of the human senses, which also acknowledged the existence of things in the
world that were very much real, though beyond our scope, encouraged the exploration of
the interior life and led to the development of the tool that we now call empathy. The
movement toward empathy was essentially anti-Cartesian and can be traced through the
history of visual theory. Nineteenth-century visual theory rejected the Cartesian model of
vision in favour of one that embraced the human imagination. The imagination enabled
the observer to overcome some of the limits of the senses.
I do not believe that since the nineteenth century, we have been steadily following
a trend away from a strictly empirical model of knowledge, toward a more imaginative
one. I argue, however, that the first (since the seventeenth century) and most forceful
turn from the Cartesian model of knowledge occurred during the nineteenth century, and
that we have never returned to dismiss the imagination (and its role in perception) as
wholeheartedly as was done when the philosophy of Descartes was at its most influential.
Neither do I believe that it is possible (or, certainly, desirable) to ever reach a point where
we consider the imagination to be wholly superior to empirical knowledge. Still, I
believe that it is possible to work toward the achievement of a better balance of the
41For a discussion of the problems that Darwin had with the use of photography in Emotions, see Philip
Prodger, ‘Illustration as Strategy in Charles Darwin's Expression of the Emotions in Man and
Animals’, in Timothy Lenoir (ed.), Inscribing Science: Scientific Texts and the Materiality of
Communication (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
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consideration of knowledge acquired by means of the senses and the imagination. Such
practice would prevent the easy dismissal of the suffering of the ‘other’ by the privileging
of empirical ‘facts’ over the consideration of what might be imagined to be happening,
but which cannot be ‘proven’. It is easy to assuage the conscience with the thought that
one does not ‘know’ that ‘the other’ is suffering, and cannot ‘know’ if the experience of
‘the other’ is really as bad as one imagines it might be. By considering the history of how
we began to consider the idea of interiority, and to struggle for ‘empathy’ as a kind of
(impossible) perceptual possibility, we can be more aware of our own consideration of
interiority, as well as the pitfalls and challenges that are presented by any and all attempts
to produce and construct knowledge of ‘the other’, both those that are fundamentally
empathic and those that are more empirical, and as such resistant to the notion of
empathy.
Though antagonistic to a very strict empiricism, empathy is not the opposite of
empiricism. Further, it is arguably assisted by whatever empirical information is available
about its subject. The most apparent means of communicating experience is through
language. Yet even language cannot achieve perfect transparency. Post-structualists
discuss the impossibility of achieving perfect communication in terms of the information
that invariably fails to reach its intended recipient, as no communication can ever be
totally successful. They refer to the information that gets lost as the ‘excluded third’, or,
alternatively, the ‘differend’, or ‘differance’.42 These are arguably ways of naming or
defining the ‘other’, whether considered as the information that gets lost along the way to
communication, or the individual who is not understood. The ‘other’ as individual is
most often considered to be someone who has particular problems among the ranks of
42Terms used by Michel Serres, Jean-François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, respectively.
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others, and who might be excluded for some reason, but it can also refer to every
individual, since no one can make their interior experiences known with absolute
certainty.
Post-structuralism offers a way to define empathy according to the way that
people have attempted and struggled to make use of it as an idea. Gilles Deleuze views
the ‘idea’ as a problem that works and is actively creative. The idea, for Deleuze, can
never really be known, and does not actually exist, though it is ‘inseparable from a
potential or a virtuality’. 43 This virtuality (for Deleuze, ‘the characteristic state of ideas’)
at once ‘possesses a full reality by itself’ and contains in itself possibility, which, while
opposed to the real, ‘designates a pure multiplicity’ in an idea. 44 We grapple with
possibility when we approach empathy, all the while acknowledging the impossibility of
knowledge of the interior experience of another. In this way, empathy is a productive
and creative struggle; something we use and ‘do’, rather than something we can ever
know. Deleuze would refer to this as a ‘dramatization’ of the idea. Deleuze argues that
‘dramatization’ respects the notion of ‘difference in itself’, unlike ‘representation’, which
is always dependent upon a stable identity. Identity, or sameness, for Deleuze, is merely a
way of managing difference. Considered in this way, representation (as a means of
constructing identity or sameness) can never really achieve its aims; despite the fact that
it is our only way of making sense of the world of difference around us. Empathy begins
as a representation to ourselves of our perception of the interior experience of difference,
as a way of making sense of difference. The next step, if any are to be taken, is to try to
represent to others what sense we have made of this difference. While is arguable that
43 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, Paul Patton (tr.) (London: Athlone Press, 1994), p.182.
44 Deleuze, Difference, p. 211.
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we will never be able to ‘represent’ empathy, the attempt to surmount the impossibility is
exactly the same as the struggle to truly understand the experience of another. Despite its
impossibility, we use the idea of empathy to understand and to promote understanding
beyond what can be expressed and understood through the use of language. We believe it
is a help, rather than a hindrance or a distraction from knowledge that can be ‘proven’.
The struggle for empathy has been closely followed by a struggle for the
representation of empathy. If empathy is a response to the ‘insideness’ of another, it is
also itself a kind of ‘insideness’, which also defies communication. Indeed, it is almost
as difficult to discuss the process of representing empathy as it is to discuss the idea of
empathy itself. Such representation is frequently made in the context of an ethical debate
or dilemma, since the perception of someone else’s suffering or distress presents a
compelling reason why one might try to ‘speak for’ the interior experiences of another
individual. It is tempting, and sometimes reasonable, when discussing the representation
of empathy, to use the language of ethical discourse, which is typically fraught with
connotation. For example, I often use the word ‘advocate’ to refer to the authors of the
texts I examine. The first definition of the noun form of ‘advocate’, as presented by the
Oxford English Dictionary, is one that is legalistic and professional; in fact, the emphasis
is almost more dependent upon the duty to speak than upon the kind of speaking that is
necessarily involved (namely, on someone else’s behalf): ‘One called in, or liable to be
called upon, to defend or speak for’. The second definition of the word, however,
describes an advocate less in terms of an obligation to be fulfilled in the case of a
summons, than of an ethical figure who is a sort of champion of someone in need: ‘One
who pleads, intercedes, or speaks for, or in behalf of, another; a pleader, intercessor,
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defender’. In spite of the word’s legalistic flavour, I feel that it is hardly neutral in its
communication regarding motivation - to speak of someone as the advocate of another is
to imply that he or she will argue in favour of that other individual’s best interests. This,
of course, is not always a correct assumption, and though I am often confident using the
word ‘advocate’ to describe the authors of the texts I examine, sometimes I am not
convinced that these authors always had the best interests of their subjects at heart.
I believe that the word ‘advocate’ is simply the best word that exists in the
English language to describe one who speaks for another. It is not my intent to explore
the motivations behind the discourse produced by those who attempted to represent the
experiences of others. Yet, at times the language available to me has fallen short of
offering a neutral term to denote an individual who speaks for the experiences of
someone else - one who feels empathy and attempts to represent it. As the idea of
empathy continues to evolve, perhaps our language will expand to accommodate the
discussion of its contexts and processes.
Victorians certainly recognized the ‘power at the heart of non-power’, though it is
impossible to know for certain whether any particular effort to represent empathy for the
vulnerable was motivated by the sincere wish to communicate the effects of this power,
as experienced by the author, or by a more selfish wish to attempt to harness this power
for the advancement of some ulterior goal. It is not my intent to assess the motivations
behind the texts I study, except as the representation of motivations informs the strategy
of the authors in important ways. I imagine that the motivations behind the texts I study
are complex, and indeed, some of the authors whose texts I examine are deeply
problematic as ethical agents. Although I have found it impossible to remain completely
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neutral in my treatment of historical circumstances that involved a great deal of suffering
and oppression, I have tried to engage as little as possible in any value-centred discussion
of motivation or judgments. This is not to detract from the suffering of the subjects or
victims of the circumstances discussed in these texts, but because it would deviate from
my particular goal of historicising the struggle to understand and to communicate our
understanding of the interior experiences of others, including their suffering.
The representation in text of the non-verbal (or the unspeakable) is the persistent
framework of this thesis, which seeks to explore the historical response to the humane
need to confront the limitations of language. The development of the word ‘empathy’ (as
distinct from sympathy) strikes at the heart of this binary as it represents the attempt to
know what cannot be known, and to put into words that which cannot be put into words.
While this thesis is not an attempt to trace the history of the word ‘empathy,’ and while I
would place this thesis more firmly within the ‘cultural turn’ than the ‘linguistic turn’ in
scholarship and historiography, it is indebted and bound to the latter movement as it
operates within a framework of the powers and limitations of language. Of course, the
‘cultural turn’ of scholarship and historiography owes such a significant debt to the
‘linguistic turn’ that one can hardly discuss the two movements as wholly separate from
one another.45 Indeed, cultural studies scholar Cary Wolfe has recently revisited the
45 The terms ‘linguistic’ and ‘cultural’ turn are often used interchangeably; however, I would like to cite
Nancy Armstrong’s claim that there is a subtle difference between the two: ‘The cultural turn is a
permutation of the linguistic turn . . . ‘The cultural turn’ is a later development that not only
marked the spread of poststructuralism to history and the social sciences but also promoted the
interdisciplinary practice of “cultural studies”, ‘Who’s Afraid of the Cultural Turn?’ Differences:
A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 12 (2001), p. 18. I would also like to point the reader of
this thesis to important works of ‘the linguistic turn’ in historiography that have influenced the
writing of this thesis: Patrick Joyce, Visions of the People: Industrial England and the Question of
Class, 1840-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Gareth Stedman Jones,
Languages of Class (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Hayden White, The Content
of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
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questions originally asked by Ludwig Wittgenstein regarding the problematics of
language in order to obtain a wider, ‘post-humanist’ view of the role of language and
communication in the ethical discourse of species.46 It is from the standpoint of post-
structuralist and post-humanist thinking that I approach the problem of exploring the
history of ethical discourse in the nineteenth century.
This thesis is primarily devoted to the examination of language (as textual
sources), both as a form of representation and as a topic and theme. Voicelessness is
posited as an indication (as well as perhaps a cause) of vulnerability. Though the
voicelessness of vulnerable individuals was often arguably something that was
constructed or invented by authors who would speak for certain subjects (especially in
the case of healthy adults), the perceived inability of subjects to speak on their own
behalf provides at least the ostensible motivation for authors to give their subjects a
‘voice’. Since I examine language within the broader context of perception (especially
visual perception - seeing, not seeing, invisibility, and what Kate Flint would call ‘sight
in non-sight’), the findings and contentions of this thesis, while based almost exclusively
upon texts and textual analysis, are indicative of historical trends that are more broadly
representational or discursive.
As a historian of representation, my approach has been deeply informed by New
Historicist literary critical methods. I would like to stress, however, that the reason I
University Press, 1987), and Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century
Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1973). On the ‘cultural turn’ in history, see Victoria Bonnell
and Lynn Hunt (eds), Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and
Culture (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999); Peter Burke, Varieties
of Cultural History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), and What is Cultural History? (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2004); Lynn Hunt (ed.), The New Cultural History (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1989).
46 Cary Wolfe, ‘In the Shadow of Wittgenstein’s Lion’ See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations: 50th Anniversary Commemorative Edition, G.E.M. Anscombe (tr.) (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2001 [1953]).
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pursue the study of the construction of texts has everything to do with the potential
relationship of such texts as I study to the real - all of the texts I study were constructed
for the purpose of influencing ideas and practices involving the treatment of vulnerable
individuals. I perform close readings of my selected texts, in order to consider the
construction of each text in terms of the author’s strategy for presenting empathic
knowledge of his or her subject as knowledge, and encouraging readers both to accept the
text as such and to try to understand, as the author understands, the perspective of the
author’s subject. In examining the strategies of each author, I ask the following
questions: How does the author deal with empirical obstacles to understanding and
communication? How does the author challenge the information that is empirically
available? How does the author attempt establish an authoritative position regarding
information that he or she could not possibly know? In short, how does the author
negotiate sameness in difference, and encourage his or her reader to do the same?
I have selected texts that were written by authors who claimed to be driven by the
perception of someone else’s present or immanent bodily suffering, not because I believe
that opportunities for discussion and expression of the interior experiences of others were
only available in urgent circumstances, but because authors working for change in urgent
circumstances would have been likely to use the most forceful discourse available to
them.47 Even in the context of legislative debates, the texts I study represent attempts to
negotiate changes to the way that vulnerable groups were treated, supported, or protected
by British society and its institutions. Though many of the texts I study were influential,
I do not attempt to demonstrate that they were so, or to evaluate the impact of each text as
47 Indeed, Victorian realist authors tended to embrace the details of the lives of ordinary individuals, as will
be discussed shortly.
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it really affected the lives of the subjects who were represented. For the most part, I do
not study the literal ‘results’ of these texts, by way of assessing the impact that any of
them had upon the ethical cause that any author intended to advance. Nor do I discuss
the popularity or breadth of influence of any particular text. This is because what the
authors of these texts were trying to do is so historically significant - they effectively
carved out a discursive space for the use of empathy in the discussion of reforms that
centred around the suffering or exploitation of vulnerable individuals. I would also like to
emphasize that I make no claims with regard to the representative nature of the texts I
have selected. This is because I mean to show how the authors of these texts responded to
urgent circumstances by pushing the limits of articulable discourse, so that the
experimental nature of these texts is evident within each relative context. I demonstrate
the ‘newness’ of what these authors tried to do within the specific context of each reform
movement, by examining and formulating arguments about the construction of texts at
the level of the individual case study.
I assume that each author meant to represent reality as plausibly as possible.
Whether the ultimate goal of the individual author was accuracy or persuasion, I assume
that his or her immediate, discursive goal was always to construct a representation that
was as real, or that seemed as real as possible. There were very real lives at stake in each
of the debates, of which each author was been keenly aware. The nature of participation
in such ethical debates pre-supposes an interest in the outcome, whether that interest is in
achieving a clearer understanding of circumstances, for the purposes of fair assessment,
or in achieving the conversion of readers to the author’s perspective (even if, as may be
40
imagined in some circumstances, such conversion is only really desired for the purpose of
increasing readership - to sell books).
Individuals who were vulnerable and suffering were likely to be the subject of
some controversy regarding their treatment or exploitation. Authors who chose to speak
on behalf of such individuals were likely to encounter some impediment to visual access
to their bodies (in addition to a lack of access to their voices or verbal expressions). This
is the reason I have rooted my study of the history of ethical discourse in the history of
visual and perceptual theory. Often, there was a responsible party who was interested in
keeping vulnerable bodies from view (sometimes, this was impossible, due to the nature
of the exploitation; my chapter on London horses and drivers explores how the persistent
and unavoidable visibility of working horses created special problems, both for those
who defended them in print, and for those who were forced to try to ‘shut their eyes’ to
the sight of the horses’ sufferings because of a sense of guilty complicity, which in turn
affected the representation and treatment of desperately poor cab drivers). The bodies of
the subject individuals were material and visible, even if in many ways unseen, and the
material of these bodies became centres for ethical discourse. Through my readings of
texts written to speak on behalf of these vulnerable individuals, I demonstrate how
Victorians used the discourse of imaginative observation to negotiate the invisible (the
interior experience of others) through their treatment of the unseen. As these authors
attempted to describe their struggles with that which they could not see or empirically
access, they encouraged their readers to follow them in constructing empathic knowledge
of the same subjects. Thus, the imaginative ‘knowledge’ of the interior experiences of
these subjects was provided by the author so that it might be constructed (both by author
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and reader) along with an imaginative version of that knowledge which really could be
empirically known if it was not hidden, far away, or otherwise rendered unavailable only
to some.
This kind of knowledge could only be taken seriously within the context of a
culture which respected the imagination as part of the process of perception. As scholars
of the Victorian realist novel tend to agree, the construction of models of reality was a
veritable nineteenth-century pre-occupation. This is not to say, however, that Victorian
authors pursued, or believed that they could achieve, a pure and simple mimesis, or that
they were not aware of the complexities of their medium.48 Victorian realist fiction, like
empathic discourse, was exemplary of the nineteenth-century struggle to overcome the
limitations of the senses through the use of the imagination. It is even reasonable to
suggest that empathic discourse emerged as part of the larger Victorian realist ‘project’, if
one considers this to mean the Victorian pre-occupation with constructing models of
reality. As well as empathic discourse, the realist ‘project’, somewhat broadly conceived
both in terms of chronology and scope, would have to include, for example, the
48 See, for example, Peter Brooks, Realist Vision (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); George
Levine, The Realistic Imagination: English Fiction from Frankenstein to Lady Chatterley
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); John P. McGowan, Representation and Revelation:
Victorian Realism from Carlyle to Yeats (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1986); Ioan
Williams, The Realist Novel in England: A Study in Development (London: Macmillan, 1974).
The idea that Victorians were interested in representing reality is also supported by other, non-
literary, scientific, artistic and representational movements and practices of the era, such as
photography, non-photographic representations and illustrations of nature and animals, and the
Pre-Raphaelite movement. On realism and Victorian photography, see Jennifer Green-Lewis,
Framing the Victorians: Photography and the Culture of Realism (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1997). On Victorian representations of nature, see Barbara Gates, Kindred
Nature: Victorian and Edwarding Women Embrace the Living World (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1999); Barbara Gates and Ann Shteir (eds), Natural Eloquence: Women Reinscribe
Science (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1997); Bernard Lightman, ‘The Visual
Theology of Victorian Popularizers of Science: From Reverent Eye to Chemical Retina’, Isis, 91
(2000), pp. 651-680; Lynn Merrill, The Romance of Natural History (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1989); For a discussion of realism and the Pre-Raphaelite movement, see Christopher
Newall and Alan Staley, Pre-Raphaelite Vision: Truth to Nature (London: Tate Publishing, 2004);
Marcia Werner, Pre-Raphaelite Painting and Nineteenth-Century Realism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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emergence of circumstantial evidence in courts of law.49 One may discuss fiction as a
literary genre, defined in opposition to what is considered to be ‘non-fiction’, but it is
difficult to absolutely divorce this type of textual construction from that which is meant
to communicate particular truths, such as legal fictions. For the most part, I try to avoid
the analysis of the fiction of novels, in order that I may show that establishing knowledge
about the interior experiences of others was not the exclusive domain of the novelist.
Many novels would supply me with a great deal of evidence regarding the importance of
representing empathy in the nineteenth century, but it is important to me to show that this
was a viable means of constructing knowledge about real historical subjects.
The texts I have selected are meant to be broadly representative of the
possibilities of a discourse for the representation of the vulnerable that Victorians who
were in a position of relative power in relation to their subjects both utilized and made
increasingly available. This is not a history of any social movement in particular. It is
not my intent to determine the social forces that drove people to take a stand against
certain injustices (as opposed to others) by speaking out for a specific group during a
specific historical moment. Nor is it my intent to determine how successful each author
or text was in influencing its readership or bringing about changes. Instead, I mean to
show how strategies of Victorian activism in general reflected broader understandings of
the possibilities of the imagination and communication in the construction of empathic
knowledge.
I do not try to construct my own representations of the voices of the individuals
who are the subjects of the ethical debates I study. In some cases, these individuals may
49 See Alexander Welsh, Strong Representations: Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).
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have left written or other kinds of records for historians to study - but in many other
cases, there are none. Part of what I hope to contribute to the field of historiography is a
careful consideration of what can be gained from studying the representations of
vulnerable individuals by people in a relative position of power: it is so often all we
have.50
While the availability of biographical information about the authors of the texts I
study is inconsistent, there are a few things that can be said about them as a group. They
hailed from a variety of backgrounds, but can be described as broadly upper- to middle-
class; most of them were either professionals engaged in professional debates, or else
they were devoted (one might say, using a loose interpretation of the word,
‘professional’) activists, who devoted a great deal of time and energy to the advancement
of their respective causes. Some, as journalists, engaged in a variety of debates as part of
their profession. All had access to some means of publication (and so would have had to
have been at least somewhat well educated), whether their texts took the form of
legislative documents, books, tracts, letters-to-the-editor, or other contributions to
periodical publications. Some of these types of texts were more widely circulated than
others; however, all of them were written to convince someone - perhaps a great many
people - to accept their interpretations of the experiences of their subjects as knowledge
of the circumstances at the heart of the respective debate. These texts were written
because the authors believed that their readers could possibly bring about change
(whether because of their individual powers of influence or because of their numbers).
Some of the authors whose texts I have selected were professionals writing at least in part
50 For a discussion of the problem of power in the production of historical sources, see Michel-Rolph
Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995).
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for other professionals, while others wrote for a more popular audience. A few did not
write at all; rather, their words were recorded as ‘expert’ testimony, in the context of a
legal debate which centred around their profession. All were heavily invested in the
practice of representation.
My principles of selection began at the level of selecting case studies. In
selecting the texts to examine in this thesis, I have considered the function of each group
of texts as a case study among other case studies, as well as the function of each text
within its respective group of texts. Though it was, of course, important to consider the
function of each individual text within the context of the larger project, for the purposes
of clarity I will address my principles of selection first in terms of my case studies and
then in terms of the individual texts within my chapters. I have chosen each group of
texts to provide effective comparison and contrast to the others, in order to achieve a
selection of case studies that would be broadly representative of Victorian ethical
discourse. As previously mentioned, I have selected these groups of texts from among
those which were written to bring about change in urgent circumstances, regarding
individuals who were perceived to be vulnerable to suffering or exploitation. There were,
however, many such individuals during the nineteenth century, and very many were the
texts that were written about them. In order to afford each case study with the attention it
deserved, and to ensure that my case studies as a whole would ultimately constitute a
manageable and coherent thesis, I was required to exclude some very worthy subjects.
The texts I have selected represent a range of popular and professional Victorian
discourses, and a range of different causes, and the individuals who were the subjects of
these texts were vulnerable for different reasons. Victims of slavery and ‘wage slavery’
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were economic units in oppressive systems, whose labour and suffering benefited
owners, masters, and economies. Animals, whether subject to vivisection or forced to
labour, were vulnerable because of their usefulness to humans. Gynaecological patients
and patients with mental infirmities, however, were at least in part the ostensible
beneficiaries of medical treatment. These were vulnerable because of illness. A
woman’s gender, however, prevented her from speaking out about her gynaecological
problems, and her experience of treatment. An individual who was labelled mentally
infirm could well have spoken out, but anything he or she said would have been easily
dismissible. Similarly, a child could have spoken, but what he or she said could have
been easily dismissed because of his or her age. Further, a child labourer’s poverty could
have had the effect of lessening the weight of what he or she said, which was also the
case with cab drivers. In addition to being poor, cab drivers were a singularly unpopular
group of people. Women and slaves were less able to speak for themselves because of
who and what they were - judged to have been inferior because of their sex or race.
Animals were vulnerable because they were not human. Animals also presented a special
case because of their inability to speak at all.
The texts I study in my first chapter, on child labourers, were written by
professionals doing a job. Similarly, my third and fourth chapters (on gynaecological
patients and the inmates of lunatic asylums) also examine texts written by professionals,
to advance particular views regarding professional practice. My second and sixth
chapters examine texts that contributed to popular debates and intended to encourage
public sympathy for their respective causes, as do the texts examined for my fifth chapter.
My fifth chapter (on vivisection) integrates legislative texts as well, because the
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relationship between popular and legislative texts regarding vivisection and
antivivisection was particularly intimate (I will discuss this relationship shortly).51
Finally, I have ended my project with the examination of texts that concern two
oppressed groups, one of which is oppressed by the other. One of these is, of course,
human, and the other animal. With this chapter I intend to punctuate a work that is at
once wholly about ‘the animal’, and wholly about the human, the humane, and the ways
in which humans reach out to their fellows - fellow humans, or fellow creatures - with all
the knowledge of the ‘other’ that each individual feels, empirically divided from
everyone and everything else by his or her sense of insideness. I argue that increased
contemplation and consideration of this ultimate isolation has also allowed for the
configuration of an idea that this isolation is ‘shared’ - we are all‘the animal’. Our
willingness to overlook empirical impossibility in order to embrace this binary is, I argue,
an important legacy of the nineteenth century.
I will now discuss my principles for the selection of individual texts within each
of my case studies, in the context of my main arguments within each chapter, and the
significance of my examination of these texts. In my first chapter, I examine the reports
and evidence presented by child labour commissioners from the 1830s to the 1860s.
51 I would like to point out that the readership of the legislative texts I examine in my first chapter (from the
Child Labour Commissions) and my fifth chapter (from the Royal Commission on Vivisection)
would have extended beyond the circle of professional legislators to a wider public. This was not
solely due to the publication of extracts by activists on behalf of each respective cause (like
George Jesse’s reproduction of selected testimony from the Commission on Vivisection, which
will be discussed shortly). The 1830s saw an explosive rise in the publication and readership of
‘Blue Books’, or Parliamentary proceedings printed the consumption of a public readership. Oz
Frankel explains that the practise of making Parliamentary proceedings (in particular, the reports
of Parliamentary Committees and Royal Commissions) available to the public in the form of these
books (which had blue paper covers) began around the turn of the nineteenth century. He points
out that the proceedings from the 1842 Child Labour Commission (which investigated the
employment of children in mines) was the most widely read government publication of the
Victorian period. See Oz Frankel, ‘Blue Books and the Victorian Reader’, Victorian Studies, 46
(2004), pp. 308-318; States of Inquiry: Social Investigations and Print Culture in Nineteenth-
Century Britain and the United States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).
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These reports were formulated in the face of considerable barriers to their understanding
of what was happening to labouring children. In addition to the problem of gathering the
testimony of (sometimes very young) children, the commissioners were confronted by
such impediments as the influences of parents or employers upon what the children
would say, factories that were cleaned specially for their visits, illnesses that would not
present themselves for many years, absentees, or even hidden labourers (as young boys
who were employed to climb chimneys for sweeps were often hidden). I study the
imaginative means employed by the commissioners to assess the ‘real’ experiences of the
children, as well as their use of circumstantial evidence to substantiate their conclusions.
In this chapter I engage with scholarly debates about evidence and testimony, drawing
upon major works of law and literature scholarship and making connections between this
body of scholarship and that of the history of nineteenth-century visual theory.
I have chosen to study a selection of the Royal Commissions on the Employment
of Children, based upon the significance of the particular Commissions and the particular
tasks and subjects of the commissioners. The Sadler Commission of 1831-32 uncovered
major obstacles with regard to the investigation of the conditions of child labour.52 In
particular, it was discovered that interviewing labourers - even adults - in a legislative
court was likely to be problematic, as those labourers were unlikely to find favour with
potential employers in the future. The 1833 Commission addressed this problem by
implementing a system of inspection and reporting; child labourers began to be
interviewed, and their working conditions assessed, at their place of employment, often
by the commissioners themselves. Those in charge of gathering information at the sites
52 On Michael Sadler’s philosophy of reform, see Kim Lawes, The Revival of Paternalism in Early
Nineteenth-Century Britain (London: Macmillan, 2000).
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of employment submitted reports to the Central Board of the Commission. This system
was followed by later commissions, of which I have chosen two to examine. The 1842
Commission addressed particular problems with children working in mines, and the 1863
Commission focused largely on the problem of the employment of children to sweep
chimneys. I have selected to examine the texts produced by these Commissions in
particular because they addressed problems that were directly related to the limitations of
observation and difficulties obtaining empirical evidence.
In my second chapter, I study the book-length accounts of two British
abolitionists (writing in the 1830s and 1840s) who travelled to America in order to
‘research’ American slavery. As professed abolitionists, these men had difficulty
accessing the individuals whose lives they wished to know and write about. They took
very different approaches to overcoming similar challenges: one restricted himself to safe
spaces in the North, while the other went about the South, and even attended slave
auctions in disguise. I relate the very different strategies of these two authors to their
understandings of perception and communication, comparing and contrasting the ways
that they make use of all of the evidence available to them in their attempts to present
their British readers with observations and interpretations of what they thought it must be
like to be a victim of slavery. I analyze both authors’ use of theological, printed, and oral
sources of information as a supplement to what they were able to witness. I discuss
scholarship that has been written about the loss of slaves’ experiences to history, as well
as current scholarship on slave psychology and the pseudo-science of race in the
nineteenth century, in terms of the strategies used by these nineteenth-century
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abolitionists to try to speak on behalf of victims of slavery, with whom they had little or
no contact.
There were only a very few British abolitionists who attempted to observe the
conditions of American slavery for the purposes of publishing documentary evidence on
the subject.53 Some of these were celebrated abolitionists who actively took part in the
American abolitionist movement.54 Others possessed status and connections that eased
the awkwardness of their position when among slave-holding society (and possibly even
kept them out of danger).55 I chose to examine, instead, texts written by two authors who
were neither celebrated philanthropists, nor famous for any other reason. Edward Strutt
Abdy and Ebenezer Davies were not directly and actively involved with American
abolitionist activities; nor did they have the advantage of such superior connections as
might have ensured them of somewhat of a safe passage through the deep American
South. They attempted, as best they could and in their own ways, to conduct their own
investigations of American slavery and to present their own evidence of slave
experiences to the British public. The different challenges that each faced, in the context
of very different approaches to the investigation of American slavery, and the strategies
that these authors developed to overcome these challenges, afford an illuminating study
53 Many British travel-writers in America claimed to find slavery distasteful, but few of these openly
supported abolition. See Max Berger, The British Traveller in America, 1836-1860 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1943).
54 Joseph Sturge, for example, was a celebrated abolitionist, and wrote from this perspective. See Sturge’s
A Visit to the United States in 1841 (London: Hamilton, Adams, 1842); See Alex Tyrrell, ‘Joseph
Sturge’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
55 Harriet Martineau was an active abolitionist who visited America and wrote about slavery. Martineau,
however, was well known by the time of her visit to America, and her connections (most
especially within the Unitarian Church) made her passage through the American slave states
relatively smooth. See R.K. Webb, ‘Martineau, Harriet (1802–1876)’, Oxford Dictionary of
National Biography (Oxford University Press, 2004).
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of the presentation of empathic discourse in the context of a very tense historical moment
in Anglo-American popular political culture.
My third chapter explores the debate over the use of the speculum in nineteenth-
century gynaecological examinations, which raged hottest in the 1850s and 1860s. I
analyze texts written to support and oppose the use of the speculum in terms of the ways
that their (male) authors attempted to speak for or make claims on behalf of
gynaecological patients. Both of these groups of doctors claimed that their approach
helped them to understand the experiences of the women in their care. Some doctors who
used the speculum claimed that this special, visual access afforded them the special status
of guardian of the woman’s secrets, and, interestingly, special access to her pain, both
physical and emotional. For them, to be able to see into a woman’s body helped them to
know what she was feeling. Opponents of the speculum claimed that they were the ones
who were able to develop special relationships with their female patients, especially since
there was no mechanical device separating them from their patients. These also accused
doctors who used the speculum of being too aggressive in their approach, attacking the
excessive use of caustics and scarification as practices largely associated with the use of
the speculum. I engage with current debates over the meaning of the female body in the
nineteenth century, and discuss the technological advancement of the speculum in the
shifting significance of sight and touch.
In this chapter, I examine texts written by a number of gynaecologists who
advocated the use of the speculum, a well as the texts written by one gynaecologist who
was a particularly outspoken opponent of the use of this instrument, Robert Lee [1793-
1877]. These texts were written by male medical professionals, mostly to influence other
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male medical professionals and to teach male medical students. They debate common
practices, and give evidence for their respective stances by making claims about which
practices were best for the health of women, as well as by providing anecdotes and
interpretations of the experiences of women who were gynaecological patients. As well
as making recommendations for practice, the authors of these texts also engage in debates
about what medical students should be taught and how they should learn to understand
women. In addition to medical texts, in this chapter I also discuss a very few non-
medical texts written to oppose the use of the speculum, in order to provide context for
the professional debates by presenting some of the kinds of accusations that were
popularly levelled upon gynaecological practitioners during the middle decades of the
nineteenth century.
In my fourth chapter, I discuss the book-length works (1840s-1860s) of John
Conolly [1794-1866], which discuss the construction of insane asylums, as well as the
diagnosis and treatment of insanity, in accordance with his philosophy of non-restraint.
Conolly claimed that nineteenth-century science could make insanity and the treatment of
insanity veritably transparent, and his key to identifying and treating insanity effectively
and humanely, as well as to remaining sane oneself, was to imagine the perspective of
others. Conolly often took vast imaginative leaps in order to overcome barriers to
knowledge of his patients’ experiences, occasionally even constructing possibilities that
could never be known, in order to prevent or ameliorate possible suffering. Many of
Conolly’s patients could and did speak, but he maintained a strict control over the
interpretation and presentation of their expressions. I examine Conolly’s strategies and
choices in light of his insistence upon the cooperation of reason and the imagination in
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the advancement of humane and effective medicine, as well as in the context of current
scholarship regarding the history of patient narrative and theories of cognition and
analogy.
In this chapter, I discuss only the works of one individual. I have not examined
Conolly’s works in the context of any larger debate about policies of non-restraint in
asylums because, as Nancy Tomes has argued, the idea of non-restraint was not ground-
breaking by Conolly’s time.56 Conolly’s great achievement was the implementation of
non-restraint on a large scale; no other large institution had dared to abolish restraints
before Conolly, and many followed his example after his experiment at Hanwell met with
such success. Arguably few, however, would have insisted that the way forward in the
treatment of the insane was to continue to tie them up. Conolly’s book-length works are
largely prescriptive, and present ‘the old system’ of the use of restraints (and physical
coercion) in asylums as rife with inherent evils. Conolly’s prescriptions, however, are
characterized by empathic discourse, and include striking attempts to know and represent
the minds and experiences of the insane.
My fifth case study is that of Victorian antivivisection. In the nineteenth-century
debate over vivisection, empirical evidence was limited for many different reasons. First,
animals could not testify about their experiences. There was also an element of secrecy
about vivisection; physiologists constructed empirical barriers on purpose. The two
opposing factions struggled over the right to interpret an animal’s experience, as well as
how to define pain and cruelty. Regulation depended upon whether the experiences of
56 Nancy Tomes, ‘The Great Restraint Controversy: A Comparative Perspective on Anglo-American
Psychiatry in the Nineteenth Century’, in W.F. Bynum, R. Porter and M. Shepherd (eds), The
Anatomy of Madness: Essays in the History of Psychiatry, vol. 3, The Asylum and Its Psychiatry,
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1988), pp. 190-225.
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the animal, as well as the motivations of the physiologist, could be made clear. Both
supporters and opponents of vivisection made claims on behalf of the experiences of
animals that were ultimately impossible to prove. In this chapter I study the testimony of
pro-vivisection and antivivisection witnesses who were called to give evidence at the
1876 Royal Commission on Vivisection, along with popular tracts that were published in
support of and against vivisection in the 1870s and 1880s. I analyze the strategies
employed by the witnesses and authors in making claims about animal experiences,
drawing on current scholarship about the relationship of language to pain, oppression,
and the idea of the animal.
The popular and legislative texts surrounding the debate over vivisection were so
closely entwined that one of the leaders of the popular antivivisection movement was
asked to testify before the Royal Commission on Vivisection, despite the fact that he was
neither a barrister, nor had any professional association with vivisection. Indeed, many
of the central arguments put forth for the Royal Commission on Vivisection are most
easily accessible through George Jesse’s popular publication of extracts from the
proceedings.57 Thus, the legislative documents form a crucial part of the larger debate
between antivivisectionists and physiologists. Many questions posed to those who were
called to give evidence before the Royal Commission on Vivisection were related to
popular and journalistic interpretations of the sufferings of vivisected animals, and much
of the material that had been interpreted by antivivisectionists was drawn from the
publications of the physiologists themselves. In my study of these tests, I examine the
struggle for control over the representation of animal suffering, as well as over the
57 George Jesse, Extracts from and Notes upon the Report of the Royal Commission on Vivisection, Refuting its
Conclusions (London and Manchester: The Society for the Total Abolition of Vivisection, 1876).
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establishment of moral and educational credentials that would be necessary for someone
to be legally considered worthy to make decisions about animal experimentation based
upon their own understanding of animal suffering and any potential ‘greater good’ that
might be achieved by particular experiments.
In my last chapter, I continue my exploration of language, understanding,
oppression, and the animal, in a study of tracts and popular articles that were written to
debate the reform of the circumstances of cab horses, cab drivers, and other drivers of
horses in Victorian London in the second half of the nineteenth century. Victorians were
particularly thoughtful about the experiences of horses and quick to speak on their behalf.
They were also thoughtful about the means of understanding and communicating with
horses, and they were generous in their application of personality, and even moral
possibility, to the horse. Touching all classes, and bringing the poor to interact with the
wealthy, many different kinds of people met in the space around the horse. As opposed
to the problem of vivisection, authors of texts written to promote better treatment of
horses had to persuade people how to interpret what they saw every day, rather than how
to envision events that occurred behind locked doors. The horse was highly visible, so
much so that the significance of individual horses was easily lost or overlooked. Authors
often expressed frustration and feelings of helplessness in writing about the abuse of
horses, because it was usually not the owners or drivers who noticed that the horses were
suffering. Hired drivers, and especially cabmen (who were alternately pitied and reviled)
suffered a great deal as well, and just as visibly. However, their uncomfortable, daily,
and sometimes threatening proximity to members of the public encouraged people to pity
them from a distance. The identity of the cab driver was often conflated with that of the
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horse, and the horse was often considered to be more ‘humane’ than other animals. In
this chapter, I study how nineteenth-century authors grappled with the ethical dilemma of
the suffering horse and its driver and struggled to understand the forces that shaped
individual perspective.
I examine the ways that popular and journalistic texts regarding the treatment of
Victorian working horses attempted to persuade readers to see and to understand the
suffering of such horses in a particular way. Further, I examine the assessments made by
authors of such texts regarding the assignment of blame for the suffering of working
horses. As in my chapter on vivisection, I consider the arguments that were made to
advance ideas about who should or could be responsible for the interpretation of horses’
sufferings and experiences. In the case of working horses, this question tended to raise
uneasy issues regarding responsibilities of class and national identity. I discuss how
these authors attempted to resolve these issues as they grappled to define the roles,
responsibilities, and relationships between and among drivers, horses, and riders in
carriages pulled by horses. In addition, I look at the way that these definitions also
constructed horses (and often poor drivers, such as cabmen) as moral units within an
immoral economic system, and how various authors used imaginative means to develop a
‘knowledge’ of this system, which, for many reasons, was difficult or impossible to
observe, as well as a ‘knowledge’ of the real experiences (responsibilities, pressures, and
sufferings) of those who functioned within it.
I have chosen to study a chronology of text that is mostly Victorian, but begins a
few years before the beginning of Victoria’s reign and ends a few years before her death.
I have chosen to examine texts that date from the end of the Romantic period for reasons
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I have already discussed. An additional reason that I have begun my study with texts
from the 1830s is that this was a time when issues such as concern over the Anatomy Act,
the New Poor Law, factory and child labour, and American slavery (versus British
abolition) rose to prominence, which would all become important concerns of the
Victorian era regarding vulnerable bodies. I extend my study to the last decades of the
nineteenth century in order to explore texts written at the pinnacle of Victorian animal
advocacy, which arguably presented the development of empathy with its most acute
challenges. I constrain my study to texts that were written no later than the early 1890s
as it is after this time that both behaviourism and psychoanalysis begin to exert influence
upon the development of empathy. Though these influences have had a great effect upon
our idea of empathy today (and despite the fact that the word for empathy was not
introduced to the English language until after the turn of the century), it is important to
study the development of empathy apart from the influence of psychoanalysis, which
produced a new epistemology and language of the human interior.
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Chapter 1:
Empathy and Inspection: The Royal Commissions on Child Labour: 1832-1863
The experience of having been a child is one to which all human beings have access,
despite how very different one child’s experiences may be from another. While many
humans have never been women, for example, and while it is conceivable that some
people have perhaps never been sick or in hospital, all have been children, and as such,
have knowledge of what it is like to have been younger, weaker, and less sophisticated
than the adults around them. Notwithstanding developmental (and perhaps cultural, or
educational) limitations, children can communicate verbally. However, the legal
significance of the verbal communication of children is generally stunted because
children are understood to be limited in their ability to communicate independently by an
underdeveloped capacity for reason and comprehension, as well as by the probable
influence of adult guardian figures upon whom they depend.
It is possible, however, for an adult to present evidence on behalf of a child or
children - as if to ‘witness’ by proxy. The Victorian legislative project of factory reform
engaged many adult individuals to provide evidence on behalf of children, including
individuals who had been specially selected for the task of seeking and gathering
evidence before processing it and reporting back to the legislative community with their
findings.1 These individuals, in addition to examining the child labourers themselves and
their surroundings, also reported on evidence provided by others who had significant
1 For a study of Royal Commissions and their function within British politics, see Hugh McDowall Clokie
and J. William Robinson, Royal Commissions of Inquiry: The Significance of Investigations in
British Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1937). For a discussion of the public
readership of the proceedings of Royal Commissions, see Oz Frankel, ‘Blue Books and the
Victorian Reader’, Victorian Studies, 46 (2004), pp. 308-318; States of Inquiry: Social
Investigations and Print Culture in Nineteenth-Century Britain and the United States (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).
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knowledge of the conditions under which children laboured. Some of these adults had
professional qualifications, such as medical doctors, and others were simply in daily
contact with labouring children and could give evidence accordingly. Others were adults
who were interviewed in the capacity of having been labouring children themselves at
one point in time - ex-child labourers. Far from inappropriate, the testimony of adults
gave critical scope to Victorian child labour commissions, ensuring that the findings were
not representative of an encapsulated period of time, during which conditions could
arguably could have been transitory. Indeed, the testimony of adults who were once child
labourers was indispensable to the nineteenth-century project of the reformation of the
conditions of child labour, for it ensured that recommended legislative actions were
considered in the light of the injuries they would prevent and the benefits they would
impart to future lives.
The historiography of the concept of ‘childhood’ as distinct segment of life has
been fraught with debate and disagreement for decades.2 Whether or not childhood
emerged as a ‘new’ concept in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe, it is
certain that, as Eric Hopkins suggests, the lives of at least working-class children in
England underwent a significant transformation between the eighteenth and the late-
2 Philippe Aries, in the early 1960s, famously argued that there was no such concept as ‘childhood’ as a
distinct segment of life during the Middle Ages. Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of
Family Life, Robert Baldick (tr.) (New York: Vintage Books, 1963). Edward Shorter, in the mid-
1970s, built upon Aries’ work, arguing that there was a surge in family ‘sentiment’ in the
eighteenth century, and an accompanying re-organization of familial priorities, which defined the
‘modern’ family. The Making of the Modern Family (New York: Basic Books, 1975). Lawrence
Stone, focusing upon the developments of sixteenth- through eighteenth-century England,
continued the trend of considering the way that childhood was ‘constructed’. The Family, Sex, and
Marriage in England, 1500-1800 (New York: Harper and Row, 1977). In the early 1980s, Linda
Pollock rejected the idea that children only came to be viewed ‘as children’, and as such objects of
affection and love, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Forgotten Children: Parent-Child
Relations from 1500-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
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nineteenth centuries.3 Hopkins explains that in the late eighteenth century, working-
class English children attended school infrequently, had few legal rights, and worked
long hours from an early age. He argues that by the end of the nineteenth century, ‘all
this had changed. Few children under the age of twelve were in full-time employment,
and education up to that age had become compulsory and free.’4 One significant
component of this transformation was, of course, the regulation and reform of child
labour practices.
In recent decades, historians of childhood and child labour have increasingly
focused their studies upon representations of children, and the significance of such
representations. Images and literary constructions of children are valuable sources of
information about historical ideas, ideals, meanings, and definitions of childhood.5 Such
representations, in disclosing what their creators considered to distinguish childhood
from adulthood, offer a means of accessing historical views of virtually every facet of life
in society, since the distinction between childhood and adulthood is also effectively the
definition of what it means to be (or not to be) a fully functional member of society. Of
course, not all adults are always viewed as fully functional members of society, so that
the representation of childhood also illuminates any scale or spectrum that has classified
different groups of people according to their potential for full participation in adult
society (or not), and also the ways that different classifications of people may have been
3 Eric Hopkins, Childhood Transformed: Working-Class Children in Nineteenth-Century England
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994).
4 Hopkins, Transformed, p. 1.
5 For an earlier influential study of the representation of childhood, see Peter Coveney, The Image of
Childhood: A Study of the Theme in English Literature (New York: Penguin, 1967). For more
recent studies, see Anne Higgonet, Pictures of Innocence: The History and Crisis of Ideal
Childhood (London: Thames and Hudson, 1998), Laura Berry, The Child, the State, and the
Victorian Novel (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1999), or any of the excellent
essays in Marilyn Brown (ed.), Picturing Children: Constructions of Childhood between Rousseau
and Freud (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2002).
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expected to develop and move toward the fulfilment of their ideal respective roles. As
such, representations of childhood communicate significant ideas regarding the historical
construction of such notions as class, race, and gender.6 This chapter will focus on a
(somewhat extended) historical moment in which children were represented in a way that
certainly grouped and defined labouring children’s lives according to the socio-economic
circumstances into which they were born. At the same time, the Victorian child labour
commissioners also recognized that one child labourer’s life and work experiences were
not representative of those of all others. Thus, the methodologies of the commissioners
tended to progress according to a kind of hermeneutics of identity that sought to know
(and to present as knowledge) the absolute difference of a vast number of individual poor
children’s lives and experiences. It will examine, as will all subsequent chapters, the
strategies employed by the authors of texts intended to present ‘knowledge’ of absolute
difference in spite of the impossibility of ever really achieving this goal. In doing so, it
will demonstrate that the texts of nineteenth-century reform movements were
characterized by empathic discourse - the acceptance of imaginative knowledge of the
‘other’ as a form of knowledge.
The goal of constructing and providing a ‘knowledge’ of the lives and experiences
of child labourers for the purpose of producing ameliorative legislation could only be
achieved through the imaginative assembly of many individual observations and
subjective judgments. The project of nineteenth-century child labour reform, then,
6 See Hugh Cunningham, The Children of the Poor: Representations of Childhood since the Seventeenth
Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). Anne McGillivray writes about the European representation
of Native American children. See McGillivray’s ‘Capturing Childhood: The Indian Child in the
European Imagination’, in Michael Freeman and Andrew Lewis (eds), Law and Literature:
Current Legal Issues, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 555-580. See also Carol
Dyhouse, Girls Growing Up in Late Victorian and Edwardian England (London and New York:
Routledge, 1981); Deborah Gorham, The Victorian Girl and the Feminine Ideal (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1982).
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necessarily accepted the imagination as a means of both weaving together and ‘seeing’
beyond scant and diverse bits of empirical information that could be gathered in the
course of so many brief and imperfect viewings and interviews during visits to different
sites where children were employed. It was necessary to infuse this ‘knowledge’ of so
many others with knowledge of the self, so that the ‘knowledge’ created (and sanctioned
officially as knowledge by the legislative body and process of which it was part) was
characterized by what we would now call ‘empathy’. Further, the representation of
vulnerable children within the project of nineteenth-century child labour reform is a
particularly important example of how social reformers produced knowledge through
empathic discourse. Carolyn Steedman has argued that in the nineteenth century, ‘the
individual and personal history that a child embodied came to be used to represent human
“insideness”’.7 In the texts of nineteenth-century child labour commissioners, child
labourers could only be represented and known as, by, and through this notion of
‘insideness’. This manner of representation was the only way to negotiate what really
happened to children who worked in factories, based upon the synthesis and
interpretation of many series of observations and interviews. As Victorian reformers and
commissioners struggled to represent the lives and experiences of child labourers, they
effectively developed a system of advocacy through empathy.
The development of a technology of inspection for the purpose of reforming
child labour practices was important to the history of ‘seeing’ both in terms of
surveillance and empathy - it is even arguable that it provided a means of achieving
empathy through surveillance. The child labourers themselves were watched by
7 Carolyn Steedman, Strange Dislocations: Childhood and the Idea of Human Interiority 1780-1930
(London: Virago Press, 1995), p. 4.
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reforming investigators as they attempted to acquire knowledge about the quality of their
lives and the condition of the children’s bodies. Those in a position to discipline child
labourers and enforce rules upon them were monitored even as they watched these same
children. The individual children who were examined in their conditions were meant to
represent the majority of child labourers unselected for examination, and hopefully to
display any suffering that was ‘typically’ endured by such children. Although there was
no guarantee that such a representative system would communicate the sufferings of
every individual child labourer, it was hoped that the process of unannounced inspection
would also encourage a system of self-inspection among the factory owners and
subordinate authorities who controlled the labour and conditions of children employed by
them.8
Through inspection and the subjective interpretations of those selected to execute
inspections, it was hoped that the system of child labour would become in some manner
visible so that it could be reformed accordingly, thus changing its collective ‘practices’
rather than the individual practices of individual employers who asserted particular
controls on individual children. The mill owners themselves, for example, were
encouraged in various ways to watch each other and to be sure that their competitors
were not obtaining an advantage by violating regulations. Further, the judgments of
those individuals who were elected to be itinerant factory inspectors, and their
subordinates, were interrogated by committee to determine whether the system of factory
inspection was achieving its aims. Thus, in order to counteract the oppressiveness of the
employment of children in the factory system, surveillance was imposed upon those who
8 See Michel Foucault’s arguments about panopticism and self-inspection, Discipline and Punish: The
Birth of the Prison, Alan Sheridan (tr.) (New York: Random House, 1977 [1975]).
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utilize child labour, and other layers of surveillance were added to check any authority
that the resulting system of inspection would tend to create. Underlining this web of
surveillance, however, was the assumption that individual observations would be
interpreted to achieve larger significance than that of the particular instances in which
they are made. So too would testimonies of many individuals be knitted together by the
readers of reports. As such, human abilities could conceivably stretch beyond what the
individual can discover through the perception of his or her senses - and even beyond
what many individuals could observe through the same. If the factory system, as a
‘system’ could not be seen, another system could be configured to see that system,
through a network of many pairs of eyes, and subjective tools behind those pairs of eyes
to possibly glean what eyes could not do.
In this chapter, I trace the configuration of a system designed to ‘see’ the
invisible as well as the unseen, through the texts that mark the struggle to achieve an
effective means of discovering and preventing the exploitation and consequent suffering
of child labourers. This has required the close reading of individual texts rather than a
broad survey of the collections of documents from which they have been selected. This
is not meant to be a history of the Victorian factory commissions, the factory inspectors,
or the factory acts. Rather, the documents selected will be analyzed as exemplary
documents of the type with which my entire project is concerned: those which attempt to
communicate knowledge of interior experiences - ultimately inaccessible and only newly
acknowledged and conceptualized in the nineteenth century. That said, my analysis will
at times tend to focus upon the testimony of certain individuals and the content of certain
commissions of inquiry, in order that I may more closely follow trends of intellect and
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judgment, and these in their proper contextual setting. In other words, there were many
child labour commissions, many child labour commissioners, and also volumes of
collections of reports from factory inspectors, during the course of the nineteenth century.
I have chosen to examine selections from the commissions that marked some of the most
significant struggles for the reform of child labour in the nineteenth century, along with
some of the inspectors’ reports of a similar chronology. The Select Committee on
Children, Mills, and Factories of 1831-32 (Michael Sadler’s Committee) was a
groundbreaking enterprise in social reform; many of the witnesses called to give evidence
were working people.9 Calling workers to give public evidence against the conditions of
work in factories, however, was not practicable, because this was likely to make it hard
for these people to find work in the future. As such, following the advice of Sadler’s
committee, the 1833 Commission was the first to recommend that Parliament send
inspectors out to observe and report upon labouring conditions in the factories.
Through a system of inspection and reporting, the 1833 Child Labour
Commission attempted to develop a new way of ‘seeing’ the unseen as a way of
accessing information about the experiences of child labourers. I am interested in the
1842 Commission because it includes a study of working conditions in mines, which
were hidden and difficult to access by nature. The 1863 Commission was the first to try
to investigate the problem of the employment of chimney sweeps. These children were
particularly difficult to access because rather than in large factories, they were employed
mostly in private residences and by single individuals.
9 Michael Thomas Sadler [1780-1835] was a prominent social reformer and political economist. See
Stewart A. Weaver, ‘Michael Thomas Sadler’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004).
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The evidence used to support the arguments that comprised the factory debates
was marshalled by legal professionals for the purpose of bringing to trial a system that
was not working. Ultimately, there was neither a single guilty party nor group of people,
nor could there be a specific cause or root of the problem. Therefore, the problem (of the
suffering of factory operatives) had to be assessed on its own terms - felt and made to be
felt, in order to engage the humanitarian senses in any sort of dialogue with economic
forces, in order to bring about effects of substantial improvement.10 It was possible, then,
to view factory legislation as at once necessary and quixotic. Even if the vicissitudes of
economics could be translated into figures on paper, the realities of the factory worker
were not so readily expressed.
The figure of the factory child was somewhat removed from any battle that could
be viewed as waged between two competitive groups of people. Instead, a child working
in a factory represented not only one member of a class of operatives, but also an
individual at the mercy of a system.11 Children were viewed by Victorians (as they were
10 Economic historians have recently tended to dismiss nineteenth-century legislation as a relatively
insignificant factor in the decline in the practice of child labour in Britain. Instead, historians such
as Clark Nardinelli and, more recently, Peter Kirby, have argued that the decline of child labour in
nineteenth-century Britain was really brought about by other factors, such as technological
advancement and related changes in the structure of production. Such arguments present the
movements for child labour legislation as having been inconsequential in bringing about real
change. Further, Kirby goes so far as to suggest that advocates of nineteenth-century child labour
reforms were really acting for the purpose of advancing their own political or economic interests.
Arguments such as these do not, of course, detract from the worth of the texts that were ostensibly
produced to bring about the reform of child labour practices. As has already been discussed,
advocates of reform can be accused of attempting to further personal interests. See Clark
Nardinelli, Child Labour and the Industrial Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1990), and Peter Kirby, Child Labour in Britain: 1750-1870 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2003).
11 For important studies of factory discipline - of the ways people were and have been made to work
according to fixed standards and rules within the factory system and why this happened, see
Gregory Clark, ‘Factory Discipline’, The Journal of Economic History, 54 (1994), pp. 128-163;
David Landes, ‘What Do Bosses Really Do?’, Journal of Economic History, 46 (1986), pp. 585-
623; Stephen Marglin, ‘What do Bosses Do?: Part I’, Review of Radical Political Economy, 6
(1974), pp. 60-112.
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viewed, and tend to be viewed, by modern Western society in general) as vulnerable and
dependent upon others, which increased the urgency of the idea that they needed to be
protected from this system.12 The study of children as factory operatives positioned the
worth of the individual life against the very texts that could be used to express the
existence of such. Proof of the reality of the existence of the individual life being given
in the continuous course of the experience of any such individual, any further knowledge
of the interiority of any other individual could only be comprehended subjectively and
intuitively, and thus without rational proof.
Charles Darwin, in his Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, relied
upon the assumption of a generally consistent interpretation of basic emotions in order to
present to his audience an analysis of their exterior manifestations. 13 Although it was
impossible for Darwin to give evidence pertaining to patterns and habits of emotions as
they are felt, he could make reference to felt emotions while restricting his analysis to
their expression without acknowledging the dichotomy. It is interesting to consider the
emphasis upon children in Darwin’s work, presumably because their expression of
emotions is less strictly regulated by social influences than that of the adult members of
the human species. Children figure very prominently in Darwin’s chapter on weeping,
which, as the most material of human emotional expressions, is arguably most commonly
considered of all such expressions to give access to interior human conditions.
‘Weeping’, the first chapter of a series of chapters devoted to ‘The Special
Expressions of Man’, features a selection of photographic plates of crying children.
12 For an analysis of the Western definition of children as essentially vulnerable and dependent, see Pia
Haudrup Christensen, “Childhood and the Cultural Constitution of Vulnerable Bodies’, in Alan
Prout (ed.), The Body, Childhood and Society (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 38-59.
13 Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1965 [1872]), p. 155.
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Although, as Philip Prodger has argued, there was no way for Darwin to be absolutely
certain which emotion, or combination of emotions, was being expressed at the exact
moment the images were being captured, Darwin’s decision to depict children
exclusively in the plates he chose for the chapter on weeping indicates a certain
confidence in the relative purity of children’s emotional expression. 14 Darwin asserted
that ‘weeping seems to be the primary and natural expression, as we see in children, of
suffering of any kind’.15 He added, however, that ‘a frequently repeated effort to restrain
weeping, in association with certain states of mind, does much in checking the habit.’16
So much so, that when Darwin asked several children to try to produce tears by
contracting the muscles around their lachrymal glands as long and as hard as they could,
it ‘produced hardly any effect. There was sometimes a little moisture in the eyes, but not
more than apparently could be accounted for by the squeezing out of the already secreted
tears within the glands.’17 Much of Darwin’s chapter on weeping discusses acquired
habits of restraining this form of emotional expression.
Darwin’s chapter on weeping, then, is concerned with the very habits of
emotional restraint that made it so difficult to analyze the sufferings of working-class
operatives, even, and perhaps especially of those of the child labourers, since much of the
evidence depended upon verbal expression. The problems that Darwin encountered
regarding the impossibility of proof of felt emotion were in a manner pre-figured by the
dilemma faced by commissions of enquiry charged with gathering evidence about the
14 ‘Illustration as Strategy in Charles Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals’, in
Timothy Lenoir (ed.), Inscribing Science: Scientific Texts and the Materiality of Communication.
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 38.
15 Darwin, Emotions, p. 167.
16 Darwin, Emotions, p. 167.
17 Darwin, Emotions, p. 167.
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conditions of factory work. So, too, was Darwin’s focus upon children in his chapter
about weeping emblematic of the hopes of Victorian culture that it was possible to gauge
and communicate the interior life to some extent, even if it were ultimately impossible to
prove such communication.
Just as Victorian science pushed knowledge beyond the limits of empiricism, so
Victorian testimony was also led beyond the boundaries of sense information. Jan-
Melissa Schramm points out that even though the interrogation of witnesses was
important to Victorian legal systems (and legal fiction) for the purpose of testing
empirical conclusions and assumptions, equally significant was ‘the Christian belief that
testimony can reach to the divine, to the supernaturally “real” or “absolute”’.18 Jonathan
Crary contrasts the idea of ‘the testimony of the senses’, which, he argues, ‘constituted
for the eighteenth century a common surface of order’ with the more subjective notions
of visual reality that developed in the nineteenth century.19 The ‘autonomization of
sight’, Crary argues, ‘was a historical condition for the rebuilding of an observer fitted for
the tasks of “spectacular” consumption’.20 The relocation of the reality of sight to the
space within the interior of the observer legitimized the possibility of truth in subjective
testimony. In this way, the acknowledgement of the limitations of human sight expanded
opportunities for investigative practice and legislative amelioration by emphasizing the
necessity of the human interpretive process.
Shoshana Felman’s struggle with the paradoxical nature of testimony highlights
the way that testimony has come to be perceived as indivisible from the concept of
18 Jan-Melissa Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature, and Theology (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 16-17.
19 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), p. 58.
20 Crary, Techniques, p. 19.
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human interiority: Since no one else can give testimony for what another has witnessed,
the task of giving testimony is a ‘solitary burden . . . And yet, the appointment to bear
witness is, paradoxically enough, an appointment to transgress the confines of that
isolated stance, to speak for and to others’ (original emphasis)21 In another chapter of the
same collaborative project, Dori Laub explores the function of the listener to testimony as
the ‘enabler of the testimony’ by being a witness to the witness and also a witness to
himself or herself: ‘The listener has to feel the victim’s victories, defeats and silences,
know them from within, so that they can assume the form of testimony’.22 Although
Laub is specifically discussing the testimony of trauma, this passage is particularly suited
to illustrate the role played by Victorian factory commissioners, who served as witnesses
and observed and listened to factory operatives, and witnesses who gave testimony on
their behalf.
If the increasing acceptance of human subjectivity as a part of human knowledge
allowed for a widening of the jurisdiction of human interpretive power, it certainly
problematized the meaning of testimony and complicated the burden of determining the
credibility of individual witnesses. The Victorian factory commissioners went to great
lengths to establish that they were suitably informed to make decisions about the
appropriate measures that should be taken to improve factory conditions. J.E. White, in
his report for the 1863 Children’s Employment Commission, included three pages of an
extremely detailed description of the process involved in the manufacture of Lucifer
matches. None of this description includes any information about the conditions of
21 Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and
History (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 2.
22 Dori Laub, ‘Bearing Witness, or the Vicissitudes of Listening’, in Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub,
Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (London and New
York: Routledge, 1992), p. 58.
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labour in the matchmaking industry or about any specific factory. Instead, it reads as a
guide through a typical factory where matches were made. Most of the factory
commission reports contain similar descriptions of types and places of work. It is
arguable that the authors of the reports felt compelled to demonstrate that they were not
ignorant of the subjects about which they spoke, and also to provide enough information
to render a reader of his report an appropriate candidate for contributing to the process of
making legislative decisions about the situation.
Further, a factory commissioner had to explain the qualifications of those whose
testimony they considered appropriate to include in their reports as ‘evidence’. This was
especially important when such a witness was not a member of the operative class. Such
was the case of Dr Henry Letheby, who was interviewed by White as part of his report on
the conditions of labour in matchmaking factories. White emphasizes the importance of
selecting appropriate witnesses to interview. He lists Letheby’s degree qualifications
before going on to argue that ‘Only a medical man dealing with people regarding
themselves in the light of patients, and having himself patients from several classes
differently employed, seems to be in a position to obtain true and sufficient data for
forming a trustworthy conclusion as to [the factory workers’] comparative health’.23 As
he was not in such a position himself, White’s strategy highlights both the collaborative
nature of the efforts of the factory commissioners and the value of individual processes of
judgment to those efforts.
A peculiar problem of testimony in any case of ethics is the relationship of
objectivity to ignorance and of subjectivity to experience. Victorian factory reform
23 British Parliamentary Papers, 1863 [3170] XVII, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children
(trades and manufactures) (1863), p. 44.
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sought to secure the well-being of factory workers, and especially of members of this
group who were children. But those who were closely associated with this class of
workers were likely to have had motives that would affect their opinions and their
positions. They were also less likely to be open-minded. Robert Gray suggests that
doctors who regularly treated factory workers appear to have striven for a balance
between advocacy and conformity to the status quo: ‘Medical practitioners in
manufacturing towns were delicately poised in relation to debates about factory reform or
other social issues. On the one hand, the persona of professionalism was as much with
enlightened philanthropy and public duty as with successful therapies . . . On the other
hand, over-assertive and controversial public stances might alienate potential patrons and
patients’.24 Ideas about welfare, happiness, and safety are relative and subject to the
forces of human interiority that mould and shape individual definitions of any such
abstract concepts.
Writing in 1903, B. Leigh Hutchins and A. Harrison were convinced of the
historical significance of the moral problem embedded in the legislative project of the
reform of child labour practices; personal interests were likely to influence opinions.
They cite one of the 1833 Children’s Employment commissioners as deeply frustrated
about the politics of ethical judgments. ‘Mr. Tufnell confirmed the cruelty of employing
children for long hours, and the ill-usage to which they were submitted, as the
“Parliamentary and public ground” for supporting the [ten hours] Bill. “But,” he went on
to say, “not a single witness that came before me to give evidence in favour of the Ten
Hours Bill . . . of whatever trade or station he may have been, supported it on the above
24 Robert Gray, The Factory Question and Industrial England, 1830-1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), p. 74.
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grounds . . . I am perfectly satisfied that motives of humanity have not the smallest
weight in inducing them to uphold the ten Hours Bill”.’25 Hutchins and Harrison also
argue that even among the factory operatives themselves, there were substantial motives
for wanting children to work for purposes other than their own good: ‘It is necessary to
recognise that the operative class themselves were . . . largely committed to the system
of child labour and long hours. Some, whether from need or demoralisation, lived on
their children’s earnings; others made a profit from employing their own or their
neighbour’s children; and, however much the better-minded and more intelligent might
revolt against the system, there was enough solidarity amongst them to make the position
of an informer invidious and impossible’.26 Writing almost a century after Hutchins and
Harrison, Peter Kirby argues that child factory labour in the nineteenth century was more
the result of changing demographics than industrialization. There were simply more
children born in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain, Kirby argues, than their
parents could afford to raise. Thus, parents were tempted to supplement their income by
sending their children out to work and collecting their wages.27
In order to approach the politics of labour relations, whether at the level of
Parliamentarian or factory worker, ‘facts’ about welfare and well-being were of course
malleable in their representation according to political, economic, and social perspective.
The discernment of justice from injustice by rising above rhetoric and politics in one’s
own subjective sense of humanity is what Richard Weisberg would describe as the ability
to recognize ‘central realities’, which, he argues, are easily evaded by the spoken or
25 British Parliamentary Papers, 1833 [167] XIX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in
Factories (1834), Supplementary Report. Cited in B. Leigh Hutchins and A. Harrison, A History
of Factory Legislation (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1966, [1903]), p. 50.
26 Hutchins and Harrison, Factory Legislation, p. 38.
27 Kirby, Child Labour, p. 10.
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written word in any type of legalistic discourse.28 The introduction of inspectors into
factory legislation after1833 acknowledged the recognition of ‘central realities’ as an
individual and interior process. The measure enabled responsible parties to make fair, if
necessarily subjective, judgments about the conditions of labour in factories; even if it
could never ultimately guarantee that they would do so.
The most basic judgment that Victorian factory commissioners were obliged to
make in their reports was that of naming the effects of factory labour. The Central Board
of the 1833 Children’s Employment Commission attempted to classify the most common
problems caused by children’s work in factories according to the degree that each were
readily observable: ‘The effects of factory labour on children are immediate and remote:
the immediate effects are fatigue, sleepiness, and pain; the remote effects, such at least as
are usually conceived to result from it, are, deterioration of the physical constitution,
deformity, disease, and deficient mental instruction and moral culture.’29 This sort of
grouping was essential to the task of evaluating the conditions of children’s factory
labour. In his 1833 report, John Elliot Drinkwater summarized a great deal of information
about the conditions in various factories in Nottingham: ‘The two mills which we found
in worst repute in Nottingham were Mr. Wilson’s at Radford and Mr. Milne’s at
Lenton’.30 Working up to the stage of making such judgments about factories, groups
within the factories were similarly evaluated; for example, sometimes males and females
were observed to respond differently to factory conditions. In his 1833 report on
28 Richard Weisberg, The Failure of the Word: The Protagonist as Lawyer in Modern Fiction (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1984), p. 3.
29 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report, p. 25.
30 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), C1, p. 40.
74
factories in Glasgow, one of the commissioners for the Northern District, James Stuart,
claimed about the John Dennistun and Co. Mill that ‘many of the females, although they
have worked for considerable periods, retain the bloom of health, and all the appearance
of being robust. The male workers, which is universally the case, were most pale and
cadaverous looking’.31 It seems that Mr Stuart developed a strategy of simultaneously
evaluating groups within an individual factory and measuring that same group (in this
case, male factory workers) against others of the same group in other factories. In
another instance, Mr Stuart observed: ‘The women at Mr. Wilson’s mill especially are
not only robust, but retain their rosy complexions . . . The children at Mr. Kirkland’s mill
look worse than at any of the other factories here [in Dunfermline] which I saw, but
neither should I be justified in saying that they exhibited any thing like a squalid
appearance’.32 Children were evaluated in their immediate circumstance at the time of
observation, but their elders afforded a glimpse of how they might fare in the future:
‘Girls suffer from pain more commonly than boys, and up to a more advanced age’.33
Here, girls are compared with boys in their apparent distresses, and also with girls of
other ages, as the observer could not possibly have followed the same children through
any number of years.
Dr Mitchell made a particularly striking claim about a group of workers in his
report for the 1842 Commission: ‘One of the most remarkable things in this pit was the
cheerfulness with which men and boys proceeded with their work, seemingly
31 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report and Minutes of Evidence, A1, p. 83.
32 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report and Minutes of Evidence, A1, p. 3.
33 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report and Minutes of Evidence, A1, p. 28.
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unconscious of there being any hardship in it. Certainly the miners are a brave set of
men’.34 For the same report, Dr Mitchell interviewed John Sommers, a surgeon in
Bedworth, Warwickshire, who often treated miners from the area. When Mitchell asked
Sommers about the injuries sustained by the miners in his care, Sommers responded with
a generalisation about the constitution of the miners, making use of a memorably strong
metaphor: ‘Are the injuries soon healed? Remarkably quick, much more so than the
agricultural labourers. They live like fighting cocks.’35 Sommers’ rather strong
statement placed the miners, as a group, alongside other labouring groups with which he
was familiar, and described their health in relative terms. His metaphor, however, went
beyond a relative comparison, effectively characterizing the personality of the miner. As
it encompassed the lifestyle and perhaps even the moral sense of the miners, it is easy to
see why Mitchell retained the use of the metaphor for use in his report.
Factory commissioners included in their reports much contextual evidence, not
only about adult factory labourers, but about anything they considered useful for the
communication of a complete picture of the life of a factory child. The testimony of the
commissioners intended to represent the children in an arena where they could not speak
for themselves. It is important to remember that many of the factory commissioners, if
not most of them, were trained as barristers. They acted, and presented themselves, as
both representative of the government (when interviewing others) and representative of
those whom they interviewed (when making their reports). Alexander Welsh explains
that in the act of representing, there is necessarily some overlap between the individual
34 British Parliamentary Papers [381] XVI, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1842), Appendix to First Report, Part I, Sub-Commissioners’ Reports and Evidence, p. 6 [48].
35 British Parliamentary Papers [381] XVI, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1842), Appendix to First Report, Part I, Part I, Sub-Commissioners’ Reports and Evidence, p. 107
[68].
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presenting the information and the subject being represented: ‘To make a representation
usually means representing the facts on someone else’s behalf - there can be a slippage
from representing the facts to representing the client’.36 Assuming that such
representation is not just a word-for-word repetition of the words spoken by the subject,
however, choices need to be made about the inclusion and exclusion of dialogue
exchanged between the one making the representation and the one being represented. To
this selection of verbal information is almost always added some form of material that
can be described as the observations of the presenter. This new, hybrid voice is meant to
be, in ideal circumstances, somehow more effective or truthful than the original words of
the subject by themselves, though not necessarily more so than the original testimony as
witnessed - one could, after all, ‘represent’ oneself, and it is quite plausible that one’s
own testimony communicated directly could be more effective or truthful than someone
else’s representation of it. However, in a situation where one is being represented by
another there is naturally some reason that one is not speaking on one’s own behalf.
Either there is reason to believe that another’s representation might prove to be more
effective or truthful than one’s own, or circumstances prevent one from giving testimony
- one cannot speak for oneself.
In either case, the individual making the representation is burdened with the
consideration of what material to include and exclude (gathered both from the original
testimony and the observation of that testimony), and of the process by which this
material must be pieced together. For, as Welsh argues, ‘a representation is literally
made; arguments need to be set forth, evidence marshalled, and words carefully put
36 Alexander Welsh, Strong Representations: Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. 9.
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together. The substance may stir emotions both crude and delicate, but the representation
should appear to be dispassionately devoted to the facts’.37 As Welsh aligns legalistic
representation to its narrative counterpart in fiction, so those obliged to make a legal
representation have an authorial responsibility to their subject, their audience, and their
text.
As such, it is important to study the choices made by factory commissioners about
what to include in their reports on the conditions of child labour. Robert Mackintosh, in
his 1833 report on the conditions of labour in the mills of Dunfermline, included in his
evidence the testimony of some parents of the children employed in the factories. The
parents’ statements varied, as some stressed the health of their children and some
lamented the necessity of their employment for the survival of the family. Mackintosh
represented Ellen Paterson, a widow supported by her three children (who were
employed by the Milport Spinning Company), as ‘an elderly woman of respectable
appearance’. It was important that Mackintosh communicate a description of Paterson’s
appearance to those who would read his report in Parliament, for it was they who would
have to decide whether to believe the sincerity of her statement: ‘ “With a clear
conscience, I don’t think it hurts their health”.’38 Mackintosh selected this statement of
Paterson’s to quote on its own, and summarized the rest of his conversation with Paterson
in his own words. Arguably, Mackintosh wished to represent the situation as faithfully as
he could; he had too little information to make a sound judgment about the widow, but
considered her to be a valuable witness. In this case Mackintosh opted to preserve the
woman’s statement regarding her integrity in her own words. As he quoted nothing else
37 Welsh, Representations, pp. 8-9 (original emphasis).
38 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report and Minutes of Evidence, A2, p. 2.
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that Paterson said, this was arguably meant to communicate to the reader of Mackintosh’s
evidence that the parents of working-class operatives were aware that they were maligned
for living on the earnings of their children, and that at least some of them would have
defended this practice, even if they did not themselves contribute to the family income.
Additionally, Mackintosh communicated that not all such parents were apparently drunk,
lecherous, and sinister, and suggested that it was possible that the employment of
children might have been the best of multiple solutions to a family’s economic problems
(for example, better than a somewhat elderly parent working).
Sometimes it was necessary to imagine the parent behind the child, when the
parent was not present. It seems to have been preferable to speak to the child alone, since
this would obviate any pressure a parent’s presence might have placed upon the child to
answer in a manner that would have pleased the parent. For example, John Welsford
Cowell, for his 1833 report on the labour conditions in Manchester factories, interviewed
a teenager whose experience with employers had sometimes been much better than
others, depending upon the individual for whom he worked. The boy explained to
Cowell that he had formerly been employed by a woman under whom he had been very
happy with his conditions of labour, although he was not so satisfied with the same in his
current position. He said that he had had to leave his favourite position because it wasn’t
paying enough. Up to this point, the boy’s testimony reads as if he was simply exercising
his agency as a labourer. Cowell then questioned him, however, about whether or not the
boy’s wages were ever paid to him directly: ‘I suppose when you say you wanted more
wages, it was your mother who wanted more wages, not you?—Yes, piecers never has
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their wages; it’s always their mothers.’39 Suddenly, it seems hardly believable that the
boy himself had considered the advantages and disadvantages of his pleasant but lower-
paying job before making the decision himself to seek another position. Cowell had
apparently by this point in the investigation become quite skilled at discovering from his
young witnesses valuable details they might not otherwise have thought to communicate.
Robert Mackintosh framed eighteen-year-old Agnes Drummond’s testimony with
his own observations, thus communicating rather a different message than the girl seems
to have intended. The young employee at Mr Hall’s flaxmill in Dunfermline apparently
feared that her wages would be cut if the Ten Hours Bill was to succeed. As such, she
emphasized her own free agency in the system of factory labour, eager to present the
conditions of her labour in a favourable light. Mackintosh, however, included details that
would likely have made any reader of the interview sceptical of her motives. Mackintosh
reported that Drummond ‘has, at this moment, although she has been standing already
twenty-four hours, no pain in her knees and ankles, is not tired, or else would not do it;
“it’s all our pleasure,” they do not force us to do it . . . would prefer the present hours and
pay to a reduction in both; most of the people would like very much the limitation, but
think the present wages little enough for ten hours’ labour’.40 Clearly, Drummond
expected that if her workday was to be shortened, her wages would be reduced
proportionately. The small direct quotation, placed as it was after the girl’s incredible
statement that she was neither tired nor feels any pain in her legs and ankles after
standing for that long, produces an ironic effect that is almost comedic. For if Drummond
39 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report and Minutes of Evidence, D1, p. 79.
40 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report and Minutes of Evidence, A2, p. 5.
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meant by ‘pleasure’ that it was technically her choice to work such long hours, standing
for twenty-four hours could not possibly be an enjoyable experience, and it is doubtful
that she was not feeling any pain. Mackintosh strategically presented Drummond’s
testimony against itself, encouraging empathy for an individual in a painful situation that
she claimed she was not, and exposing the motives for her apparent prevarication.
Sometimes, factory commissioners seem to have differed from one another with
regard to the aspects of labouring conditions that interested them. It is clear from Jelinger
C. Symons’ 1842 report on labour conditions in the mines of Yorkshire, that he was
appalled by the employment of young women in the mines. The mining work was
difficult; the girls complained frequently and consistently that the tasks they were given
to do were far more laborious than they felt they could manage. However, even though
Symons did not fail to record these complaints of constant fatigue, bodily pain, and
frequent injury, he chose to place far more emphasis upon the intimacy with which mine
workers of different sexes mingled in their workplace. This suggests that Symons was
more concerned with representing the girls’ moral lives and experiences than their
physical suffering. Symons explained in his report that in most of the mines he visited
which employed females, the female miners worked naked to the waist in trousers. In the
mines where girls were required to wear their shifts, it happened that the men who
worked alongside them wore only a shirt or were naked anyway, so it mattered little for
the sake of modesty that the girls were made to cover up.
Symons’ expressions of shock are hardly surprising, considering that other factory
commissioners throughout the Victorian factory reform movement were often dismayed
to discover that female operatives in the occasional factory sometimes removed their
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stockings where males could see them. However, it is also apparent that Symons
considered the immodesty of the mines to be the most central issue of his report, despite
the fact that this was hardly the main concern of the miners themselves. He described in
horror the heterogeneous mixture of half-naked male and female miners, and their
relatively easy attitude toward nudity:
The practice of employing females in coal-pits is flagrantly disgraceful to a
Christian as well as a civilized country. On descending Messrs. Hopwood’s pit at
Barnsley, I found assembled round the fire a group of men, boys, and girls, some
of whom were the age of puberty, the girls as well as the boys stark naked down
to the waist, their hair bound up in a tight cap, and trousers supported by their
hips. Their sex was recognisable only by their breasts, and some little difficulty
occasionally arose in pointing out to me which were girls and which were boys,
and which caused a good deal of laughing and joking.41
Even though the boys and girls were not always able to easily distinguish the sex of one
another, Symons clearly considered the exposure of the girls’ bodies the principal reason
they should not be employed in the mines.
While, as already mentioned, it would have been more than a little unusual for
Symons not to have drawn considerable attention to the nudity of the girls in the mines,
his emphasis on this phenomenon is worthy of discussion because he seems to have had
great difficulty drawing complaints from the girls about the men’s behaviour toward
them. Quite simply, the girls seem to have wanted to talk to him about the strenuousness
41 British Parliamentary Papers [381] XVI, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1842), Appendix to First Report, Part I, Sub-Commissioners’ Reports and Evidence, p. 196 [227].
This passage is suggestive of the kind of sexual politics which, according to Seth Koven,
characterized Victorian investigations of conditions among the poor. See Seth Koven, Slumming:
Sexual and Social Politics in Victorian London (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
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of their labours. It does not appear to have been, as in the case of Mackintosh’s 1833
interview with Agnes Drummond, that the female miners were silent on the subject of
gender relations in the mines because they feared that they would lose income if they
spoke up. If this would have been the case, it is unlikely that the girls would have
complained so persistently about their exhaustion and the physical strain of their work.
In an interview outside of the mine (at which, Symons was careful to note, the girls
arrived dressed neatly and properly, and looking very feminine), each of the girls asserted
her earnest desire for shorter hours, and apparently for sympathy, listing all of their
injuries and explaining how tired and miserable their work always made them. Symons
redirected the conversations, returning again and again to the subject of whether or not
the men behaved inappropriately toward the girls. Elizabeth Day, a seventeen-year-old
employed in the mines, began the interview with a complaint that the work she did was
too difficult for her. Presumably, Symons then questioned her about her relationship with
the men in the mines, because her next statement was that ‘The men behave well to us,
and never insult or ill-use us, I am sure of that.’ She then complained of a lamed ankle
and a bad back, and insisted that ‘It is harder work than we ought to do a deal.’ 42
Symons’ interviews with the other girls followed a similar trajectory. It seems
unfortunate that the girls’ own voices were afforded so little authority in this case, as they
seem to have been so eager for someone to represent their grievances. It suggests that
Symons believed that the girls’ relative indifference to nudity was the result of their
dispositions having been ruined by vice, and not because pain and exhaustion were more
pressing problems.
42 British Parliamentary Papers [381] XVI, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1842), Appendix to First Report, Part I, Sub-Commissioners’ Reports and Evidence, p. 244 [85].
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While it is tempting to evaluate the choices made by the factory commissioners
about what problems to represent in their reports, however, it is arguably more productive
to study their choices and methods as their response to the formidable challenge of
making the subjects of their investigation understood. Dr James Mitchell expressed his
interpretation of operative culture in the form of a sort of tableaux. Mitchell (who, it
might be remembered, was something of an admirer of the raw strength of the miners)
attempted to communicate his perspective in watching the miners eating.43 His
description is heavily laden with exoticism: ‘It is a fine sight to see the miners
congregated at dinner, in a large dining-hall cut out of the coal. There they sit, naked
from the middle upwards, as black as blackmoor savages, showing their fine, vigorous,
muscular persons, eating, drinking, and laughing. They sit an hour, from one to two, and
then resume their labours.’44 This is one method of communicating difference,
presumably with the aim of placing, as far as is possible, an audience with the
responsibility of making legislative decisions about the miners and their children, within
the perspective of a member of their own community who has witnessed the culture of
the miners. Since Mitchell could not express the experiences of the miners themselves,
he expressed his own response to the miners as a means of representing them, thus
bringing his audience at least a step closer to the mines.
Mitchell also represented difference by describing elements of the mine that were
very dangerous, to which the miners were quite accustomed. This would suggest that it
43 For an assessment of how the 1842 commissioners represented the general physical condition of the
miners (they described the miners as generally short in stature but robust and well-fed), see Peter
Kirby, ‘Causes of Short Stature among Coal-Mining Children, 1823-1850’, Economic History
Review, New Series, 48 (1995), pp. 687-699.
44 British Parliamentary Papers [381] XVI, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1842), Appendix to First Report, Part I, Sub-Commissioners’ Reports and Evidence, p. 4 [29].
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was beneficial for the miners to be represented by an outside observer. Mitchell
described the workspace inside a mine near Dudley: ‘Portions are left to support the
great mass until an opening is made on each side of the mass, and also part is taken away
from the back. This undergoing is a dangerous part of the work, as, notwithstanding all
that experience and judgment can do, occasionally too much is taken away, and a mass of
coals will suddenly fall and crush the men and boys engaged’.45 Mitchell’s report
juxtaposes a visual representation of the mines as he had seen them with the spectre of
accidents he did not see, but of which he was made aware. Representing vulnerability by
including in their testimony the expression of knowledge of the unseen, unprovable, and
unrepresented was one of the most difficult and important challenges that faced the
factory commissioners.
Some evidence gathered to further the aims of the legislative project of Victorian
child labour reform did not accord with other evidence gathered for the same purpose.
The process of inspection and interview was an imperfect means of acquiring information
about factory conditions. The success of an inspection, whether conducted for the
purpose of discovery or regulation, is heavily dependent upon a panoptic ideal that is
virtually unattainable; the success of an interview upon the accuracy and sincerity of the
person expected to provide information. However, the same subjective tools employed
by the factory commissioners to make judgments about groups of individuals enabled
them to weigh individual statements and bits of empirical information against each other.
Even if this technique could never ultimately illuminate the aspects of interaction and
discourse that are not directly available to the human senses, such as the motivation
45 British Parliamentary Papers [381] XVI, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1842), Appendix to First Report, Part I, Sub-Commissioners’ Reports and Evidence, p. 3 [21].
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behind a statement, it would allow responsible individuals a certain measure of
information with which to make decisions that would likely ameliorate the conditions
under which a particular group of individuals most certainly suffered. Thus, information
processed through the limited means of the subjective judgment of one individual
entrusted to glean from evidence truths that were ultimately indiscernible, was far
preferable to no information at all, and no change. James Stuart’s 1833 report on Paisley
distils the testimony he had collected from many figures with some kind of authority over
factory children into one dismissive clause:
Although there is an abundance of evidence from clergymen, as well as from
teachers, of a conflicting description, I think it upon the whole impossible to
doubt that the young workers must be so much fatigued with the very long hours
of labour that they cannot be so fit to receive instruction as other young people,
and that they have too little time for being at school even to enable them to learn
to read, write, and to understand accounts tolerably.46
Stuart arguably intended to express that the substance of the unseen motivations and
biases of the clergy and teachers interviewed were of less importance than the fact that he
was not convinced by them. There was most certainly a danger in accepting the
judgment of a relative outsider over that of an individual in daily contact with the child
subjects of this legislative inquiry. But was that danger any less than the one presented
by any number of biased motivations - or manifestations of emotional acclimatization - of
any relative insiders whose testimony might contradict the opinion of a commissioner?
What was certain was that the alternative - allowing conditions to remain as they were -
46 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report and Minutes of Evidence, A1, p. 122.
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however murky the reality of which might have appeared to an outside observer, would
have been unacceptable.
In conducting the research for his 1833 report on Glasgow, the same factory
commissioner, James Stuart, encountered a situation where the factory operatives may
have made choices about their working conditions that undermined their own comfort,
thus complicating the task of reporting those conditions. Stuart’s report expresses his
own perception of the heat in the rooms at the John Dennistoun & Co. Mill. Stuart
presented his interpretation of what he perceived to be unseized opportunities of which
the operatives could have taken advantage to alleviate the heat, in order to indicate the
possibility of a choice or preference to work in the heat:
The degree of heat that prevailed in some of the rooms, viz. 82º, was greater than
Mr. Hussey junior, who accompanied me, represented to me to be necessary; but I
suspect that the spinners find that their work proceeds better with that than with a
less degree of heat, and their earnings depend on the quantity of yarn spun. Were
it not so, they would be attentive in opening windows, and admitting a free
current of air, which could not fail to be agreeable to their feelings, and
favourable to their health.47
Stuart evaluated the opportunity to open windows according to the perceived motivations
of the workers. Stuart could see that there were windows and assessed that they could be
opened. He also asked a responsible individual about the level of heat necessary for
production to proceed satisfactorily. But the question of choice was not a simple one -
Stuart came to the conclusion that the operatives made a free choice to leave the windows
47 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report and Minutes of Evidence, A1, p. 83.
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closed, which means that the operatives would have been able to earn sustainable wages
with the windows open. He did not, however, give a final opinion on the matter. It is
possible that the relative discomfort caused by the heat (and Stuart believed that there
was some) was outweighed by the facility with which the yarn could be spun, and the
increased profits, which would have resulted. Stuart’s readers, however, would have
needed to consider all of the possibilities, just as he had done when he made his
observations. To represent choice, preference, and motivation, Stuart pointed his readers
in the directions of several different, plausible realities, without completely inventing
such realities and putting them into print. In this way, different motivations could be
considered to have been part of the legislative project of factory reform, even if they
could not be seen or physically demonstrated, or proven by such means.
Christopher Allen, in his recent study of Victorian laws of evidence, explains how
these laws changed with regard to admissibility. While the British court system became
less exclusive about who could testify on the basis of their person and status, it became
ever more restrictive of what could be said in court by anyone who could testify. The
shift in focus to the content of testimony is suggestive of the way in which truth was
increasingly understood to be ultimately subjective. ‘Evidence of questionable reliability,
which would have been heard for what it was worth a century earlier [than the 1850s],
was frequently excluded’.48 The admission of a statement into court approved that
statement and also the influence that statement could have upon individuals in a position
to judge. ‘What a statement was worth’ could tilt the scales against truth or reality as fair
and proper judgment and in favour of a skewed perspective.
48 Allen, Christopher, The Law of Evidence in Victorian England (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997).
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Interestingly, the understanding of truth as subjective seems to have made the
necessity of an objective statement more urgent. John Pegge, a doctor interviewed for the
1863 report on matchmaking factories, was at a loss to express the inexpressible - how
painful was the condition of necrosis of the jaw, which many of his patients developed
after years of working in the match factory? How could he, who had never suffered from
the condition, know how painful it is, and how could he describe the pain to others who
had neither suffered from the disease nor perhaps ever met anyone who had? Pegge
attempted to solve both of these problems by scaling pain according to the administration
of narcotics: ‘The suffering of a patient in the earlier stage of the disease and until it has
run itself out leaving the bone quite dead and exposed, are intolerable. He will then take
almost any amount of narcotics with comparatively little effect.’49 Instead of relying
solely upon a somewhat gruesome description of the condition of necrosis of the jaw to
convince his reader that the condition was painful, Pegge chose to illustrate what he had
witnessed of the experience of the disease by a means that might validate his claim that
the pain is ‘intolerable’. Pegge struggled to somehow ‘prove’ the real condition of a
painful experience. Pegge’s statement, however, acted to confirm the understanding of
pain as constrained by the limitations of human sense experience by its very attempt to
reduce those constraints.
Jonathan Crary argues that during the middle decades of the nineteenth century,
‘the issue was not just how does one know what is real, but that new forms of the real
were being fabricated, and a new truth about the capacities of a human subject was being
49 British Parliamentary Papers, 1863 [3170] XVII, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children
(trades and manufactures) (1863), p. 49.
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articulated in these terms.’50 Changes in the conception of what was ‘real’ presented
challenges and also afforded opportunities to those involved in advocating the reform of
the treatment of such physically vulnerable individuals as factory labourers, and
especially children. While it was difficult enough to prove or communicate that one
individual was suffering, it was even more difficult to prove that large groups of
individuals were labouring under painful or physically threatening conditions. However,
the increasing acceptance of the necessity of the subjective impressions and feelings of
individuals in determining appropriate legislative actions was the logical response to the
collective considerations (whether popular or specifically approved by government) that
held that the present state of factory labour was decidedly bad, and particularly bad for
children. As such, legal fictions of ‘real’ conditions of factory labour were constructed
on the basis of both empirical and responsive (conclusive, or subjective) evidence that
could be gathered by the factory commissioners as they personally visited factories and
conducted interviews with workers and those concerned with them.
Perhaps the most obvious discrepancy likely to occur in any situation where
inspection is the primary means of discovery and regulation of working conditions is that
those individuals responsible for maintaining the conditions to be inspected will
anticipate and prepare for the inspector’s visit. The child labour commissioners knew
that the factories were prepared for their visits, and took this into immediate
consideration when inspecting a factory. Robert Mackintosh, in his 1833 report on Mr.
Hall’s flax mill in Dunfermline, did not consider this to be a problem. On being informed
by an anonymous overseer that this mill was cleaned and prepared for his visit,
Mackintosh noted that ‘this of course was to have been expected. I merely mention it to
50 Crary, Techniques, p. 92.
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show that it is not the worst side of things that we have seen here, or that we shall in all
probability see anywhere.’51
In his report on the same mill, Mackintosh was careful to note anything that he
considered might have been the cause of a disparity between the factory he observed and
what he imagined it might have looked like every day. He included not only details of
aspects he believed might have been ‘cleaned up’ for the occasion of his visit, but also
incidental factors that might have mitigated the appearance of any unhealthy or
dangerous conditions. For example, he indicated that ‘the prevalence of the influenza in
this town may have afforded facility for keeping away those of the children whose
appearance might be less favourable.’52 Even though mentioning the outbreak of
influenza in the town did not necessarily prove that a factory in the town was unhealthy,
it suggested the possibility of an alternate reality than that which Mackintosh observed.
Mackintosh thus constructed the ‘real’ conditions of Mr Hall’s flax mill of Dunfermline
for the purpose of evaluation by conflating his observations of the factory with other
information he gathered during the course of his inspection. He thereby presented a
version of reality (possibly but not necessarily including the weaker children who were
too ill to come to work), which was not too far removed from what he was able to
observe empirically but not strictly based upon appearances.
As well as presenting multiple plausible realities regarding very specific
circumstances, child labour commissioners also sometimes gave very strong general
opinions about the conditions of work and the health of child labourers. In his general
51 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), A2, p. 6.
52 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), A2, p. 6.
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report on Scotland, James Stuart reported that his conclusion about the state of the health
of the child labourers was that it was not entirely as appearances made it seem. His
report concludes: ‘The heated and impure atmosphere, which generally prevails to some
extent in every factory, unquestionably soon deprives most of the workers (for all, it is
thoroughly proved, are not affected in the same way) of ruddiness of complexion and of
robust appearance. But it has not been shown that even the young workers . . . are
generally unhealthy.’53 Stuart’s text at once constructs and defines the legal fiction of the
general health of child labourers according to his feelings about his experience with such
individuals, and essentially invites his colleagues in the legislative project of factory
reform to use the evidence presented to them to form their own conclusions according to
their own interpretations of this evidence. The alignment of the conclusions of all of the
collaborators of this project would hopefully produce a kind of truth that would
encourage the most effective and ameliorative legislation.
Alexander Welsh discusses the importance of circumstantial evidence to the
development of narrative form in nineteenth-century England. The lining up of many
stories in law and literature came to be an essential means of telling of things that were
unseen.54 It was especially important to be able to draw conclusions from a chain of
overlapping individual testimonies where the issue at hand was the presence and
evaluation of suffering, because suffering was not able to be directly communicated.
Between the lines of a number of stories supplying indirect information about suffering, it
was hoped a truth could be gleaned in the form of a conclusion drawn both from
tangential facts and the subjective experience of those in a position to evaluate. The use
53 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report and Minutes of Evidence, A1, p.122.
54 Welsh, Representations, chapter 1, ‘Stories of Things Unseen’.
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of this technique was also imperative to factory reform because the entire labour system
was essentially on trial. As a system cannot be seen, the evaluation of a system is
dependent upon the alignment of many individual stories.
As opposed to the system, individual operatives were far too easily ‘seen,’ that is,
in court, testifying against other individuals who had power over them. Hutchins and
Harrison have described the vulnerability of the worker as the reason for the
implementation of factory inspectors in 1833. Once an operative had given any kind of
evidence against their employer, it was virtually impossible for them to find employment.
Further, children were subject to both their parents and employers rather than being free
agents in any real sense of the word, and neither could they act as witness in the same
manner as a legally autonomous adult. As such, factory inspectors were given the task of
collecting information and stories from many individuals, drawing their own conclusions
from what was told to them, and then representing the workers, as if by proxy, to the
legislative body. The representations, then, of the many factory commissioners, were
meant to be aligned in a similar fashion to those of the individuals and circumstances
encountered during the course of their inspections. The process of factory inspection,
then, could help to illuminate aspects of child labour that were more elusive to direct
observation. For example, the factory commissioners challenged the development of a
system of relay labour, proposed by the factory interests as a means of reducing the hours
worked by individual children without forcing the factories to dramatically shorten their
work day. Such a compromise would have made it more difficult to assess the
experience of one child by the observation of another. It would have been impossible for
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a commissioner to tell for certain by looking how long a particular child had been
working, and so they could have been somewhat easily deceived in such a situation.
Ideally, of course, records could have been kept and consulted about the
particulars of each individual worker’s situation, but such records were not always
reliable. Inspection could also offer a sense of other important aspects of labour
conditions that were wholly unseen and unrecorded. Jelinger Symons, in his 1842 report
on the mines of Yorkshire, was able to describe the dangerous conditions in the mines,
many (or most) of which he suggested were never recorded. He explained:
Accidents of various sorts and degrees are so frequent in the collieries, that it is
impossible to give anything like a correct statement of all that have happened in
each colliery for three years, or even for a much shorter time. Numbers never
reach the employers at all, and of those that are known to the underground
steward, unless they are very serious, he keeps no record . . . the collier or the
child are the only sufferers if the accident be merely a personal one. In many
cases it is concealed from the knowledge of the master, especially where
carelessness has occasioned a slight explosion, and the master’s property has been
risked.55
Symons went on to give example of accidents that he believed had happened (he had the
miners mention them), the occurrences of which were firmly denied by those in charge of
the respective operations.
As we have seen, the exposure of young girls’ bodies in the mines presented a
striking contrast to the hiddenness of the mines, and this condition quite appalled Jelinger
55 British Parliamentary Papers [381] XVI, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1842), Appendix to First Report, Part I, Sub-Commissioners’ Reports and Evidence, p. 184 [118].
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Symons. Symons was able to discover very little evidence of promiscuity among the
miners as a result of the habitual mingling of workers of different sexes without much
clothing, but he refused to be persuaded that unchastity was not prevalent in the mines.
Symons could not find evidence that the female miners tended to bear more illegitimate
children than their clothed counterparts in other industries. The explanation he offered
for his failure to uncover such evidence emphasized the possibility of interpreting
beyond, or even in spite of appearances: ‘it is, however, well known that bastardy is by
no means a proportionate index to the amount of unchastity; and that the most profligate
women are the least likely to bear children’.56 He believed that the bodies of the female
miners were made vulnerable by their exposure and the decline in sexual morality that in
his opinion would necessarily follow nakedness. Sexual promiscuity, then, was one more
unseen danger of child labour, hidden away in the darkness of the mines. He only ‘knew’
this promiscuity to exist, however, because he had drawn conclusions about it from
indirect, circumstantial evidence and a generalized knowledge of human nature as he
perceived it.
The mines were not the only place where human beings might have acted
questionably while hidden away from the rest of society, as exemplified by the
employment of young children to perform the dangerous and painful task of climbing
chimneys to clean them. Chimney sweeps often employed boys to sweep chimneys in
the nineteenth century, as having a boy climb up a chimney to sweep out the soot was
simply the most effective method of cleaning them. This was especially the case as many
larger houses and edifices had chimneys with many turns and angles, and even right
56 British Parliamentary Papers [381] XVI, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1842), Appendix to First Report, Part I, Sub-Commissioners’ Reports and Evidence, p. 196 [230].
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angles. A dirty chimney produced unsightly, dirty smoke and bad smells, so sweeps who
used boys continued to be in great demand even after machines were invented that could
do the job almost as well.
It was particularly difficult to evaluate the conditions of child labour in chimney
sweeping, since the trade was practised in the private sector and outside of any kind of
organized industrial system. Increasingly, though, it began to be recognized that ‘the
climbing boys,’ as they came to be known, were desperately in need of protective
legislation. In 1863, largely due to Lord Shaftesbury’s advocacy, their plight was
reviewed by the child labour commission.57 J.L. and Barbara Hammond, Shaftesbury’s
biographers, have summarized the remarkable difficulty that accompanied the regulation
of child labour in private chimney sweeping by explaining how hard it was to prove that a
child had climbed a chimney at all. It became common for sweeps to lie about the actual
occupation of the children employed by them. Since the ‘apprenticeship’ of the boys was
the only aspect of this system that was public, it was attacked on that level. Sweeps
responded by employing the boys without making them apprentices. ‘They would take
them into a house, ostensibly to carry their brushes and soot, in reality to climb the
chimneys, and when the doors were shut there was nobody to see except the housewives
and servants . . . unless the boy died in the chimney it was difficult to prove that he had
climbed it.’58
H.W. Lord was one commissioner who was appointed with the task of
‘evaluating’ the conditions of child labour in the chimney sweeping industry for the 1863
57 Anthony Ashley Cooper, the seventh earl of Shaftesbury [1801-1885], was a philanthropist and politician
much devoted to the cause of child labour reform. See John Wolffe, ‘Anthony Ashley Cooper’,
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
58 J.L. Hammond and Barbara Hammond Lord Shaftesbury (London: Constable, 1923), p. 221.
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commission. As one might imagine, the task was not an easy one. Lord could not simply
interview one of the climbing boys as he might have done with young factory workers,
because he did not have easy access to them. He could not, as he would have done in the
case of young factory workers, know precisely when and where they would be employed,
for the practice of employing boys to climb and sweep chimneys was one that would
have been carried out in secrecy by 1860. It was also a practice that was performed
predominantly in the houses of private citizens. Lord could only report indirect evidence
to the commission in the form of what he heard, and by narrating the experience of his
investigation to communicate scant evidence. In some cases, he reported about the hunt
for direct evidence, which never materialized. This was a kind of testimony to the
vulnerability of these children, as it indicated that they suffered their exploitation
unobserved by anyone who might help or defend them.
Lord had heard of the practice of ‘sleeping black,’ or that young sweeps would
often sleep as they worked - unwashed, covered in soot, under the cloth they used to
catch the soot that would fall from the chimneys. As the rumour of boys ‘sleeping black’
was one that caused particular public distress over the use of children to sweep chimneys,
Lord was determined to find evidence of boys doing this and to witness it himself. He
managed to find an informant who claimed to know where some boys habitually slept
that way, and who agreed to lead him to the place. He reported: ‘at about 10 ½ p.m., I
accompanied the witnesses Simpson and Stansfield to some cellars where they thought
we might find some boys “sleeping black”; so far as the boys were concerned our visit
was unsuccessful; my companions said that my inquiries had been heard of and the “birds
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had flitted”.’59 Although Lord was unable to give any particular evidence about boys
sleeping black, he was nonetheless able to communicate that sweeps who employed boys
took great pains to prevent their practices from being discovered.
One of the most impressive communications in Lord’s report on the climbing
boys was a piece of information that he must have discovered by research that would
have been publicly available as part of court records. Though not in itself new
information (indeed, it arose from the testimony of William Wood, who was a particular
activist for climbing boys), its juxtaposition with Lord’s tales of his frustrated attempts to
gather empirical evidence of the conditions of child labour in the chimney sweeping
industry must have been very effective indeed: ‘In a prosecution at Stalybridge not very
long ago it was proved that 2 boys had swept 78 chimneys in 3 days for the prisoner.
When he was called upon for his defence he said to the chairman “You know my lad
sweeps your chimneys”; the chairman perhaps did not know it, but it was true.’60
Although perhaps it was an uncanny (as well as embarrassing) coincidence that in this
case the boys in question swept the chimneys of someone who was expected to help to
bring them justice, Lord’s use of this bit of court dialogue is highly suggestive of how
‘unseen’ the wrongs of child labour in the chimney sweeping industry could actually be.
The 1863 commissioners found that it was just about impossible to find and
interview individuals currently employed as ‘climbing boys’. How, then, were they to
proceed in gathering ‘evidence’ of their working conditions? While the children were
smaller and weaker than the adults who employed them, and as such could be hidden
59 British Parliamentary Papers, 1863 [3170] XVII, Royal Commission on Children’s Employment (trades
and manufactures) (1863), First Report, p. 303.
60British Parliamentary Papers, 1863 [3170] XVII, Royal Commission on Children’s Employment (trades
and manufactures) (1863), First Report, p. 297.
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away or forced to move so that the commissioners could neither see them nor hear their
stories, it was also true that they would not always remain that way. Though their
childhood may have passed in squalor and exhaustion, it did pass, and many of the
climbing boys lived to tell their tales, even if many others perished. It makes sense that
those investigating the working conditions of the climbing boys would have turned to the
survivors of such employment to look for answers. Of course, these people were no
longer children.
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, adults were often interviewed as
‘ex-children’ when circumstances dictated that the children themselves could not directly
provide information about their conditions of life and labour. Interviewing an adult who
exhibited symptoms of a disease, disorder, or injury sustained in the course of labouring
as a child, could provide empirical evidence of a child’s exposure to the same dangerous
working conditions, whereas the same exposure could not be readily observed in children
themselves. The disease, or symptoms of the disease, would have been invisible during
childhood in such a case as the development of necrosis of the jaw by exposure to
phosphorus in matchmaking factories. As such, the strategy of interviewing adult
sufferers who arguably contracted diseases during childhood as the result of excessive
labours has already been discussed as a means of accessing evidence of ‘invisible’ threats
to the vulnerable bodies of children. However, it is important to point out that these
symptoms were not forever invisible; this is why it proved so useful for the
commissioners to interview the adults, and even to record their observations of these
sufferers. Seen in this light, the same strategy used to gather evidence of an invisible
nature also made it possible to ‘see’ into the future. In a similar fashion, the strategy of
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interviewing adults who were once employed as climbing boys was an attempt to ‘see’
into the past in order to construct the fiction of a set of present circumstances.
Edward Mason, an older sweep who was interviewed by H.W. Lord in 1863, used
the opportunity of being interviewed by the Commission to express what he wasn’t able
to communicate to anyone as a child. Mason used a machine to sweep chimneys, and
would not employ boys, because he did not wish to subject others to the same painful
experience that he had as a child. He was eager to share the details of one dreadful
incident in particular: ‘I use the machine, and have no boy. The reason why the boys are
used is that the landlords will not alter those chimneys which cannot be well swept with
the machine, and the sweeps get more for sending the boys up the chimneys. When I
climbed I was once stuck in a chimney at the Music Hall. I was there for 3 hours and a
half. A hole had to be made in the chimney to get me out. I was nearly suffocated.’61
While Mason certainly betrayed an awareness of the professional competition of the
sweeps that used boys, it was clear that he, too, could have used boys instead of a
machine, and could have increased his profits by doing so. His methods of sweeping
appear to have been genuinely rooted in an antipathy for the practice of forcing boys to
climb chimneys, as he was once forced to do.
One Mr Simpson, a master sweep who had also ceased to use boys to climb
chimneys, in favour of the machine, suggested that the commission needed to interview
adults who had been chimney sweeps as boys if it was to conduct a fair inquiry. Like
Mason, Simpson communicated both an eagerness to criticize his competitors and to
seize an opportunity to tell of his own negative childhood experiences as a climbing boy:
61 British Parliamentary Papers, 1863 [3170] XVII, Royal Commission on Children’s Employment (trades
and manufactures) (1863), First Report, p. 301.
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‘masters who were never apprenticed to the trade, and who know nothing about it, speak
against the machine to save themselves the trouble of using it; they work with locked
doors, so that no one may see what is done’.62 Simpson seems to have been frustrated
that he had to wait until he was an adult to tell his tale - until it was too late for anything
to be done for him. His complaint about the lack of exposure of the plight of the
climbing boys was put forth with the fervour of one who survived a terrible ordeal that
should have been prevented. Even after Shaftesbury and others publicized the sufferings
of the climbing boys in general, it was necessary to imagine what the boys might have
been enduring in the present based upon scant information and information that was long
overdue in the asking - and the telling.
It was not always necessary to wait until a child labourer was fully grown to
observe the ill effects of unhealthy labouring conditions upon their bodies. Occasionally,
as in the case of James Kirk, who was interviewed by Michael Sadler’s Select Committee
in 1832, older children already exhibited the effects of hard labour on their bodies. Kirk,
aged 17, had been employed in a factory since the age of nine. During his eight years of
employment, Kirk developed a physical deformity of the legs. Sadler’s organization of
the interview with Kirk emphasizes the faculties of observation - both the faculties of
Kirk’s immediate observers, and those of the individuals with and for whom he had
worked for eight years. Sadler had the advantage of being able to display his witness to
his fellow committee members, and in a sort of reversal of the general technique of the
later commissioners, he encouraged them to imagine how Kirk may have looked to those
around him as his deformity progressed. Sadler asked: ‘Was it observed by any body in
62 British Parliamentary Papers, 1863 [3170] XVII, Royal Commission on Children’s Employment (trades
and manufactures) (1863), First Report, p. 303.
101
the mill, that your knees were bending?—Yes . . .Will you show your limbs? [Here the
witness showed his knees and legs].’63 Sadler then ascertained that it was also the
opinion of the medical doctor who attended Kirk that his deformity was owing to long
hours of labour.
The strategy of asking whether anyone else noticed the changes in Kirk’s physical
form established the fiction of a set of parallel observers who, though able to see that
Kirk was beginning to suffer from deformity, were either unwilling or unable to do
anything about it. Perhaps this was because the only people who witnessed the process of
Kirk’s deformity were operatives of equal stature; or, perhaps his employers knew what
was happening to Kirk, but did not care. Sadler did not ask Kirk to specify whether and
to what extent his employers knew of his condition. He did ask, however, ‘Did your
employers inquire after you, or pay any attention to you after you became thus weak and
deformed?—No.’64 It seems to have been less important to know whether Kirk’s
employers had seen him in this condition than to know that the progress of his deformity
was readily observable by those who saw and worked with him every day, and yet
nothing was done to stop it. Whether this was the fault of a single master, or of a system,
in which a vulnerable individual could become lost to the sight of a responsible superior,
did not matter. Sadler negotiated the ‘seeing’ of a whole system in the sight (or potential
sight) of one boy becoming deformed. This brought the vastness of the entity of the
system to a palpable and visible reality in the bodily deformities of one boy. The boy’s
body presented the committee with an immediacy that tended to override the problem of
63 British Parliamentary Papers (706) XV, Children, Mills, and Factories Bill, Select Committee (1831-32),
Report, Minutes of Evidence, p. 15 [304-310].
64 British Parliamentary Papers (706) XV, Children, Mills, and Factories Bill, Select Committee (1831-32),
Report, Minutes of Evidence, p. 15 [318].
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trying to ‘see’ a system. The boy’s body presented at once a single moment of the
consequences of exploitation, but also the time and suffering that must have produced
these effects upon his body. Further, the boy could easily have been imagined to be one
of many like him - his body was made to stand in for the bodies of many other children
who were developing or who had already developed similar problems due to overwork
and injurious labouring conditions.
The development of a system of inspection was in essence an endeavour to
properly see people, and especially young people, who were vulnerable to exploitation.
Working children proved especially difficult to see. It is helpful to apply to this situation
Crary’s modification of Foucault’s theory of vision. Crary argues that although Foucault
‘emphasizes the ways in which human subjects became objects of observation . . . he
neglects the new forms by which vision itself became a kind of discipline or mode of
work’65 in the nineteenth century. The ‘work’ of developing legislation that would afford
authorities empirical verification of conditions of labour struggled to place the subject of
investigation under scrutiny at the same time as it tried to enable the subject to
demonstrate circumstances according to his or her own perception of the situation.
Through his or her own testimony, an individual being examined might confirm or
attempt to amend visual evidence as perceived by the examiner.
Thus, the challenge was to observe a subject and to allow the subject a voice at
the same time. This could be difficult in the event that visual evidence might contradict a
subject’s testimony. The body of one under observation might, in essence, ‘speak’ for
itself. In many cases, and especially in the case of young children, there might be reason
to consider that the testimony of the subject might be flawed by ignorance or by unseen
65 Crary, Techniques, p. 18.
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motives. But how could one judge against the testimony of a subject without depriving
them of their voice? The techniques of inspection that emerged in response to this
dilemma signalled the rise of a new technology of vision; a new kind of ‘work’ that
involved engaging the human imagination to compensate for the limitation of direct
human sensory perception.
The task at hand was essentially to expose the ‘symptoms’ of exploited bodies
and dangerous conditions of work (while keeping the identities of individuals hidden, and
thus protected from exposure within the system). Individuals conducting inspections or
making reports would necessarily invent fictions of conditions by naming them in their
conclusions, ‘dangerous,’ ‘unhealthy,’ or otherwise. As Foucault argues, ‘the gaze that
traverses a sick body attains the truth that it seeks only by passing through the dogmatic
stage of the name, in which a double truth is contained: the hidden, but already present
truth of the disease and the enclosed truth . . . the synthetic truth of language . . . not a
question of an examination, but of a deciphering’(original emphasis).66 As a ‘body’ of
workers was prone to sickness or injury in their individual bodies when labour conditions
were dangerous or unhealthy, so too were the conditions under which the vulnerable
bodies of factory workers named as such and distinguished as disease or disorder.
John Pegge, Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons, in an interview for the
1863 Child Labour Commission, named a disease after the population of workers who are
peculiarly prone to it. Pegge did not invent this name himself, and did not neglect to give
the name of the disease as it was called by the medical community; his own credentials,
however, lent authority to the source of the familiar term for ‘necrosis of the jaw,’ as it
66 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, A.M. Sheridan Smith (tr.), 1973 (New York: Vintage Books,
1994 [1963]), p. 60.
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was named by the people who knew it best: ‘I have been in practice for nearly 30 years.
During this time I have treated several cases of necrosis or jaw disease, or as it is call[ed]
by the people themselves in this neighbourhood the “match disease”’.67 The doctor’s
credentials substantiated the condition as a disease that was recognized by medical
authorities. However, his allusion to its epithet granted the people whose community
suffered from the disease a measure of authority. These people were an authority to be
consulted on this problem that affected their families and community. The simple
familiarity (and arguably, resignation) with which such a popular name was assigned to
the disease communicated that the problem of the cause of the disease needed be treated
as a symptom of the unhealthy conditions under which the matchmakers lived and
worked, as these conditions were the common factor in the occurrence of the disease.
The doctor’s reference to necrosis of the jaw as ‘the match disease’ suggests that the
problem of the occurrence of the disease could be addressed without considering the
people who lived daily with the reality of the pain and loss associated with it.
Other reports of the Victorian child labour commissioners also emphasized
dangerous working conditions by citing idiomatic expressions used by working people to
refer to these conditions. For example, Dr James Mitchell, in his 1842 report on working
conditions in mines, detailed the presence of several hazardous gases in the mines. He
defined one such poisonous substance as ‘the carbonic acid gas, or, as it is called, damp,
by which a miner may be damped to death, that is, choked.’68 By communicating the
existence of this idiom within the language of the miners indicates that the miners were
67 British Parliamentary Papers, 1863 [3170] XVII, Royal Commission on Children’s Employment (trades
and manufactures) (1863), First Report, p. 48.
68 British Parliamentary Papers [381] XVI, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1842), Appendix to First Report, Part I, Sub-Commissioners’ Reports and Evidence, p. 4 [30].
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familiar enough with the substance, and the condition of its presence, to have developed a
means of expressing an experience with the substance, which referenced other, similar
experiences. The idea of ‘damp’ was thus shown to have been incorporated into mining
culture. The idiom functions in the report to demonstrate a common awareness of the
prevalence of this particular dangerous condition in the mines. The suggestion is that the
miners encountered carbonic acid with some regularity. The inclusion of the idiom in the
report communicated the danger to which miners were exposed more immediately than
any quantitative process of detection could do. Since the mines themselves were always
moving and changing as the miners broke into new ground, it would have been difficult
to record the actual incidence of the presence of carbonic acid in an individual mine.
Even if one could have registered with accuracy each injury or death that occurred as a
result of carbonic acid, it would not have told how many experienced miners had only
narrowly escaped such a fate. The existence of the phrase ‘damped to death’ in the
common language of the miners, however, contended that the miners were well
accustomed to the threat of suffocation by exposure to carbonic acid. It was only left to
the legislative body, then, to decide if this threat was an acceptable occupational hazard,
and to decide what could be done to lessen the threat by way of regulation and inspection.
Not surprisingly, the workers themselves were often consulted about the
conditions under which they worked, and direct statements were taken even from the
young children. It is interesting, though, to notice how the statements of the workers (and
especially of the young workers) were aligned with the observations of those conducting
the interviews. These observations might confirm or qualify the statements of the
workers. Robert Mackintosh asked one young mill-worker about the usual state of her
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frock: ‘Mary Hay “is wet every day. Mary Peacock is worse than me; her frock was just
dripping yesterday”.’ Mackintosh then attached a note to this excerpt of the interview, as
if to confirm the statement: ‘The frocks of those two children were already at a quarter
before seven in the morning (when I examined them) very moist. The night before at the
conclusion of the work they were quite wet, and must have been so many hours.’69
Mackintosh was careful to supply information that was as objective as possible, regarding
the times he witnessed the girls’ wet frocks, and the degree to which the frocks were wet
at these times. It would have been reasonable to conclude by his statement alone that the
girls work in very wet conditions. The pairing of his statement with the young workers’
own claims that they are wet every day, however, communicated that they also perceived
themselves to be wet every day.
Apparently, Mackintosh would sometimes consult with the proprietors of the
mills he surveyed about the conditions under which children worked. Mackintosh
distilled the content of an interview with eleven-year-old Mary Peacock, and one with her
employer, regarding the cause of the sores on her hands. Combining their statements
with his own observation, Mackintosh relinquished the form of dialogue to present an
unquestionable conclusion: ‘The witness’s hands were broken out into sores, which she
(and Mr. Hall the proprietor) attributes to the constant dabbling in warm water’.70
Although Peacock’s own statement about the cause of the sores on her hands combined
with Mackintosh’s statement about the existence of the sores, might have stood well
enough on its own. Unlike a wet frock, however, the sores from water exposure would
69 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report and Minutes of Evidence, A2, p. 5.
70 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report and Minutes of Evidence, A2, p. 6.
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have been acquired over at least somewhat of a long period of time - longer than
Mackintosh could possibly have stayed to witness. Thus, the proprietor’s statement was
used to confirm Mary’s own.
While Mary Peacock said that ‘she would . . . be glad to take less wages if she
could get a limitation of time’,71 Mackintosh did not seek to substantiate her need for a
reduction in hours by stating the hours she normally worked, or any other related
information. Instead, he asked why she was required to work more than she wished. The
girl demonstrated that she and her siblings had little choice in the matter: ‘Has two
younger sisters in the same mill; has heard them complain to her mother, and she has told
them they must work’.72 The aforementioned observation of the sores on Mary’s hands
was kept back until after this portion of the dialogue had been communicated, which
strategy afforded the interview dramatic punctuation. Mary’s mother not only insisted
that she worked, but that she worked until and even though her hands were broken out in
sores. Despite what poverty or circumstances might have been driving Mary’s mother to
do so, one gets a distinct sense from reading Mackintosh’s report that the Peacock
children had very little agency, and that their wishes for a shorter workday were rooted in
distinctly un-childish grievances.
Helen Aitken, aged 15, asserted to Mackintosh that if she had a little girl, she
‘never would send her to a mill’.73 Her statement demonstrates that she did not consider
that her history of employment had been entirely voluntary. Further, it suggests that she
71 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report and Minutes of Evidence, A2, p. 6.
72 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report and Minutes of Evidence, A2, p. 6.
73 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report and Minutes of Evidence, A2, p. 6.
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did not personally conclude that her circumstances required her to pursue employment.
Instead, she was ‘sent’ to a mill by her parents. Helen Aitken did not consider that her
labour was her own.
Mary Beveridge, only a year older than Helen Aitken, apparently answered the
same question that was put to Helen Aitken. However, the question of whether or not she
would cause her child to be employed at the mill was decidedly more urgent in
Beveridge’s case, for she was herself a young mother. Mackintosh reported that the 16-
year-old Beveridge ‘Has one child herself fourteen months old. It will never come to the
mill if she can help it; “because I know to my experience what a mill is”.’74 Drawing
from her own experiences, Beveridge constructed a fiction of a mill in determining for
herself ‘what a mill is’, possibly implying that one who was never employed at a mill
could never access this knowledge, even by interviewing subjects such as herself.
Conspicuously, Beveridge did not list reasons for wishing that her child would never be
employed at a mill, arguably because her statement was predicated upon the synthesis of
a young lifetime of experiences, the whole picture of which she could not possibly have
communicated to the commissioner in an interview. Instead, she constructed a fiction of
a mill and a possible future for her infant child, and calculated that another child would
likely have had similarly negative experiences being employed in a mill.
It is important to note the novelty of distinguishing between the will and the needs
of parent and child in the nineteenth century. It was difficult to incorporate a measure of
protection for children from exploitation in employment without calling into question the
boundaries of parental agency. No one wanted to exchange the figure of the responsible
74 British Parliamentary Papers [450] XX, Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Factories
(1833), First Report and Minutes of Evidence, A2, p. 6.
109
parent in society with state authority, least of all that majority of Victorians who
embraced middle-class ideals of virtuous domesticity and familial patriarchy. However,
it was not easy to affix all of the blame for the exploitation of child labourers to the
manufacturers. The factory system was an intricate sort of abstraction for which many
people and possibly most of society could be held responsible. Further, the lower-class
parents of labouring children arguably offered a very tempting alternative target to the
wealthier members of the manufacturing classes, notwithstanding the powerful image of
the clash between the greedy businessman and the frail factory child.
James Stuart and Leonard Horner were elected as Factory Inspectors after serving
as commissioners for the Royal Commission on Child Labour in 1833. Along with a few
others, they produced reports every few months regarding the working conditions in
particular factories in particular regions. It was also their job to enforce the law and
report any infringements, to try to isolate trends in evasion of the laws, and to make
suggestions whereby child labourers might be better protected from harm and
exploitation. One of the problems they found very difficult to solve was that of the
illegal employment of children who were too young to work. Despite the fact that
children were required to hold documents attesting to their age that were certified by a
surgeon in order to work, it was difficult to determine who was to blame when these
documents were falsified or non-existent. Thus, factory inspectors visited both
manufacturers and surgeons to ensure compliance with the regulations regarding the
production and verification of certificates of age. The inspectors also observed labouring
children themselves, and frequently removed from employment numbers of children who
seemed to be younger than the required age for employment. Often, they were able to
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ascertain the real ages of the children simply by asking them, thus demonstrating how
lost a child’s voice could become among the statements and texts produced by their
elders. Of course, it was not possible for factory inspectors to visually confirm the age of
each child who entered a factory; the adults responsible needed to be brought to account
for overlooking or attempting to falsify the ages of children who were too young to work.
Manufacturers cited the difficulties in determining whether a certificate of age
had been falsified, and surgeons blamed the parents. Indeed, if children who were too
young to work were working in factories, the parents of the children must have been at
least in part responsible.75 Matthew Gibson, a surgeon from Glasgow, told James Stuart
in an interview that it was primarily the parents of potential child labourers, as opposed to
potential employers, who were likely to incite him to falsify certificates of age. Stuart
paraphrased Gibson: ‘he never was asked by a factory proprietor, or his manager, to act
otherwise [than in accordance with the law], but he has frequently to resist the
solicitations of parents’.76 Similarly, Leonard Horner reported that in general, he found
parents were ‘very ready to agree with the employer to evade the law’.77
Were impoverished parents to be blamed for doing whatever they could,
including sending very young children to labour in factories, in order that they and their
family might survive? Sadler asked one child, ‘Did not your parents object to this over-
work; did they interfere? —No. If they had, could they have got the hours diminished?
—No, they could not. And they had it not in their power to subsist themselves and their
75 Indeed, recent historians such as Clark Nardinelli and Peter Kirby have tended to emphasize the role and
responsibility of the parents of child labourers in the exploitation of their children.
76 British Parliamentary Papers (519) XIX, Factory Inspectors’ Reports, Half-Yearly Report for 1839
(Jan.), p. 43.
77 British Parliamentary Papers (218) XXIII, Factory Inspectors’ Reports, Half-Yearly Report for 1840
(June), p. 11.
111
children without your labour? —No.’ 78 How could anyone have determined the
difference between greed and desperation in the parents of child labourers? Some parents
of child labourers took to task those who mistreated their children at their work. Sadler’s
interview with William Kershaw, who was a forty-two-year-old ex-child labourer,
provided a rather unusual anecdote:
I have been beat with a billy-roller . . . till I repeatedly vomited blood . . . I
entreated my mother not to make a complaint, lest I should be further beaten. The
next morning, after I went to work, she followed me, and came to the slubber that
had used me in that way, and gave him a sharp lecture . . . and as soon as she was
gone, he beat me severely for telling, when one of the young men that served the
carder, went out and found my mother, and told her, and she came in again and
inquired of me what instrument it was I was beaten with, but I durst not do it;
some of the by-standers pointed out the instrument, the billy-roller, and she seized
it immediately, and beat it about the fellow’s head, and gave him one or two black
eyes.79
Child labourers needed to be protected, even if it was not always clear from whom. To
obtain the information needed to assess the problems of child factory labour, children
were interviewed both for the information they provided in their statements, and through
their presence as subjects to be examined, as patients in need of a remedy. As a patient
might have displayed symptoms of a disease to be cured, so the bodies and the
expressions of the children (and ex-children) demonstrated the wrongs of the factory
78 British Parliamentary Papers (706) XV, Children, Mills, and Factories Bill, Select Committee (1831-32),
Report, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, p. 46 [1149].
79 British Parliamentary Papers (706) XV, Children, Mills, and Factories Bill, Select Committee (1831-32),
Report, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, p. 47 [1150].
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system. These wrongs were written upon their bodies and engraved upon their
developmental experiences.
The Victorian child labour commissioners attempted to reproduce the experiences
of children after they witnessed factory conditions themselves, as much as was possible
during the action of inspection, and heard the testimony of those for whom the conditions
of factory labour was a quotidian reality. They used and worked within emerging
theories of observation and representation to define and produce truths of subjective
vision, to feel and communicate the sufferings of factory children in order to enable
appropriate legislative decisions to be made. These individuals, who were responsible for
gathering information from the places of children’s employment for presentation to the
legislative body, were often thrust into an empirical dilemma that could only be solved
through the use of the moral imagination - despite whether their ultimate goals were
sincerely to bring about positive reform, or whether their intent was really to advance a
political agenda. Unfortunately, when circumstances are questionable but not universally
deplored (as were the circumstances surrounding child labour in the nineteenth century),
the only way to gather the information necessary to institute appropriate reform is to
place the question in the hands of a selection of people who can be determined to be
relatively ‘objective’. The level of subjectivity that would have been required even to
make the most basic decisions about what to ask, and what to record would have had
much to do with the enquirer’s pre-conceptions, assumptions, and opinions on the matter.
Here, we have seen the testimony of a fairly large number of people gathered in order to
make use of individual subjectivity while achieving a broad (and hopefully, conclusive)
view of a controversial issue.
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Chapter 2:
Man, Brother, Other: Two British Travellers Write Home About American Slavery
Marcus Wood has convincingly argued that the famous Wedgewood anti-slavery
medallion, which figures the body of a black man in chains against a vacant white
background, and reads ‘Am I Not a Man and a Brother’, signifies the condition of
abolitionist movement. Wood argues that abolitionist rhetoric regarded ‘the black as
cultural absentee, the black as a blank page for white guilt to inscribe’.1 Wood further
argues that abolitionists and others who constructed texts about slavery and the
experience of slaves in effect wished to ‘steal black pain’.2 It is certainly true that the
abolitionist movement in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain and America,
afforded the perfect space for whites to ‘play’ in black suffering and white guilt, without
the burden of the personality or the experience of the victim of slavery.3 The experiences
of the victims of slavery are indeed, as Wood suggests, lost to history.4 Just as Wood
1 Marcus Wood, Blind Memory: Visual Representations of Slavery in England and America, 1780-1865
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 22.
2 Marcus Wood, Slavery, Empathy, and Pornography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
3 For a discussion of the Wedgewood medallion in the context of the late eighteenth-century abolitionist
visual culture in which it was produced, see J. R. Oldfield, Popular Politics and British Anti-
Slavery: The Mobilisation of Public Opinion against the Slave Trade, 1787-1807 (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1995).
4 Wood argues that the experience of the victims of New World slavery is forever ‘lost to the conventional
resources of historical reconstruction’. Memory, p. 44. While I agree, I define ‘empathy’ very
differently than Wood. Wood illustrates what he calls ‘empathy’ (as the stealing of black pain)
with texts located within the tradition of the eighteenth-century ‘cult of sentiment’; these texts
primarily appropriate the sufferings of others for the effect that they have upon the self. Thus,
Wood does not define ‘empathy’ as a way of knowing, as I do, but as a way of appropriating
feeling. Both Wood and I use the word ‘empathy’ to discuss texts that are older than the word
itself, so that neither of us can make any claims regarding contemporary usage. I can report,
however, that by the mid-nineteenth century, Victorians such as Frances Power Cobbe were using
a different word - the German schadenfreude - to refer to the practice of seeking thrills in the
sight or consideration of the pain of others. One of Wood’s main points in this work is to
demonstrate how black pain is denied humanity and constructed as ‘other’, which argument
114
suggests, all of the sources available to the historian of New World slavery emerge from
a context that is dominated by whites and white agendas, and that the voices of the
victims themselves were so utterly silenced that even those rare moments of self-
expression that have been recorded are only accessible through the filter of the enslaving
culture. It is difficult to extricate the humanitarian and egalitarian impulses of
nineteenth-century abolitionist writers, from texts composed from within a culture that
largely condoned racism and racial slavery. Such texts are necessarily contaminated with
notions of white superiority, as even the most fervent abolitionist could only enter into an
ideological exchange of ideas using the voice that he or she developed as part of that
same society, and in the language of the unconverted. Abolitionists, even British
abolitionists after 1833, functioned as components of a controversy and not outside of
that controversy, so that all of their rhetoric, upon close inspection, is arguably
epistemologically suspect. Worse than that, controversy on such a scale will always
present ample opportunity to those who embrace it - opportunity for fame or notoriety,
power, redemption, and certainly money. It is, of course, impossible to confirm the
motivations of even the most zealous advocate of any cause, or to verify their intentions,
with absolute certainty.
None of this means, however, that the experiences of these victims would have
been readily available to abolitionists, if only they had sincerely wished to try to
understand, interpret, and communicate these experiences. In the nineteenth century
United States, slavery was not easy for an outsider to observe, and the real experience of
implies that those who would ‘steal’ the pain of the slave would not imagine that they were
understanding or feeling the same pain that the slave was feeling, but instead that they were
mining the suffering of the slave in order to achieve a feeling in themselves that was
fundamentally different, better, and ‘white’.
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the victims of slavery not readily witnessed, especially as slave-holders came under
closer scrutiny and felt threatened. It must be recognized that the discursive
opportunities afforded to abolitionists by slavery also represent the primary challenges
faced by abolitionist writers who, in their own deeply flawed and white-culturally
specific ways, attempted to influence opinions and policies regarding the practice and
support of slavery. Just as it is important to evaluate abolitionists texts in terms of their
ultimate failure to understand and communicate the experiences of slaves, so too is it
important to examine the strategies by which abolitionist authors attempted to accomplish
just these goals. What kind of knowledge did abolitionists try to produce? How did they
attempt to produce this knowledge? By what means did abolitionist writers endeavour to
construct and interpret the experiences of slaves for their readers?
Literally hundreds of British travellers published accounts of their visits to the
United States during the period between the abolition of slavery in Britain and her
colonies and the emancipation of American slaves at the start of the American Civil War.
Since American slavery was such a controversial topic, it would be naïve to think that
some of these writers did not publish their accounts at least partly for pecuniary reward,
or to think that their aims were always wholly selfless.5 What is more interesting is that
so few who published were abolitionists. Max Berger, in his 1943 study of British
travellers in America, pointed out that out of approximately 230 British citizens who
published accounts of their travels to America during the period from 1836-1860 and
5 Audrey Fisch discusses the enormous popularity of abolitionist literature and slave narratives in Victorian
Britain. According to Fisch, such materials could hardly be written and published fast enough to
keep up with the demands of the Victorian reading public. See American Slaves in Victorian
Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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despite the fact that most of the travellers professed an abhorrence of slavery, the number
of these who openly supported abolition ‘were so few as to be counted on one’s fingers’.6
From the inhabitants of the slave states of America, British activists could expect
very little information about the sufferings of victims of slavery. Especially from 1833,
when Britain abolished slavery in its own territories, the American South became a focal
point of British abolitionist concern. The slave-holding and slave-trading population of
the United States were increasingly and urgently inclined to escape the scrutinizing (or
even potentially scrutinizing) gaze of individuals from outside their own communities.
While an outsider, even a foreigner, could well have gone unnoticed in the big cities of
the South and might have occasionally visited a slave-holding plantation through the
introduction of friends, the slave states were generally a very dangerous place for anyone
who professed to be an abolitionist. In some southern states, spreading abolitionist views
was illegal. Max Berger illustrated the danger that awaited a British visitor to the
American South with the example of William Thomson, a Scottish weaver who visited
his brother, a slave-holder in Virginia, in the decades before the American Civil War.
Thomson, who was converted to the pro-slavery cause during his stay in the United
States, nevertheless held anti-slavery views before he reached the American shores.
During his sea voyage, Thomson argued with his ship captain about slavery, and when he
landed, was only rescued from being tarred and feathered as an abolitionist by the
intervention of his brother.7
6 Max Berger, The British Traveller in America, 1836-1860 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943),
p. 192. For a discussion of how anti-slavery sentiment could exist independently from any
abolitionist movement, see Christopher Leslie Brown’s study of the origins of British
abolitionism, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2006).
7 Berger, Traveller, p. 182.
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American slave-holders had good reason to prevent British abolitionists from
accessing slaves and witnessing their experiences. During the 1830s and 1840s,
abolitionists on both sides of the Atlantic worked together to influence policies that were
likely to affect the future of slavery in America.8 One such policy regarded the potential
American annexation of Texas, because it was likely that the annexation of Texas would
result in the addition of another slave-holding state to the Union. Another issue that
brought British and American abolitionists together was that of fugitive American slaves
who managed to escape to British territories in the West Indies and Canada. British and
American abolitionists worked to ensure that such individuals would not be returned to
their ‘owners’ in America.9 As tensions in America rose ever higher over the issue of
slavery in the decades leading up to the American Civil War, popular opinions about
American slavery became increasingly important. Because Britain’s factories and textile
mills put to use a great deal of cotton, the chief export of the American South, it is
arguable that British public opinion would have been viewed by Americans, including
slave-holders, as particularly crucial.
It is arguable that a professed abolitionist travelling through the South for the
purposes of gathering information about the sufferings of slaves was unlikely to meet
with much success. The few British abolitionists who travelled to America and published
accounts of their travels did not tend to venture very deep into the South, and several of
them largely restricted their writing to a discussion of the politics of slavery and
8 See Clare Taylor, British and American Abolitionists: An Episode in Transatlantic Understanding
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1974). Taylor reproduces several of Edward Strutt
Abdy’s letters.
9 See David Turley, The Culture of British Anti-slavery, 1780-1860 (London and New York: Routledge,
1991). While Turley argues that by the 1830 and 1840s, enthusiasm had waned for the Anglo-
American abolitionist alliance, there were still a few key issues that continued to bring British and
American abolitionists together, namely the possible American annexation of Texas and the fate of
slaves who escaped to British North American territories.
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abolitionism. Only a very few tried to communicate the sufferings of the victims of
slavery to their audience back at home, which seems reasonable, considering the limited
contact a professed abolitionist would have had with slaves. How could anyone
communicate the experience of someone or of a group of individuals with whom they had
such limited contact? It is easy to dismiss such an endeavour as impossible, but this was
also an era that embraced the power of the imagination to overcome empirical barriers to
communication and understanding. The challenges faced by the project of child labour
reform in the nineteenth century affords a parallel: it made sense to employ
commissioners to investigate the conditions of child labour - to interview, to observe, to
make judgments based upon their own empirical experiences. But these commissioners
could not see everything. This did not stop them from trying to investigate the suffering
they could not see, and of children with whom they had no contact. For British
abolitionists in America, access to slaves was very limited. The voices of slaves were
silenced, and their bodies hidden from the view of those who wished to investigate the
conditions under which they lived and worked. Those abolitionists who wished to write
about the conditions of slavery faced the daunting task of assembling minute bits of
information to construct a possible reality. Such accounts were necessarily shaped by the
writer’s imagination, and much closer to ‘fiction’ than the reports of the child labour
commissioners, who were technically entitled to have access to their subjects, even if this
was not always a practical reality.
Slaves, as ‘property’, were virtually unprotected by the law so long as slavery was
legal.10 The American government could send no commission, no inspectors to
10 See Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1982) for a discussion of the historical question of property in persons.
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investigate or regulate the conditions under which slaves lived and worked. Information
about the suffering of slaves had to be gathered in snatches, or in a clandestine fashion.
Still, British abolitionists in America believed that they were in a position to offer some
insight into the sufferings of slaves, weighing oral and written sources of information
against each other and against their own empirical experiences, as well as engaging in as
much contact as possible with the victims of slavery themselves.
Edward Strutt Abdy [1791-1846] was the son of an Anglican clergyman from
Essex, and was educated at Cambridge. In 1833 Abdy was sent to study the American
prison system as part of a delegation led by William Crawford of the Society for the
Improvement of Prison Discipline and the Reformation of Juvenile Offenders.11 Abdy
stayed behind after his party left, for the explicit purpose of gathering information about
slavery for abolitionist purposes. He was not affiliated with a particular group of
abolitionists during his travels, and did not tend to associate exclusively with
abolitionists, but he was introduced to some of the most important figures of American
abolition, and even met with Willam Lloyd Garrison. With regard to his mobility and
travels, it would seem that Abdy, wishing to investigate American slavery, took the most
logical course available to him as an abolitionist, remaining mostly in the north, but
travelling as far south as Virginia in order to get closer to the victims of slavery. He
11 Elizabeth Baigent, ‘Edward Strutt Abdy’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004). See also Maria Weston Chapman’s extended obituary in the American
abolitionist annual The Liberty Bell (Boston: National Anti-Slavery Bazaar, 1847), pp. 295-299.
In addition to A Journal of a Residence and Tour in the United States, from April 1833 to October
1834, 3 vols. (London: John Murray, 1835), with which this chapter is concerned, Abdy later
published another, shorter work denouncing racism and slavery, entitled American Whites and
Blacks, A Reply to a German Orthodermist (London: C. Gilpin, 1842). For a discussion of
Edward Strutt Abdy’s influence upon William Ellery Channing, see Thomas Harwood, ‘Prejudice
and Anti-Slavery: The Colloquy between William Ellery Channing and Edward Strutt Abdy,
1834’, American Quarterly, 18 (1966), pp. 697-700.
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talked to as many ex-slaves, free people of colour, and abolitionists as possible, and even
visited individuals imprisoned in the north for being runaway slaves.
Abdy realized that discussing slavery with individuals who were not abolitionists
could be dangerous. His records of his conversations reveal that he often tried to avoid
the topic of slavery, but when the subject was introduced to him, he was not ordinarily
successful in keeping quiet. This was as much the case in New York as it was in
Virginia. Whether this was because Abdy was trying to achieve a balance between
prudence and the effective gathering of information, or because he simply had trouble
keeping his mouth shut, one gets a sense in reading Abdy’s accounts of these
conversations that it was a very good thing that Abdy did not travel any further south than
he did.
Ebenezer Davies [1808-1882], a Presbyterian evangelical minister with a flair for
the dramatic, served for several years as the minister of the Mission Chapel in New
Amsterdam, Berbice before returning to Britain to fill the post of minister of the
Caledonian Road Chapel in London.12 In 1847, Davies toured America, including the
deep South, ostensibly to aid his wife’s ailing health.13 It is, however, difficult to believe
12 On nineteenth-century Evangelicalism and reform movements, including abolitionism, see Boyd Hilton,
The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic Thought, 1795-
1865 (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1970); David Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A
History from the 1730s to the 1980s (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). See also Leonore Davidoff
and Catherine Hall, Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780-1850
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). For a study of the relationship between British and
American Evangelicalism, see David Carwardine, Transatlantic Revivalism: Popular
Evangelicalism in Britain and America, 1790-1865 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1978), and
for a study of the impact of British Evangelical abolitionism upon American religion, see Thomas
Harwood, ‘British Evangelical Abolitionism in American Churches in the 1830s’, Journal of
Southern History, 28 (1962), pp. 287-306.
13 This chapter will examine Davies’ published account of his tour, American Scenes and Christian
Slavery: A Recent Tour of Four Thousand Miles in the United States (London: John Snow, 1849).
Though Davies makes regular references to the presence of his wife, it is, of course, possible that
that she did not accompany him on his more pointed and dangerous fact-finding missions within
the deep South.
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that the character of his endeavours would have encouraged the return of his wife’s
health, for the methods by which Davies gained information about slavery would hardly
have suited a weak constitution: he travelled in the deep South, essentially acting as an
undercover agent for the abolitionist cause. He travelled within the slavery system and
among slaves as well as slave-holders. Of course, he could never speak his mind in their
presence: ‘Had my real object and character been discovered, I gravely doubt whether I
should have left the “great” and “free” city [of New Orleans] alive!’14 Davies recognized
that the project he had undertaken - to ‘spy’ on American slavery - was unusual and
daring. He was hardly modest about it: ‘Having entered the states by their most Southern
port - that of New Orleans, and finding himself at once in the midst of Slavery, he had
opportunities of observing that system not often enjoyed by a British “Abolitionist”’.15
Perhaps less apparently innocuous in its intent than Abdy’s publication, Davies knew that
by reporting from within the lion’s den, as it were, he could communicate information
that would not be accessible to someone who travelled in the company of abolitionists, or
to the places where an abolitionist would be safe. In his preface, Davies speaks of
himself in the third person: ‘Representing no public body, bound to no party, a
“Deputation sent by himself,” - he was completely free and independent in thought and
action, and enjoyed advantages for observation which one did not often meet’.16
Davies’ work demonstrates the Victorian pre-occupation with visual information -
with observation, spectacle, and ‘seeing’. It is arguable that Davies offered the culture
and politics of abolition more than a voyeuristic thrill. Davies’ abolition was, in a very
real way, abolition in practice, as he invited his reader to enter into an analogical
14 Davies, Scenes, p. 53.
15 Davies, Scenes, p. iii.
16 Davies, Scenes, p. iv.
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relationship with the slaves he encountered. He encouraged the establishment of
sameness through the relation of signs of distance in the individuals he observed - he did
not claim to be able to tell very much about them, rather, he read and communicated the
signs of an interiority as full and deep as it was intangible. For example, he constructed
the crisis and anxiety of being sold at a slave auction by describing the way that some
slaves looked back at those who looked at them. He seems to have found the refusal of
slaves to return the gaze of those to whom they were presented a particularly poignant
response to this indignity: ‘George kept his eyes fixed upon the dome, as if he felt above
looking down on the grovelling creatures beneath him’.17 Davies encouraged his reader
to interpret this disconnection as emblematic of a personality that was as unique as it was
mysterious; he could decipher as much and as little from their faces as he could from the
face of any person unknown to him.
In this manner, Davies attempted to construct the arena of spectacle in reverse, as
the spectacle, or ‘spectacle’ was the subject of his writing. He elaborated upon the
discomfort of being the subject of spectacle by articulating the distance of that subject
from the experience. The anxiety of a slave at an auction was best described as such - as
the anxiety of an individual, which could not ultimately be articulated. Davies explained
that the slaves’ eyes could withhold, and could express in their withholding. That there
was something beyond what could be seen - an untappable reservoir of interiority within
the slave - was the communication that needed no description because each reader would
be able to form an analogy based upon the interiority that he or she could never
communicate.
17 Davies, Scenes, p. 61.
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This is not to say that Davies did not attempt to read personalities from the slaves’
faces. Even the individuals who appeared to be emotionally disconnected could
communicate some element of their personality. ‘Ben . . . was a fine buckish young
fellow, about twenty-one . . . He was dressed in a good cloth surtout coat, and looked
altogether far more respectable and intelligent than most of the bidders. He was
evidently a high-minded young man.’18 But because Davies was ‘undercover’, he did not
have the opportunity to get to know the slaves he encountered at the auction in any other
context. This is where the limits of Davies’ method of investigation become apparent.
Davies expressed a wish to help Ben, and a wish that Ben did not have to stand alone:
‘Oh! That I could have whispered in his ear a few words of sympathy and comfort.’19
Davies could not help, precisely because he was a ‘deputation sent by himself’. Alone in
a crowd of speculators in human property, even if Davies decided to speak out or stand
up for Ben, his efforts would certainly have been ineffectual, as well as terribly
dangerous.
Abdy, in contrast, was able to converse with the slaves he met, even when he was
in the South. He did not venture to slave auctions or other such places where he would
have been more likely to see the most intimate workings of the slave system up close, but
when a slave crossed his path he had a measure of freedom to talk to them. Whenever
Abdy did converse with a slave, he subjected himself to the suspicious gaze of the white
population alongside that slave. Unlike Davies, he was able to stand with the slaves
instead of just watching helplessly.
18 Davies, Scenes p. 63.
19 Davies, Scenes p. 63.
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Although Abdy could converse with a slave, he was very aware that he could not
do so for any length of time in the sight of a slave-holding population. ‘I now thought it
time to break off the conversation, as it had already attracted the attention of every one
who passed’.20 By describing himself as a conspirator in the eyes of white southerners,
Abdy placed himself under the gaze of the slave-holder. Living in a society whose
politics have recently declared against slavery, a British reader in the mid-1830s might
have imagined himself or herself transported to a very different world where views
against slavery were not tolerated. When Abdy was less careful, the slaves with whom
he conversed were quick to remind him that their interactions were carefully monitored:
‘I begged he would sit down, as he seemed to be tired, and I would take a seat by him on
the grass, while we conversed together. “I dare not”, he muttered, looking carefully
round: “if I was to be seen by the whites, I should suffer for it”. The keen and scrutinizing
glance of a man, who stopped at the moment to look at us, explained what he meant.’21
Abdy was no longer a spectator. Rather, he communicated the tension of an awareness of
being watched himself, along with the slave to whom he had got too close for the comfort
of the slave-holding population. Instead of reiterating arguments against slavery, in this
instance Abdy aligned himself (and his reader) with the position of the slave against the
scrutiny and suspicion of slave-holding society.
Abdy pre-empted any argument that could be made concerning the troubles of the
southern planter, who lived in fear of a slave insurrection, by demonstrating how the
merest display of sympathy for the plight of the slave was enough to render someone an
enemy in the eyes of the southerner. A British reader (with anti-slavery sentiments)
20 Abdy, Journal, II, p. 211.
21 Abdy, Journal, II, p. 212.
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would have been thus placed alongside Abdy on the receiving end of the suspicious looks
of the slave-holder, occupying the same position as the slave with whom he was
conversing, and would have been made to know that he or she was already an ‘other’
according to the perspective of the slave-holding population of the United States.
This might have significantly changed the way that a British person would have
read pro-slavery or anti-abolition arguments from the slave states. The distance between
Britain and the southern states of America could have easily been used to ask one who
had never traversed that distance to consider their own ignorance of the situation before
passing judgment, despite the fact that slavery was unpopular and that slave-owners were
much maligned. Abdy, however, drew his fellow Briton into an association with himself
as a foreigner of their own origin, having stood quite alone and having been classed as an
enemy alongside the slave for holding anti-slavery views. Abdy communicated that for
the American slave-holder, there was no middle-ground; if one had enough compassion
for the plight of a slave to have talked to them and to have appeared to show some
interest in their life or welfare, than one had taken their side, and, with regard to being the
object of scrutiny and suspicion, one had taken their part.
Abdy was viewed ambiguously by the few slaves with whom he conversed in
Virginia. One of these offered to sell to Abdy a young girl who has been left in his
charge for the purpose. When Abdy declined, the ‘old grey-headed negro’ responded: ‘”I
thought . . . you did not look like a trader”.’22 Abdy did and did not look like a member
of the slave-holding population of southern America. Perhaps his body language or facial
expression communicated that he did not wish to be mistaken for such a one? Perhaps
the elderly and experienced person of colour had long since learned to recognize
22 Abdy, Journal, II, p. 210.
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individuals with whom he could converse as freely as he dared to do with Abdy, as a
matter of survival. Abdy blended in to his surroundings to a certain degree, but his
camouflage was imperfect, whether because he had no wish to conceal his views against
slavery, or otherwise. He made a brave political statement by conversing with slaves in
Virginia, in public - something that Davies could not do when he was ‘undercover’.
Davies was also mistaken for a slave trader - by a slave trader. He did not,
however, venture to correct the error, which was made while Davies was observing an
informal slave market along a street in New Orleans. ‘As we moved along in front of this
sable row, one of the white attendants (though my wife had hold of my arm) said to me,
with all the nonchalance of a Smithfield cattle-drover, “Looking out for a few niggers
this morning?” Never did I feel my manhood so insulted. My indignation burned for
expression. But I endeavoured to affect indifference, and answered in a don't-care sort of
tone, "No, I am not particularly in want of any to-da—.” I could scarcely finish the
sentence. Emotion choked my utterance.’23 It is perhaps less than surprising that the
slave trader should have addressed Davies as a potential client, because he was looking at
the slaves and probably with interest. The emotion that Davies described having felt at
the encounter - whether affected or not - is indicative of the particular barriers that
existed between the victims of slavery and those who might defend them.24 In the space
23 Davies, Scenes, pp. 23-24.
24 It is important to point out that emotional language and the description and reference to emotion had long
been rhetorical weapons commonly employed by British abolitionists by this time. See Brycchan
Carey, British Abolitionism and the Rhetoric of Sensibility: Writing, Sentiment, and Slavery, 1760-
1807 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). It is certain that Davies would have been much
influenced by this tradition. Still, Davies’ expression of emotion regarding his inability to access
the victims of slavery without having to pose as a slave-trader is indicative of the barrier that
existed between the victims and any who would understand them and help them or comfort them.
Davies’ emotional expression communicates his struggle with the impossibility of surmounting
that barrier to the humane knowledge he sought. Davies’ British readers would have faced even
more difficulty trying to understand the experiences of the victims of American slavery from their
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of the slave market, Davies could only safely gather information about slavery in the
guise of a trader. The victims themselves must necessarily have viewed him as a
potential master, and so would have acted and communicated with him accordingly. This
confirms Marcus Wood’s argument that the experience of the victims of New World
slavery is forever lost to history, but it also affirms the need to examine the new ways in
which nineteenth-century activists attempted to surmount the problem of defending
individuals who were vulnerable and voiceless. There was little that could be known
about the real experience of slaves, and nearly all of the information that Davies provided
to his reader was superficial empirical description heavily supplemented by his own
imagination. Yet the attempt that he made to ‘fill in the blanks’ of experience and to try
to bridge this particularly unbridgeable gap between human beings is quite striking.
One of Davies’ most remarkable strategies for representing empathy with the
victim of slavery is demonstrated by the expression of his response to witnessing a young
girl named Margaret being auctioned with her infant child. Davies was a spectator at the
sale and knew nothing about the girl other than what he could see and what was
announced by the auctioneer. When he heard her name, however, he grasped this kernel
of information and attempted to construct a kind of narrative of possibility around it: ‘The
next was a very modest-looking mulatto girl, of small features and slender frame, with a
little child (apparently not more than a year old) in her arms, evidently the daughter of a
white man. “Now, who bids for Margaret and her child?” Margaret! My own dear
mother’s name. “Margaret and her child!” What should I have been this day, if that
location. Davies’ text establishes a parallel between one person who could not know (himself) and
another (his reader). His emotional expression was arguably meant to encourage his reader to
engage with their own inability to know or understand the victims of slavery, and to follow his
lead in imaginatively struggling to know and understand them anyway.
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Margaret “and her child” Ebenezer had been so treated? Who can think of his own
mother, and not drop a tear of sympathy for this mother—so young, so interesting, and
yet so degraded?’25 The auctioneer described the girl as between the ages of sixteen and
seventeen, and as pregnant again. He also pronounced her a good breeder: ‘She’ll no
doubt be the mother of a great many children, and that is a consideration to a purchaser
who wants to raise a fine young stock’.26 Although Davies knew nothing else about this
woman, he knew that she was valued for the ‘stock’ she would produce as a reproductive
unit. He also knew that she and the child in her arms were being considered for purchase
according to their potential to be economically and possibly sexually exploited (Davies
concludes that her child is that of a white man, presumably because of the colour of its
skin). There is a hint that Davies found her sexually attractive (‘so interesting’), and this
suggestion, whether intentional or not, completes the picture of the young woman’s
vulnerability, making it even more significant that he imagined his mother in her place.
One could easily call Davies as a thrill-seeker and easily dismiss his musings as
nightmare fantasies (as Marcus Wood might). Further, Davies cannot be considered to
present an accurate or reliable voice for this woman; the historian can never recover her
experience. However, the strategy of imagining his mother in the place of this young
victim of slavery, and himself in the place of her child, shows that in some way he was
trying to relate to her by considering something about her that was the ‘same’ as himself;
it was arguably the closest that one in his circumstances could get to achieving ‘proof’ of
her suffering.
25 Davies, Scenes, p. 56.
26 Davies, Scenes, p. 56.
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Abdy, who made no secret of his identity, was unable to penetrate the spaces that
Davies did, and was thus unable to see the victims of slavery in their ordinary
environment. When he ventured into the domain of the slave-holder, it was only on the
terms of the slave-holder, who was generally on guard. Abdy gained admittance, for
example, to the place where a dealer in slaves kept his human property before selling it
again. It is not clear how Abdy was represented at the door of the establishment, only
that he gained admittance through the introduction of some ‘guide’. ‘[The proprietor]
himself was out. Two of his men, however, were standing at the door; and as my guide
was familiarly acquainted with them, we were admitted without difficulty.’ Once inside,
Abdy was given a tour. He did not, however, think that he was allowed to see
everything. Nor was he certain that he was given access to the ordinary circumstances of
the holdings: ‘We were ushered into a well-furnished room, and invited to take wine,
some bottles of which were standing on a side-board, for the accommodation, doubtless,
of purchasers . . . We then went over the establishment; the delay that had occurred in the
parlor, having given time to prepare it for our inspection . . . Everything looked clean
and in good order . . . I asked the man who attended us, whether we had seen the whole
establishment; having heard a great deal of a dungeon, where the refractory are confined,
and where (as I had been informed by a lady who had visited the place, and was unable to
proceed from the horror she felt at the description given her of the thumbscrews; and
other instruments of coercion) a very different scene was to be witnessed. I was told that
there was no room of the kind. It was not to be expected that I should be allowed to visit
such a place; to deny the existence of which would be the natural consequence of having
it.’27
27 Abdy, Journal, II, p. 180.
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On another occasion, in the District of Columbia, Abdy observed a less
scrupulously guarded holding pen. Although he did not have access to its interior, he was
able to peek inside through the windows:
I went to see the ‘slaves’ pen’—a wretched hovel . . . the outside alone is
accessible to the eye of a visitor; what passes within being reserved for the
exclusive observation of its owner, (a man by the name of Robey,) and his
unfortunate victims. It is surrounded by a wooden paling fourteen or fifteen feet
in height, with the posts outside to prevent escape, and separated from the
building by a space too narrow to admit of a free circulation of air. At a small
window above . . . two or three sable faces appeared, looking out wistfully to
while away the time and catch a refreshing breeze; the weather being extremely
hot.28
Without having entered the building, Abdy was able to communicate a palpable sense of
the barrier that existed between himself and the slaves within. In his description of the
faces at the window, he was also able to describe to his reader that there were things he
could not see - the bodies below it - and in presenting the barriers to any further visual
information about the inhabitants of the pen, he was able to communicate a sense that the
slaves were trapped. His description of the oppressive heat of the day gives an even
stronger sense of their claustrophobic condition. This episode of Abdy’s ‘peeking in’ at
the conditions of these victims is arguably representative of his whole experience in
American slavery, during which he was able to ‘see’ less than Davies. However, Abdy
was not confined to the constant assumption of a disguise, which would have inhibited
his ability to interrogate the things he did see.
28 Abdy, Journal, II, p. 180.
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Though Abdy did not bear witness to the more forbidden sights of American slave
culture, such as slave auctions, when he did encounter slaves he was able to collect their
direct verbal testimony. Restricting himself to safer spaces, Abdy did not need to disguise
his motives, and as such seems to have gained the trust of those persons of colour with
whom he spoke (though of course we cannot be certain). This is not to say that he never
took risks: on one occasion, he conversed with a group of slaves in Virginia ‘at some risk
to both parties; for I went to their houses by stealth, and at night.’29 Abdy did not
indicate for how long he interviewed these individuals, and did not present a dialogue of
their conversations. He did, however, present some of the content of their discussion.
Further, he attempted to analyze what these victims of slavery told him, in the context of
the particular socio-political culture of slavery as he understood it to exist in that area of
Virginia. He contrasted the attitudes toward people of colour in Washington, D.C., as
opposed to in Richmond, Virginia, even so far as to analyze the influence of these
differing attitudes upon the perception of those victims of slavery with whom he visited
in secret:
Washington is more liberal than Richmond to these people. In the former they
have two societies for mutual instruction, and two churches supported by their
own contributions. The females, too, have formed several benevolent associations
for mutual assistance. Such things would not be tolerated in Richmond; where the
contrast between freedom and slavery is made to turn, as much as possible, in
favour of the latter, by connecting degradation and delinquency with the former,
29 Abdy, Journal, II, p. 264.
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that the chain may feel lighter, and the lash less galling. A slave told me he would
rather be as he was, than lie idle about with nothing to do.30
Although it is arguable that Abdy was hardly in a position to be so critical of the slave’s
point of view, it is important to consider his attempt to imagine what circumstances have
informed the perspective of this particular individual.
One interesting strategy that Abdy used to increase his access to the victims of
American slavery within a relatively safe space was to visit runaway slaves in prisons in
the North. Away from the eyes of the southern slave-holding population, Abdy was able
to interview these individuals in a territory that seems to have been strangely marginal.
Having committed a ‘crime’ that was not illegal according to the laws of the land that
held them, these victims were caught between the legal worlds of the North and South,
and do not seem to have belonged anywhere. Abdy discovered that the difficulty of
classifying the status of a runaway slave in the North was much more than a cultural or
legal conundrum, but was a matter of practical urgency for the person so identified:
‘These poor creatures had no means of support, but what they obtained from casual
charity or by waiting upon the other prisoners . . . Upon inquiry of the keeper, I was told
that there was no legal provision—no allowance of any kind, made for persons under
these circumstances’.31 Abdy’s work rescued the stories of these people from a system
that afforded them no space.
The runaway slaves with whom Abdy spoke in a prison in New York varied from
one another in their enthusiasm for his interview. One of these ‘had been within the
walls sixteen weeks. He had made his escape four years before from New Orleans. He
30 Abdy, Journal, II, p. 264.
31 Abdy, Journal, II, p. 16.
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honestly confessed to me that he was a slave; the other was less frank; and so
disheartened by the prospect before him, that he declared he would destroy himself if
taken back to his master in Virginia.’32 In presenting these differences, Abdy
demonstrated that the experiences of individual victims of slavery were personal and
distinct. Instead of presenting a trope of a runaway slave, he offered an open-ended
picture of the oppression of slavery, inviting others to imagine that there were a multitude
of others whose voices would never be heard by anyone.
Interestingly, Abdy realized that Damon Jones, one of those being held in the
New York prison as a runaway slave, actually ‘belonged’ to someone he knows: ‘It
happened, that his master, to whom I had been particularly introduced a few days before
at a party, was then in the city; and I determined to call and inquire of him whether
Damon’s account was to be relied upon’.33 Abdy was not surprised when this man would
not corroborate his slave’s story, considering that Jones had claimed to have purchased
his freedom several times and had been each time defrauded of it. Though Abdy, as an
abolitionist, may not have been likely to believe the word of a slave-holder over that of a
victim of slavery, it is important to note his eagerness to collect information from
different perspectives.
Abdy extended his practice of aligning information gathered from different
sources to his analysis of print sources. Abdy’s work often makes reference to printed
materials, some of which, like the American Annual Register, the Niles Register, and
various legislative documents, would not have been difficult for someone in Britain to
locate. Others, like the Hopkinsville Advocate (Kentucky), were more local and might
32 Abdy, Journal, II, p. 17.
33 Abdy, Journal, II, p. 17.
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not have been very easy to access outside of the United States. Indeed, it seems as if
Abdy spent a good deal of time researching American popular and legal representations
of slavery, but his analysis of print sources extends far beyond the information he could
find in print. Abdy often weighed the information he read in print against what he heard
and against his general experiences within American culture, and he sometimes
concluded against the print sources. Abdy was particularly keen at reading silences in
printed material. Some silences were general: ‘So much care is taken to conceal what is
passing on the plantations in the South, that it is incidentally only, and when the liberal
limit to cruelty is exceeded, that publicity is given to deeds of extraordinary atrocity.
Enough, however, is on record, of what is daily practised without observation or
animadversion, to stamp the whole system with the indelible marks of unmitigated and
inevitable atrocity.’34
As it is difficult to gather proof of things that are concealed, this judgment is
presented as something that must be felt rather than as something Abdy could claim to
have witnessed. His point was rather to communicate that his experience in America had
left him with the feeling that what was written about the atrocities of American slavery
was so incomplete as to give an inaccurate picture of what really happened. Having
discovered to what lengths the slave-holding population of America would go to conceal
events that were likely to provoke public opinion against them, Abdy imagined it safe to
assume that the crimes of slavery were more widespread and horrific than what one could
learn from print sources. While Abdy could not prove that this was so by giving
examples of events he witnessed personally, he was able to describe how he was led to
the conclusion that American slave-holders were desperate to avoid negative press.
34 Abdy, Journal, I, p. 385.
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Abdy sometimes analyzed very specific omissions in printed materials. For
example, he discussed an account given in the 1826 American Annual Register of a
murder of a slave by his master. The article reported that the victim was suspended by a
rope from the ceiling of a smokehouse at the order of his master, a Captain Carter, but
‘there is nothing . . . said of Carter’s arrest’.35 Abdy describes the content of several
other, similar murder cases as mentioned in the same volume. ‘It is not stated whether
the perpetrators of these diabolical outrages were punished or not.’36 Abdy suggests that
the significant absence of such important details effectively articulated what was not
permitted to be reported in these texts: cultural and political tensions surrounding the
controversy of the slave system stifled even the voices of those writers whose duty it was
to report the criminal injustices inflicted upon the victims of American slavery.
Abdy argued that American newspaper sources tended to ignore events that
highlighted the tragic plight of slaves. He considered that much newsworthy information
was suppressed or overlooked because it was either politically risky to run stories about
injustices done to slaves, or because the victims of slavery were not considered important
enough to merit their stories to be documented by the press. Abdy indicated, however,
that although many such stories did not make the papers, they defied the cultural attempt
to suppress them and became ‘news’ anyway. For example, Abdy reported the tale of a
young girl in Washington, D.C. who was pursued by hounds as she tried to escape
slavery. Rather than allow herself to be caught, the girl threw herself into a river to be
drowned. ‘No notice whatever was taken of this horrible occurrence by the public
35 Abdy, Journal, I, p. 386.
36 Abdy, Journal, I, p. 386.
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papers; though it was a matter of notoriety’.37 Abdy must have heard this story from
local residents as he suggests that it was somewhat common knowledge. The implication
is that he searched through the local papers looking for mention of the incident. Abdy
juxtaposed what he perceived to have been common knowledge with what was
considered by the press to be suitable to report in order to demonstrate a tension between
what was ‘known’ to be wrong, or tragic, and what was publicly admitted to have been
so.
Davies, too, compared what he read in American newspapers to the information
he gathered from other (presumably verbal) sources. Davies gave two sides of a story he
had heard and read about in Mississippi: ‘Here, a few years ago, “a Negro man was
condemned by the mob to be burned alive over a slow fire, which was put into execution,
for murdering a black woman and her master Mr. Green, a respectable citizen who
attempted to save her from the clutches of this monster." Such is the newspaper version
of the affair. Had the real truth been stated, it would have appeared that this Green was
the “monster,” who had seduced the wretched negro’s wife!’38 In contrast to Abdy’s
more formal methodology, Davies did not explain where he read about this event, or even
tell exactly what he had heard elsewhere. He did not aspire to achieve the same
semblance of objectivity as did Abdy. As a result, Davies’ text reads more like gossip,
but it is important to note that both Abdy and Davies were writing about things they did
not and could not have witnessed. Their strategies of presentation may have been quite
different, but this only serves to highlight that they were working toward the same
interpretive and communicative goals. Like Abdy, Davies attempted to communicate a
37 Abdy, Journal, II, p. 92.
38 Davies, Scenes, p. 99.
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significant disparity between ‘the word on the street’ and what was recorded in the
newspapers. This reflects a tension between what was documented publicly and what
was popularly acknowledged, and suggests the former adhered to a morality that was
constructed to conform to political and cultural imperatives, rather than any real or felt
sense of right and wrong.
Davies recounted the story of Mary Brown, headed ‘A Painful Story’, without so
much as mentioning where he heard the story. Mary Brown, according to Davies, was
sold in the town of Natchez, Mississippi, and it was while recording his travels through
that town that Davies chose to tell her story, almost as if she and her sufferings were part
of that landscape: ‘At night we came to Natchez, a town beautifully situated on the top of
a hill, about 300 feet above the level of the river, and for this reason called “Natchez-on-
the-Hill” . . . Darkness had set in when we approached it; yet the numerous lights on
shore, rising row above row to a great elevation, gave it a lively and interesting
appearance. But, alas! Natchez also is a great slave market; and I can never think of it
without remembering the sufferings of poor Mary Brown. Let me narrate her painful
story. It may waken in some breast a feeling of sympathy for the American slave.’39
Davies took several pages to tell the story of Mary Brown, who, as he explained, was
born of free parents, but cheated of her free status by local officials when they died. The
manner in which Davies detailed her story is quite intimate, as if she had communicated
it to him personally - indeed, he never said that she did not.
Her handcuffs made her wrists swell so much that at night they were obliged to
take them off, and put fetters round her ankles. In the morning the handcuffs were
again put on. Thus they travelled for two weeks, wading rivers, whipped up all
39 Davies, Scenes, pp. 93-95.
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day, and beaten at night if they had not performed the prescribed distance. She
frequently waded rivers in her chains, with water up to her waist. The month was
October, and the air cold and frosty. After she had travelled thus twelve or fifteen
days, her arms and ankles had become so swollen that she felt as if she could go
no further. They had no beds, usually sleeping in barns, sometimes out on the
naked ground; and such were her misery and pain that she could only lie and cry
all night.40
A skeptical reader might doubt that he could have obtained such information from any
other source but from Mary herself - or one might be tempted to think that he made some
of it up. What is intriguing to note is that Davies did not feel a sense of urgency to
communicate the source of his information. He described how Mary Brown felt and
about what she did at night when no one was watching, without so much as hinting that
he had even met the girl. Why was Davies was so easy about relating this story without
feeling any need to tell where he got the information? It is impossible to say for certain,
but perhaps he considered that emotion was more convincing than the appearance of
‘fact’. It certainly forms a contrast to Abdy’s methodology. This difference in their
methodologies probably relates to the question of why Davies chose to wear a disguise to
seek access to spaces that would be forbidden to anyone known to be an abolitionist,
while Abdy did not.
Despite his very limited empirical access to the victims of American slavery,
Abdy demonstrated a desire to supply his readers with solid evidence to confirm even
some very basic ethnological statements, rather than allowing judgments that he formed
according to his observations to rest unsupported. Abdy offered ‘proof’, for example, of
40 Davies, Scenes, p. 94.
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the intellectual equality of the oppressed blacks to the enslaving whites, in the form of an
expert opinion from one who had served for twenty years as headmaster at a school in
New York for people of colour: ‘He assured me that he could not discover any difference
of intellect in blacks and whites:—he thought that, with similar advantages, the former
would be fully equal to the latter’.41 Not only was Abdy careful to point out this man’s
qualifications, but, interestingly, he made a direct argument in favour of his credibility.
The result was a little heavy-handed: ‘This testimony is not to be hastily rejected,
derived, as it is, from a man highly respected, of much experience in the tuition of both
races, competent to form a sound opinion, and coming to a conclusion directly opposed to
all that he had been taught and all he still hears’.42 Clearly, Abdy had considered the
influence that popular prejudices were likely to have had on the reading Briton, and had
determined not only to expose the plight of oppressed African-Americans, but also to
negotiate for an understanding of the sameness of these victims. The force with which
Abdy insisted that his readers accept the headmaster’s argument indicates that he
anticipated that his readers might have tended to distance themselves from the sufferings
of the victims of American slavery by classing them as a group who were substantially
different from the white Briton.
In addition to their words, Abdy describes the emotional responses exhibited by
people who witnessed the suffering inflicted upon American slaves. One man, in relating
to Abdy some events he had personally witnessed, cried when he described to Abdy what
he had seen. Abdy made it a point to mention the man’s tears, and then went on to make
a more general statement about the emotional response to slavery: ‘Persons who witness
41 Abdy, Jounal, I, p. 9.
42 Abdy, Journal, I, p. 9.
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these cruelties for the first time are affected even to tears:—the heart seems to sink under
the pressure of mental suffering, and sickness, often accompanied with vomiting,
ensues’.43 It is not clear how Abdy knew this, but it was an interesting strategy to align
such physical evidence of aversion with the initial sight of cruelty to slaves. This
suggested that emotional distress, as might cause one to cry or to vomit, was the natural
response to witnessing the horrors of slavery. Abdy’s strategy provided his readers,
many or most of whom would never had witnessed these horrors, with physical
indications of the level of emotional response that were often experienced by people who
would witness them for the first time. This gave both an idea to the reader of how he or
she might feel when confronted with the spectacle of American slavery, and suggested to
the reader that those who would claim it was other than horrific (as slave-owners would
have been likely to do) had probably become hardened to such sights and been taught to
suppress their emotions. The idea that so many individuals had hardened themselves
against responding to the suffering of slaves would likely have encouraged British
readers to think carefully about the extreme vulnerability of the slaves, who could not
even rely upon others who witnessed their suffering to care about what was happening to
them.
Both Abdy and Davies used dialogue to represent the speech of the victims of
slavery whom they encountered.44 Their dialogue was almost always presented in proper
English without any attempt to represent dialect, which is arguably significant, as to have
done so would have made the subjects of their study to seem more exotic and probably
43 Abdy, Journal, II, pp. 243-244.
44 For a study of the representation of the words of people on the margins of nineteenth-century English
society, see Bertrand Taithe’s The Essential Mayhew: Representing and Communicating the Poor
(London, 1996).
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would have increased the sensational aspect of their works. But Abdy and Davies
presented their subjects as normal people who spoke plain English. They both tended
not, however, to record long passages of the speeches of even those they interviewed;
rather, they normally used dialogue to illustrate points that they themselves had made.
Abdy, in delivering to his reader the testimony of a slave he met who was serving as a
waiter in Washington, D.C., was sparing with the man’s own words, yet certainly made a
point of using them: ‘He had been married three times;—not that he had been twice a
widower . . . the most endearing ties which can bind the parties together by tokens and
objects of mutual affection being liable to be torn asunder at a moment’s warning. “If the
owner of my wife,” he observed, “should endorse a bill, and the drawer fail, he would
perhaps sell her to obtain money; and we should never see each other again”.’45 It is
particularly interesting to note that Abdy chose to present the slave’s description of a
hypothetical situation rather than a descriptive narrative of something that happened to
the man personally (for example, a narrative of what happened to dissolve his former
marriages). The choice tended to lend a certain authority to the man’s speech, and
suggested that only a slave would know best about the general effects of slavery upon the
personal relationships of its victims.
Although both Abdy and Davies mostly restricted themselves to weaving short
quotes from the subjects they encounter into their own arguments, Davies presented
several pages of the speech of a Presbyterian minister of colour. Theodore Sedgwick
Wright, though not a slave, died as a result of racial prejudice he experienced while using
public transportation in New York, according to Davies . Excluded from transportation
that would have been available to whites, Wright was forced to undertake a long journey
45 Abdy, Journal, II, p. 88.
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on foot, suffering from exposure and exhaustion, which lead to his demise. Incredibly,
Davies asks his reader to ‘listen to his voice. Though “dead, he yet speaketh”. He had
felt this cruel prejudice against the colour of his skin as iron entering his soul . . . “No
man can really understand this prejudice, unless he feels it crushing him to the dust,
because it is a matter of feeling”.’46 It is arguable that Davies was inviting his reader to
‘hear’ Wright’s voice in a spiritual sense, especially since Wright was dead.47 The
juxtaposition of the biblical reference with the request that the reader ‘listen to his voice’
further implies that Wright’s soul had transcended the limitations of the flesh (and the
prejudice against his skin colour). 48 It is even more interesting that Davies should have
presented Wright’s statement that no one could understand such racial prejudice until
they have been subjected to it. Of course, Davies himself could not claim the experience,
but it was even more important to consider a lesson of ‘that which could not be known’
from someone who had transcended earthly life into the realm of divine knowledge.
Empathy, as such, was a divine lesson.
Davies contrasted Wright’s ‘voice’ with other voices he heard at Wright’s funeral.
Several hired white attendants, including the cabmen, ‘all behave exceedingly well. But
did you overhear what those three or four low dirty men said as we approached? [Davies
was asked to be a pall-bearer at Wright’s funeral] I am ashamed to tell because those
men are not Americans, but Irishmen,—“Here comes the dead nigger!”’49 Davies also
quoted from the eulogy, which was delivered by Dr Patton, a white minister who, as
46 Davies, Scenes, p. 237.
47 On the historical relationship between the human voice and hearing (as well as the inability to hear), see
Jonathan Ree, I See a Voice: Deafness, Language, and the Senses (London: Harper Collins, 1999).
On sound and hearing in the nineteenth century, see John Picker, Victorian Soundscapes (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003).
48 The biblical reference is from Hebrews 11:4.
49 Davies, Scenes, p. 237.
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Davies informed his reader, racially segregated his own congregation with the use of a
‘Negro pew’: ‘Dr Patton delivers an oration. In that oration, while speaking of Mr.
Wright’s anti-slavery feelings as being very strong, he adds, with very questionable taste,
‘“But at the same time our brother had no sympathy with those who indulged in
denunciation, wrath, and blackguardism. He would never touch those missiles which
none but scoundrels use”.’50 Clearly, Davies did not consider Wright’s funeral to be an
appropriate venue for denouncing abolitionism.
As well as overhearing the racial slurs of the attendants at Wright’s funeral, and
‘hearing’ the racial prejudice that informed Dr Patton’s speech, Davies also ‘heard’
voices that were unspoken, often in a religious context. Davies juxtaposed his memory of
words spoken to him by slave-traders with those he heard spoken at a religious service.
He indicted the culture of the slave-holding population of the southern United States by
repeating the slave-trader’s words for his reader in dialogue, and contrasting them with a
religious sermon about freedom: ‘He prayed for “our nation and rulers.” He prayed that
“the great blessings of Civil and Religious Liberty which we enjoy may be handed down
to future generations.” "Looking out for a few niggers this morning?” thought I.’51
Davies also ‘heard’ scriptural voices presenting words that juxtaposed with the
actual scripture that he heard being read, in a way that highlighted the hypocrisy of slave-
holding Christians: ‘“Where is Abel, thy brother?” thought I, during this address to the
Father of the spirits of all flesh. He then read the 23rd and 24th psalms. The 33rd psalm
was then sung. “Where is Abel, thy brother?” was still heard (by me, at least) louder than
50 Davies, Scenes, p. 237.
51 Davies, Scenes, p. 29.
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the swelling tones of the organs.’52 The parenthetical reminder that Davies was the only
one to hear this voice, suggested that there was a ‘truth’ that Davies believed to be known
by all who are present at the church, but that he believed to have been ignored by
everyone else but himself.53 That truth, arguably, was the reality of the suffering of
slaves, which was wrong despite the fact that no one would discuss it. Davies knew that
he could not discuss it either. The scriptural ‘voice’ had to remain silent in his head if
Davies was to keep safe among slave-holding American society. It is even arguable that
the tension that prevented Davies from speaking was itself that ‘voice’. Davies believed
that the collective conscience of the slave-holders was aware that slavery was wrong and
that it caused tremendous suffering, and his proof of this was the tangible delicacy of the
topic of slavery, and the awareness of the vulnerable position of the institution against the
force of social reform.
The biblical passage that Davies ‘heard’ spoken in the church is significant, as
they are God’s response to Abel’s ‘blood crying out from the stones’54 This was
suggestive of the voicelessness of the slave, and also suggested that God could ‘hear’ the
voice of the voiceless. Just because the cries of the victims of slavery were silenced did
not mean that they did not exist. This was an essential statement of hope for defending
the vulnerable. While it was essentially a statement of religious faith, it was at the same
time a statement of hope in the possibilities of reaching across the boundaries of human
sense perception. Although the voices of American slaves were effectively stifled by
52 Davies, Scenes, p. 28.
53 For a study of the moral problem that slavery presented to the traditional British Protestant ideology, see
Edith Hurwitz, Politics and the Public Conscience: Slave Emancipation and the Abolitionist
Movement in Britain (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1973). For a broader study of the
moral problem that slavery (and, most saliently, the enslavement of Africans in America)
presented to European ideology, see David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western
Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966).
54 Genesis 4:10.
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slave-holding society, Davies had, after all, infiltrated this society in order to tell the
‘story’ of those voices - despite the fact that to do this, he needed to rely heavily upon his
own imagination.
Davies’ use of the scriptural dialogue between Cain and his Maker is further
significant in that Cain responds to God’s question (‘Where is Abel, thy brother?’) with
another question of his own: ‘Am I my brother’s keeper?’55 It is very likely that Davies’
readers would have been familiar with this story, and it is arguable that Davies, in using
it, meant to imply that slaveholders deliberately chose to ignore its lesson. Of course,
Cain’s response was hardly sufficient, and neither was it acceptable for members of the
slave-holding society of southern America to ignore the sufferings of their fellow human
beings. Davies echoed the Christian idea that all of humanity is ‘one body’ and thus
dismissed the idea that pain is solely the concern of the individual whose body is feeling
it.
Both Abdy and Davies, in opposing slavery and racial prejudice, returned again
and again to the theological argument that all human beings are the children of one God.
It is important to note that contemporary science was deeply interested in uncovering the
secrets of racial difference, despite the fact that the concept of race, or at least of
‘blackness’, seems to have emerged concomitantly with the Atlantic slave trade.56 The
black body came to be seen as so very different from the white body that, as Todd Savitt
has pointed out, white scientists went so far as to conduct experiments to try to ascertain,
55 Genesis 4:9.
56 See Peter Erickson, ‘Representations of Blacks and Blackness in the Renaissance’, Criticism, 35 (1993),
pp. 499-528. Cedric Robinson argues that ‘blackness’ (as distinct from ‘race’) developed as a
concept alongside the Atlantic Slave Trade in ‘The Inventions of the Negro’, Social Identities, 7
(2001), pp. 329-361.
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for example, how ‘deep’ black skin went.57 Despite the fact that nineteenth-century
scientific discourse accepted the legitimacy of the empirical exploration of racial
difference, a parallel religious discourse maintained that all races were descended from
God the common parent, citing religious texts as evidence. Abdy did just this as he
searched for a tactful way to disagree with the racist contentions of one New Yorker.
Upon remarking against the strict segregation of black from white schoolchildren, Abdy
recognized the futility of attempting to persuade his racist conversant to change his
opinion, but quietly stood his ground: ‘A contemptuous smile and a very silly assertion
that Nature, by degrading the one race, had placed an insuperable barrier to a closer
approximation with the other, were the only reply. I contented myself with remarking
that there was no color in the soul, and turned the conversation to some other topic’.58
Thus, Abdy eschewed any argument over biological difference by dismissing the
consideration of such factors as irrelevant anyway, where the concern was the fair
treatment of human beings. He did not engage in an argument over the empirical,
physical, or ‘natural’ differences between the black and white races, because even if there
were such differences, it did not matter. The religious discourse of ‘sameness’ among
human beings was apparently a viable cultural alternative to the scientific discussion of
racial differences.
57 Todd L. Savitt, ‘The Use of Blacks for Medical Experimentation and Demonstration in the Old South’,
Journal of Southern History, 48 (1982), 331-348. In a similar vein, Sander Gilman has discussed
the claims of nineteenth-century science to be able to empirically distinguish racial difference with
regard to the Jews: ‘the Jew was . . . inherently different from the Aryan . . . Given the basic
philosophy of late nineteenth-century science, this difference was defined in terms of observable
phenomena (or phenomena suggested to be observable) by ethnologists and those they influenced,
such as the physicians of the period. The Case of Sigmund Freud: Medicine and Identity at the
Fin-de-Siecle (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1993), p.14.
58 Abdy, Scenes, I, p. 5.
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Abdy argued that racism was irreligious because the bodies of all human beings
were, in a sense, spiritual entities in themselves. He paraphrased the statement of one
American minister, that Negroes were ‘ “a degraded, unenlightened, unprincipled, and
abandoned race,”’ and that they were ‘“equally worthless and noxious in themselves, and
a nuisance to the public”’. 59 He remarked about these statements that ‘the arrogance of
this language is lost in its impiety; the preacher has insulted the Maker in insulting the
work of his hands’.60 These bodies were flesh and blood, but they were more than the
sum of their parts, and were due a measure of respect as such. Abdy presented some
(second-hand) knowledge of the possibility that slaves were sometimes ‘owned’ by
religious congregations as evidence of the ultimate absurdity of the slave system: ‘It is
not uncommon for churches to hold slaves. A person, who was in the habit of asking the
slaves to whom they belonged, one day received the following answer, “I belong to the
congregation”. On inquiry, he found that the man was one of a gang who had been
bequeathed to a religious society for pious causes; and the proceeds derived from their
labour were appropriated to the repairs of the building, and other expenses connected
with the congregation.’61 Even if, as Boyd Hilton has argued, pain and suffering were
believed to have been part of the Divine Will and a mechanism of conversion and
redemption in the first half of the nineteenth century, the pain and suffering that was the
result of such exploitative practices as slavery did not fit very well into this equation.
Hilton argues that ‘the problem with slavery was that it was so obviously unfair that it
challenged the liberal evangelical belief in a just distribution of rewards and punishments
59 Abdy, Scenes, II, p. 85.
60 Abdy, Scenes, II, p. 85.
61 Abdy, Scenes, II, p. 244.
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in the natural world’.62 Suffering caused by slavery was very difficult to justify as
anything but contrary to God’s will, arguably because it was easy enough for one to
imagine oneself in the position of the slave, despite whatever differences might have been
suggested to exist between a person of another race and oneself.
Davies pointed out that slave-holders often class the bodies of slaves with those of
different species. In doing so, he highlighted the attempt of slave-holding society to deny
the victims of slavery the dignity of humanity. Davies quoted a man with whom he
travelled on the Mississippi in Louisiana: ‘We observed on the river's bank what a man
at my elbow (a professor of religion, who had discovered a great propensity to talk about
his religious experience before gamblers) coolly designated “a drove of horses, mules,
and niggers”.’63 Davies also compared the way that Edmund, a 32-year-old young man,
was physically inspected at a slave auction to the way that one might have inspected a
horse one was considering for sale: ‘At this moment a gentleman, who, like most of those
present, appeared to be a sort of speculator in slaves, stepped forward, and examined with
his hands the boy’s legs, especially about the ankles, just as I have seen horse-dealers do
with those animals at fairs.’64 This familiar action is suggested to the reader as having
been performed in a highly inappropriate context; it is hard to imagine that Edmund could
have been indifferent to this manner of inspection, as one might imagine a horse could
have been.
Davies implied that the experience of this kind of physical inspection would have
been particularly distressing for a woman, as the public exposure of her body would have
caused her to feel humiliation and to fear sexual violation. Davies considered the action
62 Hilton, Atonement, p. 210.
63 Davies, Scenes, p. 102.
64 Davies, Scenes, p. 54.
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of close physical inspection of a woman to be so socially unacceptable that it absolutely
shamed the individual who performed such an action: ‘Cornelia was standing upon the
chair. “Now, gentlemen, who bids for this girl? She is sold for no fault, but simply for
want of money. Who bids for this excellent washer and ironer?” At this moment one of
the “gentlemen”, standing in front of her, deliberately took his walking-stick, and, with
the point of it, lifted up her clothes as high as the knee.’65 Davies’ suggestion that he did
not consider the man to be a ‘gentleman’ was arguably more than just an observation of
the man’s apparent class status. Although he did not give a description of the man, it
seems clear that Davies imagined a great disparity between the man’s behaviour toward
Cornelia and what his behaviour would have been if she were a white woman, and not for
sale. Davies may also have meant to suggest that Cornelia’s cultural inhibitions, which
were likely moulded very deliberately in her training as a household maid, were
completely incongruous to the treatment she was expected to tolerate at the auction. As
such, Cornelia had been taught to dress (and probably to act) modestly, only to have this
modesty violated.
Davies suggested that some human actions and responses transcended cultural
performativity to a sort of universal significance. The bond between parent and child
would cause behaviours that would mean the same whether performed by an American
Negro or a white Briton. Davies described to his reader an incident of small moment,
which he observed at the same auction in New Orleans where Cornelia was being sold:
The next ‘lot’ was a family, consisting of the husband, a man slightly coloured
about 30 years of age, the wife about 25, quite black, and reminding me forcibly
of an excellent woman in my own congregation, a little girl about 4 years of age,
65 Davies, Scenes, p. 53.
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and a child in the arms. They were told to mount the platform. As they obeyed, I
was attracted by a little incident, which had well nigh caused my feelings to
betray me. Never shall I forget it. Parents of England, let me tell it you, and enlist
your sympathies on behalf of oppressed and outraged humanity. It was that of a
father helping up, by the hand, his own little girl to be exposed for sale!66
Davies entered into a kind of discourse of the ‘natural’ relationship between parent and
child in order to encourage his reader to consider the transcendence or spirituality of
some actions of the human body. The performance of this father in assisting his
daughter is rendered perverse by the context of the slave auction. Many of Davies’
readers would have been able to recall having performed similar actions in assisting their
children. Davies suggested that the spirit of such actions would have been the same for
these other people, but perverted by the yoke of slavery.
Bertram Wyatt-Brown has written particularly on the subject of role-playing and
the psychology of the male slave in nineteenth-century America. He argues that role-
playing was a crucial survival skill for a slave in the Old South, but reminds his reader
that ‘role-playing does involve inner feelings. Pressure to conform to bondage, to recite
the script as given, can lead to self-deprecation or even self-hatred’67 Both Abdy and
Davies struggled to see beyond the mask of the slave and to represent their especially
elusive interior experience. Neither Abdy nor Davies presented their subjects as
consistently tractable or docile, and both seem to have been keen to witness evidence of
the human behind the slave-mask. Abdy described a gang of slaves, who were labouring
in a field in Virginia by which he passed in a coach:
66 Davies, Scenes, p. 52.
67 Bertram Wyatt-Brown, ‘The Mask of Obedience: Slave Psychology in the Old South’, American
Historical Review, 93 (1988), 1228-1252, p. 1230.
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The laborers in the field were unwilling machines. The slow and lifeless manner
in which they handled the hoe or turned the plough-share;—the uplifted looks
they cast at us as we passed;—the furtive cessation from the toil that invariably
took place, as the overseer’s eye was turned from them;—spoke a language that
could not be mistaken. It told of unrequited labor, of undeserved misfortune, of
blighted affections, and the destruction of all hopes and fears that play round the
heart of a man, and distinguish him from the brute creation.68
Abdy could sense both elements of their disposition - the human as well as the slave-
mask. He suggested that for one who cared to look, the human suffering could be read on
the faces of the victims of slavery.
Davies assigned words to the humanity he read on the face of one intractable
slave. He writes of ‘Tom’, a 35-year-old man who was sold by auction in New Orleans:
‘An excellent painter and glazier, and a good cook besides. His only fault is that he has a
great idea of his own reserved rights, to the neglect of those of his master . . . 300 dollars
were first offered for him, but poor Tom went for 350. “Now, sir,” said the man-seller to
Tom, with a malicious look, “you’ll go into the country” . . . Tom, as he descended from
the chair, gave a look which seemed to say, “I care not whither I go; but my own reserved
rights shall not be forgotten!”’69 Davies communicated a sense of the human spirit
behind the slave. Though the slave could not speak out against the ‘man-seller’, neither
did he hide his feelings. It is for this reason he was sold, and for this reason that Davies
was given a rare opportunity to glimpse what slave-masks would mostly hide from him.
68 Abdy, Journal, II, p. 214.
69 Davies, Scenes, p. 54.
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It is easy to dismiss the efforts of such British abolitionists as Edward Strutt Abdy
and Ebenezer Davies as self-serving, as we can never verify their motives. Their
attempts to write about American slavery certainly carry the taint of their own white
cultural perspectives. Yet Abdy’s and Davies’ texts, written in 1833-34 and 1849
respectively, make remarkable bookends. Between their works one can sample the
cultural progress of the imagination in the nineteenth-century expression of ethical
concerns. Unconfined by the legal or scientific framework that would have made the
study of their works less unruly, these two popular activists could attempt to see, and to
cause others to see, what they could not really observe. They expressed the unknowable.
Their very different strategies for overcoming their often significantly different




When it Hurts to Look: Interpreting the Interior of the Woman
The history of American slavery has an unfortunate intersection with the history of
gynaecology in the career of Dr J. Marion Sims, who designed one of the earliest modern
specula. Although his later patients came to include European royalty, his fame was
established through a series of surgical experiments performed upon American slave
women in a makeshift hospital in his backyard in Montgomery, Alabama, during the
years 1845-1849. To inspect a vesico-vaginal fistula, Sims fashioned a pewter spoon
into an instrument that would serve as the prototype for the type of speculum that would
bear his name in the future (also known as the ‘duck-billed’ speculum). Though Sims
eventually met with some success in treating the vesico-vaginal fistula, which had been
formerly untreatable, many if not most of his early ‘patients’ died as a result of the
surgeries or of secondary infections.
Terri Kapsalis, in Public Privates: Performing Gynecology from Both Ends of the
Speculum, examines the ideological context to Sims’ experiments. Kapsalis argues that
‘the institution of slavery served medicine in providing subjects for experimentation’, and
points out that all we know about these women is what Sims himself wrote about them in
his autobiography.1 It is impossible to know whether or not these women consented to
these operations (which were conducted without anaesthesia), especially since the
disorder was not life-threatening. Sims remains a controversial figure in the history of
gynaecology; medical professionals will often praise his innovations without mentioning
the deeply problematic context of his ‘discoveries’. Some argue that he was merely a
1 Terri Kapsalis, Public Privates: Performing Gynecology from Both Ends of the Speculum (Durham and
London: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 32.
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product of his age. Others, not surprisingly, refuse to abide any reference to Sims’
achievements not immediately qualified by denunciation of his practices.2
Kapsalis associates Sims’ zeal for invention with a wider trend of enthusiasm for
innovation in the study and practice of gynaecology in the mid-nineteenth century:
‘Forever in search of a new tool or surgical technique, Sims was one of the earliest
physicians to link female reproductivity with a kind of technophilia, publishing
extensively on each new innovation’.3 This trend was not restricted to the American side
of the Atlantic. British physicians pursued gynaecological innovation with a fervour that
was equal to that of their colleagues in the United States, despite the fact that they did not
have access to slave bodies on which they could experiment. Although not subject to
reproach from abolitionists, many of the pioneers of nineteenth-century British
gynaecology were (and are) very controversial figures themselves. Robert Lawson Tait,
for example, is both revered for his surgical innovations and notorious for the frequency
with which he performed ovariotomy as a remedy for diverse ailments. While one can
hardly compare the plight of the nineteenth-century British gynaecological patient to that
of the gynaecological patient who was also a slave, Sims’ experiments are a helpful
reference point from which to begin to consider the opinions of those who tried to speak
out in defence of the vulnerable female body as seen through the new technology of the
speculum.
Sims’ slave subjects were denied every consideration of female modesty, though
his white patients were apparently afforded more dignity.4 Across the Atlantic, slavery
had been outlawed in both France and England by the mid-nineteenth century. How
2 See Kapsalis, Public Privates, pp. 48-49 for a brief analysis of the controversy over Sims’ career.
3 Kapsalis, Public Privates, p. 49.
4 Kapsalis, Public Privates, p. 41.
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freely could a doctor study the reproductive organs of a free woman? The first modern
speculum was created and used in France by Joseph Récamier in 1801, and by 1810 the
speculum became an instrument of the state as all prostitutes were obliged to register with
the government and to submit to an internal pelvic examination. In the late 1860s,
Britain would implement the Contagious Diseases Acts, which would similarly force
alleged prostitutes in garrison and naval towns to submit to pelvic examinations. Ornella
Moscucci explains that by the 1830s and 1840s British medical students were exposed to
the use of the speculum while studying in Paris, and implemented this technology in their
own practices upon returning to Britain.5
Stanley Joel Reiser places the speculum alongside a number of other nineteenth-
century innovations in medical technology (such as the opthalmoscope and laryngoscope)
that enabled doctors to visually probe the body. Reiser explains that whereas sound had
once been ‘the doctor’s main sensory probe of the human interior’, by the nineteenth
century the visual sense had become just as important a means of acquiring such
information.6 A doctor could now expect to see many parts of the inside of the living
body that had previously been hidden from sight. Although the speculum was only one
of many new instruments that allowed medical practitioners to peer into the inside of the
bodies of patients, the ‘instrumental interference’ of the speculum in gynaecological
practice was not widely accepted in nineteenth-century Britain.7
In her analysis of a late eighteenth-century tract directed against ‘man-
midwifery’, Ludmilla Jordanova demonstrates that by that time the use of instruments
5 Ornella Moscucci, The Science of Woman: Gynaecology and Gender in England, 1800-1929
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 112.
6 Stanley Joel Reiser, Medicine and the Reign of Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1978), p. 55.
7 Moscucci, Science of Woman, p. 113.
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(such as forceps) to assist in childbirth or in the treatment of gynaecological ailments had
become associated with male practitioners, as opposed to the traditional, female midwife,
whose approach was less scientific and less interventionist.8 Through to the nineteenth
century, the male practitioner of obstetrics and gynaecology continued to be
marginalized, even by other medical professionals.9 As such, the arguments of
nineteenth-century gynaecologists who utilized the speculum in the examination of
patients were already burdened by the stigma of their profession before they even began
to advance the question of the legitimacy of this suspicious new instrument. The
argument to legitimize the practice of seeing into women’s bodies through the use of the
speculum was closely aligned with the larger argument in favour of the movement away
from traditional midwifery (and away from the traditional arts of medicine in general)
and toward a more scientific approach to the body as diagnostic material.10
The exposure of a woman’s reproductive organs to the prying eyes of (male)
science presented a great threat to Victorian moral ideals, as this part of the woman had
previously been absolutely hidden from all human sight. Even the external genitals of a
woman had almost never been permitted to be seen by any except her husband and her
(female) attendants at childbirth. Practitioners who advocated the use of the speculum,
however, claimed that this new instrument provided them with crucial knowledge about
8 Ludmilla Jordanova, Nature Displayed: Gender, Science, and Medicine 1760-1820 (London: Longman,
1999), pp. 24-25.
9See Moscucci, Science of Woman, pp. 57-74 for a discussion of the political struggle to overcome the
stigma of midwifery in order to establish the professional status of gynaecology within nineteenth-
century medicine.
10 It is important to note that during the early nineteenth century, abdominal surgery was for the most part
considered too dangerous to attempt, so that any technical advancement in accessing women’s
reproductive organs was necessarily experimental to a certain extent. It is, as Ann Dally suggests,
easy but unreasonable to assume that the chief aim of nineteenth-century gynaecological surgeons
was always or most often experimentation, rather than the treatment of women’s health problems,
since any innovative treatments of the abdominal area would have been necessarily experimental.
See Ann Dally, Women Under the Knife: A History of Surgery (London: Hutchinson Radius,
1991).
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the woman’s interior - her experiences, as well as the state of her internal organs. Far
from just a convenient metaphor, a woman’s internal organs provided these doctors with
information that they claimed could help them to know her pain and suffering. In effect,
the speculum helped them to ‘see’ what was happening inside a woman, and what she
was feeling. This was especially important as Victorian women were likely to be
extremely reticent about gynaecological afflictions. However, the professional
opportunities that would necessarily follow the acceptance of the widespread use of the
speculum by the medical community convinced some medical professionals that the
welfare of the individual patient was not the only motivation behind the advocacy of the
instrument. Moscucci claims that debate over the use of the speculum ‘had little to do
with science, and everything to do with morals.’11 I argue, however, that although there
was certainly a strong moral incentive to oppose the speculum in Victorian Britain, some
medical professionals also seem to have been legitimately concerned for the feelings and
the bodies that were rendered vulnerable to the promising new advances in the science of
gynaecology.12
It is certainly no surprise that both advocates and opponents of the speculum
claimed to be acting in the best interest of the patient. However, it is interesting to note
that both sides argued that the speculum should be used if, and only when, urgently
11 Moscucci, Science of Woman, p. 114.
12 As Mary Jacobus, Evelyn Fox Keller, and Sally Shuttleworth have argued, the woman’s body has often
been the site for competing discourses and meanings other than women’s own struggles. In
particular, nineteenth-century scientific discourses ‘cast the feminine body as the malfunctioning
organism that embodies society’s ills’. See the introduction to Body/Politics: Women and the
Discourses of Science (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), especially pp. 7-11. Both sides
of the speculum debate represent discourses that compete with the issues of women’s health and
well-being. Medical professionals on both sides of the debate claimed to be able to speak on
behalf of the women in their care with regard to what was best for these women. The struggles for
patriarchal values, cultural ideals about propriety, and the advancement of medical knowledge
were complicated by the real circumstances of the welfare of gynaecological patients (the
ostensible subject of the texts written to advance both sides of the debate).
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necessary. Charles West [1815-1898], a strong advocate of the use of the speculum in
gynaecological examination, reminded medical students in his 1856 The Diseases of
Women, that
the simplest mode of examination, and that which causes our patient the least
distress or alarm, is that which we employ our sense of touch alone, unaided by
any apparatus whatever. It is perhaps scarcely necessary for me to remind you
that, while it is our duty to use every means essential to the thorough investigation
of our patient’s condition, it is no less our duty to make no needless examination;
never to use an instrument when we can ascertain all that is necessary without it,
never to resort to ocular inspection when we can feel a reasonable certainty that
by the sense of touch alone we have arrived at a true knowledge of the disease.13
From this passage alone, it would be difficult to guess that West was such a strong
advocate of the widespread use of the speculum. West even advised against using a
13 Charles West, Lectures on the Diseases of Women (London: John Churchill, 1856), p. 12. For a
discussion of the Victorian medical view of young pubescent girls as particularly delicate, see
Deborah Gorham, The Victorian Girl and the Feminine Ideal (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1982), pp. 85-99. Gorham argues that Victorian medical practitioners ‘extended the
dangerous time of menstruation to the entire period of puberty’, p. 87. While West does not, in
this statement, refer exclusively to pubescent girls in this statement, it is arguable that the
Victorian view of pubescent girls as extremely vulnerable contributed to the ‘common sense’
argument against employing the speculum in the diagnosis and treatment of unmarried women.
The other factors that are likely assumed by West in referencing this ‘common sense’ knowledge
are arguably that an unmarried woman would never had sexual intercourse or borne children
before, so that her sense of alarm and violation at the exposure facilitated by the speculum. It is
further arguable that West meant to imply that in the diagnosis and treatment of an unmarried
woman, the least invasive or intrusive course of action should be taken. Interestingly, it follows
that whereas the ideal means of treating an unmarried woman’s gynaecological ailments would be
one that would involve no empirical knowledge whatsoever of such a woman’s genitals, the use of
the hand and fingers to probe a woman’s body would have been considered less distressing to her
than for a doctor to view her internal organs with the use of a speculum. Perhaps in the case of an
unmarried woman, the use of the hand and fingers may have been considered to have been less
potentially physically uncomfortable or painful to the woman than the use of the speculum, but it
is also arguable that this ‘common sense’ prohibition suggests that West considered sight, in such
circumstances, to have been more of a violation than touch. Charles West was founder of Great
Ormond Street Hospital. A lecturer in midwifery, West published widely on the diseases of
children as well as on the diseases of women, and is perhaps best known for his work in paediatric
medicine. See N. G. Coley, ‘Charles West’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004).
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speculum to examine a woman who was a virgin in all cases but those requiring
emergency intervention: ‘Need I say that there are some cases, those of unmarried
women for instance, in which nothing but the most urgent necessity would justify your
employing the speculum.’14 One might imagine that it would only be a passionate
opponent of the speculum who would disapprove of its use even in urgent circumstances.
It is interesting to note West’s suggestion, in the passages cited above, that his
caveats against the unnecessary use of the speculum hardly needed to be explicitly stated.
West considered that medical students and fellow medical professionals were very likely
to be aware that an examination with a speculum would likely cause much distress to the
patient, and that they would of course be sensitive to this issue when making the decision
of whether or not an examination with a speculum was necessary in a particular situation.
West claimed to be secure in the knowledge that the speculum would be used only
judiciously by anyone with an ordinary conscience: ‘restrictions to its use, indeed, such
as these, speak to the common sense and right feeling of every one too distinctly for there
to be much hesitation in subscribing to them’.15 This passage implies that West only felt
obliged to make these redundant cautionary statements because he knew that if he had not
stated the obvious, he would have been attacked by zealous critics of the speculum.
Thus, he placed the opponents of the speculum outside the fellowship of the respectable
medical community by equating their concerns with the suggestion that medical
professionals could not be trusted to make ethical decisions in the best interest of their
patients. West argued that critics of the speculum would tie a doctor’s hands and render
them helpless to aid a patient who was in dire need of an examination with a speculum.
14 West, Diseases, p. 22.
15 West, Diseases, p. 22.
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West was convinced that a frightening percentage of women unknowingly
suffered from diseases of the uterus, even if they were not sexually active. He examined
the uteri of sixty-two deceased hospital patients (nineteen of whom, he explains, were
‘believed to be virgins’)16 and came to the conclusion that many of their reproductive
organs were unhealthy: ‘There is something at first not a little startling in the result at
which we arrive, that the womb was found in a perfectly healthy condition in little more
than half of the 62 women, none of whom died of uterine disease, nor were supposed to
be suffering from any grave uterine ailment’.17 This certainly seems to confirm
Moscucci’s statement that ‘Woman was, by definition, disease or disorder, a deviation
from the standard of health represented by the male.’18 West also commented more
generally on the pathological nature of the reproductive system in the human female:
The return of blood from the organ, which is rendered difficult by its situation at
the lowest part of the trunk, is still further impeded by the absence of valves from
its veins; while every month, for several days together this organ and its
appendages are the parts towards which blood flows in superabundant streams.
During this period . . . haemorrhage breaks forth along the whole tract,—and it is
not until this has continued for some days, that the congestion ceases and the parts
16 Charles West, An Enquiry into the Pathological Importance of Ulceration of the Os Uteri, Croonian
Lecture Series (London: Brown, Green, and Longman, 1854), pp. 24-25.
17 West, Ulceration, p. 26.
18 Moscucci, Science of Woman, p. 102. On Victorian ideas about the inherent ‘weakness’ and ‘sickness’
of womanhood, see also Anne Digby, ‘Women’s Biological Straightjacket’, in Susan Mendus and
Jane Rendall (eds), Sexuality and Subordination: Interdisciplinary Studies of Gender in the
Nineteenth Century (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 192-220; Barbara Ehrenreich
and Deirdre English, For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts’ Advice to Women (Garden
City, NY: Anchor Press, 1978), pp. 91-126; Barbara Harrison, ‘Women and Health’, in Jane
Purvis (ed.), Women’s History: Britain, 1850-1945 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 157-
192; Sally Shuttleworth, ‘Female Circulation: Medical Discourse and Popular Advertising in the
Mid-Victorian Era’, in Mary Jacobus, Evelyn Fox Keller, and Sally Shuttleworth (eds),
Body/Politics: Women and the Discourses of Science (London and New York: Routledge, 1990),
pp. 47-68.
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subside once more into their former state of quiescence . . . I need not stop to tell
how a slight cause may protract this haemorrhage, or how some accident may
check it.19
It is easy to see how one might have imagined that a woman’s reproductive organs were
in constant need of surveillance, if one were to have accepted West’s description of their
precarious structure and awkward physiology.
Robert Lee [1793-1877] was a strong opponent of the speculum, especially in the
examination and treatment of unmarried women.20 He did not, however, condemn the
use of the speculum in every situation. One of Lee’s main arguments against the over-use
of the speculum was that most women were too healthy to warrant a visual inspection of
their reproductive organs. Lee undertook projects similar to those of Charles West,
studying the uteri of deceased hospital patients, in order to prove that most women were
not actually afflicted with ulceration of the os uteri. In Lee’s introduction to his book
entitled A Treatise on the Employment of the Speculum in the Diagnosis and Treatment of
Uterine Diseases: with Three Hundred Cases, the ostensible purpose of which was to
speak against the widespread use of the speculum, there is not very much reference at all
to the actual practice of using the speculum. In this work, Lee mostly argued against
aggressive medical practices associated with the use of the speculum, rather than
dwelling upon specifically how and why a woman or her modesty was ‘wounded’ by an
19 West, Ulceration, p. 8.
20 Robert Lee was a prominent and accomplished practitioner, researcher, and lecturer on midwifery with
decades of experience by the 1850s, a fact reflected in his implication that the trained and
experienced sense of touch (which younger and inexperienced doctors may have lacked) was the
best means of detecting problems with a woman’s internal reproductive structures (see p. 173).
Lee was outspoken and conservative in his approach to gynaecological medicine; he attacked the
practices of ovariotomy and caesarean sections as well as the indiscriminate use of the speculum
in examinations. Hilary Marland, ‘Robert Lee’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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examination with the speculum.21 As in West’s work, it is implied that the consideration
of a woman’s distress in this circumstance is mostly ‘common sense’, although it is not
overtly stated. It is surprising how many references Lee made to his own use of the
speculum in gynaecological examinations, which may be explained by the fact that this
instrument was the ostensible subject of this particular work. In context, however, these
references seem to demonstrate that Lee did not consider the speculum inappropriate in
all circumstances.
Moscucci mentions that opponents of the speculum were not so much troubled
‘about preserving the physical virginity of the patient . . . as the Queen’s accoucheur
Charles Locock pointed out, it was sometimes necessary to break down the hymen during
an examination by the finger, but obstetricians were never condemned for such a
practice.’22 She emphasizes the incongruity of the opposition of the medical community
to the speculum with a relative acceptance of the penetration of a woman’s vagina by her
doctor’s finger during a gynaecological examination, in order to show that ‘for the
participants in the speculum debate, a woman’s virginity was less physical than moral
and mental.’23 While certainly an important and interesting point to be made about the
speculum debate (if only applicable to the gynaecological examination of virgins), it
seems significant to consider that penetration was not really the issue at the heart of the
speculum debate, but the means of penetration. That the speculum was considered a
much more offensive means of penetrating a woman’s body than the finger says much
about the Victorian privileging of sight over the other senses. In the twenty-first
21 Robert Lee, A Treatise on the Employment of the Speculum in the Diagnosis and Treatment of Uterine
Diseases: with Three Hundred Cases (London: John Churchill, 1858), p. 9.
22 Moscucci, Science of Woman, p. 115.
23 Moscucci, Science of Woman, p. 115.
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century, it is arguably touch that is considered the most intimate (and the most
dangerous) means by which one can obtain sensory information about someone else’s
body. Touching someone’s body, today, is more likely to cause them more offence or
distress than looking at them. In the nineteenth century, however, the penetration of a
woman’s body with the finger was associated with more traditional methods of acquiring
information about her internal organs than the use of the speculum, which literally
brought to light parts of the woman that had never been seen before.
Jordanova, in discussing the debates surrounding visual representations of
women’s internal organs in the late eighteenth century, offers some insight as to why the
speculum was such a controversial instrument as it began to be employed in the century
afterward. Decades before the speculum began to be employed in Europe, anatomists
like William Hunter were publishing depictions of the internal organs of the woman in
striking and graphic detail. In Hunter’s The Anatomy of the Human Gravid Uterus, the
bodies of women and foetuses are shown partly in lifelike detail, with regard to such
features as the facial features, hair, and skin of the foetus, and partly as butchered chunks
of meat, for example where the legs are amputated in accordance with the boundaries of
what is being depicted, and the vascularity of the uterus and surrounding region.
Jordanova explains that ‘anatomical illustrations linked medical knowledge to sight, and,
in the case of eighteenth-century depictions of women, to seeing parts of nature
previously deemed private, thereby forging additional links with sexual-cum-intellectual
penetration and with the violence of the dissection room.’24 The producers of these
anatomical illustrations, like the practitioners who would advocate the use of the
speculum in the decades to follow, argued that the sight of ‘nature’ was nothing if not
24 Jordanova, Nature, p. 194.
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humane, and that the enabling of a more perfect medical view of the human body was far
from violent, and indeed compassionate.
Medical opponents of the speculum in the nineteenth century, however, seem to
have been concerned with more than just the morality of seeing into the woman’s body.
In fact, some of the tracts written by medical opponents of the speculum concentrated
almost wholly upon the issues associated with the use (or over-use) of the speculum, such
as aggressive gynaecological treatments, and the use of the speculum as a tool for
learning (as opposed to healing) rather than focusing exclusively on the issue of
penetration. This suggests that the speculum controversy was not exclusively a debate
about feminine morality. Instead, it places the speculum controversy within the much
larger debate over the scientization of medicine, which considered the question of
whether a patient should be regarded an object of study as well as a person to be cared for
and healed.
There was arguably much more to the speculum debate than the placing of an
instrument inside a woman’s body; the access provided to a medical practitioner by the
speculum reflected a new dimension of not only the doctor-patient relationship, but also
of the relationship between the outside world and the inside of a woman’s body. Would
this new ocular access to a woman’s interior be aligned with a new respect for the
vulnerability of the gynaecological patient to the current philosophies and accepted
procedures in medicine? Both sides of the speculum debate engaged with questions
regarding the acquisition of information from the body of the woman, as well as her voice
and any other means of expression. Both sides also had to negotiate a path between
appropriate diagnostics and consideration of the experience of the patient. Whether the
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space between the doctor and patient was mediated or not by an instrument, a doctor had
to choose a level of interaction with the patient and her body, and the choice of whether
to use a speculum or not was part of this, but certainly not the whole. How would a
doctor see his patient? How would he feel her? Or was looking enough? What did her
pain mean? Her discomfort, unease, or shame? Would he hear her voice? Would he
gauge her experience, or just her body? How would he contextualize her difference or
sameness to other women? These are some of the deeper questions that were asked by
individuals on both sides of the speculum debates of the mid-nineteenth century.
Interestingly, when discussing the experience of female processes, a Victorian
doctor often deferred to the authority of the woman to explain what is ‘normal’.
Although West confirmed that it was ‘proper’ for women to experience a certain amount
of pain during their monthly courses, he could only rely upon the women’s
communications to him to determine if their sufferings were indicative of an unhealthy or
a healthy (though inherently pathological) reproductive system: ‘The regular return of
menstruation, its accomplishment within a given period, attended by a certain average
degree of discomfort are regarded by women, and with propriety, as conclusive evidences
of the healthy state of the sexual functions’.25 Since the doctor could not feel the pain
himself, he had no choice but to trust a woman to report if she was experiencing any
‘abnormal’ suffering. The health, then, of the female reproductive system was
established largely by a doctor’s (subjective) interpretation of a woman’s expression of
her opinion about her suffering as relative to what she believed that other women suffered
‘normally’. This would seem to have placed women in rather a powerful position with
regard to the status of their health (or, at least, with regard to their degree of pathology).
25 West Diseases, p. 6 (my emphasis).
166
The doctor, however, was free to interpret their expressions in what way he
would, and could confirm or decline to confirm that ‘nature’ in the woman was in a state
of equilibrium. A doctor could also assign a woman with an ‘unhealthy’ level of pain by
assigning her an equal level of ignorance. Edward Tilt [1815-1893]26 equated this
ignorance with nature itself: ‘Now as menstruation is a natural process, it is supposed by
women to be part of those inevitable evils to which human flesh is heir, and however
much attended by suffering, they imagine it useless for them to seek relief. Thus we are,
generally speaking, not called in.’27 The woman was ignorant, according to Tilt, because
she was associated with nature, and nature’s wild whims.28 In gaining control over a
woman’s expression of pain, Tilt argued that science could convince her that she suffered
unnecessarily, and that ‘nature’ was less her ally than the doctor. Of course, in order to
appropriate her voice, he needed literally to look inside her to see what she could not tell
him. Thus, Tilt fashioned the rather ‘unnatural’ intimacy of the gynaecological speculum
as allowing a closeness between doctor and patient that was in effect a breakdown of
‘natural’ or empirical boundaries. This made the doctor privy to the secrets of the
woman’s body, and thus, Tilt would argue, her pain.
It is clear enough that Lawson Tait wished to be able to claim a perfect
knowledge of the suffering of a female patient: ‘My method of continuous elastic dilation
26 Edward John Tilt undertook much of his medical education in Paris, where he learned to use the vaginal
speculum from Joseph Claude Récamier. Récamier is credited with having introduced the
speculum to modern European medical practice in 1801. Tilt was one of the original fellows of
the Obstetrical Society of London (founded in 1859), and served as president of this organization
from 1874 to 1875. D.A. Power, Susan Soxnall (rev.), ‘Edward John Tilt’, Oxford Dictionary of
National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
27 Edward John Tilt, On Diseases of Women and Ovarian Inflammation : In Relation to Morbid
Menstruation, Sterility, Pelvic Tumours, and Affections of the Womb (London: John Churchill,
1850), p. 7.
28 On the association of women’s reproductive organs with ‘instinct’ and nature, as opposed to reason and
civilization, see Moscucci, Science of Woman, p. 34.
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of the uterus involves no trouble to the surgeon, and neither pain nor risk to the patient,
and it ought to have for her no pain’. 29 But what if his patient were to contradict him, and
claim to feel pain when she ‘ought not?’ The solution was simple enough. Further along
in the same paragraph, Tait explained that using this method, uterine ‘dilation may be
made completely in six hours, if there is need for it, and the pain may easily be subdued
by a hypodermic injection of morphia’.30 Doubtless ‘a hypodermic injection of morphia’
would solve a multitude of problems. To say that Tait was being slightly devious in
order to market his new procedure is a simple enough assertion, but this is complicated
by the way he dictated what should be the appropriate experience of the female body
undergoing the procedure.
It would be absurd to deny the benefits of anaesthesia for the woman (or any
individual) undergoing a painful medical procedure. However, as anaesthesia alleviated
physical pain, it also changed the ‘rules’ governing the empirical ‘ownership’ of a
medical experience. Mary Poovey, in discussing nineteenth-century obstetrics, argues
that ‘chloroform transfers to the doctor the knowledge of pain, as it renders the woman’s
body merely a sign, which he can read more accurately than she can’.31 Poovey goes on
to describe how this epistemological transfer heightens a doctor’s control over the moral
meaning of the procedure, rendering the woman’s interior experience so much emotional
clay: ‘Epistemologically, the “unresisting body” offers no impediment to the doctor’s
interpretation. Chloroform, therefore, enables the medical man simultaneously to
conceptualise his necessarily intimate physical contact with a woman in abstract and
29 Tait, Diseases, p. 109.
30 Tait Diseases, p. 110.
31 Mary Poovey, ‘ “Scenes of an Indelicate Character”: The Medical “Treatment” of Victorian Women’,
Representations, 14 (Spring 1986), p. 141.
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euphemistic terms and to replace what Simpson described as the doctor’s incapacitating
vicarious suffering with a powerful feeling of having earned the thanks with which
women rewarded his labor’.32 Armed with an effective means of alleviating pain, a
doctor had a woman at his mercy; from such a position, he could virtually dictate her
experience. The power to subdue pain through technology elevated the status of
associated technology and gained the wielder of such technology access to secrets that
would otherwise be revealed with pain. A woman’s experience was thus arguably
wrenched to fit the experience projected by her doctor, and probably was at least in some
way really changed by his exertion of this control.
This is not to say that nineteenth-century medical men denied the emotional
suffering that a woman undergoing a gynaecological procedure was likely to experience.
West, a fervent enthusiast of speculum technology, took great care when addressing an
audience of medical students to provide a very personal construal of what a
gynaecological patient felt during an examination with the speculum, particularly when
she lacked the urgency of the circumstance of childbirth to dull her modesty:
The examination . . . by which alone this information can be obtained, must be
extremely painful to a woman’s feelings, since she is not now, as in the time of
labour, impelled by the extremity of her sufferings to submit to anything for the
sake of relief. She seems indeed to be now peculiarly alive to every painful
impression; and while she feels almost overwhelmed by a sense of humiliation at
having to undergo an examination of the necessity for which she may not yet feel
fully convinced, she will judge with painful minuteness each act of yours—any
32 Poovey, ‘Scenes’, p. 141.
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needless delay, any careless exposure of her person, any apparent want of
delicacy or consideration.33
West attempted to view himself (and asked his students to attempt view themselves) as
he imagined the patient viewed him. In doing so, West meant to encourage his students
to try to imagine what it would be like to feel, as the woman would, the pressure of the
instrument upon sensitive parts of the body, and to imagine the sense of urgency she
would feel at any deviation from what she was been taught (perhaps by him, or others
who have undergone similar procedures) to expect was necessary. West’s pedagogical
strategy was also arguably a rhetorical one, as it displayed (to his opponents in the debate
over the speculum) his own complete sensitivity to the distress that was likely to
accompany the examination of a woman’s body with the speculum.
Before he could attempt to bridge the profound gap between male self and female
other, the Victorian gynaecological practitioner seems to have imagined that he needed to
catch the elusive prospective female patient, who was likely to try to escape him and his
prying questions (not to mention his prying eyes). Once the ailing woman was snared
and her illness ‘discovered’, it was argued that she would hide its finer points beyond a
labyrinth of lies, half-truths, and silences, despite her suffering. Tilt even assigned the
woman a peculiar sort of intelligence for the purpose of leading her doctor astray in his
attempt at diagnosis: ‘Instead of making it clear to him, the patient will often ingeniously
evade his questions . . . she may say what is not true, so that he will be frequently led
wrong’.34 Despite his argument that this made a doctor’s position very difficult, Tilt
associated this propensity to lie with femininity - a facet of both nature and of
33 West, Diseases, p. 11.
34 Edward John Tilt, A Handbook of Uterine Therapeutics (London: John Churchill, 1863), p. 2.
170
civilization. The gynaecological patient was to be admired for her shyness. ‘Female
modesty’, Tilt explained, ‘which is the best attribute of woman and the sure safeguard of
society, raises such a barrier between the patient and the practitioner that she long
conceals her sufferings.’35 Tilt warned the young medical professionals especially that
the gynaecological patient, when her ‘modesty bends to self-preservation and a sense of
duty, she naturally prefers the elder practitioner, and thus deprives the younger of the
average opportunities of studying her disease.’36 While Tilt’s patronising admiration
ostensibly meant to encourage pity for the quietly suffering woman, it also suggested that
the experience of her body was a sort of prize to be sought with subtlety and persistence.
Charles West, rather than encouraging medical students to expect women to
prevaricate at every given opportunity, discussed the reticence of a gynaecological patient
in terms of what she would tell her doctor:
Women may apply to you, who seem out of health, and in whom you may,
perhaps, at first, suspect the existence of uterine disease, but they appear annoyed
at inquiries with reference to their sexual functions, or perhaps deny, and with
perfect truth, the existence of any pain in the uterus, or its immediate
neighbourhood. Perhaps, however, they may confess to a pain in the rectum …
Always suspect the import of these sufferings.37
Both Tilt and West expected to have to access a woman’s private pains against her will.
They both implied that she secretly wanted to be found out, in order, of course, that she
might be relieved of what is ailing her. Any ground she gave was a ‘confession’, which
description is suggestive of West’s perception that there was a burden relieved as a
35Tilt, Handbook, p. 2.
36 Tilt, Handbook, p. 2.
37 West, Diseases, p. 9.
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woman shared her experience with her doctor. West’s advice that the doctor should
‘always suspect’ would have communicated, however, that despite the prospect of the
relief a woman might have found in confessing her pain to her doctor, it was more than
likely that her pain would need to be discovered in spite of her.
It made sense to West that English women should have guarded the secrets of
their bodies with more vigilance than women on the continent. He described that the
posture for examination with the speculum of women on the continent provided superior
access to the one generally allowed to doctors of British women:
On the Continent, the posture usually assumed by a patient when about to undergo
a specular examination, is on the back, with the nates resting on the edge of a bed
or table, and the legs bent up towards the body, or the feet resting on two chairs,
between which the doctor stands. There can be no doubt but that in this position
of the patient the os uteri falls more readily within the orifice of the speculum, and
that light is admitted much more thoroughly than in any other attitude; but its
apparent indelicacy is so serious an objection to it, that except under especial
circumstances, it is desirable to introduce the speculum with the patient lying on
the left side.38
West considered that the internal reproductive spaces of a British woman were especially
secret. The British doctor had to work a little bit harder to discover her secrets, and the
prize of the knowledge of what occurred inside her body was a little bit harder to win.
A sense of ‘wonder’ at the mystery of the woman was right and proper, according
to West, but one had to be careful to distinguish between reverent awe and ignorant
superstition, with which he cleverly associated the traditional values that would prevent
38 West, Diseases, pp. 20-21.
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society - and prevent a woman - from allowing a doctor to see inside her body. With a
Platonic reference, West placed himself within a venerable contemplative tradition, yet
he insisted that to keep a respectful distance was to stifle the advancement of civilization:
In wonder, says the ancient writer, all philosophy begins, in wonder it ends; —but
wide, indeed, is the distance which separates the marvelling of the ignorant from
the admiration of the learned . . . the principle of life . . . was in the earliest ages
the object of reverence, or of actual worship, while the happy issue of the
mysterious process of parturition was sought to be secured by rites and
ceremonies, and charms, propitiating the various deities who superintended it.39
Here, we must notice a movement away from the intimacy of the relationship between a
woman and her doctor, and toward a scientist’s relationship with his subject. No longer
are the barriers between the gynaecological patient and her doctor persuading a woman to
suffer in silence, but the progress of medicine is retarded, and Western society is drawn
back into a darker age of spells and superstitions. This passage is headed for a very
strange defence of the advancement of medical science through looking at healthy
women’s reproductive organs, which I will discuss later in this chapter.
The clear advantage of the use of the speculum in gynaecological examinations
was, and is, quite simply, that the instrument enables a doctor to see inside a woman’s
body. The advantage is so indisputable as to have rendered debate over its use
completely moot through the twentieth century. Can we not, however, even now
consider the dangers of placing our complete faith in the human eye as a mechanism
through which we may avert or ameliorate suffering? The importance of the eye itself
has now been dwarfed by technologies designed to improve upon human sight. Whether
39 West, Ulceration, p. 3.
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in the hands of a male doctor, a female doctor, or even a woman examining the inside of
her own body, the speculum can facilitate visual access to internal organs, but can hardly
be said to wield the diagnostic power of laparoscopy. Donna Harway argues that though
women claimed the speculum for themselves in the 1970s, this ‘handcraft tool’ can
hardly be considered empowering in the face of the more sophisticated technologies of
vision developed in the late twentieth century. 40 As technologies of medical vision
become ever more arcane, one can, indeed feel (and probably look) more cyborg than
human in the context of a modern investigative procedure. Yet the human can never be
forgotten - the creative force behind and directing the technology, making the decisions -
as well as the human patient, who, such a space away from her doctor, can seem to be at
the mercy of machines, without a human to whom she (or even her unconscious
humanity, in her body) can appeal.
Robert Lee’s arguments against the speculum suggest that he was concerned that
the instrument, if used when unnecessary, could rob medical diagnostics of some its
humanity in favour of an increased reliance upon new technological (rather than human)
vision. If the doctor could ‘see’ his patient better through the filter of technology, it
might be at the expense of not being able to ‘feel’ her so well. Even Edward Tilt, a
staunch advocate of the speculum, qualified the diagnostic value of the instrument as
opposed to touch. While he considered the speculum indispensable, he allowed that it
40 Haraway discusses the problematic issues underlying the technologies of the twentieth century, which
have learned to ‘see’ women in new ways: ‘Among the many transformations of reproductive
situations is the medical one, where women’s bodies have boundaries newly permeable to both
‘visualization’ and ‘intervention. Of course, who controls the interpretation of bodily boundaries
in medical hermeneutics is a major feminist issue…The technologies of visualization recall the
important cultural practice of hunting with the camera and the deeply predatory nature of a
photographic consciousness’. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (London
and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 169.
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was ‘less useful than the finger for diagnosis of uterine affections’.41 Lee, not
surprisingly, provided several examples of instances where, in his opinion, the speculum
was of little or no use to a doctor. In describing these instances, Lee focused upon the
inferiority of the speculum to the use of the hand as a diagnostic tool. For example: ‘In all
large uterine polypi it is obvious that the speculum can be of no use, and that it would not
enable us in any case to decide whether a tumour in the vagina was a polypus or an
inverted uterus, a small portion only of the lining membrane of the uterus, in either case,
being all that could possibly be presented to the eye’.42 Lee’s argument was that the
visual sense had not the penetrative power required to diagnose the case successfully,
because as the afflicted parts were brought to the eye and be presented to it, they were
alienated from their original, human context. What was needed, according to Lee, was a
way to get more properly inside a woman in order to diagnose. Long before the
availability of such advances as laparoscopy, Lee believed the human hand was the best
apparatus for the task. The implication is that the more intuitive, more qualitative
epistemology of the human touch was better suited to discerning the workings of the
internal (and interior) woman than the eye in such circumstances.
Despite his reservations, Lee had enough experience using the speculum to
compare his experiences of making diagnoses with and without it. He explained that
when ‘tumours have passed partially or completely through the os and cervix uteri, their
size, density, the length and thickness of their roots, and the relations these bear to the os
and cervix uteri, can only be determined by the touch’.43 He continued, confidently: ‘I
have never detected a small polypus within the os uteri, or hanging through it which I
41 Tilt, Uterine, p. 83.
42 Lee, Speculum, p. 7.
43 Lee, Speculum, p. 6.
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failed to detect with the finger’.44 This does not imply, though, as one might suppose,
that he had never used a speculum in any such case. He explained why: ‘I have,
however, repeatedly employed the speculum to ascertain the colour of the polypus of the
uterus, and the degree of vascularity of the investing membrane, which without ocular
examination could not have been determined. The knowledge thus acquired was of no
use in the treatment’.45 Lee did not, then, necessarily object to a doctor’s acquisition of
visual knowledge of the inside of a woman’s body. Rather, he was concerned about the
reason for the acquisition of that knowledge. He implied that there are often two goals in
medicine, and that more general, scientific knowledge was often sought alongside the
knowledge of a particular case and course of treatment: ‘In a case of small glandular
polypus in a sterile married lady … the speculum was employed, and it made us
acquainted with the colour, and more perfectly with the nature and diminuitive size of the
disease. The polypus was removed with the forceps, after the speculum had been
withdrawn’.46 It seems that Lee meant to suggest that some knowledge was ‘taken’ from
the patient without her knowing, as there would probably have been no way for her to
know whether or not the visual inspection of her internal affliction was necessary. Of
course, it is easy to imagine that one of the other doctors in attendance could have argued
(and possibly did argue) against Lee, that the knowledge of what the polypus looked like
in the particular instance was helpful to the case in some way or other. It was precisely
this uncertainty that placed the woman in such a vulnerable position - for if there was
some question about whether or not she needed, for the sake of her health and the
avoidance of pain, to make a visual display of her physiological secrets, it would have
44 Lee, Speculum, p. 6.
45 Lee, Speculum, p. 6.
46 Lee, Speculum, p. 6.
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been difficult for her to refuse to do so. And so, we might ask, noticing Lee’s use of the
plural pronoun, how important was the information gathered in this instance? We might
imagine two, or three (or more?) men taking turns peering inside this woman, and she in
some discomfort wondering what they were seeing. This is exactly the kind of scene that
Coral Lansbury imagines women to have had in mind when they made such a strong
stand against vivisection in the nineteenth century.47
Much of the debate surrounding the use of the speculum in nineteenth-century
medicine, however, was centred exasperatingly outside of the real experience of women.
One striking example of a text written to oppose practitioners of gynaecological medicine
was George Morant’s 1857 Hints to Husbands: A Revelation of the Man-midwife’s
Mysteries. As the title clearly indicates, this text was not intended to educate women who
were likely to be treated by practitioners of gynaecological or obstetrical medicine, nor
was it intended to persuade them directly. Rather, it was meant to enlighten men about
the danger of allowing their wives to be treated by ‘men-midwives’, who would
contaminate their purity and thus reduce their moral value.
Morant dedicated an entire chapter to the evils of the speculum, and called the
patient examined by this instrument a ‘victim’. He described the women who were
‘victimized’ by the speculum, however, as suffering a loss of respect rather than
experiencing any positive suffering: ‘its employment plunges its wretched victim,
woman, down into the lowest deep of infamy and degradation’.48 Morant continued from
that statement in an interestingly racial bent, to claim that the hiddenness of the woman’s
47 Coral Lansbury, The Old Brown Dog: Women, Workers, and Vivisection in Edwardian England
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 83-95.
48 George Morant, Hints to Husbands: a Revelation of the Man-midwife’s Mysteries (London: Simpkin,
Marshall & Co., 1857), p. 46.
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reproductive organs defined her basic humanity. Thus, an examination with the
speculum robbed a woman of a certain dignity that nature bestowed even upon savages:
‘added, in its application, that of sight; exposure the most complete of all which modesty,
even in the most abject of races, invariably conceals’.49 It is as if women, in submitting
or being made to submit to an examination with the speculum, were made to wear their
secret reproductive parts on the outside of their bodies. Indeed, William Acton referred
to the speculum as an instrument for converting the uterus from an internal to an external
organ: ‘By means of physical examination the uterus may be converted, as it were, into
an external organ, and the art of diagnosis reduced to the simple plan applicable to organs
situated externally’.50 It is worth remembering at this point the stubborn belief that
women’s reproductive organs were basically the male reproductive organs, turned inside
out.51 It is important to make a careful distinction within the rhetoric of the speculum
debate, between the woman as a vulnerable victim, and the woman as threateningly
masculinized, her reproductive organs dangerously liberated.
It is equally important to realize how difficult it can be to make this distinction,
and why. Morant criticized Charles Locock for approaching the examination with the
speculum from a doctor’s perspective, instead of considering that of the woman who
would be examined. Morant cited Locock as saying ‘that he looked into the vagina as he
would a throat’.52 Morant was not satisfied: ‘True enough, so far as he simply is
concerned . . . But would the woman regard it in this philosophical light? Is it the same to
49 Morant, Husbands, p. 46.
50 William Acton, A Practical Treatise on the Diseases of Urinary and Generative Organs, in Both Sexes
(London: John Churchill, 1851), p. 32.
51 See Catherine Blackledge, Story of V (London: Wiedelfield & Nicholson, 2003) for a thorough
discussion of this idea and its tenacity, even through the nineteenth century.
52 Charles Locock, Medical Times, 21 (8 June 1850). Quoted in Morant, Hints, p. 47.
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her whether her tongue is pressed down with a spatula, or her vagina distended with a
speculum?’ (original emphasis).53 At first glace, Locock’s position seems less sensitive
than Morant’s. But upon further consideration, it seems that one motive for Locock’s
statement may have been to try to encourage the medical community to foster a space
where women might feel less shame about their bodies - in order that women would be
able to escape the moral significance of their bodies for long enough to have their
physical ailments tended. It is arguable that Locock attributed much of a patient’s
suffering during an examination to her perception of the doctor’s perspective - as a man,
rather than a doctor. Locock’s decision to communicate his perspective in this way
suggests that he believed that if women suffered emotionally during an examination with
the speculum, it was in part because they were made to feel that they should.
Morant, on the other hand, considered the feelings of ‘the woman’ as she was - or,
perhaps more accurately, as she was meant to be. Though Morant’s sensitivity for the
woman’s experience in this instance was perhaps more palpable than Locock’s, it was
arguably also more shallow and not so thoughtful. Morant did not mention the possibility
of a physical ailment in need of remedy, and so did not consider the possibility of
competing necessities, which may have been difficult for the patient to prioritize.
Further, the question he asked next suggests that he considered a woman’s suffering
during an examination to have been an indicator of her status as a woman: ‘Is her moral
state to be left out of account together, and are we to treat the most sensitive organ in her
frame as if it was so much inert matter, whose great use was to be cauterized?’54 For
Morant, a woman suffered during an examination with the speculum because it was
53 Morant, Hints, p. 47.
54 Morant, Hints, p. 47.
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morally wrong; her sexual identity was inseparable from her moral identity. Morant’s
use of the word ‘sensitive’ demonstrated the ease with which a woman’s ‘moral
suffering’ was able to be collapsed with her physical suffering, as if no distinction needed
to be made. If there were a distinction between the two, then a woman could have made
the choice to prioritize one over the other. In Morant’s world - the world defied by the
emergence of gynaecological medicine - a woman could not express the difference
because she lacked the vocabulary to do so.
Morant’s argument that a gynaecologist made improper ‘use’ of the uterus
suggested a contest over the ‘ownership’ of a woman’s uterus and its services. Of course,
the proper ‘use’ of the uterus would have been procreation within marriage. This service
was owed to a woman’s husband and to society. This raised the question of who ‘owned’
womanhood. For Morant, it was womanhood, rather than individual women, that was
vulnerable. The title Hints to Husbands clearly indicates that ‘husbands’ owned
womanhood, and that gynaecology would rob them of this prize, women themselves
being passive and thus unable to prevent it.
Ownership of womanhood was not, however, the exclusive rhetorical territory of
the opponents of the speculum. William Jones used the idea of the ownership of
womanhood to establish a shared emotional space with his patients: ‘I can readily
commiserate the delicately painful situation of the woman whom circumstances compel
to submit to the employment of the speculum’.55 For Jones, womanhood was jointly
owned, and if there was an injury to modesty then it was an injury to both doctor and
patient. Paired with the suggestion that women were often unaware that the speculum
would cause them no physical harm, empathy for the emotional injuries a woman would
55 William Jones, Practical Observations on Diseases of Women (London: H. Bailliere, 1839), p. 94.
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sustain in an examination with the speculum presented a compelling interpretation of a
woman’s relationship with her doctor: “Let it be explained to them, that it neither
bruises, cuts, nor injures them in any way;—let them be convinced that although painful
to their feelings, it is equally unpleasant to the feelings of the practitioner, and that
nothing but a stern necessity—a consciousness of imperative duty—impels him to adopt
it’.56 For Jones, the doctor hardly wielded the speculum; rather, he sustained the same
emotional injuries as the patient who was examined with it. If the woman was subject to
his gaze, he looked back at himself by appropriating her perspective from the position of
knowledge and privilege he had established inside her body. Instead of merely peering at
her, he stood with her; but in order to do so she (and her culture) needed to allow him to
make a legitimate space inside her for himself.
Jones negotiated for the sanctioning of a new kind of intimate relationship
between a man and a woman. Unable to wholly escape the sexual significance of this
relationship, Jones embraced it with tenderness. He described his ideal scenario for the
introduction of the speculum as gentle and slightly ritualistic: ‘let it be proposed with
caution, circumspection, and delicacy; let the confidence of the patient be first gained,
and then let the proper moment be taken for its employment’.57 If this sounds like advice
that might have been given to a groom concerning his wedding night, Jones immediately
killed the moment by mentioning his mother. Instead of making a contrast, however,
Jones insisted that he was only summarizing what he has said about the proposal of the
speculum to the woman: ‘in short, let any practitioner who can duly appreciate the
speculum, and who is convinced of its necessity in a given case, only act towards his
56 Jones, Diseases, p. 91.
57 Jones, Diseases, p. 91.
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female patient with the same firmness and kindness that he would manifest towards his
mother, and rare indeed will be the objections made by women to the employment of the
speculum’.58
Sacrifice and selflessness formed the heart of this new relationship and were the
key to the empathy that would enable the doctor to implement the technology of the
speculum into real life, according to Jones. It was not the woman alone who should have
been required to sacrifice. Jones would have had the woman believe that he suffered with
her in her sacrifice, and he scorned any members of her family who would not make the
sacrifice as well: ‘nor yet [can I suppose] a being, worthy of the name of man, attached to
a mother, to a sister, or to one still more nearly allied to him, who could weigh a
momentary sacrifice against years of happiness’.59 Far from compromising his
masculinity, a man who allowed his wife to undergo an examination with the speculum
was brave and selfless enough to endure the pangs of hurt modesty alongside his wife -
and her doctor.
What title, then, would Jones have wished to employ to secure the status of the
new relationship that he proposed to exist between the doctor who examined with the
speculum and his female patient? Poovey, in discussing the debate over chloroform in
obstetrics, describes the attempt to legitimize the doctor’s place with an anaesthetized
woman, which was especially troubling because of the contact he would necessarily have
with her genital area in assisting the birth of her baby. She argues that the vulnerability
of modesty was implied to be the very jurisdiction of the doctors who might otherwise
seem to threaten it; guarding womanhood was held out as the vocation of every medical
58 Jones, Diseases, p. 91.
59 Jones, Diseases, p. 95.
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professional. A woman is without defences under anaesthesia, therefore, as Poovey
argues ‘the doctor’s calling is . . . to keep her secrets and to superintend her delicate
modesty’.60 Jones would certainly have agreed to bestow upon the doctor who employed
the speculum the title of ‘Keeper of Secrets’. This title certainly describes the position
envisioned by Jones of a doctor who employed the speculum with reluctance and a sense
of special duty.
This duty would certainly have been a cultural duty; did it follow that it was only
owed to women of one class? In practice, some women were afforded more modesty
than others: after the passage of the Contagious Diseases Acts in 1864, certain women
were not free to refuse an examination with the speculum. We may also remember that
Edward Tilt considered no young physician’s education complete without a year in the
Paris hospitals, where they were very ‘generous’ with their women. Were poor women
considered to be less deserving of the kind of guardianship outlined by Jones? Did they
have secrets to keep? Were their secrets worth keeping? Victorian doctors who debated
the practice of examining gynaecological ailments with the speculum did not often
discuss class in their texts. At first, it is tempting to surmise that this is because they
were not inclined to discuss the feelings, modesty, or morals of poor women. If these
medical authors maintained an absolute silence regarding the issue of class, it would be
very difficult to believe anything else. It is also certain that almost all of the women
whose bodies were studied by doctors after their death came from hospitals, and were
poor. Occasionally, however, one of these doctors did discuss class in their writings about
the speculum. The issue always seems to have been raised un-self-consciously, as if the
author did not perceive the need to point out that female patients came from different
60 Poovey, ‘Scenes’, p. 152.
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classes. For example, in one of his texts, Charles West discussed the different social
classes of potential patients in order to explain that a particular illness or disorder would
tend to be presented in its early stages by one class of women, and in its later stages by
another. West explained that this was particularly the case with cystitis - wealthier
women would have it treated at the first sign of discomfort, while poorer women would
wait much longer, until the condition had advanced considerably.61 The lifestyles of
poorer women increased their possibility of suffering from certain ailments, and
sometimes medical authors who engaged in the debate over the speculum discussed the
consideration of class difference in determining class-specific causes of ailments.
Writing a few decades after West, Robert Lawson Tait described a kind of uterine
disorder ‘in which the displacement is due to a previous puerperal condition, and where it
has arisen in an arrest of the process of subinvolution’.62 He explained that ‘In the upper
ranks this is generally due to the non-fulfilment of the functions of lactation; in the
hospital class of patients it is due to the women getting about too soon’.63 He apparently
did not consider that all of the habits of wealthier women were particularly salutary.
The tone of these statements about class suggests that doctors did not feel the
need to specify particular methods, treatments, or considerations for women with
elevated class status. This is not to say that in practice extra consideration was not given
to wealthier women, or that poorer women were not, in practice, treated more coarsely.
Lee made it clear that he found it unacceptable to use a speculum, without urgent
necessity, to examine any unmarried woman, regardless of class: ‘In unmarried women,
61 West, Diseases, p.180.
62 Robert Lawson Tait, Diseases of Women and Abdominal Surgery III (Leicester: Richardson & Co.,
1889), p. 139.
63 Tait, Diseases, p. 139.
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whatever their rank or condition in life may be, the integrity of their structures should not
be destroyed with the speculum, nor their modesty wounded by an examination of any
kind without a necessity for such a proceeding being clearly shown’.64 This statement
implies that there have been individual practitioners who would have striven more
earnestly to avoid injuring the modesty of a wealthier woman than a poorer one. Charles
West explained how one might have acquired such a habit and warned that a medical
professional needed to be vigilant against it:
The familiarity which hospital practice begets with these ailments among women
whose sensibilities are not always as keen as those in a higher class of life, or the
circumstance that they do not venture to express the pain which want of
consideration may have caused them, leads but too often to carelessness in these
respects on the part of men who would yet shrink from the idea of inflicting a
moment’s unnecessary suffering upon any one.65
It is difficult to decide what West really meant to communicate in this statement about
class, as the statement does not entirely commit to a reason for the behaviour of lower-
class women. Did West mean to suggest that they were hardened, and so were not as
sensitive to the injury of their modesty as wealthier women would have been? Or did he
mean that they were less communicative - hushed by a sense of class inferiority and
vulnerability to both doctor and disease? This statement, one of the very few that he
wrote to discuss issues of class, ruled out none of the above, nor does the statement
necessarily imply that all poor women felt or acted the same way. What is clear is that
West encouraged young medical professionals to imagine what suffering might have
64 Lee, Speculum, p. 9.
65 West, Diseases, p. 12.
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been experienced by a woman in their care, whether or not they had been taught by
society to consider that poor women were less sensitive than wealthier women, and
whether or not the woman would have been likely to communicate her distress to him.
Whether as new, important and vulnerable clinical material or as patients whose
modesty required a doctor to fill in the blank spaces between expression and experience,
women fired the imagination of nineteenth-century medicine. Newly empowered to see
and to treat the inside of a woman’s body, medical professionals now had the task of
assigning identity to disorders that had once been known only by reported symptoms,
which had only recently began to be regarded as an inferior means of detecting and
determining illness. The nineteenth century saw a proliferation of newly identified
women’s disorders and diseases. Of course, both the ‘new’ diagnoses and women’s
awareness of them were a great boon to the emerging study and practice of
gynaecological medicine. But how many of these ‘problems’ were real abnormalities
that posed a threat to a woman’s health or happiness, and how many were fabrications of
a sort of craze for women’s medicine? If being a woman and possessing a set of female
reproductive organs was enough to classify one as ‘ill’, than it would have been
impossible for a woman to have been ‘cured’. It also would have meant that all women
needed medical treatment.
Advocates of the speculum argued that it was necessary to use this instrument
frequently in the examination of female patients, because most of them, being women,
were likely to have been afflicted with reproductive illness. In the preface to Practical
Observations on Diseases of Women, Jones claimed of ‘numerous complaints peculiarly
incidental to women’, that ‘scarcely one … out of ten passes through life without
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experiencing some one or other of them’.66 It is clear that he believed that most women
needed some kind of gynaecological treatment, but whether he meant to imply that most
of these experienced serious reproductive disorders is not so apparent. Charles West, as
we have seen, claimed that roughly half of all women are disordered in their reproductive
organs. West placed this claim directly in the context of a plea for the more widespread
use and acceptance of the use of the speculum. Despite the fact that the women whose
bodies he studied were not known to have been suffering or exhibiting the symptoms of
any gynaecological ailment, West argued that it would have been better if the ailments
had been seen and known, presumably so that they could have been treated before they
became more advanced.
Technology in medicine, according to A.J. Youngson, altered women’s lives ‘far
more than the lives of men’.67 Medical technology has liberated women (and, of course,
everyone else) from scores of diverse sufferings that were once necessarily endured.
Sufferings particular to women, encumbered with cultural meaning and liable to weighty
interpretation, presented a problem for traditional medicine and a great opportunity for
scientific medicine. Women’s reproductive organs were essentially material that had
been previously shrouded by taboo. While exploring this ‘new’ material, medical
professionals also shattered archaic perceptions about the necessity of women’s pains,
and could really claim to have been breaking down the barriers that had once trapped
women needlessly in their sufferings. Thus, as gynaecology emerged as both a subject of
inquiry and an area of treatment, practitioners could claim advancements for both the
66 Jones, Diseases, p. iv.
67 A.J. Youngson, The Scientific Revolution in Victorian Medicine (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 216.
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science and humanity of medicine - indeed; they needed to do so, for they had many
opponents, both among their medical colleagues and in popular opinion.
But could one so easily have kept both aims in mind at all times? Nineteenth-
century medical practitioners produced texts illustrative of the web of intent surrounding
the science and medical treatment of women, and often conflated the two as if one were
indistinguishable from the other. It is easy to see how women may have been perceived
as more vulnerable as their genitals were exposed in new ways, and it is equally apparent
that women’s reproductive organs were not necessarily best served by secrecy. An
examination of the rhetoric surrounding the use of the speculum provides reason to
believe that the path to the advancement of women’s health was not set exclusively in
one direction. The debate over the use of the speculum encouraged discussion of the
protection of women’s newly exposed bodies from over-enthusiastic science as well as
the protection of women from disease and injury that could result from neglect through
prejudice or ignorance. The scrutiny of one side of the debate by the other allowed
respect for women’s feelings and comfort, while the other prevented them from being
forced to endure for the sake of modesty.
Charles West, in promoting the use of the speculum, moved easily between the
roles of scientist and humanitarian. Often he accomplished this by shifting directly from
compassionate consideration of one woman to a discussion of the importance of a general
knowledge of the woman and her structures, as if to discuss one were to discuss the other.
In discussing ignorance, West craftily aligned myth and shamanic superstition with an
ignorance of the interior of a woman’s body.68 He phrased a response to general criticism
68 West, Ulceration, p. 2.
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over the lack of success in curing women’s ailments in terms of ‘investigation’ and
‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ as opposed to ‘alleviation’ and ‘treatment’:
Their existence has been made a constant ground of reproach against those who,
having to do with ailments so simple as they are assumed to be, yet have left so
much concerning them uncertain or unexplored. I believe, however, that many of
the doubts and uncertainties which beset these subjects depend on the difficulties
in the way of arriving at truth concerning them, far more than any want either of
diligence of honest purpose on the part of those whose special duty it was to
engage in their investigation . . . those difficulties have arisen which did, and still
do, retard the advancement of knowledge concerning uterine disease.69
It is arguable that West was purposefully unclear whether this duty was toward science or
toward the welfare of individual patients - whether this purpose was healing or
knowledge. West’s opinion was that the two were inseparable.
That medicine is greatly assisted by advances in scientific knowledge is hardly
cause for debate. However, at whose expense should such knowledge be gained? West
argued that the speculum needed to be used to examine healthy women - not just those
who were sick or suffering, and in need of treatment. It was more difficult to make the
argument that medical professionals should have access to the inside of women’s bodies
solely for the knowledge such access would provide. Still, West could not find a nicer
way to say it: ‘we must not forget that where the knowledge of healthy structure and
natural function is defective, the knowledge of diseased structure and perverted function
must be imperfect too’70 He also blamed the slow progress of learning about uterine
69 West, Ulceration, p. 3.
70 West, Ulceration, p. 5.
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physiology upon a lack of access to ‘the intimate nature of its structure in the virgin
state’.71 Despite the fact that we no longer consider that an examination with a speculum
corrupts a woman’s purity, it is hard to read this passage without getting a sense of
someone being violated. Neither, West argued, was it entirely helpful to be granted
access to dead bodies: ‘It must … be borne in mind that many evidences of disease, such
as are very obvious during life, may be greatly obscured, or may even entirely disappear
after death’.72
Perhaps, on these points, West did not wish to mince words. He certainly
communicated a great deal of frustration, and this frustration extended from knowledge
to treatment: ‘It was from sheer want of opportunity, that the anatomical and
physiological discoveries that were made, though slowly and imperfectly, remained long
unapplied; that for ages all knowledge of the pathology of the female sex continued
fragmentary’.73 In another volume, West directly considered the worth of knowledge
against the expense of the suffering gained in its acquisition. The speculum, he argued,
‘adds so much to our therapeutical resources as to counterbalance all the suffering, both
moral and physical which its employment not infrequently inflicts upon the patient’.74
Here again, it is not entirely clear whether this statement meant to address the therapeutic
resources that would benefit the particular treatment of individual patients, or whether
West meant to suggest that it was acceptable for a woman to endure some moral and
physical suffering for the sake of science. The latter seems more likely, and even if we
do not consider an examination with a speculum to be likely to cause a great deal of
71 West, Ulceration, p. 5.
72 West, Ulceration, p. 18.
73 West, Ulceration, p. 4.
74 West, Diseases, p. 23.
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moral and physical suffering, it is reasonable to expect that there might have been
opposition to the suggestion that women should make the sacrifice.
West’s discussion of professional ‘duty’ is ambiguous with regard to whether it
was one that was owed to the body of the patient or to a body of knowledge. Other
physicians who were engaged in this debate, however, presented their duty to employ the
speculum as one which was strictly owing to the health of patients. If it was the pursuit
of knowledge that compelled William Jones to look inside the bodies of women, he did
not say so. Rather, he acknowledged the existing body of scientific knowledge as the
reason a doctor was obliged to perform an examination with the speculum upon a woman
with some suspected disorder of her reproductive system. For Jones, ‘it is incumbent on
the practitioner to take care that [the speculum] be employed at least in every case which
has been of some duration … we must admit that the practitioner who, in the present
advanced state of pathological science, neglects its employment in cases indicating its
necessity, incurs an awful responsibility, if he be not highly culpable’.75 It is easy to
imagine that few of Jones’ colleagues, on either side of the speculum debate, would have
disagreed that a physician who neglected to use a speculum when he thought it was
absolutely necessary, would have been committing an injustice. The dispute was rather
over what circumstances should have convinced a medical professional of the necessity
of seeing inside a woman’s body. It was, after all, the reason for an examination with the
speculum (or, indeed, any examination) that distinguished between a patient and so much
clinical material.
Jones argued that there can be no knowledge obtained during an examination that
did not benefit the patient, since ‘negative evidence is frequently as valuable as
75 Jones, Diseases, pp. 100-101.
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positive’.76 ‘Negative Evidence’ is highly suggestive of the feelings of the patient, for an
examination that would produce such evidence would necessarily be conducted after a
patient’s complaint or presentation of symptoms. Rather than looking for new and
interesting pathology, a doctor seeking negative evidence would be looking for tissues
and structures that were normal, often for the purpose of reassuring a worried patient.
Jones offered several anecdotes to demonstrate the potential of negative evidence gained
with the use of the speculum to comfort an individual who was worried that there was
something terribly wrong with her.
Before demonstrating this admirable sensitivity, however, it must be said that
Jones also offered thanks, in the preface to Practical Observations on the Diseases of
Women, to a number of colleagues who ‘lended’ him their patients for the purposes of his
research: ‘For many of the illustrative cases [the author] is indebted to medical friends,
whose kindness permitted him to examine patients under their care, for which he avails
himself of the present opportunity to offer his sincere thanks’.77 No mention is made of
the patients who ostensibly allowed Jones to examine them in their illness. It is
arguable, though, that the women Jones examined, even if they had given him their
enthusiastic consent, would not have wanted to be mentioned, for shame of the exposure
they had made to him. Still, one cannot help wondering if these women knew, and what
they might have thought about being clinical material for a book.
Ultimately, because of the cultural taboos surrounding women’s reproductive
organs, it is hardly surprising that Jones felt obligated to thank his colleagues for lending
him their patients to examine for the purposes of his book. Opportunities for internally
76 Jones, Diseases, p. 98.
77 Jones, Diseases, p. viii.
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examining women were scarce, for whatever purpose. Not only was it problematic to
examine women for research, but it was very difficult for a young or inexperienced
doctor to gain expertise in conducting examinations with a speculum. Since it was
arguable that only a doctor with some experience could interpret what he could see
happening inside a woman’s body in a way that would help the woman, giving such
access to an inexperienced doctor was likely to benefit his education more than it would
the patient. Further, young doctors in general were less likely to be trusted with a
woman’s modesty.
Edward Tilt encouraged young medical professionals to take advantage of every
opportunity available for experience in studying the anatomy and pathology of women’s
reproductive organs. Tilt cautioned that women’s modesty tended to make it difficult for
a young doctor to learn about the female body, for ‘when modesty bends to self-
preservation and a sense of duty, she naturally prefers the elder practitioner, and thus
deprives the younger of the average opportunities of studying her disease’.78 The
implication is that something was taken from the young doctor that was rightfully his.
Tilt suggested many tips and tricks for studying the ‘mental peculiarities’ of women, and
insisted that certain rather unscientific criteria needed to be met for one to achieve the
status of a successful ‘lady’s doctor’: ‘He need not be handsome, but must not be ugly …
He must be married, or what right has he to know anything about women!’79 And where
could a young medical professional learn about women? Paris. ‘No one, who intends
following this branch of practice, should think of settling down without having spent at
least one year in the Paris Hospitals, which afford such large opportunities for studying
78 Tilt, Diseases, p. 2.
79 Tilt, Diseases, p.6.
193
diseases of women—opportunities so generously placed at the disposition of all’.80 Who
was so ‘generous’ with women’s bodies? It is ultimately unclear whether he was
referring to French legal authority or to the French medical community. Perhaps the
French women themselves? It is probably not likely that Tilt viewed French women as
having had so much control over their own bodies, but there is definitely the suggestion
that something about French culture that allowed greater access to women’s bodies (or at
least poor women’s bodies). Of course, France had been compelling its prostitutes to
submit to examinations for a number of decades by the 1850s. Was this also
‘generosity?’
Tilt insisted that women should be made a study; that the young doctor needed to
focus upon them and learn all they could. He presented women as elusive and perhaps
devious. He illustrated the obstacles that prevented one from accessing a greater
knowledge of their bodies with alarming frankness. According to Tilt, knowledge of
women did not come easily; at least, not in Britain. But perhaps the portrayal of
women’s bodies as difficult to access tended to highlight that some viewed their bodies as
clinical material; the scarcity of an important resource does tend to make its presence or
absence felt and talked about. What complicates matters is that female modesty was also
viewed by Victorians as a precious resource, and arguably a national resource. Who
should have been given access to this resource, and who should have sacrificed?
As we have seen, extensive and intimate knowledge of the female anatomy was
argued to be crucial to understanding the experience of the woman, especially because
she was expected (and encouraged) to be reticent about her own body. Whether
knowledge was gained to benefit a general wealth of knowledge (which could benefit
80 Tilt, Diseases, p. 5.
194
many women in the future), or to assess the state of the body of one woman, Victorian
medical professionals radically disagreed about the means of acquiring this knowledge.
Their arguments took the form of attempts to ‘speak’ for the women in their care, and
even for women in general. Claiming knowledge of the woman and her experiences
through medical intimacy with her body, doctors on both sides of the debate over the use
of the speculum attempted to argue from a position of empathic as well as scientific
knowledge with regard to what was best for her.
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Chapter 4:
Madness and Chains: John Conolly and the Reform of Asylums for the Insane
That the nineteenth century saw the mass-institutionalization of care for the mentally ill
in Britain is a fact neatly confirmed by a striking increase in the recorded number of
people assigned to British asylums for the insane during this period.1 This trend,
however, developed alongside and intersected with a movement for the reform of the
treatment of the insane that is more difficult to define, loosely labeled the movement for
the ‘moral treatment’ of the insane.2 Historians tend to trace the beginnings of ‘moral
treatment’ to the late-eighteenth century, and specifically to the theories and innovative
practices of Phillipe Pinel [1745-1826] at the Bicêtre Hospital, in France and William
Tuke [1732-1822], a Quaker merchant whose ‘retreat’ at York was developed in response
1 Roy Porter refers to ‘brute figures,’ which establish that the insane were increasingly institutionalized
throughout the nineteenth century: whereas ‘around 1800, no more than a few thousand ‘lunatics’
were confined in England to all kinds of institutions, by 1900 the total had skyrocketed to
100,000’. Mind-Forg’d Manacles: A History of Madness in England from the Restoration to the
Regency (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 2. Steven Cherry, more recently,
has offered figures for the middle decades of the nineteenth century: in 1845, less than 5,000
patients were confined to English county asylums. By 1880, there were 40,000. Mental Health
Care in Modern England: The Norfolk Lunatic Asylum/St. Andrew’s Hospital, 1810-1998
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2003), p. 10. For discussion of nineteenth-century asylums and the
emerging asylum system, see Joseph Melling and Bill Forsythe (eds), Insanity, Institutions, and
Society, 1800-1914 (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).
2 As Andrew Scull explains, ‘one cannot readily summarize in a phrase or two what moral treatment
consisted of, nor reduce it to a few standard formulae, for it was emphatically not a specific
technique’. Scull argues that instead, moral treatment was ‘a general, pragmatic approach which
recognized the lunatic’s sensibility and acknowledged (albeit in a highly limited and
circumscribed sense) his status as a moral subject’. Most Solitary of Afflictions: Madness and
Society in Britain, 1700-1900 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 98. William Bynum,
Eric Carlson, and Norman Dain equate ‘moral therapy’ with a focus upon therapeutic efforts to
treat the non-bodily or psychological elements of mental derangement, as opposed to the treatment
of physical disorders that accompanied insanity in patients. See William Bynum, ‘Rationales for
Therapy in British Psychiatry, 1780-1835’, in Andrew Scull (ed.), Madhouses, Mad-doctors, and
Madmen: The Social History of Psychiatry in the Victorian Era (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1981), p. 37; Eric Carlson and Norman Dain, ‘The Psychotherapy that was
Moral Treatment’, American Journal of Psychiatry, 117 (1960), p. 519.
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to the suspicious death of a Quaker inmate of the York asylum.3 Though historians
generally agree about where and when the movement for ‘moral treatment’ began, there
is less of a consensus regarding the conditions out of which this movement arose, or,
indeed, regarding the meaning or historical implications of ‘moral treatment’.4
Pinel and Tuke embraced the ideal of ‘non-restraint’, which was the reduction, or
even abolition, of the use of restraints to subdue or control the mentally ill. Later, John
Conolly [1794-1866] became the first person to successfully abolish restraints at a large
asylum in England.5 Though Conolly did not invent the practice of non-restraint, his
success in its implementation at the large Hanwell asylum, near London, was certainly a
landmark achievement in the moral reform of the treatment of the insane.6 Conolly’s
3 For a study of William Tuke and the York Retreat, see Anne Digby, Madness, Morality, and Medicine: A
Study of the York Retreat, 1796-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). On
Philippe Pinel and the beginnings of moral treatment in France, see Jan Goldstein, Console and
Classify: The French Psychiatric Profession in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1987).
4 See Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, Richard
Howard (tr.) (New York: Random House, 1965 [1961]), for a discussion of the social and cultural
meanings of the large-scale confinement of the mad and the moral reform of this practices.
Foucault argues that the institutionalisation of the mad was a means of policing the poor, and that
moral reform simply replaced physical restraints with even more effective, and more repressive,
psychological bonds. See also Andrew Scull, Museums of Madness: The Social Organization of
Insanity in Nineteenth-Century England (London: Allen Lane, 1979). Foucault’s arguments have
been the focus of a great deal of debate and qualification. Since the publication of Foucault’s
book, most historians of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century psychiatry maintain some position on
his arguments. For a summary of many of the stronger and more influential of these positions, see
Scull, Solitary, ch. 1. See also Roy Porter, ‘Foucault’s Great Confinement’, in Arthur Still and
Irving Volody (eds), Rewriting the History of Madness: Studies in Foucault’s Histoire de la Folie
(London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 119-125; H.C. Erik Midelfort, ‘Madness and
Civilization in Early Modern Europe: A Reapprasial of Michel Foucault’, in Barbara C. Malament
(ed.), After the Reformation: Essays in Honour of J.H. Hexter (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1980), pp. 247-265.
5 Andrew Scull and Nancy Tomes have discussed Conolly’s career and philosophies in the context of the
nineteenth-century moral reform of the care of the insane. See Andrew Scull, Charlotte
MacKenzie, and Nicholas Hervey, Masters of Bedlam: The Transformation of the Mad-Doctoring
Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). See also Nancy Tomes, ‘The Great Restraint
Controversy: A Comparative Perspective on Anglo-American Psychiatry in the Nineteenth
Century’, in W.F. Bynum, R. Porter and M. Shepherd (eds), The Anatomy of Madness: Essays in
the History of Psychiatry, vol. 3, The Asylum and Its Psychiatry (London: Tavistock Publications,
1988), pp. 190-225; Scull, Solitary, pp. 149-151.
6 See Akihito Suzuki, ‘The Politics and Ideology of Non-Restraint: The Case of the Hanwell Asylum’,
Medical History, 39 (1995), pp. 1-17. Following his success at Hanwell, the previously obscure
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career cannot be described as having been overwhelmingly successful, nor can it be said
that his achievement was the crown of a linear struggle for the advancement of a clear
and consistent reform agenda. In fact, Conolly at one time firmly opposed the practice of
treating the insane within asylums.7 It is with Conolly’s strategies for the advancement
of his reform agendas, however, that this chapter is concerned.
From his Inquiry Concerning the Indications of Insanity with Suggestions For the
Better Protection and Care of the Insane, written in 1830, almost a decade before his
appointment to Hanwell, through to The Treatment of the Insane Without Mechanical
Restraints, written in 1856, Conolly demonstrated a consistent approach that places him
in a prominent position within the history of empathy, even if it lacks a parallel in his
unsteady career and fluctuating philosophies.8 Conolly attempted to make plain the
invisible and the unverifiable, imagining what he could not know, and often imposing a
narrative over both the expressions and the silences of the asylum inmate. Though this
narrative is not infrequently arrogant, it represents a project of reaching beyond empirical
boundaries to try to construct the interior experience of the insane, who lacked the power
to make themselves understood. By doing so, Conolly attempted, albeit in a very
patriarchal fashion, to establish a basis from which the methods and practices of the
treatment of the insane could be considered.
Conolly was celebrated by figures such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, seventh earl of Shaftesbury,
was elected a fellow of the Royal College of Physicians and presented with an honorary DCL
from Oxford University. See Andrew Scull, ‘John Conolly’, Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
7 See Scull, MacKenzie and Hervey, Bedlam, p. 48.
8 John Conolly, An Inquiry Concerning the Indications of Insanity, with Suggestions for the Better
Protection and Care of the insane (London: John Taylor, 1830), The Construction and
Government of Lunatic Asylums and Hospitals for the Insane (London: John Churchill, 1847), and
The Treatment of the Insane Without Mechanical Restraints (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1856).
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Conolly often gave descriptions of his patients’ experiences. He described what it
was like for patients to be treated in asylums, and even what it was like to be insane.
Even though Conolly’s use of his patients’ voices often (if not always) amounts to
appropriation, his expressions were crafted to produce a compelling account of real
experiences, which warranted action and reform. This is particularly important, as
patients’ voices do not figure prominently in records available to historians as sources of
the history of nineteenth-century asylums.9 While we can never know how accurate
Conolly’s interpretations of his patients’ expressions were, these interpretations are
valuable as records of empathic ‘knowledge’ of these subjects.10 Conolly’s empathic
discourse serves to render a significant portrait of the lives of inmates of nineteenth-
century asylums, which is often as illuminating as it is subjective. Conolly’s
representation of his patients’ experiences are suggestive not only of the construction of
knowledge of insanity in the nineteenth-century, but also of how Victorians took
seriously the idea of trying to understand and communicate what it was like to be
someone else, even in spite of significant impediments to reasonable communication with
that someone else. Further, Conolly’s works demonstrate the importance of empathic
discourse to debates over Victorian social reforms.
Conolly often used the voices of his patients not only to demonstrate and
celebrate his own ideas and successes, but also to construct an alternative, ‘old system’ of
9 On the scarcity of patient voices in recorded sources for the history of nineteenth-century asylums, see
Cherry, Mental Health Care, p. 13; Andrew Scull, ‘Psychiatry and its Historians’, History of
Psychiatry 2 (1991), pp. 245; David Ingleby, ‘Mental Health and Social Order’, in Stanley Cohen
and Andrew Scull (eds), Social Control and the State: Historical and Comparative Essays
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1981).
10 Historians have, however, increasingly attempted to locate these patient voices. See Allan Beveridge,
‘Life in the Asylum: Patient’s Letters from Morningside, 1873-1908’, in History of Psychiatry, 9
(1998), pp. 431-469; Dale Peterson (ed.), A Mad People’s History of Madness (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981); Roy Porter, A Social History of Madness: Stories of the
Insane (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987).
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treatment of the insane, which differed sharply from his own. It is arguable that even as
more and more asylums implemented non-restraint, turning the tide very much in favour
of Conolly’s ideas and practices, Conolly’s post-Hanwell works required him to produce
a rhetorical model of a system, against which to define his own.11 The result was most
certainly the kind of ‘anathema’ that Roy Porter argues did much to contribute to the
‘demonology’ of the system of care for the insane that existed before the Victorian ‘moral
reform’ movement.12 Conolly presented the world inside the ‘traditional’ asylum as one
that could not easily, if ever, be known - a world of stifled cries and lost voices, which
could only be recovered if they were rescued and brought to the light of the non-restraint
asylum.
Although the practice of putting the insane on display had not entirely ceased by
the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Conolly argued in 1856 that for many years,
the insane had not been sufficiently visible to prevent their ill-treatment. Of course, it is
not necessarily inconsistent to consider that insanity may have been both spectacle and
secret, especially during the early part of the nineteenth century, but as reform sentiment
grew stronger there was clearly more incentive to prevent outsiders from witnessing ill-
treatment of the insane in asylums. In his Treatment of the Insane Without Mechanical
Restraints (1856), Conolly argued that until the practice of using restraints in asylums
began to be abolished, and asylums began to be more strictly regulated, ‘secrecy had long
been the protection of the officers’.13 Conolly gave examples of the concealment of
practices, records, and even patients themselves: upon inquiry into a number of asylums,
11 Andrew Scull points out that by the time Conolly published The Treatment of the Insane without
Mechanical Restraints, Conolly’s model of non-restraint had become ‘the ruling orthodoxy,
particularly among the expanding county asylum system’. See Scull, ‘John Conolly’.
12 Porter, Manacles, p. 5.
13 Conolly, Treatment, p. 24.
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he claims, ‘the actual disappearance of many patients was never accounted for . . . In
reporting the number of deaths, several—sometimes 100 out of 300—were taken from
the list of the dead, and placed in the list of the cured’ (original emphasis).14
If ‘lunatics’ were confined because they were not thought mentally fit to have
the freedom to interact with other people, then it is small wonder that, without any
functional system of inspection or regulation, individuals could have been made to
‘disappear’. A form of disappearance occurred, in fact, when a person was removed from
the public world and placed in confinement. In order to see that person, one needed
special permission, authority, or qualifications. Then, everything that the public
discovered about what happened inside an asylum, according to Conolly, made people
dread to commit a relative to the care of such a place, and certainly to fear being confined
themselves.15 Thus, if one were to experience symptoms of mental infirmity, one would
try to disguise or hide them. As no one had access to the interior experience of the
individual, it was very difficult to prove whether or not an individual was insane. It was
also difficult to prove that one was not insane. If one were suspected of insanity, the
suspicion planted deeply enough in the minds of relatives, friends, or doctors, one could
be mistakenly confined to an asylum. Conolly gives an example of such a case: ‘His
indignation would pass for raving; his moderation, for the proverbial cunning of a lunatic.
A man of undisturbed understanding, suddenly surprised by the servants of a lunatic
asylum, with handcuffs ready, and a coach waiting to carry him off, would infallibly
exhibit some signs, easily construed into proofs that he was “not right in his head”’.16
14 Conolly, Treatment, p. 25.
15 Conolly, Indications, p. 6.
16 Conolly, Indications, p. 4.
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Yet Conolly claimed that it was not outside the scope of nineteenth-century
medicine to determine whether or not an individual was insane. On the contrary, he
claimed that increased access to the insane and to asylums would significantly diminish
the mystery of insanity. This would happen through the prevention of the mistreatment of
the insane (people would no longer view the asylum as necessarily a horrible place where
bad things happened to those confined within), and also through the proper training of
medical students in the art of diagnosing mental illness.17 Conolly further claimed that
the diagnosis of insanity should ‘present no greater difficulties in the way of observation
than those [disorders to which the medical student] is accustomed to in his study of the
functions of respiration, circulation, digestion, or reproduction; and are in no degree more
hidden and mysterious even in their nature, though certainly not less so.’18 Conolly made
this claim in the first chapter of an instructional text he authored on the subject, and it is
clear that with this claim he meant to deny some general notion that insanity was
mysterious or difficult to identify and diagnose.
The ‘mystery’ of insanity is not itself very difficult to identify. It was impossible
then, as it is now, to absolutely know the interior experience of another individual. How
was one to know whether what was happening inside someone’s own mind was
‘insanity’? How was one to define what was ‘insane’? Perhaps not surprisingly, Conolly
had an answer. He argued that any individual who was insane would demonstrate this
through his or her behaviour. This was so, not so much because behaviours afforded a
key to what an individual was experiencing within his or her own mind, but because
17 Conolly claimed, as of 1830,that medical students were not given proper access or training with regard to
the mentally infirm. He also argued that the asylum was the best place for medical students to
acquire knowledge, through experience with patients as well as instruction. Conolly, Indications,
p. 36.
18 Conolly, Indications, p. 37.
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Conolly located insanity in the performance of behaviours suggested by abnormal
impulses. Sanity, according to Conolly, was not the condition of not having abnormal
thoughts, impulses, or imaginings, but rather the ability to recognize them as such and to
resist performing the types of behaviours that they would seem to prompt. This included
the making of claims and the uttering of other speech that did not conform to the societal
consensus of what was real or appropriate.
If a person’s senses provided them with information that was somehow different
than the perception that is common to his or her fellows, this would tend to disrupt,
according to Conolly, the relationship between that person and the rest of the world. For
Conolly, this was a spiritual as well as a physical disorder, since it affected what
happened in the spaces within one that connected one person’s interior experience with
that of another:
So dependent is the immaterial soul upon the material organs, both for what it
receives and what it transmits, that a slight disorder in the circulation of the blood
through different portions of the nervous substance, can disturb all sensation, all
emotion, all relation with the external and the living world; can obstruct attention
and comparison, can injure and confound the accumulations in the memory, or
modify the suggestions of imagination.19
To have suffered from a disordered perception was not, however, madness in itself. To
have been mad, one must have believed that the information supplied by one’s
19 Conolly, Indications, p. 94.
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‘unfaithful’ nervous agents was accurate and correct, despite being told that everyone
else’s perceptions were very different.20
The ability to interpret ‘false intelligence’ as such was the jurisdiction of the
faculty of comparison, according to Conolly. 21 A person whose senses supplied him or
her with faulty information, who also lacked the ability to compare his or her experiences
with the experiences of a majority of other people, in order to reach the conclusion that
what the majority experienced was necessarily nearer to what is real, correct, or true, was
mad, according to Conolly. Thus, it was imperative that a person with disordered senses
be able to imagine what it was like to view the world from someone else’s perspective,
for it was the recognition that most other people had a different experience of the world
than oneself, and a subsequent renunciation of one’s own experience in favour of that of
the majority, that distinguished madness from mere sensory disorder. Conolly offered the
example of colour-blindness, or rather, colour-impairment: ‘There are individuals whose
sensations of colour do not accord with those of the generality of mankind; who do not
know blue from green’.22 Such a one would be mad, according to Conolly, if he or she
insisted that what everyone else called blue was green, and vice versa. However, as he
pointed out, most people in such a position would conclude that they must be suffering
from some impairment, if their experience was so different from everyone else’s. It
would be madness to conclude that everyone else was wrong.
20 Conolly, Indications, p. 62. For a study of the nineteenth-century association of sanity with ordered and
controlled behaviours, and of mental deficiency with the failure to regulate the passions, see Roger
Smith, Inhibition: History and Meaning in the Sciences of Mind and Brain (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1992). Smith also discusses the development of the
perceived relationship between the material body (especially the brain) and the sound or unsound
mind. See Smith, Inhibition, p. 3.
21 Conolly, Indications, p. 62.
22 Conolly, Indications, p. 96.
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Conolly located truth, then, in social consensus. Interestingly, and perhaps
disturbingly, this consensus need not have been something as arguably universal as the
difference between blue and green. A refined taste was also an indication of sanity, in the
same way as a preference for coarse over sophisticated sounds, for example, was
indicative of a defect or impairment of the comparative faculty. According to Conolly,
there was something wrong with someone who could not ‘derive any greater pleasure
from a musical composition of the first merit, than from the strains of a street fiddle, or
the scream of a peacock.’23 Sophistication, somehow, was a mark of sanity. One cannot
help but wonder how far Conolly would have pressed this assumption. Would he really
have considered that anyone whose taste differed from his own must have been impaired?
Taste aside, Conolly scrutinized an event in the life of an eighteenth-century man
of letters, of whom he spoke reverently despite using an anecdote about a claim that he
made as an example of madness:
Dr Johnson believed that at one time he heard the voice of his deceased mother
calling to him, “Sam, Sam!” he believed that his mother called to him from the
other world. It was useless to say to him that a voice could not be so heard; he
believed that it could. Unless therefore we believe that the dead may
communicate with the living, (which I am not prepared to deny,) we must say that
this was an insane belief.24
One might ask whether, since Dr Johnson died three years before he was even born,
Conolly could have reasonably claimed, by his own standards, to have been able to judge
Johnson’s assertion as madness. Conolly and Johnson were not alive at the same time;
23 Conolly, Indications, p. 96.
24 Conolly, Indications, pp. 316-317.
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would not both have needed to be part of the same circle of social consensus in order for
one to have declared the other an aberration? This problem was arguably not central for
Conolly; he implied that at least some others among Johnson’s contemporaries attempted
to dissuade him from the idea that his mother was trying to communicate with him from
beyond the grave.
It is arguable that Conolly chose the example of Dr Johnson because he imagined
that he was someone with whom his reader would have been quite familiar (he may even
have expected that his reader was likely to have been familiar with the anecdote). Dr
Johnson lent an air of uncompromising objectivity to Conolly’s argument, so that it
appeared that Conolly felt bound to name madness wherever he found it, even in the life
of an eminent literary genius. It is interesting to note, however, that Conolly stopped
short of classifying a belief in ghosts as necessarily irrational. Perhaps he did this in case
there were those among his contemporaries who were less than skeptical. If there did not
exist a social consensus against the existence of ghosts, then to believe in them would not
have been madness, according to Conolly. Conolly’s moderate tone also served to show
that rather than making a pointless accusation, he was providing an example by which he
could demonstrate how an episode of madness could be identified, if certain criteria were
met. It did not matter, then, if it could be argued that Dr Johnson’s individual case did
not fit the criteria, because it could just as well have served as a kind of template for
discussion if the conditions in the individual case were not met absolutely.
Whether literary genius or common man, it has long been argued that human
perceptions must share some basic elements in common. Barbara Stafford has most
recently discussed the structure of human cognitive coherence in terms of ‘hardwiring’,
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suggesting that the constraints of neural processes are responsible for shaping the way
that people deal with information, which helps to explain how we relate to one another.25
Although he had difficulty articulating it, Conolly gave a wonderfully pre-Freudian
account of the way in which people can be said to gather, store, sort, and recall pieces of
information that have come to them through the senses and have been processed into
perceptions. Conolly described insanity as a sort of waking dream, where one could not
control the way one assembled this information into an experience recognizable as
reality. During sleep, Conolly argued:
the Imagination still revives the thousands of buried but indestructible chains of
ideas which are mysteriously treasured in the brain, and weaves them into endless
combinations . . . But as during this state we cannot command our attention, we
can therefore exercise no comparison; we cannot reflect, we can form no correct
judgment, can exercise no self-control’ and we act inconsistently with the
imaginary scene into which the unsleeping imagination has transported us, or
evince no surprise at the most unlikely combinations of places and persons, or
experience undue impressions, immoderate anger, unreasonable fear, or pleasure
as excessive as it is transient and unsubstantial.26
A post-Freudian world would likely re-phrase this definition of insanity as a ‘leaking’ of
the subconscious. For Conolly, it sufficed to say that someone who was insane acted as if
in a dream.27 The dream served for Conolly both as a tool for classification and as a
25 Barbara Stafford, ‘Leveling the New Old Transcendence: Cognitive Coherence in the Era of
Beyondness’, New Literary History, 35 (2004), p. 328.
26 Conolly, Indications, p. 45.
27 For a discussion of the evolution of the idea of the ‘unconscious’ before Freud, see Lancelot Law Whyte,
The Unconscious Before Freud (New York: Basic Books, 1960). Roger Smith also discusses the
nineteenth-century association of sleep with the suspension of reason. See Smith, Inhibition, p.
42.
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bridge between the experiences of sanity and insanity, so that a sane person might have
been encouraged to reach toward an understanding of what it was like to be insane by
recalling the dream state.
For Conolly, it was not only the presentation of false sensory information within
the dream that distinguished it (and insanity) from a sane, wakeful state, but also the
ability to judge what is real, and to command and direct attention toward appropriate
objects and away from those upon which it would be unsuitable to dwell. Conolly
explained that ‘we can give indulgence to the imagination, which then exerts unlimited
power over them, disconnecting and uniting the several links in an infinite number of
series’.28 This, he argued, was what happened when sane people fell asleep, and relaxed
control over their imaginations. For Conolly, most unlike Freud who would follow some
half a century later, the content of the dreams was unimportant. Arguably, it did not
matter that much for Conolly whether the information one received when awake was
absolutely accurate, or relatively dreamlike. What was most important is that one could
recognize the difference between the real and the imaginary when one was not sleeping.
Conolly argued that in order to achieve a cure for the insane, one needed to
employ one’s imagination to get inside their world, at least for a time. This was not a
dangerous thing for a sane person to do, because a sane person would always be able to
distinguish between reality and fantasy, and would always be able to direct their
attentions appropriately. A sane person could imagine what it was like to be insane
without confusing the invented scenario with reality. In order to help a person suffering
from insanity, Conolly argued that one needed to attempt to reconstruct their experiences
in order to relate to them. Then, one could guide them back to sanity by convincing them
28 Conolly, Indications, p. 44.
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that they were acting in a way that was ‘not right’. If an insane person could recognize
that what he or she was doing, feeling, or thinking was different from everyone else, the
person could subsequently choose to conform according to the consensual standard. In
making this choice, he or she would then be ‘cured’.
For Conolly, all odd behaviours constituted a degree of insanity. He defined
eccentricity as being a ‘diseased state of the comparing faculty’, and argued that ‘any
affection of that faculty brings a man nearer to the condition of a lunatic.’29 If this seems
a wide bracket with which to encompass all those approaching madness, Conolly
confirmed his hard line as he explained that some forms of eccentricity also approached
madness:
If a man wears a white linen coat in July, or a very broad brimmed hat of light
manufacture, it may be that the coat and hat are cooler, and therefore better, than
the coats and hats commonly worn; here is an appearance of reason, but an
appearance only: for the custom of wearing a warm coat and stronger hat has
really arisen from long experience of the short continuance and great uncertainty
of the hot weather . . . The general attention, memory, and comparison of the
people of this country, have come to such a conclusion; but the eccentric
individual has not come to the conclusion. His attention has been unduly attracted
by the sensations of a few hot days; he has not paid the same attention to the
sudden, but common, interruptions occasioned by inclement weather.30
29 Conolly, Indications, p. 135.
30 Conolly, Indications, p. 136.
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Thus, any departure from usual practice, even if it seemed to make sense, was evidence
of madness. If sanity equalled reason, it was a reason equivalent to a Rousseauian
General Will, from which any departure would be error, for anyone truly reasonable
would reach the same conclusion by way of his or her own faculties. One might wonder
how this could ever have allowed for innovation, or for the respiration of the human
imagination? As we have seen, Conolly assumed the imagination to have been ever-
present, only restrained by the same faculty of the will, and informed by the comparative
faculties, which would recognize a potential behaviour as aligned with common practice
or divergent from it. Conolly somewhat weakly offered that innovation could be viewed
as present in the production of works of genius without models (he gave the example of
ancient philosophers), but nonetheless he insisted that genius was antithetical to madness,
because of the control and force of the will that was ultimately required to produce works
of genius.31
The imagination was crucial to Conolly’s process of self-regulation, for the
process of constantly comparing one’s behaviours with those of others required the mind
to occupy the space between the self and other individuals, constantly creating and
destroying contemplative worlds of activity and stasis, before one could choose a path of
action to follow. This correlates with Stafford’s argument about cognitive coherence,
perhaps explaining how the self-proclaimed hyper-rationalist Conolly of Indications
could so easily slip into the highly imaginative, empathic Conolly of his other works,
who tended to tell stories from the perspective of mental patients:
Biology . . . supports the ancient combinatorics of analogy: our bent towards
mental travel and the collecting and piecing together of many different kinds of
31 Conolly, Indications, p. 136.
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realities by the roving imagination. The primal prefix, trans-entangled with
multidimensional aspirations to connect—functions epistemologically and
ontologically like the arch of a bridge. But this linking image-in-the-middle—
striving to join things that are segregated, divided, or on the other side—has
proved notoriously difficult to delimit merely to the activity of medication.
Whether deployed rhetorically or philosophically, this enabling device has
periodically resisted the self-effacing role of span. In other words, the mental
operation that had served as a supple medium for bringing distant monadic
elements into proximity itself came to stand for the integration it was working to
achieve. Rather than being a participatory condition making unity possible, it was
reified into a representation of that unity.32
For Conolly, it was part of life to imagine oneself in a different position, performing a
different action, or wearing a lighter coat in warm weather. Just as it did not oppose
reason to place oneself within the perspective of a patient experiencing paranoia or
dementia, it was not insane to imagine oneself in many different situations, doing many
different things. Conolly argued that madness was in the matter of choosing to act out
the wrong one in reality, because one did not know the difference.
Social intercourse would effectively prevent eccentric behaviour in most people,
according to Conolly. Awareness of the experience of one’s fellows would most often
stop an individual from exhibiting certain behaviours, because one was likely to care
about what others would think and feel: ‘When eccentric habits are growing upon a man
who continues to mix in society, they may be checked by his own efforts, on observing
32 Stafford, ‘Leveling’, p. 327.
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the surprise or the amusement which is caused by them. The starts of irritability, and the
gloom of discontent, are alike corrected by prudential feelings, or by regard for others.’33
For this reason, he argued, it was imperative that mental patients engage in as much
social contact as was possible. Completely cut off from family and friends, as under the
‘old system’ before non-restraint, one would have had little reason to try to abandon
abnormal behaviour, to focus the attentive and comparative faculties. Conolly described
how he imagined it would be impossible to do anything but become worse in such an
environment: ‘a place in which a thousand fantasies, that are swept away almost as soon
as formed in the healthy atmosphere of diversified society, would assume shapes more
distinct.’34 It is interesting to note Conolly’s particular attention to the sensual and even
geometric aspect of the experience of madness. He attempted to form a bridge between
everyday daydreams, which he assumed that all readers of his texts would have had, and
the experience of the mad, which he imagined and argued to be primarily an inability to
control these.
Conolly’s definition of madness included any kind of action that did not conform
to the standards of society, but it is also clear that this definition was conceptual rather
than practical in its purpose, and that he did not consider that anyone who deviated from
this extremely rigid standard to have been ‘mad’. Further, he knew that those who had
become insane had not always been that way, and suggested that no one could be totally
secure in their faculties. Thus, the treatment of the insane was a universal issue: ‘Every
man is interested in this subject; for no man can confidently reckon on the continuance of
33 Conolly, Indications, p. 17.
34 Conolly, Indications, p. 22.
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his perfect reason.’35 Conolly took for granted that everyone his text might have reached
would have experienced some personal moments of unreason. He tried to build on some
common mental ailments in order to encourage empathy for the incarcerated mad.
Conolly believed that most people had, at some point, experienced mental distress, and he
relied on this assumption in order to communicate what he imagined it was like to be
restrained in such a state. He offered the example of a sleepless night, assuming that
most of his readers would have experienced insomnia at some point: ‘Whoever has
known the affliction of a restless night must know that his affliction would have received
no abatement from his being tied down to his bed; and that fresh air, cold water, sitting
up awhile, and diversion of mind, are the things to which he would resort for relief.’36
Conolly also insisted that the inmates of an asylum shared with those outside its
walls the trait that they were all individuals in common, and were each one different in
personality and quirks to the next: ‘we cannot fail to perceive that . . . the degrees and
shades of affection are very variable, and almost infinite: that, like the persons without
the walls of that institution, each individual has a distinct character, his own trains of
thought, his own peculiar habits, his own pursuits’.37 It is interesting to note that he
presented the range of personalities inside the asylum walls as a parallel to those on the
outside, rather than grouping the ‘mad’ together as if they were one personality, in order
to try to communicate a singular experience of madness. Here, Conolly made an
important decision, for if he had chosen to consistently construct a ‘typical’ inmate of an
asylum, according to common traits and circumstances, it would have been easier to
make his reader feel that they ‘knew’ this personality as a character. In this instance,
35 Conolly, Indicaions, p. 8.
36 Conolly, Treatment, p. 51.
37 Conolly, Indications, p. 11.
213
however, Conolly chose to distance the reader from the ‘typical’ inmate by establishing
the range of difference inside the asylum. By doing so, it is arguable that Conolly meant
to impress his reader with the force of numbers, almost as if he were supplying statistics:
there were ‘as many’ different kinds of people within the asylum as outside of it. Here
was a world apart, and the reader would have been forced to confront that it existed as
such, as well as the people within it.
Of course, the people who lived or worked within an asylum would have been
best acquainted with its other world. It was important for Conolly that those on the
outside were kept aware that this world existed, mostly in order that what went on in the
asylum would not be kept a secret. People outside could influence legislation that would
affect the way people were treated inside the asylum, but ultimately what mattered the
most was what happened within the space where the inmates and the staff of the asylum
interacted with each other. Conolly was interested in characterizing this space as intimate
and familial: ‘An officer living in an asylum, and really intimate with the insane, can
scarcely fail to become interested in persons who in the wreck of mind retain often so
many valuable feelings. Fear and anger are not long the emotions they excite, but in their
stead sympathy and compassion.’38 If everyone involved with the care of the insane were
very close to one another and to the inmates, natural affection would generate an interest
in the welfare of patients, and the space between and among these individuals would
become the site of healing. In this context it is easy to imagine how Conolly figured the
ideal asylum as centred around a patriarchal leader who would inspire kindness and
ensure order while attempting to lead by example.
38 Conolly, Treatment, p. 115.
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Conolly depicted his patients as dependent children, who would be granted their
freedom once they regained their sanity, despite the pain that this would cause to both
parties. Of course, he would know when the time was right, like any parent. Conolly
portrayed the ideal asylum doctor as wise as well as led by feeling. He claimed that
patients often cried at the conclusion of their treatment because they did not want to leave
his asylum: ‘Witnessing these scenes, not without emotion, and reviewing them at the
quiet close of each busy and anxious day, I began to feel assured that the system we were
pursuing, however difficult, could not be wrong.’39 Conolly’s asylum, as well as his
movement for reform of all asylums, was ultimately be governed by feeling - though he
insisted that feeling must be informed and educated by a soundly reasonable mind.
According to Conolly, certain kinds of people could generally be expected to be
more reasonable than others, although no one could be completely certain that their good
mental health would always continue. Namely, Conolly argued that those whose senses
and faculties were more ‘educated’ were less likely to suffer from all manner of mental
ailments, ranging from eccentricities to nervous habits to insanity. This argument
amounts to a rather disturbing distinction between rich and poor:
The faculties of uneducated people, and particularly of the lower order, who are
neither instructed by precept or observation . . . suffer daily the same
inconveniences [as do children], for want of power to connect causes and effects.
Even their senses are so unskilfully employed and unimproved, that we cannot
always depend on what they believe they have seen with their eyes, or heard with
their ears.40
39 Conolly, Treatment, p. 117.
40 Conolly, Indications, p. 99.
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Conolly’s spectrum of mental strengths and weaknesses infantilized inmates and
encouraged to mimic their ‘betters’. In the following description of admission to the
asylum, it is difficult to determine whether or not Conolly meant to imply that poverty
alone was the cause of many cases of mental distress: ‘When no proper care is omitted, it
is often gratifying, after the patient has been an hour in the asylum, to see a poor, ragged,
dirty, half-starved, sullen, wretched creature, transformed into a clean, decently-dressed,
cheerful and hopeful person, disposed to be pleased with everybody and everything: and
this is a first step towards a cure’.41 Especially after reading his description of the general
mental weakness of the poor, one might imagine that poverty was in some measure
equivalent to insanity for Conolly.
Connolly stressed that the behaviour of asylum staff was important as it set an
example for the inmates to follow, as well as providing a positive stimulus to encourage a
good response. Patients, too, exerted influence over their fellow inmates. In describing
the influence that inmates of an asylum might have upon each other, Conolly at once
emphasized the importance of watching the inmates, their behaviours, and interactions, as
well as the importance of recognizing that they, too, were watching what they saw around
them. ‘The religious despair of a patient in the next apartment, brings back and confirms
the religious despondency of his neighbour in this: the passions and violence of those
who are parading the airing grounds revive the passions and raving of those who are
becoming more tranquil’.42 The staff, then, had to endeavour to regulate what happened
in the spaces between the inmates, as well as what happened in the spaces between the
inmates and themselves.
41 Conolly, Construction, p. 107.
42 Conolly, Indications, p. 28.
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Restraints, of course, made it quite easy to control these spaces. When the
restraints were removed, not only could the patients wander, but they became free to
make new associations with their environment and with other patients. They could also
manipulate their environment, perhaps in dangerous ways, if proper pre-cautions were
not taken. Conolly referred to restraint as having been ‘the grand substitute for
inspection, super-intendence, cleanliness, and every kind attention’.43 It is easy to see
how the removal of restraints must have necessitated a total upheaval in asylum practice,
for without them patients would require far more attendance and supervision to prevent
them from injuring themselves or others. Conolly acknowledged the trouble that needed
to be taken when restraints were removed, and insisted upon a new regime of discipline
within the asylum that would never allow any means to ease the responsibility of the
constant supervision of patients. Conolly argued that ‘any contrivance which diminishes
the necessity for vigilance, proves hurtful to the discipline of an asylum’.44 In this new,
quasi-familial space, the staff were meant to keep watch over the patients every moment
of the day and night. This, according to Conolly, would have the dual effect of regulating
the behaviours, actions, and interactions of the inmates, as well as encouraging bonds of
empathy between and among everyone who participated in the daily life of the asylum.
Conolly believed that the flaw at the core of the ‘old system’ (which used
restraint) was the way that the inmates were viewed: ‘The old system placed all violent or
troublesome patients in the position of dangerous animals. The new system regards them
as afflicted persons, whose brain and nerves are diseased, and who are to be restored to
health, and comfort, and reason. This simple difference of view it is which influences
43 Conolly, Construction, p. 28.
44 Conolly, Treatment, p. 202.
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every part of an asylum for the insane.’45 This process of viewing at once suggests the
consideration of the humanity of the patients, and also that any significant understanding
could only be reached by constant surveillance. It is arguable that watching was also
important because it facilitated non-verbal communication. Non-verbal communication
was especially important because the verbal communicative abilities of the mentally
infirm were easily dismissed as defective, and in some cases may actually have been
limited. Conolly suggested that once the staff learned to view the inmates as human
beings, they would naturally watch, attend, and form bonds with them. Hence, viewing
was the central act of the asylum, both with regard to the care of patients and to the
experience of being an inmate.
Conolly argued that as asylum staff became accustomed to seeing patients in
restraints, and their feelings disregarded, they became detached from the patients and
learned to view cruelty as acceptable. He said of circumstances in which restraints were
commonly employed upon mental patients: ‘nothing can more forcibly illustrate the
hardening effect of being habitual witnesses of cruelty, and the process which the heart of
man undergoes when allowed to exercise irresponsible power.’46 Of course, staff would
not need to watch patients as closely if they were wearing restraints. They would not
have to constantly consider and worry about what a patient might do next. Thus, they
would not have to consider the patient’s thoughts and feelings, to imagine their
perspective, and get to know their personality.
Under Conolly’s system of non-restraint, a patient who became unmanageable
might be removed from the society of the rest of the asylum, and placed in isolation.
45 Conolly, Treatment, p. 49.
46 Conolly, Treatment, p. 28.
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Conolly understood that this practice could be interpreted as just as cruel as imposing
restraints upon a patient. He took trouble to explain the differences between the two, and
to articulate the conditions under which a patient may be placed solitary confinement.
Conolly argued that without the option of placing a patient in isolation, it might prove
impossible to dispense with restraints in a large asylum.47 He added that ‘a written report
of each instance of seclusion, and of its duration, is sent to the physician at the close of
each day, and copied by him into a book which is inspected at every meeting of the
Committee’.48 The practice of isolating a patient was carefully monitored by a system of
observation, report, and review. A representation was generated of the patient in
isolation, which also became a record of the member of staff who made the decision to
place the patient in isolation.
Conolly recommended that the patient in isolation had to be watched through an
inspection plate in the door, so that while in solitary confinement, he or she was not left
alone, or allowed to remain confined for any longer than was salutary: ‘By occasionally
looking through the inspection-plate, the attendant is enabled to ascertain the effect of the
seclusion; and the medical officers, to whom every seclusion is, or ought to be, reported
immediately, are enabled to judge of the propriety of continuing or putting an end to it.’49
The observations, then, would be recorded and a representation of the patient’s condition
would be passed along to those in charge, so that they, too, could ‘see’ the necessity for
keeping the patient in isolation. If the doctor in charge had engineered a warm and
trusting environment, and had selected staff who were likely to be honest about their
observations, then even if the faculties of the staff members were not so well ‘trained’ as
47 Conolly, Treatment, p. 41.
48 Conolly, Treatment, p. 45.
49 Conolly, Construction, p. 26.
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those of the doctor’s, his acutely educated observational skills would enable him to see
beyond the report and prompt him to go and see for himself, if he sensed that something
was amiss.
The Foucauldian may consider Conolly’s arrangements the very pinnacle of
Victorian panopticism, but there is one important exception to be noted: the
specifications of Conolly’s means of inspection do not fit into Foucault’s paradigm. The
function of Foucault’s panopticon, as derived from Bentham’s famous prison design and
applied to many other institutions, is ‘to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and
permanent visibility that assures that automatic functioning of power . . . power should be
visible and unverifiable’.50 As Conolly explained how the inmate in isolation should be
monitored through an inspection plate, he went to some trouble to describe the exact
specifications of the device. It was required to be placed in the door at a convenient eye-
level, and the hinges needed to be fitted in such a way that it made no sound to disturb the
patient.51 Conolly specified that the inspection plate should not be unverifiable by any
means. He explained that in other asylums, inspection of the patients had been
conducted by means of concealed apparatus, ‘secret openings in the walls or roof’ that
allowed staff to peer in at patients without them knowing.52 Even despite the danger
posed by patients who were ‘disposed to injure the eyes of the attendants when applied to
the opening’ of the inspection plate in the door, Conolly called this the concealment of
the apparatus of inspection a ‘perversion of ingenuity’. 53 He argued that the active
curiosity and sharpened senses of most patients would immediately discover these
50 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Alan Sheridan (tr.) (New York:
Random House, 1977 [1975]), p. 201.
51 Conolly, Construction, p. 27.
52 Conolly, Construction, p. 27.
53 Conolly, Construction, p. 27.
220
supposed secret openings; and that they would be more likely to be offended by them
than by a more avowed watchfulness. He suggested that patients were likely to triumph
over the defeat of such a contrivance.54 Conolly effectively argued that such deception,
especially practised upon those who may already be prone to paranoia, would break
bonds of empathy with the patients and encourage them to view their attendants and
doctors as enemies. Instead, Conolly recommended engagement with the perspective of
the inmates and tried to imagine them returning the gaze of the asylum staff.
Conolly was aware that the system of observing patients through an inspection
plate in the door was not perfect, but he apparently thought it was the best option of all
available. He knew that inmates would try to frustrate the attempts of asylum staff to
observe them, and considered that sometimes it might have been acceptable or even
desirable for the staff to let them do so: ‘Some patients are particularly sensitive
concerning being watched, and contrive to hang up clothes so as to obstruct inspection.
This is chiefly the case with patients whom it is not necessary to look so closely after
when left to themselves; but in the refractory wards the practice must not be permitted, or
in the case of patients disposed to suicide.’55 Conolly relied upon the subjective
judgment of asylum staff to determine whether or not it was inappropriate for an inmate
to opt out of inspection in such a way. The rules, apparently, were more of a guideline in
this matter than absolute law. Conolly expected that attendants, who, it must be
remembered, were supposed to be well acquainted with the personalities of the different
patients, should be able to feel their way through these kinds of situations. Trust was
arguably more useful to Conolly than forced obedience, and it is also arguable that he
54 Conolly, Construction, p. 27.
55 Conolly, Construction, p. 27.
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would have liked his patients to develop a measure of self-control even when they were
aware that they were not being watched.
In addition to inspection of the inmates, Conolly also expected asylum staff to
monitor their own behaviour. The patient was never to be presumed insensible to what
was going on, even if he or she seemed very far away: ‘they know and appreciate
everything that is done, whether they are well or ill’.56 Conolly rested partly on the
authority of the patients themselves, who were able to recall to him things that were done
or said when they had been apparently insensible. Patience and increased acquaintance
with inmates would, according to Conolly, demonstrate to the attendant that they were
not beyond reach, even when they seemed very much so:
A lunatic is seldom, even in his most raving fits, insensible to what is said to him:
he will often show, among his wildest and most extravagant expressions, that he
is watchful of the conduct of those about him, and when the ordinary observer
would expect nothing from him but what indicated savage fury, those who are
patient with him, and who, regardless of his wildness, continue to indicate their
kind feelings towards him, will find that sometimes his voice falters, and his eyes
fill with tears.57
Persistence, then, would eventually reach through madness to the person within. The
hand extended to the inmate by the asylum needed to be one that he or she was not afraid
to cling to, for this contact was the foundation upon which his or her social life was to be
rebuilt.
56 Conolly, Construction, p. 27.
57 Conolly, Treatment, p. 210.
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Like the testimony of children, the testimony of the mentally infirm is easily
denounced as an unreliable source of evidence. In presenting the voices of those
designated mad, Conolly often sheltered these voices under the authority of his own
narrative, integrating paraphrase and carefully selected quotations into his own
arguments. Conolly led by example in his acceptance of the words of the mentally
infirm, tacitly asking his reader to trust in his own experience and ability to distinguish
sanity from insanity. He assumed that his reader would not deny that there was at least
the possibility of truth in the testimony of the insane, arguably relying on the perception
of their vulnerability to prevent any absolute dismissal. The reader, aware that there was
never likely to be anyone but the abuser to witness the ill-treatment of the confined mad,
might well have been reluctant to allow the grievances of the insane to go completely
unacknowledged.
What knowledge can a sane person have of the experience of madness? Conolly
explained that the appearance of insensibility could be very deceiving. How did he
know? Rather than recording and presenting myriad individual testimonies as evidence,
Conolly distilled what he heard of the words of the mad into a brief narrative. He offered
himself as a witness to the testimony instead of delivering it directly: ‘Recovering
gradually from this state, they would tell us that, even in that apparent torpor, they
watched everything that was done, and were attentive to every observation that we made;
and by degrees they understood us, and tried to rouse themselves’.58 There is no mention
of the means by which he acquired this precise information: did he ask questions of his
patients during periods of calm? How many patients did he interview? How did he
decide when they were ‘calm’ enough to speak about their experiences? To pose such
58 Conolly, Treatment, p. 122.
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questions would be to question the credibility of the ‘witnesses’ themselves. In order to
proceed so far with Conolly, it would have been necessary to consent to a suspension of
such conventions of interrogation, for the subjects (indirectly) presented by Conolly were
avowedly unreasonable. The reader could only trust Conolly to describe what he believed
a person recovering from a paroxysm of madness would say, presumably based upon his
experiences with individuals in this circumstance and his interpretation of their
expressions.
It is apparent that Conolly often wrote from personal experience, either
remembering or recounting specific episodes with particular patients, or making broad
assumptions and statements regarding patients or types of patients in general. It is also
clear, however, that he made frequent use of case notes and reports, in order to
substantiate his arguments regarding the insane and their proper treatment. As the first
physician of Hanwell, his authority extended in practice to the last word of any narrative
that issues from the asylum, whether regarding the expressions of patients or the
complaints of the staff. As Hanwell was his great responsibility and experiment, so
Conolly’s arguments implemented narratives of diverse origin, and processed these
according to his own expressive needs. In this way, Conolly’s larger works mimicked the
design of the individual case note, which would function to harness the concise truth of a
patient’s situation by viewing it through the lens of medical knowledge and previous
experience. While it is arguable that referencing case notes in order to write about a
patient’s experience effectively obstructs the voice of the patient behind a wall of
previous analysis, it must also be said that the case history tells the story of the patient in
its own way. Stuart Hogarth and Lara Marks argue that ‘far from eliminating the
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narrative, new techniques of examination (linked as they were to new bureaucratic
standards of documentation) transformed the patient narrative into a case history that
became the cornerstone of institutionalized welfare’.59 Conolly shifted so effortlessly
between the use (and even reproduction) of case notes and of less formal, less verifiable,
and more literary sources of observation, that it is often difficult to follow his shift from
one to the other. For Conolly, it was all part of the same ‘story’.
It is arguably easier to discredit the words of one labelled mad than to discredit a
doctor’s interpretation of them. Conolly developed a strategy of relating the experiences
of insane individuals together as one narrative statement. He developed a strong
narrative position by confirming individual expressions with other, similar tales. Conolly
demonstrated the way in which these stories corroborated one another, so that the
repetition of certain expressions of the inmates functioned as a form of evidence for their
experiences. He paraphrased the tale of one woman in particular (he added that she
eventually left his asylum, fully recovered), and then moved on to make a more general
statement about what he had heard from female patients of their treatment in other
asylums:
She had a distinct recollection of the events of her illness; told us that for a length
of time she had worn a strait-waistcoat in the day-time, her wrists being at the
same time confined by iron handcuffs; and that at night both her hands and feet
had been fastened to the bedstead . . . In their calmer intervals they [women]
59 Stuart Hogarth and Lara Marks, ‘The Golden Narrative in British Medicine’, in Trisha Greenhalgh and
Brian Hurwitz (eds), Narrative Based Medicine: Dialogue and Discourse in Clinical Practice
(London: BMJ Books, 1998), p. 145.
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would relate the severities inflicted upon them; often, it seemed, by men, who
were employed to overpower them.60
It is possible that he chose to highlight this one woman’s testimony because he could say
that she eventually recovered from her insanity. However, Conolly did not supply the
woman’s own words or the words of the others whom he mentioned as having suffered
similar experiences. Conolly expected that his reader would trust his judgment in the
interpretation of these women, perhaps especially since he was entrusted with the
decision of whether and when any of these under his care were to be released, and called
‘sane’ again.
Conolly maintained complete control of the presentation of the stories of the
insane, often writing their experiences as his own narrative. He told the story of a woman
who experienced a traumatic event, before being taken to an asylum where restraints
were used upon her: ‘When in childbed, a fire broke out in a neighbouring house. She
was extremely alarmed; and mania ensued . . . Her peculiar condition, her recent fright
and agitation, were alike disregarded.’61 Conolly explained that this woman was
eventually removed to Hanwell: ‘She was timid, agitated, and cried much; and spoke
affectionately of her husband . . . she speedily began to regain composure and to feel
some confidence in those about her.’62 Conolly indicated that the patient was released
within a month after he began to care for her. In the course of relating her narrative,
Conolly described an event (the fire), he related what the woman felt during this event
(she was alarmed), and even gave a retrospective diagnosis (mania ensued). He then
described the failings of those who attended her at the first asylum (disregard for her
60 Conolly, Treatment, p. 119.
61 Conolly, Treatment, p. 109.
62 Conolly, Treatment, p. 109.
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condition, fright, etc.). He then moved effortlessly to describe what he may actually have
witnessed, after she was placed in his care, and more, as he described what confidence
she began to feel in those around her. Within this narrative, Conolly related the interior
condition of the woman as easily as he asserted verifiable facts and observable actions,
for these were for him part of the same story. We may assume that he inferred this
information from personal interviews with this patient, but we really don’t know; perhaps
he may have gathered much of it from attendants who spent more time with her. He
simply did not bother to communicate such details. Instead, he made her story his own,
in order that he might tell it, and anyone who would challenge it would be challenging
him, rather than his patient.
Conolly often related the expressions of his patients in paraphrase, indicating that
the words he used were at least approximately their own: ‘Nobody, she told us, used to
come near her; and she was let to cry from vexation and the pain caused by the strait-
waistcoat’.63 In this instance, Conolly began by describing the woman as she was when
she arrived at Hanwell. The indication of her appearance and her vital signs suggests that
he was actually present at the moment the woman was brought in, though he could have
easily read this information from a report that had been made to him by a member of his
staff. Certainly his use of the object pronoun ‘us’ was meant to communicate his
presence on the occasion. Interestingly, he stated that ‘her mind was confused, and she
talked rapidly and incoherently’ before he began to explain what ‘she told us’. 64 This
information contrasts distinctly with the clarity of Conolly’s own paraphrase of the
woman’s words. Was this a purposeful contrast? Did Conolly mean to fashion himself as
63 Conolly, Treatment, p. 108.
64 Conolly, Treatment, p. 108.
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the woman’s skilled interpreter? Or was her initial confusion meant to contrast with the
clearer dialogue of which she was apparently capable later? It is not entirely clear why
Conolly chose this strategy, except that he certainly meant to align the woman’s former
incoherence with her former institutions, and clarity with Hanwell. In the sentence that
followed, Conolly assigned blame for the woman’s confusion and for her inability to
communicate clearly: ‘Unfortunately, she had been first taken to a private asylum, where
restraints were in ordinary use.’65 Was it mental illness, or ill-treatment, that robbed this
woman of the ability to communicate clearly? Despite whatever condition in which she
might have been when she arrived at the first asylum, at Hanwell, Conolly was sure to
emphasize, they managed to reach her.
Very occasionally, Conolly utilized direct quotations from patients. Whenever he
did so, it was usually to demonstrate strong feeling, as in the case of one twenty-year-old
young woman who denounced the treatment she received at another asylum before
coming to Hanwell. At Hanwell, the woman caused no particular trouble to the staff and
eventually became well enough to discuss her past history: ‘She complained, however,
that before coming to Hanwell, she had worn “those infernal fetters” day and night for
three weeks’.66 The direct quotation here is very useful, as it establishes that the woman
was sensible of what was done to her while she was in restraints, and also that she was
sufficiently coherent and stable to recall her unpleasant experience with clarity and to
denounce it while yet remaining calm enough to discuss it without raving. At Hanwell,
as she pronounced the words, she was not in fetters, and though angry, she was not
furious. The experience of having been fettered was the real experience of a human
65 Conolly, Treatment, p. 108.
66 Conolly, Treatment, p. 118.
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being, and her civilized condemnation of the practice of putting people in fetters was
arguably meant to inspire doubt that the woman could have ever given so much
provocation as to convince someone that she needed to be restrained in such a way for
three weeks.
A most interesting instance of Conolly’s use of quotation is actually one in which
he made use of his patient as a secondary source, the primary source of the quotation
having been a warden who attended the patient at the beginning of her illness, twenty
years before: ‘At this distant period she still remembered her own expressions and
theirs—her appeals to them as women, her prayers for pity, and their too ready reply,
which shut out hope—“You don’t know what a madhouse is yet, but we will teach
you”.’67 The inverted commas imply the speech of one voice, if not one person.
Arguably, Conolly meant to communicate that his patient heard this reply over and over
again, from different attendants, at the first asylum to which she was committed. The
tertiary quotation, however, is phrased as one voice, just as Conolly heard it told. The
patient arguably distilled many instances of having heard the same or similar speech
repeated, into one voice, which was still very much alive in her memory. That she would
have spoken of this experience was evidence of the positive effect of Conolly’s reforms.
The woman obviously made a significant distinction between the treatment she received
under Conolly’s care, and the treatment she once received at another asylum twenty years
ago.
When one of Conolly’s patients gained access to his own records (presumably by
looking over the shoulder of an attendant, or some such accident), his response to what
67 Conolly, Treatment, p. 125.
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was written about him before he became an inmate of Hanwell proved too valuable a
piece of evidence against the old asylum system for Conolly to have omitted:
A man reported dirty and violent has sometimes himself remarked, when
accidentally seeing these characters written on his admission paper, that he might
well be both when he was fastened down in a trough, half fed, and often struck;
and such patients, on being set at liberty, have not unfrequently at once become
cleanly in their habits and calm in their conduct.68
Although Conolly did not use a direct quotation in this instance, the paraphrase itself
retains a great deal of the bitter emotion that must have been expressed in the patient’s
original words. Part of the reason is that Conolly himself would not have had the
authority of personal experience to place behind the complaint; if Conolly claimed a
patient had been ‘half fed’, it would have been the expression of a reasonably wealthy
man describing the condition of one who was much poorer than himself. This could have
read as exaggeration if applied outside the context of the paraphrase, or stated more
generally about patients who came to Hanwell from other institutions.
The spontaneity of the accident of the patient seeing his own records gave the
paraphrase an extra element of plausibility; despite the fact that that Conolly retained
absolute control over the patient’s testimony (and despite the fact that he could very well
have said things to direct the patient’s response, once the patient began to remark upon
what was written about him), it appears that the patient had assessed the treatment he
received prior to his arrival at Hanwell according to his own standards. Using paraphrase
in this way, Conolly achieved a persuasive balance of subtle and stark language, thus
delivering a rare brand of testimony: the insane patient, whose words would have
68 Conolly, Treatment, p. 49.
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ordinarily been dismissed as the raving madness, was able to speak out against the
treatment he had been given at asylums before Hanwell, and to defend his violent
behaviour and dishevelled demeanour as having been the results of this treatment. Dr
Conolly gave to the patient’s words the weight of his own respected reason, and the
patient, in return, gave to the doctor’s argument the weight of his personal experience.
Conolly framed his own account of the patient’s response to what was once said about
him within the context of the experiences of his other patients. The suggestion is that that
these others would have presented similar testimony if given the chance to respond to
what was said about them before they had been integrated into the system at Hanwell.
In Indications, Conolly presented an interesting account of one patient who was
able to comment on her own condition during her lucid intervals. In order to demonstrate
that in the event of hallucination, ‘the illusion is not the madness’, Conolly explained that
though this woman hallucinated consistently, her ability to recognize her hallucinations
as such did not always fail her. 69 Sometimes, according to Conolly, the woman was
‘conscious that her sensations were diseased; and was of sane mind: she could exercise
her observation on others, and by comparison of their unconcern with the false images
which her senses figured to be around them, remain convinced that the images were
unreal’.70 In this instance, it is difficult to believe that the patient’s own words
approximated anything like what Conolly wrote. Unlike in the instance of the patient
who saw his own records and responded to what was written on them, it is certain that the
words Conolly used to communicate the woman’s circumstances were nothing like the
69 Conolly, Indications, p. 113.
70 Conolly, Indications, p. 113.
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woman’s own words. Conolly positioned himself in this instance in the role of a
translator between the patient and his audience.
Whether or not her own words were clear enough to have been easily understood
in their original form, Conolly ‘medicalized’ this woman’s expressions in a way that
presented her experience as the description of an interesting case. While this at once
seems somewhat arrogant of him, and places his subject at a greater emotional distance
from his reader than if her expressions were presented more ‘naturally’, it also represents
an attempt to divulge an experience that we would now call ‘empathic’, by means of a
more medical, professional language. Using this language, the woman’s experience may
have fit somehow with a variety of other expressions that other patients of other doctors,
and so to use a common (if lofty) parlance would also tend to make her experience more
accessible to other doctors who may have treated similar cases, or cared for individuals
suffering from similar ailments. Here was a woman who could speak of the experience
of mental illness with the intimate knowledge of a sufferer. The challenge for Conolly
was to present the ‘knowledge’ acquired to a third party, and Conolly chose to do this by
completely refiguring her story and placing her case at a distance in order to describe it in
his own way.
At times Conolly stepped wholly into the perspective of his patient,
communicating details of experiences so intimate that it can only be assumed that he
invented them. For this he never apologized. Instead, he encouraged his reader to think
beyond what he or she could readily accept as empirical proof of what happened within
someone else’s mind, as there could never be perfect evidence of such, most especially if
that person was not completely capable of communicating effectively according to
232
established social and cultural protocol. Just because someone could not communicate
their interior experience, it did not mean that it did not matter whether they were
suffering. Conolly’s strategy was suggestive of the need to consider the possibility of
what might be happening to a person who was locked inside themselves without means of
expressing their experience. Conolly used any clues available and used his own
imagination to fill in any blank spaces. He gave the example of a woman who lived in
fear of being burned alive: ‘In every one who approached her she seemed to behold an
enemy, or an executioner. It may be readily supposed that in a case of this kind, a stern
reception, the continuance or the imposition of restraints, and a darkened room, would
only have confirmed the patient’s fears’.71 Conolly certainly exercised some shrewd
logic in the translation of this woman’s fears and expressions, but his reasoning was
heavily dependent upon his imagination. He encouraged others to use the same kind of
reasoning to step beyond what could be readily proven in order to reach for a more
imaginative knowledge of someone else’s experiences. Interestingly, given the context,
one could speculate that this particular woman may not even have existed as an
individual; it arguably would have been enough to suppose that some individuals were
subject to such paranoia, in order to place oneself in the perspective of such a one.
Perhaps Conolly had seen many such cases and selected facets of a particular case in
order to construct a type with which to illustrate his point. Since his point was to
encourage others to push beyond the boundaries of the empirical into the realm of
possibility, it would have served just as well to have done so.
Conolly sometimes constructed wholly representative characters out of the
material of his real patients. In one instance Conolly even constructed, for the sake of
71 Conolly, Treatment, p. 112.
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argument, a fictitious patient he did not believe to be typical, in order to provide a ‘worst-
case scenario’. Conolly attempted to pre-empt any argument against the sensibility of
patients admitted to asylums:
I will suppose a person to have been received into the establishment unconscious
of the change,—a thing which happens very rarely. The patient is insensible, and
suffers nothing. But this state will not last long. The patient recovers some
degree of consciousness; his vehemence and passion abate; or a load of
despondency and horror begins to be cleared from him. He tries, very feebly and
imperfectly, to recover broken chains of thought: recollections of past
circumstances return to him, as to one awakening from a deep sleep, or from a
troubled dream; perhaps the recollections of his family, of his home, and of
suspended affections. Who can paint the surprise and alarm which must naturally
arise from the unexplained confusion around him! Shocked and affrighted, he
may relapse into his madness and be lost.72
The purpose for the creation of this character and scenario was not to describe something
that actually occurred, to demonstrate the necessity of considering what might be the
experience of an inmate in an asylum. To incite fear was certainly part of Conolly’s
strategy; he presented the mystery of mental illness in a manner that would likely
encourage a wish that individuals who might find themselves in this situation would be
extended a hand beyond the frontier of normal social intercourse. Conolly provided
points of reference, to which anyone could relate - the experience of a troubled dream;
the gradual recollection of the good things in one’s life as a nightmare fades. No one
72 Conolly, Indications, p. 18.
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who had not experienced madness could really know if it is like experiencing a troubled
dream. However, the example of a dream served as a sort of integer, taking the place of
unknown factors. This was Conolly’s interpretation of innumerable interactions with the
mentally ill, or an expression of what he imagined the experience of madness to be.
In The Treatment of the Insane Without Mechanical Restraints, Conolly described
the experience of living through the ‘old system’ of treatment by interpreting the words
of old official reports and imagining what the lives of the people who were observed in
these reports might have been like. For example, after quoting from the report of Mr
Wakefield, Mr Western, and Mr Calvert to the House of Commons in 1815, which
concerned Bethlem Hospital, Conolly descended into long, narrative paraphrases,
eventually culminating in highly imaginative statements regarding what it must have
been like to be a patient at Bethlem in 1815: ‘Each miserable day was like another, and
each night’.73 He did not claim to use any other source but the report to be able to know
this, yet the statement challenged the reader to assert that the reality of the lives of these
patients could have been any other way, based on the portion of the content of the 1815
report that had been reproduced on the page before.
Conolly sometimes presented physical evidence of the experiences that Hanwell
inmates had endured at other institutions, as if their only the bodies of the inmates could
clearly express the reality locked within these individuals, in spite of the obstacles of
their disordered minds. Who could explain what it was like to have lived in shackles for
years? Even Conolly had not travelled alongside the patient from that world, where he
had no jurisdiction. Thus, only the patient could document the contrast with any
authority. Conolly read their experiences from their faces, especially when they were
73 Conolly, Treatment, pp. 26-27.
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reminded of former days: ‘in these patients the mere mention of restraint was often
observed to cause the patient’s face to become deadly pale—an evidence of its efficacy as
a punishment; standing quite apart from any proof of its efficacy as a means of moral
control’.74 According to Conolly, the damage that had been done to these people would
never entirely heal, and their facial expressions and body language would reflect this
damage whenever they were caused to remember past torments. These memories could
cause a patient to be chained again, somewhere in his or her own mind. Using his
imagination, Conolly read and expressed the stories behind the scars.
Some of these emotional scars had their counterparts impressed upon the physical
form of these individuals, which served as a more permanent reminder of their past
treatment for anyone with whom they interacted. Unlike bad memories and emotional
scars, which could be seen only when a patient was reminded of the horrors of his or her
time in chains, physical scars could be seen all the time, even when the patient was not
perhaps in mind of the past. Conolly described a woman of forty-six who had worn
restraints for twenty years before coming to Hanwell: ‘like most of the patients of those
old asylums, the story of her restraints was written in broad indelible scars on her wrists,
but in still worse characters on her memory.’75 The physical scars, according to Conolly,
were only the scratches on the surface, which could not fully reveal the extent of the
wounds. Yet, the scars upon the wrists were palpable and immediate; they could not be
dismissed or obscured by rhetoric and theory. It provided Conolly with evidence of
cause-and-effect, which effect necessarily had some parallel in the mind of the individual
74 Second Report from Hanwell, 1840. Cited by Conolly, Treatment, p. 205.
75 Conolly, Treatment, p. 125.
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whose body had been so marked.76 What parallel this might have been, anyone could
imagine. Conolly argued, however, that it was worth trying to imagine, even if there was
no way to be certain.
Patients, including women with gynaecological ailments and people with mental
infirmities, were the ostensible beneficiaries of the medicine that was practised upon
them. We have seen, however, that it was not unheard of in the nineteenth century for a
medical professional to have considered the benefits that practising upon one person
could possibly have had upon society more generally, especially with regard to potential
of contributing to the common pool of knowledge. Women’s bodies were viewed as very
private property (though perhaps not the property of the women who inhabited them). As
such, these bodies became sites of fervent dispute when doctors wanted to access what
happened inside them. By contrast, the bodies of the mentally infirm needed to be
handled by someone in order that they might be shut away and made to become ‘secret’,
at least until the minds that inhabited them were healed. The treatment of the ‘lunatic’ as
such was at least in part meant to benefit the society that could not cope with their free
presence. The mentally infirm patient, then, was vulnerable because he or she was not
someone whose body a society would particularly wish to own. Conolly struggled to
demonstrate that by releasing the mentally infirm from their restraints, he could improve
the lives and experiences of inmates of lunatic asylums without exposing people to
danger, and indeed, that he could do so with the effect of contributing to the wellness of
society by reducing the number of people who were mentally infirm. Conolly presented
himself as an intermediary figure capable of interpreting and communicating the
76 On the history of the physiognomy of madness, see Sander Gilman, Seeing the Insane (Lincoln, NE:
University of Nebraska Press, 1996), and Disease and Representation: Images of Illness from
Madness to AIDS (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
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experiences of his patients. Empathic discourse, for Conolly, functions as a means of
demonstrating the necessity and success of his reforms.
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Chapter 5:
Suffering and Science: The Victorian Vivisection Controversy
The ability of an individual to speak for himself or herself can be hampered by any
number of ‘handicaps’, which are constructed as a facet of cultural or legal
epistemology, but not necessarily rooted in any real obstacle to communication. Black
slaves in nineteenth-century America, notwithstanding illiteracy or fear of punishment,
could and did certainly manage to articulate their suffering in the event that they were
given access to someone who might have some power to speak up for them. Likewise, a
woman undergoing gynaecological treatment in nineteenth-century Britain,
notwithstanding a sense of embarrassment or shame, would have been capable of telling
someone about her experiences. As Gayatri Spivak argued famously in ‘Can the
Subaltern Speak?’, a voice and language are not all that is necessary in order to make
oneself effectively heard.1 The problems presented by the testimony of a child or of
someone suffering from mental disease, are perhaps more ‘real’, in that there may be a
legitimate barrier to communication, although not necessarily so. In either of these cases,
any apparent problem with an individual’s testimony is likely to stem from an inability to
use language effectively to express oneself, or else the perceived possibility of
dissimulation. But what if verbal language were not a possibility?
Nonhuman animals do not have access to human language tools, in all cases but
those of a few specially trained primates. It has often been argued that because they lack
language, animals are necessarily excluded from the kind of social contracts that protect
1 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg
(eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988),
pp. 271-313.
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human beings from one another.2 While not all agree that this is right, it is certainly the
reason that they invariably need a human advocate to speak for them in any context
determined by human language; humans may do as they wish with, and may even kill
those animals who are not protected by the contracts which protect themselves. 3
Jacques Derrida calls this phenomenon a ‘sacrificial structure’, which he defines as ‘a
matter of discerning a place left open, in the very structure of . . . discourses (which are
also ‘cultures’) for a noncriminal putting to death’.4 Such a ‘sacrificial structure’ is
necessarily predicated by the notion that something must be done, usually for survival or
safety - will be us or them. Whoever (be they human or animal), in such circumstances,
finds themselves in the position of them, need not bother with a defence, for if it can be
accomplished, their fate will already have been decided.
A study of the development of the concept of empathy would be grossly
incomplete without the inclusion of the study of attempts to empathize with animals,
precisely because they lack our language tools. Despite the limitations of language, how
do we fare without that method of communication? Pain is particularly difficult, if not
impossible, to communicate through language, even among human beings. Elaine Scarry
goes so far as to argue that language is useless when we are in pain. She explains that
‘physical pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, bringing about an
immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being
2See, for example, Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). See also Vicki Hearne, Animal Happiness (New York:
Perennial, 1995).
3 See Cary Wolfe’s introduction to Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2003).
4 Jaques Derrida, ‘Eating Well’, in Points . . . Interviews, 1974-1994, Elizabeth Weber (ed.), Peggy Kamuf,
et al. (tr.) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p.278.
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makes before language is learned’.5 If the use of language is a primary explanation for
the separation of humans and non-human animals into such different ethical categories
regarding treatment and consideration, what about the human in pain, who lacks
language? If we have no language when we are in pain, how have we tried to understand
animals that are in pain? We can only begin to answer these questions by studying the
attempts that have been made to overcome barriers to communications when individuals
have perceived or imagined others to be experiencing pain and suffering.
As Victorians began to make the epistemological leaps consequent to their
increasing acknowledgement of the limitations of human sense perception, they did not
limit their attempts at empathy to their fellow human beings. James Turner has argued
that the awareness of biological affinity between humans and non-human animals,
evident since the late-eighteenth century but more forcefully apparent as the works of
Charles Darwin influenced Victorian society (as well as science), animal pain became an
increasingly urgent subject for consideration.6 Turner also discusses how the
establishment of the relationship between humans and animals based upon evolutionary
science presented opportunities to make use of animals in ways that were scientifically
and medically relevant to humans.7
5 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 4.
6 Of particular significance, Darwin’s On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, or the
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (London: John Murray, 1859), and The
Descent of Man (London: John Murray, 1871). James Turner discusses Victorian British culture as
a site for a major transformation of the consideration of animals, especially with regard to the
sensitive interpretation of animal pain. Turner argues industrialization was another major factor in
this transformation. Reckoning with the Beast: Animals, Pain, and Humanity in the Victorian
Mind (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). More recently, Lucy Bending has
discussed the meaning and representation of pain in (late) Victorian culture, as these were linked
both with evolutionary science and ideas of civilization. The Representation of Bodily Pain in
Late Nineteenth-Century English Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
7 Turner, Reckoning, pp. 60-63.
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As they tried to make sense of their connection with animals, Victorians increased
their consideration of their fellow creatures, arguably as resourcefully as they found new
ways of exploiting them. One of the most controversial of these was the practice of
experimental physiology, or vivisection. Although people had been experimenting upon
live animals (and humans) since ancient times, in the nineteenth century experimental
physiology gained increasing importance as a profession and a branch of medical
science.8 Vivisection was subject to popular moral censure in nineteenth-century Britain.
Opposition to vivisection can be viewed in association with the larger movement for the
reform of the treatment of animals.9 Hilary Rose has demonstrated how prominent
antivivisectionist Frances Power Cobbe [1822-1904] drew together discourses of pet-
keeping and the defence of domestic animals against abuse to increase the strength of her
antivivisectionist rhetoric. Rose argues that Cobbe, in her article ‘The Consciousness of
Dogs’, worked at once to convince her audience of animals’ capacity for pain and to
harness the power of Victorian sentiment for pets to advance the cause of
antivivisection.10
8 For a concise and comprehensive study of the history of vivisection, see Anita Guerrini, Experimenting
with Humans and Animals: From Galen to Animal Rights, Johns Hopkins Introductory Studies in
the History of Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). On the history of
vivisection (and opposition to vivisection) before the nineteenth century, see Andreas-Holger
Maehle and Ulrich Tröhler, ‘Animal Experimentation from Antiquity to the End of the Eighteenth
Century: Attitudes and Arguments’, in Nicolaas Rupke (ed.), Vivisection in Historical Perspective
(London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 14-47.
9 For a study of the movement for the reform of the treatment of animals in Victorian Britain, see Harriet
Ritvo, The Animal Estate: English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1989).
10 Hilary Rose, ‘Learning from the New Priesthood and the Shrieking Sisterhood: The Debate over the Life
Sciences in Victorian England’, in Lynda Birke and Ruth Hubbard (eds), Reinventing Biology:
Respect for Life and the Creation of Knowledge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995),
pp. 3-20. See Frances Power Cobbe, ‘The Consciousness of Dogs’, Quarterly Review, 133 (1872),
p. 281. Cobbe will be discussed shortly in greater detail. Rose further explains that vivisection
was viewed as a threat to domestic pets, as pet owners worried that their pets could be stolen and
vivisected by physiologists. Rose, ‘New Priesthood’, p. 14. On pet-stealing (for ransom) in
Victorian Britain, see Philip Howell, ‘Flush and the Banditti: Dog-stealing in Victorian London’,
in Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert (eds), Animal Spaces, Beastly Places: New Geographies of
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Antivivisection can also be viewed as a reaction against the emergence of
scientific medicine, especially as manifested in the trend of appropriating bodies for
scientific experimentation (the Anatomy Act of 1832 provided for human bodies to be
supplied to scientists for dissection).11 As the decades of the nineteenth century passed,
the practices of medicine and medical science (including experimental physiology)
increasingly merged and developed as branches of the same profession. Scientific
medicine became increasingly respected as a professional discipline, especially as
innovations and advancements in medical science brought new benefits, protection and
cures, thus providing palpable evidence of its own worth.12 At the same time, opposition
to the practices of experimental physiology intensified, based upon the pain and suffering
caused to the animals whose bodies were the subject of vivisection.
Human-Animal Relations (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 35-55. On Victorian
sentiment for pets, see Teresa Mangum, ‘Animal Angst: Victorians Memorialize their Pets’, in
Martin Danahay and Deborah Denenholz Morse, Victorian Animal Dreams: Representations of
Animals in Victorian Literature and Culture (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 15-34.
11 See Ruth Richardson, Death, Dissection and the Destitute (London and New York: Routledge, 1987).
For a study of the social and cultural responses to the Anatomy Act of 1832, see Timothy
Marshall, Murdering to Dissect: Grave-Robbing, Frankenstein, and the Anatomy Literature
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). Coral Lansbury connects fears about the
scientific appropriation of the bodies of poor people with support for the antivivisection
movement. See The Old Brown Dog: Women, Workers, and Vivisection in Edwardian England
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).
12 On the emergence of medical science during the nineteenth century, see M. Jeanne Peterson, The
Medical Profession in Mid-Victorian London (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978);
A.J. Youngson, The Scientific Revolution in Victorian Medicine (London: Croom Helm, 1979).
Bruno Latour argues that the emergence of experimental physiology as a profession was simply
part of a larger trend toward professionalization in the nineteenth century. Latour locates the link
between science and medicine through experimental physiology in that the latter allowed for the
scientific examination of a part of a body that was still representative of (as it was still attached to)
the functional, and functioning, whole. Therein, Latour argues, was the relevance of this emerging
branch of science to the practice of medicine and the medical profession in the nineteenth century.
‘The Costly Ghastly Kitchen’, in Andrew Cunningham and Perry Williams (eds), The Laboratory
Revolution in Medicine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 295-303. For a
general study of professionalization from the late nineteenth century, see Harold Perkin, The Rise
of Professional Society: England Since 1880 (London and New York: Routledge, 1989).
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Protest against vivisection erupted into a significant social and political movement
in the 1870s.13 The crusade against vivisection led to the formation of the first Royal
Commission on Vivisection and the consequent passage of the Cruelty to Animals Act of
1876, which by no means satisfied the requirements of the antivivisection movement. In
this chapter, I will analyze texts that attempt to ‘speak’ for the animal subjects of
vivisection during the period immediately before the enactment of the 1876 legislation.
Sometimes, these human voices claimed scientific knowledge of the experience of the
animal, and sometimes they attempted to express the interests of animals vulnerable to
vivisection - animals they perceived to be in pain by means of feeling and empathy.
Whatever these writers tried to communicate about the experiences of animals, they
could not say anything without recourse to the kind of imaginative vision that propelled
so much of nineteenth-century art and thinking; where their senses failed, they tried their
best to fill in the blanks, and without apology.
Recent scholarship of nineteenth-century antivivisection has largely focused upon
the role of women in the movement. Indeed, nineteenth-century antivivisection provides
a very rich context in which to study Victorian women’s philanthropic activities, for it
was considered have been largely a ‘women’s movement’.14 Of course, many of the
contemporaries who named it as such intended to label antivivisectionists as either
13 See Richard French, Antivivisection and Medical Science in Victorian Society (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1975).
14 See Lansbury, The Old Brown Dog; Mary Ann Elston, ‘Women and Anti-vivisection in Victorian
England, 1870-1900’, in Nicholaas Rupke (ed.), Vivisection in Historical Perspective (London:
Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 259-294; Moira Ferguson, Animal Advocacy and Englishwomen, 1780-
1900: Patriots, Nation, and Empire (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Barbara
Gates, Kindred Nature: Victorian and Edwardian Women Embrace the Living World (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1999), and In Nature’s Name: An Anthology of Women’s Nature
Writing and Illustration: 1780-1930 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Susan
Hamilton, Animal Welfare and Antivivisection 1870-1910: Nineteenth-Century Women’s Mission
(London and New York: Routledge, 2004).
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ignorant females or effeminate men. Victorian women certainly rallied to the cause of
antivivisection - though the question of whether this was because they, unlike men, did
not have to worry about appearing to be ‘unsexed’ in this role has not been sufficiently
explored. Rather, scholars have looked at the opportunities that antivivisection provided
for Victorian women, whether as a public platform that women could ascend with relative
impunity, in order to make themselves heard, or, as Coral Lansbury has argued, as a
means by which women could rail against the injustices done to themselves and the
members of their sex, only through the pretext of defending animals who were vulnerable
and exploited in ways with which women could readily identify.15 While much of the
scholarship that has been undertaken to align the history of antivivisection with gender
studies has produced rich historiography and compelling theses, it is ultimately
unsatisfactory to consider that the primary motivation behind such robust activism as was
conducted by so many prominent female antivivisectionists in the nineteenth century, was
to advance their own aims. Is it not enough to say that these women were genuinely
concerned for the suffering of vivisected animals, and that they were speaking out to stop
a practice which they believed to be deeply wrong?
Whatever their primary or secondary motivations, women were certainly accepted
as appropriate spokespeople for the cause of antivivisection, and as such for vivisected
animals and those animals liable to vivisection. As Mary Ann Elston has shown, women
who supported vivisection (including the wives of prominent physiologists) were
commonly criticized as not possessing a ‘natural’ feminine compassion, and men who
championed the cause of antivivisection were often portrayed as ‘soft’ or unmanly.16
15 See Lansbury, The Old Brown Dog.
16 See Elston, ‘Women and Anti-vivisection’.
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Despite the social acceptability of women’s involvement in antivivisection, however,
their attempts to speak out against vivisection were often easily dismissed for the very
reason that they were considered to be ‘natural’ - women’s allegedly unreasoning
compassion. Further, notwithstanding that Elizabeth Blackwell [1821-1910] was a
successful physician as well as an antivivisectionist, few women held qualifications as
doctors, surgeons, or any other position that enabled them to speak with any authority on
the subject of physiology.17 Therefore, their opponents could and did argue that women’s
‘natural’ response to vivisection was uninformed and based solely upon appearances, and
further, that women could be easily led to support antivivisection through exposure to
graphic images and anecdotes, supplied to them for the purpose of provoking emotion
rather than explaining ‘facts’.
Women, then, were considered to be the natural advocates of animals subjected to
vivisection, just as they were the least likely to be taken seriously. The most famous of
these women was arguably Frances Power Cobbe.18 In an introduction to a collected
volume of antivivisection writings, Cobbe explained that ‘As regards the scientific
17 This is not to say that women physiologists did not exist, nor to detract from their contributions to their
field. See Lynn Bindman, Alison Brading, and Tilli Tansey (eds), Women Physiologists: An
Anniversary Celebration of their Contributions to British Physiology (London and Chapel Hill:
Portland Press, 1993), especially E.M. Tansey, ‘“To Dine with Ladies Smelling of Dog?” A Brief
History of Women and the Physiological Society’, pp. 3-17. See also Rose, ‘New Priesthood’,
pp. 6-9. The novelist George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans), though not a physiologist herself, lent
support to the physiology through the establishment of a studentship in memory of her companion
George Henry Lewes (Lewes will be discussed later in this chapter). On George Eliot’s support
for physiology, see E.M. Tansey, ‘George Eliot’s Support for Physiology: The George Henry
Lewes Trust, 1879-1939’, Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, 44 (1990), pp. 221-
240. On the relationship between George Eliot’s fiction and science, see Sally Shuttleworth,
George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Science: The Make-Believe of a Beginning (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984).
18 Frances Power Cobbe [1822-1904], was born in Dublin into a family of the Anglo-Irish gentry. Cobbe
was a prolific writer and prominent activist on behalf of several causes, including women’s rights
and, of course, antivivisection. See Barbara Caine, ‘Frances Power Cobbe’, Oxford Dictionary of
National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Life of Frances Power Cobbe: by
Herself, 2 vols. (London: R. Bentley & Son, 1894); Sally Mitchell, Frances Power Cobbe:
Victorian Feminist, Journalist, Reformer (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004).
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passages and descriptions of experiments in these papers, they have all been written with
the help (or, at least, not without the revision) of men qualified to judge of each question.
I have no fears that their accuracy will be seriously impugned.’19 Clearly, Cobbe intended
to pre-empt criticisms regarding her sex and her education. If she was not qualified to
speak on scientific subjects without the support of a man of science, however, Cobbe
insisted that she was perfectly qualified to address the moral aspects of the vivisection
controversy. She asserted:
The moral arguments have been the results of my own long and anxious
reflections, based on the chosen studies of my youth. When, more than thirty
years ago, I wrote my Essay on Intuitive Morals (an attempt to present Kantian
ethics in a popular and religious form) I did not anticipate that my old age would
be devoted to an effort to apply those large principles solely to protect the
science-tortured brutes from cruel wrong.20
Cobbe styled herself as a moral philosopher, and, as the controversy over vivisection was
essentially a moral issue, she approached it from this angle. What is more, Cobbe was a
woman, and she believed that womanhood had already endowed her with a certain moral
authority. She argued that if scientific knowledge was provided to her from a reliable
source, she could evaluate it for herself and speak as an advocate for animals from the
perspective of a moralist.
It is not difficult to imagine why antivivisectionists, especially those who were
women, were unlikely to witness vivisections themselves, in order that they could present
evidence they had gathered themselves. It was highly improbable that Frances Power
19 Frances Power Cobbe, The Modern Rack: Papers on Vivisection (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.,
1889), p.v.
20 Cobbe, The Modern Rack, p.v.
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Cobbe, or any other known antivivisectionist, would have been made very welcome in a
physiological laboratory or theatre. This ‘secrecy’ itself was often claimed as evidence
against the practice of vivisection - as evidence that there was ‘something to hide’.
Physiologists, meanwhile, insisted that in order to ‘see’ vivisection properly, one needed
suitably trained and ‘scientific’ eyes. They argued that unlike most antivivisectionists,
physiologists could ‘understand’ what was really felt (and not felt) by a vivisected
animal, rather than being deceived by appearances. J. Crichton Browne wrote, in a letter
to The Times, that ‘to the non-professional reader [graphic descriptions of vivisections]
may seem to justify the unwarrantable conclusion that intense and protracted agony was
inflicted during their progress’.21 With reference to the same sort of graphic descriptions
of vivisections, Charles Ferrier wrote to George Jesse, explaining why these did not seem
consistent with the physiologist’s claim that the animals involved suffered no pain: ‘What
to you may be inconsistencies, do not appear so to those capable of interpreting the true
significance of the facts’.22 It would follow, then, according to the physiologist, that he,
rather than an ‘ignorant’ antivivisectionist, was the best person to speak for the vivisected
animal. I will return to discuss this particular argument later in this chapter.
Lack of access to actual vivisections presented antivivisectionists with a real
problem in terms of gathering evidence. To overcome this obstacle, antivivisectionists
commonly used the most readily available materials available on the subject of
vivisection - namely, the words of the physiologists themselves. Rather than apologize
for the apparent need to borrow the words of their opponents in order to construct their
21 J. Crichton Browne, letter to The Times, 4 August 1875.
22 Letter, Charles Ferrier to George R. Jesse, dated 9 August 1875, quoted by Jesse to the Royal
Commission, and reproduced in his Extracts from and Notes upon the Report of the Royal
Commission on Vivisection, Refuting its Conclusions (London, 1876), p. 15.
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own evidence, antivivisectionists proclaimed that they really didn’t need to do anything
else, for the sufferings of animals were written into the works of the physiologists by
their own hand.23 George Jesse, secretary of the Society for the Abolition of Vivisection,
read aloud from a publication of his society, to the members of the Royal Commission on
Vivisection in 1875, ‘ “Thine own mouth condemneth thee, and not I. Yea, thine own
lips testify against thee”.24 As it is often asserted that the practices of vivisectors are
exaggerated, the Society brings forward more examples of them’.25 Mona Caird, writing
some twenty-five years afterward, returned to this central feature of the vivisection
controversy, as if to suggest that the absurdity of the refusal of physiologists to take their
own evidence as evidence against them was the very reason that the controversy was not
resolved: ‘ The present controversy as to whether or not torture is inflicted, is truly
ludicrous, seeing that numberless volumes of evidence are extant, written by the
physiologists themselves, wherein the contentions of their opponents are proved, and
proved again. Indeed the evidence of the operators in these terrible experiments on living
creatures, is practically the sole evidence that exists on the subject. Yet so truly ironical is
Fate, that this is the evidence that pro-vivisectors deny with so much anger and scorn!’26
Much of the debate that surrounded vivisection in the late nineteenth century was, then, a
debate over who could ‘speak’ (not always meaning to advocate) for animals with
authority and who would do so with integrity.
23 Stewart Richards explores the problem of publication in physiology with relation to the antivivisection
movement in Victorian Britain, with particular reference to J. Burdon Sanderson (ed.), Handbook
for the Physiological Laboratory (London: J & A Churchill, 1873). This book was a particular
source of reference and a target for antivivisectionists. See Richards, ‘Drawing the Life-Blood of
Physiology: Vivisection and the Physiologists’ Dilemma, 1870-1900’, Annals of Science, 43
(1986), pp. 27-56.
24 Job XV, 5-6
25 Jesse, Extracts, p. 10.
26 Mona Caird, Beyond the Pale: An Appeal on Behalf of the Victims of Vivisection (London: William
Reeves, 1897), p. 5.
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While Frances Power Cobbe, George Jesse (an engineer by trade), and other non-
medical antivivisectionists did not consider that they absolutely needed to witness actual
vivisections in order to make their arguments, the cause of antivivisection was still very
dependent upon those few medical persons who, having witnessed vivisections
themselves, were willing to speak out against what they saw. By far the most important
of these figures was George Hoggan, who, in February 1875, wrote a letter to The
Morning Post, testifying against what he had seen during his tenure as an assistant to
physiologist Claude Bernard, with the air of someone who wished to make amends for
what he had seen and not stopped. Hoggan declaimed:
I am of the opinion that not one of those experiments on animals was justified or
necessary . . . I witnessed many harsh sights, but I think the saddest was when the
dogs were brought up from the cellar to the laboratory. Instead of appearing
pleased with the change from darkness to light, they seemed seized with horror as
soon as they smelt the air of the place, apparently divining their approaching fate
. . . Hundreds of times I have seen when an animal writhed in pain, it would
receive a slap, and an angry order to be quiet and behave itself . . . To this recital I
need hardly add that, having drunk the cup to the dregs, I cry off, and am prepared
to see not only science, but even mankind, perish rather than have recourse to
such means of saving it.27
This letter was reprinted in The Spectator in May of 1875, and quoted very frequently by
antivivisectionists throughout the debate surrounding the legislation of the 1876 Cruelty
to Animals Act. Richard French argues that it was this letter that ‘so further aroused
27 George Hoggan, ‘Vivisection’, letter to The Morning Post, 2 February 1875. Reprinted in the Spectator,
48 (1875), p. 177.
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public opinion that [Richard Holt] Hutton, Cobbe, and other activist antivivisectionists no
longer needed the wealth and power of the RSPCA to gain access to Parliament. Of all
medical testimony against vivisection, before or since, George Hoggan’s letter had the
greatest impact’.28 French describes the situation before 1875, when the chief hope of
antivivisectionists was for the unconditional support of the RSPCA, which, as it had been
founded primarily to prevent the cruel treatment of animals at the hands of the poorer
classes, hardly knew what to do with vivisection, as physiologists were necessarily well
educated individuals. Hoggan’s letter, which communicated a sense of his having been
helpless to relieve the suffering he witnessed every day as he was employed as an
assistant to a prominent physiologist, also described a lack of feeling demonstrated by the
other physiologists with whom he worked: ‘Were the feelings of experimental
physiologists not blunted, they could not long continue the practice of vivisection. They
are always ready to repudiate any implied want of tender feeling, but on the contrary, in
practice they frequently show the reverse’.29 At the publication of Hoggan’s letter, the
British public was arguably seized not only with horror at the pains inflicted upon the
vivisected animals, but also with compassion for their voicelessness. Not only did these
animals lack the language tools to articulate their sufferings in words, but their non-
verbal expressions of pain were ignored. Hoggan’s letter reads as if he wished to put
voice to the expressions of the voiceless sufferers of the physiological laboratory, and
there proved to be many who were willing to listen.
In debating vivisection, Victorians on both sides of the issue often found
themselves struggling to determine what should be considered evidence that an animal
28 French, Antivivisection, p. 68.
29 Hoggan, ‘Vivisection’.
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was in pain. While antivivisectionists refused to countenance any suggestion that the
observable indications of suffering were not necessarily proof that an animal was in pain,
they had to concede that appearances could be deceiving, as questions over the efficacy
of anaesthetics changed the nature of what would once have been accepted as evidence of
insensibility. Despite the fact that no one could ever say for absolute certain what an
animal was experiencing, and despite the fact that animals had no language with which to
communicate their experiences, Victorians felt quite passionately that the subject was
worth discussing. It is arguable that the interior experience of the animal had never
before been so closely considered.
Victorians, or at least Victorian scientists, seem to have questioned whether frogs,
in particular, were capable of feeling pain, and to what degree. Henry Wentworth Acland
was Regius Professor of Medicine at Oxford during the time that he was interviewed by
the Royal Commission in 1875. Like many other physiologists, he was not prepared to
make any absolute claims about what a frog suffers during the course of a physiological
experiment. Despite this, however, Acland implied that he had difficulty believing that
certain experiments performed on frogs were not extremely painful to those animals.
After describing an experiment he had read about in which a frog is disembowelled alive,
Acland comments: ‘Now, if the frog suffers pain, that is as painful, I suppose, a thing as
can be done.’30 While Acland did not make any claims about the specific experience of a
frog or frogs, he presented a kind of ‘common sense’ opinion, derived from the processes
of his imagination, and yet protected by an ‘if’ clause. He could not help but to imagine
that a frog would feel terrible pain if disembowelled alive.
30 Jesse, Extracts, p. 27.
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It is worth mentioning at this point that few physiologists called by the 1875
Royal Commission were willing to support the work of all their fellows without
exception. Although physiologists wished to retain as much autonomy as possible in the
face of possible legislation to regulate vivisection, they can hardly be said to have closed
ranks. Rather, most physiologists tended to make a general statement of support for the
practice of vivisection, but reserved their staunch support for those experiments that they
performed personally, and for those of their colleagues who performed similar
experiments to their own. This was arguably because, during that time of uncertainty, it
was not prudent to subject one’s own reputation to the censure that others, who surely
caused more pain to animals than oneself, received. Physiologists who practised what
they considered to be a limited amount of vivisection, or who caused what they
considered to be only a little suffering, were quick to denounce the work of other
physiologists. As such, it is really impossible to discern a consensus among the
physiologists summoned before the 1875 Royal Commission about animal suffering.
Alfred S. Taylor, another physiologist who spoke before the Royal Commission
in 1875, exhibited a particular strategy for qualifying a statement about what frogs did or
did not suffer. Having presented his opinion of what a frog might feel when boiled alive,
he was prepared to say that it would be painful for a frog, but insisted upon adding that
the pain would be less than if a human were to endure the same: ‘I think it a very painful
experiment, subject to the observation that the frog does not suffer as much pain as
ourselves, but still for the animal I have no doubt it is a very painful experiment, and do
not see what good purpose it would answer.’31 Physiologists seem to have been very
reluctant to discuss the amount of suffering that an experiment would cause to an animal
31 Jesse, Extracts, p. 27.
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without also discussing the purpose or worth of the experiment. I will discuss this later in
this chapter. What is immediately interesting about Taylor’s statement is that he made a
very confident claim about a frog’s perspective, which he could not know. The claim
was constructed in a way that stated not only a ‘knowledge’ of difference between human
and frog, but also an ‘awareness’ of the existence of an entirely separate perspective from
that of the human. Some deference was paid to the unknowable status of the frog’s
perspective, as Taylor expressed ‘no doubt’ that the experience would be painful ‘for the
animal’, rather than phrasing the statement more positively. For example, Taylor could
have said that ‘the frog feels a great deal of pain’. Instead, he fashioned a space for the
frog’s perspective that could never be filled. He had ‘no doubt’ that this perspective
existed, and he could be certain enough to say that the pain would be very great in the
circumstances described to him, despite the fact that there could be no absolute proof of
this.
George Rolleston, Linacre Professor of Anatomy and Physiology at Oxford
during 1875, was posed a very direct question by one of the commissioners, regarding the
same experiment upon which Taylor was asked to remark: ‘ “Having regard to the low
temperature of the frog’s blood, that is very much the same as if we were put into boiling
water, is it not?” “Well, I am not quite clear about that”.’32 In order to determine the real
meaning of such an equivocal answer, one would need to know the context. Rolleston
could have communicated any number of responses here by altering the tone of his voice.
It is interesting as well to consider this line of response by itself, because it represents the
reluctance of many scientists to state their position too strongly with regard to the
existence and degree of animal suffering, for which there could really be no proof.
32 Jesse, Extracts, p. 30.
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Some physiologists, however, did try to provide evidence regarding the nature of
animal suffering. G.M. Humphry presented anatomical evidence in order to assert the
difference between the physiological experiences of human and ‘animal’: ‘ “You said you
believed that the animal creation did not suffer so acutely as the human race?” “Just so”.
“On what do you found that observation?” “Their nervous system is not so large, it does
not bear so large a proportion to their bodies, and we have reason to think it is not so
sensitive”.’33 There is, of course, a logical gap between the first two suggestions and the
third. It seems that Humphry was trying to supply the size and proportion of the nervous
system in animals as plausible reasons for their alleged insensitivity, despite the fact that
this did not prove the insensitivity. If one were willing to assume, based upon the other
‘reasons’ to which Humphry alluded, that the nervous system of animals was less
sensitive than that of the human, then the anatomical ‘reasons’ supplied by Humphry
might provide clues about why this might be so. However, Humphry’s anatomical
‘evidence’ could not stand alone. It is arguable that in providing this anatomical
information, Humphry hoped to sway opinion. If one were inclined to think that animals
did not suffer pain in the same way as humans, but could not explain it, here was a
possible solution.
Other physiologists attempted to prove that animals were less sensitive to pain by
providing examples of animals responding differently to pain than humans, drawn from
everyday life. In the Westminster Review, it was written that ‘It occurs not unfrequently
to flyfishers to take a salmon or other fish, which has already one or more hooks fastened
in its jaw, but which does not seem to have suffered in health or condition in
33 Evidence of G.M. Humphry, British Parliamentary Papers [1397] XLI, Royal Commission on Vivisection
(1876), p. 332.
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consequence; yet compare this with the effect of any injury of a similar magnitude upon a
human being, and the contrast will be striking enough’.34 Again, there is no real evidence
provided here to establish the relative insensibility of fish to the pain of having hooks
stuck in its jaw, but it is arguable that the author was hoping to persuade rather than to
prove. As such, there was no need to apologize for relying upon appearances. Out of the
imagined difference between the responses of the fish and the human that the author
hoped to build feeling against the idea that animal pain is similar to human pain.
William Rutherford, Professor of the Institutes of Medicine and Physiology at the
University of Edinburgh, argued before the Royal Commission that even among dogs
there are different levels of sensibility to pain. Dogs of different breeds, he explained,
responded to similar operations in different ways: ‘greyhounds and spaniels are
exceedingly sensitive, and are thrown into great excitement by an operation which, if
done on a sheep dog, or a mongrel dog, would scarcely produce any excitement at all. It
is wonderful what one may do to a sheep dog without the animal making any
commotion.’35 Although both sides of the vivisection debate argued that appearances
could not always be trusted as evidence of sensibility or insensibility to pain, both sides
made reference to response as a clear indicator of whether an animal was suffering or not.
This is hardly surprising, considering that expressions of some description are the only
way of communicating pain, or anything else. The constant return to expression and
response as evidence of suffering, despite the fact that it is not proof of such, is a
reminder that in considering the interior experience of an animal (or a human, for that
34 ‘Physiological Experiments: Vivisection’, Westminster Review, 85 (1866), p. 137.
35 Jesse, Extracts, p. 15.
256
matter), there must always be an imaginative leap, rather than a clear empirical path to
follow from observation to conclusion.
The author of the Westminster Review article on animal sensibility went a step
further than comparing the responses of one breed of dog to another to painful operations;
it was argued in this article that humans of different backgrounds also experienced pain
differently from one another. For this author, it seemed a logical extent of the argument
that different animals respond to painful stimulus by different degrees - beyond this, the
author believed that there was an entire hierarchy of sensibility that did not abruptly level
with the human: ‘The proposition, then, that the animal creation, not excepting even its
higher classes, is immensely less sensitive to pain than is mankind, is one which we
believe will not admit of serious dispute; but it is worthy of notice in this connection that
the degree of sensibility to pain even in mankind varies directly with the increase of
civilization’.36 Here, the author provides anecdotes from medical men who had treated
men of different races, and argues that doctors had much ‘evidence’ that an operation that
would give a white man much pain would not upset an ‘Arab’. One such doctor cites, for
example, removed a bullet from the arm of an Arab without his patient making any
expression of pain. The author presented this as evidence of a hierarchy of sensitivity
according to refinement of sensibility, which did not only distinguish animals from
humans, but also human from human. The social and/or racial ‘superior’ among humans,
then, deserved special consideration not merely because of a constructed set of social
rules, but also because an ‘inferior’, by definition, had less need of consideration.37
Emotional prejudice was thus aligned with a kind of empiricism based upon regard; if the
36 Westminster Review, p. 136.
37 For a discussion of the Victorian association of sensitivity to pain with civilized humanity, and
insensitivity to pain (in humans) with the ‘savage’, see Bending, Bodily Pain, pp. 123-134.
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observer did not notice (or care to notice) the suffering of another, it could be assumed
that suffering did not occur.
It is now difficult to imagine how, based on appearances, a nineteenth-century
doctor once concluded that different races of people had different levels of sensitivity and
tolerance to pain. Indeed, as we have come to consider that race is socially and culturally
constructed, such a claim would today be dismissed as absurd. Yet we might learn much
about the relationship between the appearance of pain and the perception of another’s
pain, from the apparently wild racial assumptions of this doctor, who felt confident
enough in his claim to submit it as testimony before the Royal Commission on
Vivisection: appearances can be deceiving regarding the perception of another’s pain,
whether one is tempted to assume, based on appearances, the existence or the non-
existence of pain in another individual.
J.Crichton Browne once explained in a letter to The Times that animal subjects of
vivisection were often assumed to be in pain when they were not, because they gave
outward indications that under normal circumstances would mean that they were
experiencing pain. Likening the feline subjects of a specific vivisection to musical
instruments, Browne argued that these animals were not in pain, but acting as if they
were because of the parts of the brain that were being stimulated. He accused those who
objected to the experiment of seeking the attentions of an ignorant public: ‘All of this
must have been well known to those who concocted the advertisement referred to, and
yet they have not hesitated to deceive the public by representing mere automatic
movements as indications of intense and protracted agony. To such base practices may
not ill-judged enthusiasm, or a thirst for subscriptions, reduce even a benevolent
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society.38 Browne pointed out that the mystery of another’s pain could be harnessed and
used to persuade largely without restriction, since the existence of pain in another could
not be disproved, even if it could not be proved, and the suggestion of the possibility of
pain could have poignancy even without proof.
George Jesse’s reply to Browne’s letter, which, though it was never printed by
The Times, he read before the Royal Commission on Vivisection, claimed that Browne
substituted his credentials for proof that the cats in question were not feeling pain, and
asked why, when the brains of animals were stimulated during experimentation, they did
not exhibit signs of anything but pain: ‘Browne’s credulity permits him to affirm, though
it is what he cannot possibly know, the creatures felt no more than a pianoforte, how was
it the animal gave evidence of astonishment, anger, rage, and pain? . . . Why, then, when
other “motor centres” were “stimulated” did not the cat evince signs of love and other
feelings?’39
The previously mentioned author of the Westminster Review article supporting
vivisection, explained that one thing regarding animals’ pain, of which there could be
certainty, was that many people did not understand it or perceive it correctly: ‘The
subject of pain, as it exists among the lower animals, is one upon which it is impossible
to doubt but that a vast amount of misconception exists, not among the ignorant only, but
also among the refined and highly educated’.40 In addition, the author of this article
argued that it was known that to rely upon appearances when arriving at conclusions
regarding pain in animals could be misleading:
38 J.Crichton Browne, letter to The Times, 4 August 1875.
39 Jesse’s reply to J. Crichton Browne, unpublished by the Times; quoted by Jesse to the Royal
Commission, and reproduced in his Extracts, p. 21.
40 Westminster Review, p.134.
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It is certain . . . that in any attempt to estimate the degree to which animals of
various grades in creation are sensitive to pain, we must go beyond mere
appearances or we shall be grossly misled. What are commonly spoken of as “the
ordinary indications of pain” are all of them more or less fallacious. Every
surgeon has seen men writhe and heard them groan under operations when he has
known well that chloroform had rendered them perfectly insensible before they
began.41
It is interesting to note the shift from the discussion of animal to human pain within the
context of the Victorian debate over vivisection tended to occur without any sort of
introduction, as if to speak of the human was to speak with certainty, even if the human
one discussed was under anaesthesia. It is especially important to note that the human
under anaesthesia lacks something that humans in most other situations do not, and that is
language. Thus, the anaesthetized human, who complained of pain without the use of
language, became the effortless substitute for the animal.
It was not only the supporters of vivisection who questioned the relationship
between the existence of pain and the appearance of pain. Antivivisectionists were also
mistrustful when appearance was offered as proof that an animal was not in pain.42
Mostly, such suspicions concerned the effectiveness of anaesthesia. The advent of
anaesthesia, of course, significantly changed all discussions of any kind of ethics
regarding pain. If pain could be removed, did that not put an end to the question? The
41 Westminster Review, p.134.
42 See Stewart Richards, ‘Anaesthetics, Ethics, and Aesthetics: Vivisection in the Late Nineteenth-Century
Laboratory’, in Cunningham and Williams (eds), The Laboratory Revolution, pp. 142-169.
Richards argues that one of the primary reasons physiologists were unable to mount an effective
defence against antivivisectionist accusations of cruelty and brutality was that they failed to ‘stress
sufficiently the efficacy of anaesthetics’ (p. 146).
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problem was that sometimes an awareness of the existence of anaesthetics could allow
people to be convinced that animals were not feeling any pain, when in fact they were. A
strong belief that this was often the case, based upon his experiences as an assistant
physiologist, caused George Hoggan to make some very strong statements: ‘I am inclined
to look upon anaesthetics as the greatest curse to vivisectable animals . . . They indeed
prove far more efficacious in lulling public feeling toward the vivisectors than pain in the
vivisected’.43 One might imagine how a member of the public may have felt duped and
outraged after reading Hoggan’s letter in the Morning Post or its reprint in the Spectator,
if formerly he or she had believed that vivisected animals were all effectively
anaesthetized before any experiment began.
Hoggan explained to a horrified public that it was possible for a substance to
induce the appearance of anaesthesia without actually dulling pain. He referred to a
substance called ‘curare’, which (we now know) induces muscular paralysis without
diminishing pain. During the nineteenth century, some argued that curare did actually act
as an anaesthetic, but because it was poisonous, it was difficult to know for certain.
Hoggan told of an experiment he witnessed conducted on the Continent, the subjects of
which were administered curare, he argued, more for the benefit of the audience than for
the animals themselves. These ‘were supposed by those present to be insensible to [what
was being done to them], while all the time the poor brutes were suffering double torture
that the feelings of the audience might be spared’.44 The idea that an animal in pain
might, by the use of this substance, be rendered unable to move or cry out, proved




called into question much of the use of ‘anaesthetics’ as a solution to the problem of pain
in vivisection.
It was not only the effectiveness of curare as an anaesthetic that was questioned.
While arguing that anaesthetics had indeed brought great benefits to humanity, Hoggan
insisted that the benefits that anaesthetics had brought to the subjects of vivisections had
been negligible:
The incalculable advantages which mankind have derived from chloroform have
remained a dead letter as it regards the lower animals, in consequence of the very
unsatisfactory state of knowledge of the line which separates insensibility from
death in those animals. Many of these die apparently before they can become
insensible through chloroform . . .The practical consequence of this uncertainty is,
that complete and conscientious anaesthesis is seldom even attempted, the
animals getting at most a slight whiff of chloroform, by way of satisfying the
conscience of the operator, or of enabling him to make statements of a humane
character. We have also to bear in mind that when complete insensibility has
been produced at the beginning of an operation, this effect only lasts for at most a
minute or two, and during the rest of the experiment, lasting perhaps for hours,
the animal must bear its torture as best it may.45
Now, the effect of ‘anaesthesia’, or painlessness, was not necessarily consequent of the
use of anaesthetics (even in the case of substances, like chloroform, that were commonly
used in humans and known to be generally effective). Arthur de Noé Walker explained
to the Royal Commission on Vivisection: ‘When an experimentor says . . . that “before
45 Hoggan, ‘Vivisection’.
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and throughout these experiments anaesthetics were used”, it is perfectly true; but if by
that you choose to believe that while the animal lived and was experimented upon, he
was throughout insensible, it is the greatest delusion that ever was’.46 Here, Walker
suggested that one could choose, or not choose, to validate the possibility an animal’s
pain, which could not be absolutely known or proven.
Between pain and anaesthesia, many levels of suffering exist as represented by a
vast and imprecise spectrum of language. Though a multitude of expressions allow for
more explicit communication, none of the minute connotations of words used to describe
pain will affix to any empirical reference point in order to provide any possibility of a
standard definition. Thus, neither antivivisectionists nor supporters of vivisection had an
easy time explaining the nuances of their arguments regarding the level of suffering
experienced by vivisected animals. What did it even mean, and how much suffering
would have to be present, even to declare that something was ‘painful’? Sir William
Fergusson, when he was questioned by John Colam at the Norwich vivisection trials,
‘said that the injection of absinthe into the femoral vein would cause suffering in any
animal, but how it would suffer it was impossible to say’47 At the same trials, Thomas
Tufnell, President of the Royal College of Surgeons of Ireland, tried to be more specific,
but in doing so, only provided reasons why an animal would suffer in the same
circumstances: ‘The stomach is accustomed to receive a variety of things, but the vein
only its particular fluid, and therefore the injection into the stomach by means of a tube
would not cause pain’.48 In making this claim, Tufnell was arguing in relative terms, as
he meant to show that one vivisection in particular could have been performed more
46 Jesse, Extracts, p. 25.
47 ‘Account of the Norwich Vivisection Trial’, British Medical Journal, II (1874), p. 753.
48 ‘Account of the Norwich Vivisection Trial’, British Medical Journal, II (1874), p. 753.
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humanely than it was. In more general terms, it was far more difficult to discuss, let
alone to discuss how to regulate the levels and kinds of pain caused to animals by
vivisection, because it was impossible to say, as Fergusson pointed out, exactly how they
would suffer. This made it all the more difficult to decide what amount of animal
suffering might be considered ‘acceptable’ in exchange for a certain potential benefit.
Some of the individuals called to give evidence before the Royal Commission on
Vivisection were prepared to exploit the elusiveness of a standard definition of pain,
offering some rather extraordinary interpretations of what is painful to an animal, when
questioned on the subject. Frederick William Pavy, Physician to Guy’s Hospital and
Lecturer in physiology, was asked to give his opinion of the suffering that would be
experienced by an animal - frog or human - when gradually boiled alive:
‘But I suppose the healthy frog suffers very much the experience of being
put into boiling water?’
‘I should think not’.
‘I suppose the frog would feel much what we should feel if we were to be
put into water and the temperature gradually raised to the boiling point?’
‘I think we should not feel any pain’.49
Although, to a certain extent, one can only wonder at Pavy’s response, whether or not he
really believed that even a human would not suffer pain if boiled alive, it is also possible
to imagine that Pavy was attempting to redefine pain to suit his purpose, knowing how
elusive it was to define.
Frances Sibson, Consulting Physician of St Mary’s Hospital, also presented an
interesting interpretation to the Royal Commission on Vivisection of circumstances
49 Jesse, Extracts, p. 9.
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usually categorized as painful. The experience upon which he was asked to comment
was that of starvation. Sibson did not claim that starvation did not involve any suffering
whatsoever, but he insisted that he would not classify the level of suffering as ‘pain’:
‘Would you say the same of Chossat’s experiments of starving animals to
death, that very little suffering was involved in those experiments?’
‘I am very familiar with those experiments; I have been over them again
and again, and I would say the very same of them, that there was very little
suffering inflected on the animals by the process of starvation to which they were
subjected by Chossat’.
‘Then do you mean that when, sailors are exposed to the process of
starvation, from the loss of their vessel, what they go through can only be
described as discomfort or inconvenience, and does not merit the name of extreme
pain?’
‘I should say so, certainly’.50
Though puzzling in its own right, Sibson’s response sheds light on that of Pavy’s, in that
both arguments sought to define what would constitute a ‘painful’ (or ‘extremely
painful’) experience according to very rigid criteria.
Pavy and Sibson understood that it was this criteria against which the proposed
benefits of vivisection would be measured, in order to determine whether and in what
circumstances a ‘balance’ between its good and its evil could be achieved. Once it was
accepted that there could be some motivation among physiologists for the good that could
come to humanity (rather than only the good that could come to their own careers)
50 Jesse, Extracts, p. 9.
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through vivisection, there was indefinite room for interpretation of the pain that such
‘good’ would cost to animals. Of course, antivivisectionists did not accept that to
endeavour to achieve such a ‘balance’ in vivisection was a right goal - whether because
they did not believe that such positive motivation existed, because they did not think that
the good could be worth the evil, or because they did not trust the slippage between the
force of motivation for professional advancement and the interpretation of pain. The only
goal of antivivisection was to prevent the pain caused to animals by vivisection,
regardless of what reasons a physiologist might have had to undertake to cause it.
It is difficult to determine which question tends to be asked first (or which should
be asked first): why does one cause pain to another, or does it matter why? The concept
of ‘cruelty’ considers both questions at once, incorporating motivation into an abstraction
of power and pain relationships that is already a judgment. However it is defined,
‘cruelty’ always considers motivation, and is always a judgment. It is important to note
that even before motivation becomes a part of the deeper abstraction of ‘cruelty’, it is
invisible and unverifiable by empirical means. As such, the perception of motivation is
almost wholly dependent upon language and the imagination, as we have seen in previous
chapters. Yet, perhaps because it is such a protean concept, and elusive as it has to be in
order to consider both of the above questions at the same time, ‘cruelty’ is the concept to
which legal and ethical discourse arguably clings the most readily, as if to seek refuge
from the empirical when feelings are the urgent imperative. This also means, of course,
that ‘cruelty’ is as difficult to ‘prove’ as it is to define.
Of everyone who was involved in the Victorian discussion of vivisection, Frances
Power Cobbe probably spent the most energy defining cruelty. In The Modern Rack,
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Cobbe stated that ‘CRUELTY may be objectively defined as the voluntary infliction by a
Moral Free Agent on a Sentient Being of severe Pain, not beneficent to the sufferer and
not authorised by Justice’.51 After adding her own supplementary definitions of the
words ‘beneficent’ and ‘justice’, Cobbe launched into what she termed a ‘subjective’
definition of cruelty, which comprised a number of classes into which ‘cruel’ acts could
be placed. These are actually types of cruelty resulting from various deficiencies of
human character: ignorant cruelty, of which the perpetrator is unaware; careless cruelty,
to which he or she is indifferent; wanton cruelty, which is inflicted for the purpose of
excitement or spectacle; malignant cruelty, inflicted out of hatred; and interested cruelty,
which is inflicted for the perpetrator’s own benefit. These categories do not mention any
particular act or kind of act that must be performed, nor do they specify the type, degree,
or level of pain that must be inflicted in order for an act to qualify as ‘cruel’. Instead, the
focus is upon the cause or motivation behind the pain that is inflicted.
Cobbe’s ‘objective’ definition of cruelty is problematized by the necessity of the
interpretation of any and all of its clauses. The most striking of these is the suggestion
that exceptions may be ‘authorised by Justice’, but, as we have seen, with regard to non-
human animals, the meaning of ‘severe pain’ and even of ‘sentient’ could also be thrown
open to debate, because animals cannot use human language to express or to contradict
what is said about them and what they do or do not feel. It is arguable that Cobbe’s
‘objectivity’ was informed by her own deeply religious sensibility, which would likely
consider ‘Justice’ (as well as the ‘truth’ about such concepts as sentience and pain) to be
51 Cobbe, The Modern Rack, p. 62.
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rooted in divine ‘Truth’ and thus above petty dispute. 52 Cobbe realized, though, that this
‘objectivity’ (despite the fact that it is, to her, simple reality) could hardly stand according
to the rules of secular empiricism, and so she supplied her secondary, ‘subjective’
definition of cruelty. Cobbe may well have meant to suggest that the popularly scientific
and legal rules, according to which she had to argue, were not interested in real,
‘objective Truth’. Rather, she had to approach the definition of cruelty as if it were an
abstract concept.
Cobbe understood that even outside of any legislative proceedings, the debate
over vivisection tended toward a quasi-legal tone, likely to avoid depending upon
sentiment and abstract ‘belief’ (though certainly, not all antivivisectionists did so) in
favour of hard evidence that could not be easily dismissed as emotional rhetoric, despite
the difficulty faced by both factions in establishing empirical facts to support their
respective arguments. In distinguishing between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ definitions
of cruelty, Cobbe attended to the practical matter of proof, while she insisted upon
reserving a larger, more important, more intuitive reality that would nevertheless be
reviled as unreasonable both in the British courts and the legal culture of popular, secular
debate. Still, Cobbe often proved unafraid to speak of a spiritual and moral reality, as she
perceived it, rather than restrict herself to ‘facts’ or ‘evidence’ that could be demonstrated
and proven. Thus, she engaged warmly at times against circumstances that would, to her,
indicate cruelty in its ‘objective’ sense - an appeal directly to the hearts of others whom
she believed to harbour a similar intuitive knowledge of the ultimate (or ‘objective’)
52 Throughout her career, Cobbe published extensively on the subjects of religion and spirituality. Though
her theology was often unorthodox, Cobbe’s religious works were somewhat influential. Her
1884 defence of the spiritual life was even admired by the likes of William Gladstone. For a
thorough investigation of Cobbe’s spirituality, see Mitchell, Frances Power Cobbe, pp. 63-83.
268
difference between right and wrong, in the hopes that feeling might override ‘facts’. Of
course, this exposed her to some ridicule (then, as now) as an overemotional and
unreasonable zealot for the cause of antivivisection.
Cruelty to animals had been officially outlawed in 1822 under the Martin’s Act.53
As such, the word ‘cruelty’ had not only ethical connotations, but distinctly legal ones as
well. Of course, the Martin’s Act did not outlaw all acts which caused pain to animals
(nor did it, incidentally, protect cats, dogs, or birds). The pain that was caused to an
animal by a certain act was not enough to classify that act as cruel. Cobbe herself
justified many uses of animals that cause them to come to harm; she was (and, indeed,
still is) commonly criticized for her support of other practices that caused pain or death to
animals, and most especially for her consumption of meat. In ‘The Right of Tormenting’,
Cobbe explained the difference as between pain (or death) and torture: ‘The hours of its
keen and excessive agony outweigh immeasurably all its poor little harmless joys of food
and sunshine, and the love of its master and its offspring. It were well for that creature
had it never been born.’54 As we have seen, however, the existence of pain, though easy
enough to recognize and to assume, is much more difficult to prove - how much more so
the difference between ‘pain’ and ‘severe pain’?
Though it is possible that she wrote more than anyone else on the subject of the
definition of cruelty, Cobbe was far from the only person in Victorian Britain who was
concerned with determining what it meant to label a particular act as cruel, as well as
whether, and to what extent vivisection was cruel. As witnesses were chosen and
53 The Act to Prevent the Cruel and Improper Treatment of Cattle, or ‘Martin’s Act’, was passed in 1822.
The first legislation passed to protect animals from cruelty, it was championed by the Irish
Member of Parliament Richard Martin [1754-1834]. See Hilda Kean, Animal Rights: Political
and Social Change in Britain since 1800 (London: Reaktion Books, 1998), pp. 33-35.
54 Frances Power Cobbe, The Right of Tormenting (London: Victoria Street Society, 1884).
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interviewed for the purpose of gathering evidence for the 1875 Report of the Royal
Commission on Vivisection, many of the questions they were asked sought to discover
the motivations behind the practice of vivisection. The witnesses were made to defend
the motivations behind any vivisections they had performed, as well as their beliefs about
the motivations of others, in order that they might provide evidence regarding the cruelty
of specific vivisections, as well as of vivisection in general, despite the fact that the
definition of cruelty was itself fraught with difficulty and disagreement. Arthur de Noé
Walker, a medical professional who was against vivisection, declared to the commission
that he considered that vivisections were sometimes performed without good reason, and
were therefore cruel. He was then pressed by a member of the commission to provide
convincing proof of his assertion, especially since it amounted to an accusation that
would have been necessarily directed at respectably educated individuals. Instead of
attempting to provide empirical evidence by way of example in this instance, Walker
remained fixed within the realm of concepts, as if avoiding the temptation: ‘ “Are we to
take it as your opinion that eminent Physiologists, whose time is valuable, perform such
experiments with no object whatsoever, and for mere wantonness?” “My reply is, that a
certain number of experiments performed by them I deem to be wanton cruelty”.’55
Interestingly, George Jesse would later extract this dialogue in order to present his own
kind of ‘evidence’ to a wider public, so that they might interpret the dialogue themselves,
and gather meaning from the silences.
Witnesses also gave more direct answers regarding the motivations behind
vivisections. The more direct the response, however, the more speculative it had to be, if
the speaker was not speaking exclusively about his or her own actions. John Anthony,
55 Jesse, Extracts, p. 25.
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another medical professional with sentiments against vivisection, was not quite ready to
demonize those of his colleagues who practised vivisection: ‘I think it is not from want of
feeling, but they do not think about it. They want to know something, and the creature is
utilised for that particular purpose.’56 According to Cobbe’s definition of cruelty, this
would fall into both the categories of careless and of interested cruelty. Of course,
Cobbe’s definition was hardly a standard to which the commissioners uniformly adhered.
Yet, Anthony’s statement demonstrates the difficulty with which many grappled in trying
to define what it meant for a human to be cruel, since to be cruel would be to deny or to
be without human feeling, in some way. Anthony tried to make a very sharp distinction
between ‘feeling’ and ‘thinking’, suggesting that physiologists who vivisected animals
simply prioritized their motivation to learn over their impulse to feel pity. Was this not
cruelty? If not, certainly the reasons for the performance of the vivisection would have
had to have been very good ones. But who was to decide which reasons were good ones?
Supporters of vivisection asserted that educated scientists were necessarily humane
enough to make their own decisions. Antivivisectionists, however, insisted that
individuals who could shut off their feelings so easily were not fit to make such a
decision, as it relied so heavily upon feeling. Further, antivivisectionists argued that
scientists would be biased toward the advancement of science over the welfare of the
animal. Physiologists argued the opposite; that antivivisectionists would be biased
against science. In addition, they insisted that no one but a scientist was fit to determine
the importance of a particular experiment.
Cobbe argued that the impulse to have compassion, though learned, was learned
independently of the sort of scientific education a physiologist could claim. She insisted
56 Jesse, Extracts, p. 11.
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that, in fact, physiological education through vivisection could cause compassion to be
‘unlearned’ in a way that would inspire a forgetfulness of the traditional bonds of
affection between domesticated animal and human master. Interestingly, Cobbe proved
willing to rhetorically sacrifice less favoured groups of animals for the sake of cherished
cats and dogs:
But it is impossible to regard this subject as if it were an abstract ethical problem.
The vivisection of dull reptiles and wild rats and rabbits, wherewith the elder
generation of students generally contented themselves is not alone in question, nor
even that of the heavy beasts in our pastures. By some strange and sinister fatality
the chosen victims at present are the most intelligent and friendly of our domestic
favourites—the cats who purr in love and confidence as they sit beside us on the
hearth; the dogs whose faithful hearts glow with an affection for us, truer and
fonder than we may easily find in any human breast.57
Cobbe’s inconsistency, however, is arguably less interesting than her insistence upon the
immediacy of feeling and its priority over strict logic. For Cobbe, vivisection specifically
ignored a very real connection between human and animal. The case of domesticated
animals offered the best proof that the practice of vivisection disregarded, purposefully
shut down, and ultimately quashed empathy, exactly because it was a case that had a
special pleading. Whether it was right or wrong that domesticated animals were more
likely than other animals to provoke emotion in human beings was, according to Cobbe,
just another obtuse question that got in the way of ethical human impulses. Thus, for
57 Frances Power Cobbe, The Moral Aspects of Vivisection (London: Williams and Norgate, 1875). It must
be said that elsewhere in her writings, Cobbe did advocate the welfare of wild species and less
popular animals, such as rodents and frogs.
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Cobbe, if it felt wrong, it probably was wrong - unless one had been taught ‘wrong’
feeling (which, for her, was undoubtedly a spiritual or religious matter, rooted in some
simple, if mysterious, divine Truth). Over-discussion, as such, stripped from the
knowledge of pain its sense of urgency; to delay the remedy was to prolong the suffering.
It was just this simplicity with which the experimental physiologists of Cobbe’s
time took exception. Appealing and ‘natural’ as it may have seemed to many people that
ethical decisions should be dictated by feeling, supporters of vivisection argued that only
individuals educated beyond this level of sophistication could assess the relative evils and
prospective benefits associated with vivisection, by which they could achieve a nobler, if
far more complicated, system of ethics. Decisions made accordingly would necessarily
be painful ones. In order to demonstrate this, the physiologists called before the Royal
Commission on Vivisection often made reference to their own fondness for animals.
G.M. Humphry, for example, provided as evidence of his sensitivity to animals’
suffering, his reasons for abandoning the practice of hunting for sport, as he could not
justify the evils of shooting the hunted game with any larger benefit to humanity: ‘I may
mention for my own part that I was very fond of shooting, and one of the things which
ultimately led to my giving it up altogether, was the pain consequent on it to animals, the
lingering suffering of the animals after they were wounded’.58 Significantly, many male
antivivisectionists often cited their relationships with their hunting dogs as the source of
their disgust with the practice of vivisection.59 These argued, as Cobbe did in her defence
of meat consumption, that the degree of pain caused to animals by shooting them was not
58 Evidence of G.M. Humphry, British Parliamentary Papers [1397] XLI, Royal Commission on Vivisection
(1876), p.331.
59 Thomas Tufnell, who interrupted the vivisection that led to the prosecutions at Norwich, and cut the
restraints of the dog that was subject, phrased his denunciation: ‘I am a sportsman as well as a
surgeon, and I will never see a dog bullied’. British Medical Journal, II (1874), p. 752.
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comparable to the pain caused by vivisection. However, for many physiologists, like
Humphry, it was the motivation behind the act that really mattered.
In discussing his decision to forsake his enjoyment of hunting in order to save
animals from unnecessary pain, Humphry silently underscored his belief in the necessity
of vivisection, suggesting that he always considered the pain that his actions caused to
animals, both in and out of the laboratory, and perhaps even hinting that his experiences
as a physiologist rendered him more sensitive than others to animals’ pain. In effect,
Humphry emphasized the difference of the experience, and so the ethics, of the
physiologist as a medical scientist. While he attempted to explain the ethical decisions
that he and his colleagues were forced to make, he also suggested that the ethical world
inhabited by physiologists was far too complicated to have been accessible to most other
individuals. According to this argument, it was the physiologist who was denied
connection, and who could be easily misunderstood. Persecuted by both popular and
now, legislative forces, the only way he could defend his actions to a mistrustful world is
to present for consideration the decisions he had made outside of his laboratory.
According to Humphry, he could only hope that through the evaluation of his personal
character, outside of the laboratory, the world would come to trust him, though they
could never understand.
Perhaps the strongest argument against such a position as Humphry’s came from
other doctors who were opposed to vivisection. While these may have been individually
vulnerable to critique on the basis of their science, Humphry hardly could have called
them wholly ignorant of medical practice. As we have already seen, not all medical
professionals promoted or supported vivisection. Neither were all other
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antivivisectionists ignorant of science. John Colam [1826?-1910], then secretary of the
RSPCA, based what were arguably the most important accusations of the entire Victorian
controversy over vivisection upon the grounds that a series of vivisections performed
upon dogs utilized bad science.60 Colam argued that these experiments, conducted in
Norwich in 1874 with the aim of demonstrating the epileptic effects of absinthe, favoured
ease and quickness over both the welfare of the subjects and the validity of the results.
Colam claimed that both charges rendered the experiments ‘cruel’ and subject to
prosecution under Martin’s Act. The absinthe was administered to the animals by
injection into the femoral vein, which was argued by Colam to have been more painful to
the dogs, as well as less useful to medical science, than if it had been administered by
other means. The court proceedings paraphrase Colam: ‘The insertion of this noxious
fluid into the stomach was one thing, but inserting it into a vein was another; and he
submitted that the analogy was destroyed by the mode in which this experiment had been
performed. If it had been injected into the stomach, he was not prepared to say whether
these proceedings would have been taken. He could not, however, say whether this
would have been so or not’.61
It is important to note that throughout the course of the late nineteenth century,
the RSPCA had a very uneasy relationship with antivivisection. While the RSPCA never
really sanctioned vivisection, at least not without exception, neither did it ever officially
oppose the practice unconditionally. This relative neutrality was often read by
60 John Colam served as secretary of the RSPCA from 1861 until 1905. He was a shrewd leader and
strategist, not well liked by those who, like Frances Power Cobbe (and Henry Salt, who was an
anti-hunting activist and a strong advocate of vegetarianism), would have preferred the RSPCA
take stronger positions regarding more radical animal welfare reforms. See Brian Harrison, ‘John
Colam’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
61 ‘Account of the Norwich Vivisection Trial’, British Medical Journal, II (1874), p. 752.
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antivivisectionists as a betrayal, and the issue proved divisive as well as frustrating for
many supporters of animal welfare reform. That said, it is also important to recognize the
important role that Colam and the RSPCA played in the focusing of popular attention
upon the problem of the ethics of vivisection. Richard French argues that if Colam had
not prosecuted the physiologists at Norwich, there never would have been much of a
Victorian antivivisection movement, despite however specifically these particular
physiologists might have been targeted for their carelessness in this instance. 62
Neither the supporters nor the opponents of vivisection united to adhere to any
standard position. Many of those who opposed vivisection were simply not prepared to
accept science or medicine as a good enough reason to cause the degree of pain to
animals that they believed vivisection to cause. However, if many were unprepared to
accept any kind of vivisection performed for any reason, arguably many more were
prepared to acknowledge the need for legislation that would ensure that vivisections were
performed only for the best reasons, and caused as little suffering as possible. Further,
antivivisectionists did not always uniformly oppose other practises, which caused animal
suffering, such as hunting and eating meat. As we have seen, some antivivisectionists,
like Frances Power Cobbe, did not necessarily consider other uses of animals to be
wrong, including killing them for meat, or even sport. Thus, supporters of vivisection
were quick to compare vivisection to many other different uses of animals, which would
cause animal suffering or death in order to save human life. The supporter of vivisection
who anonymously authored the mentioned Westminster Review previously mentioned in
this chapter asked his readers: ‘Does any reasonable man doubt that he may lawfully ride
62 French, Antivivisection, p. 70.
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a horse to death to save a human life, whether his own or another’s?’63 This question,
which has nothing to do with experimental physiology, and everything to do with the
respective value of human and animal life, operates according to the assumption that the
benefits and motivations behind vivisections were always good. Some reformers, while
they agreed that human life was worth more than animal life, were not prepared to make
those assumptions about the good intentions of experimental physiologists and the life-
saving benefits of vivisection. James MacCauley, for example, wrote in a religious tract
entitled ‘A Plea for Mercy to Animals’, in 1875:
The advancement of human knowledge and happiness may rightly supersede the
claims of the lower animals, but we must examine how far these benefits are real.
The advancement of the healing art, for example, might warrant the adoption of
experiments on living animals, but we must be satisfied that the results of
vivisection are such as justify the practice of it, and that these results can be
obtained in no other way.64
Though he was willing to accept that physiologists may be justified in causing animals to
suffer if it would truly bring about progress in medicine, MacCauley was also deeply
suspicious of the real benefits achieved by experimental physiology. Such a point of
view required solid proof of the advantages of vivisection. Someone like MacCauley was
unlikely to trust unconditionally in the good intentions of those who carried out
experiments on animals. Instead of doubting the intelligence of experimental
physiologists and their ability to recognize the worth of their findings, MacCauley
questioned their sincerity and the motivations behind their research.
63 Westminster Review, p.137.
64 James MacCauley, A Plea for Mercy to Animals (London: Religious Tract Society, 1875), p. 10.
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But why else, besides for the benefit of humanity, would one possibly perform
vivisections upon animals? Dr George Hoggan, who worked as an assistant to prominent
experimental physiologist Claude Bernard, made some harsh claims regarding the true
motivations of his ex-colleagues in the vivisection laboratory, in his incendiary letter to
the Morning Post: ‘The idea of the good of humanity was simply out of the question, and
would have been laughed at, the great aim being to keep up with, or get ahead of, one’s
contemporaries in science’.65 Here was the stark opinion of one who had worked among
experimental physiologists as one of them, before his conscience got the better of him.
Hoggan’s letter made experimental physiology seem something of a conspiracy - was the
goal of the welfare of humanity just a ruse? If practitioners of vivisection were indeed
conspirators, they did not demonstrate any real solidarity as they testified before the
Royal Commission on Vivisection. It seems to have been impossible to have persuaded
any one physiologist interviewed by the commission to make any statement of support
for the ethics of any group of experiments or kinds of vivisections that were not
performed by themselves or their closest colleagues. In fact, many of the physiologists
called to testify seemed very willing to critique the ethics of vivisections practised by
others; finger-pointing was not uncommon. Rather than making broad statements in
support of vivisection, as witnesses, these physiologists were prepared to defend their
own work, but not the work of others. And though many of the English physiologists
often found fault with the ethical standards of vivisections performed by their
countrymen, they frequently proved even more eager to denounce the ethics and practices
of continental physiologists, most popularly one by the name of Francois Magendie.
65 Hoggan, ‘Vivisection’.
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What if medical science could prove the good intentions of experimental
physiologists and the benefits of vivisection to humanity, beyond any doubt? Some, such
as Frances Power Cobbe, insisted that this would never have swayed her from opposing
vivisection. Cobbe doubted that vivisection benefited humanity as much as some
physiologists claimed, but she also firmly believed that the degree of pain caused to
animals by vivisection could never be justified: ‘But even if I be mistaken—if vivisectors
have already made or shall hereafter make discoveries, tending directly and importantly
to relieve our bodily pains, even then would Vivisection, I ask, stand justified? Not so
my friends, assuredly. Bodily health, relief from pain, prolongation of life, are not the
only or the greatest good to be sought by man.’66 In suggesting ‘the greatest good to be
sought by man’, Cobbe directed attention toward spiritual goodness, reminding her reader
that before any benefits were achieved by vivisection, humanity would be required to
inflict the opposite of what it sought to gain - causing sickness, pain, and death.
It is not extraordinary that Cobbe should have valued spiritual over bodily
‘health’. As Boyd Hilton has demonstrated, many individuals living in the late
eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries believed in an economy of atonement, whereby
spiritual shortcomings were offset by earthly sufferings, borne with patience in order to
expiate sin.67 It must also be noted that in giving testimony before the Royal Commission
on Vivisection, experimental physiologists often reflected this same paradigm of
atonement. As we have seen, physiologists like G. M. Humphrys spoke of suffering
themselves at the necessity of putting animals in pain through vivisection, as if it were
their own sacrifice made for the greater good of medical science. Perhaps, though,
66 Cobbe, Tormenting.
67 See Boyd Hilton, The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic
Thought, 1785-1865 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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George Henry Lewes expressed this belief the most eloquently when he explained to the
Commission that in vivisection, ‘the pain is in the wounding and not the wound.’68 By
encouraging identification with the suffering animal subject of vivisection, Cobbe sought
to edify the human spirit before regarding the ailments of the human body. Her attempt
to consider the necessarily alien perspective of the animal in pain was quite consistent
with her otherworldly beliefs about what was good for humans; to look inward from the
outside fosters spiritual development rather than the empirical knowledge gained from
use of the senses.
Cobbe tried her best to imagine, and to encourage others to imagine, what might
have been the perspective of an animal subject to vivisection. She turned to religious
ideas in order to persuade her readers to think beyond a human-centred perspective.
Rather than relying upon scriptural teachings to communicate her lesson, Cobbe chose in
this instance to utilize the idea of beings that were greater than humanity in order to
construct an imaginative universe: ‘Let us fancy superior beings—angels, or God
Himself—treating us in like manner; accepting our humble services, drawing forth our
adoring love and fidelity, and then coldly consigning us to the torture chambers whence
we shall never escape!’69 As she could hardly hope to prove what it would be like to be
in the position of an animal liable to vivisection, Cobbe tried to get people to imagine a
position of strength above themselves; religion provided a kind of cultural currency from
which Cobbe could draw a common notion of the vulnerability of humanity to a higher
power. Cobbe assumed that most people will at some point in their lives have felt
helpless, powerless, or vulnerable; what is more, she knew that most would have been
68 Evidence of George Henry Lewes, British Parliamentary Papers [1397] XLI, Royal Commission on
Vivisection (1876), p. 611.
69 Cobbe, Tormenting.
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taught, as she was taught, to fear and to hope for mercy from a greater Being with
absolute power over life. As such, it was no great step to ask them to imagine what it
might be like if God suddenly ‘turned’ and treated them as they had done to His
creatures. At the same time, Cobbe accused experimental physiologists of ‘playing God’
with the animals in their care, thus establishing a sort of allegorical world that would
have been readily accessible to most by a common faith as well as by an awareness of the
ultimate ignorance of humanity regarding the mysteries of life and the universe, despite
so many advances in science.
Cobbe dramatized this allegorical world into Science in Excelsis: A New Vision of
Judgment. A most unusual sort of tract, Science in Excelsis reads as a play. In it, a group
of angels perform vivisections upon a group of physiologists. Only the Angel of Mercy
objects. As she is dismissed by the others as ignorant and weak, with specific reference
to her sex, the Archangel Rafael supplies her with reasons for the physiological
exploration of humans. He exalts the noble search for knowledge and doubts whether
humans are really very sensitive to pain, before declaring that in fairness, physiologists
themselves will be the subjects of the same vivisections they performed upon animals on
earth. The angels then discuss amongst themselves which of the physiologists’ own
experiments will be tried upon each of them. Cobbe interjected instructions read from
specifically referenced physiological works, into the angels’ dialogue:
We must first take off the Professor’s spectacles, and then
‘scrape the cornea of the eye, so as to remove the epithelium completely.
Hereupon, the caustic is to be rubbed two or three times lightly over the whole
281
surface, after which the eye is washed with saline solution, and the animal (or
professor) is left to itself for twenty or thirty minutes’—
during which interval spectators have recorded that it is apt to perform antics of a
very diverting description.70
The effect of Cobbe’s bold tract is to afford an eerily visual, palpable representation of
vivisection from the perspective of the subject. No doubt the subtitle, A New Vision of
Judgment’, suggests her intent to encourage her readers to try on a new and imaginative
perspective, inviting them to become playwrights of the possibility of animal experience.
Cobbe and her fellow antivivisectionists knew that there was a significant chasm
between the debate over the ‘facts’ of vivisection and the experience of witnessing its
reality. Since it was not possible to bring people into vivisection laboratories in order
that they might witness for themselves what happened behind their locked doors,
antivivisectionists had to make the most of the information that could be gathered from
physiological writings, incorporating, as we have seen, the sparse testimony of those few
non-supporters of vivisection who had actually been given the opportunity to witness
vivisections, that they might construct such a visual tableau as would communicate
scenes of vivisections as interpreted according to antivivisectionist perspective. In The
Moral Aspects of Vivisection, Cobbe illustrated the emotional connection that she
believed to exist between humans and dogs, using only vague testimony, but testimony
that nonetheless invoked familiar experiences that many people would have had with
dogs, in order to communicate the pathos of betrayal in vivisection:
70 Frances Power Cobbe, Science in Excelsis: A New Vision of Judgment (London: Victoria Street Society,
1875).
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So deeply rooted, indeed, is this faith in man in the case of the dogs that those
who have witnessed the scenes in the laboratories of physiologists testify that the
brutes can scarcely be made to understand that it is intended to hurt and kill them,
but still try after hours of agony to lick the hands of their tormentor, and plead
with him for mercy with their beseeching eyes when their limbs are all fastened
down and immovable on the operating table.71
Not only was it likely that Cobbe’s reader would have witnessed a dog entreating a
human by licking their hands, but it was also likely that many would have at some point
observed a dog acting submissive despite having been ill-treated. Cobbe assumed that
her audience would have had this sort of familiarity with dogs and so would have been
able to follow her visual representation of the pathos of vivisection.
Those who had witnessed vivisections often did not feel that they could
effectively communicate the experience to others who had not. Henry MacCormac,
Consulting Physician to Belfast Hospital, wrote in 1868: ‘Ah! There are things about
vivisection that cannot be committed to paper, the agonising, if inarticulate intreating, the
groans, the pantings, and the cries, the paws even of the poor brutes being cast round the
neck of the hardened operator.’72 Rather than try to describe one scene, McCormac listed
bits of empirical information that have affected him emotionally. He conjured these
sights and sounds as if conjuring demons that haunt him. Placing them in a list
surrounded and bombarded the reader with all of the worst of MacCormac’s experiences
with vivisection. To the individual who had never witnessed a vivisection, he presented
an alternative to the construction of a scene. The result was less realistic, in effect, than
71 Cobbe, Moral Aspects.
72 Henry MacCormac, ‘On Vivisection’, Medical Press and Circular, 1 (1868), p. 281.
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Cobbe’s description of the betrayal of the submissive dog who continued to lick the hand
of the vivisector, but it was far more nightmarish. It is arguable that MacCormac’s
medical qualifications gave him the added credibility that one would have needed in
order to convincingly present his reader with such a nightmare sequence of impressions.
If, as MacCormac argued, it was impossible to understand the true extent of the
horrors of vivisection without witnessing them oneself, how could antivivisectionists ever
hope to communicate their message to people who had never been inside a physiological
laboratory? The secrecy with which vivisections were performed was antivivisection’s
biggest obstacle, but it also provided antivivisection with one of its most convincing
platforms: why, if experimental physiologists were not ashamed of their work or afraid of
public censure, were the operations not made more public? As we have seen,
physiologists argued that it took a mind thoroughly educated in the physiological sciences
to understand the true purpose of physiology - to see beyond its immediate evils to grasp
the greater humanitarian rewards. Physiologists faced a problem, however, in that in
order to disseminate the knowledge attained by vivisection, they needed to publish the
results of their experiments. A.S. Taylor explained to the Royal Commission: ‘we must
steer between two difficulties, on the one hand of not making these matters too public,
but at the same time giving enough to inform professional men. I have endeavoured to
do that in a work on poisons lately published, that is to say, to give professional men
knowledge, without giving knowledge to the public.’73 In this statement Taylor
compared the dissemination of dangerous knowledge about poisons to the provision of
too much information to the public regarding vivisection. It is arguable that Taylor
73 Evidence of A.S. Taylor, British Parliamentary Papers [1397] XLI, Royal Commission on Vivisection
(1875), p. 356.
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meant to imply that too much information about vivisection was poisonous to a mind
without or with too little education in the physiological sciences.
No doubt Taylor would have considered Cobbe’s Light in Dark Places a
poisonous piece of work. Largely comprised of illustrations taken from books by
physiologists, Cobbe stated that the purpose behind this work was ‘to convey . . . ocular
illustration of the meaning of the much disputed word Vivivsection’.74 The title suggests
that bringing visual information about vivisection to the public would expose the
secretive world of the physiological laboratory. With this title Cobbe also implied that if
this task were ever wholly completed, the ‘light’ of liberation would enter into the
‘darkness’ of that same laboratory, as a public wholly enlightened about the horrors of
vivisection would not rest until this were accomplished. Cobbe pointed out, as
MacCormac also argued, that words were not sufficient to describe vivisection. In order
to grasp its atrocity, one needed to see:
Some of the tools and some of the furniture of the physiological laboratory,
various modes of fastening the victims, and a selection of instances of divers
experiments, have been arranged with the view of affording the reader by a few
moments’ inspection a truer idea of the work of the work of the ‘torture chambers
of science’ than can be obtained by the perusal of a vast quantity of letter-press
description.75
Cobbe noted that all of her reproductions come from the ‘standard works of eminent
physiologists’ - by this we may assume that the works were somewhat easily accessible.76
But who would be looking in a physiological handbook or textbook besides a
74 Frances Power Cobbe, Light in Dark Places (London: Victoria Street Society, 1883).
75 Cobbe, Dark Places.
76 Cobbe, Dark Places.
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physiologist? Cobbe, in this instance, capitalized upon the very weakness expounded by
A.S. Taylor; namely, that physiologists needed to publish their work, and that their need
to publish most often outweighed the necessity of keeping graphic images of their work
from the sight of a public that was likely to ‘misunderstand’ it.
Was it entirely desirable, even for an antivivisectionist, to persistently thrust
graphic images, or even graphic descriptions, of vivisection into the face of individuals
who might have been deeply disturbed by such materials? Just as today, exposing people
to disturbing images and similarly upsetting information in order to persuade them to
support a cause could as easily drive them away as achieve its intended purpose of
attracting supporters. Despite the fact that he extracted many of the more disturbing
passages from the Royal Commission on Vivisection, for a publication that was likely to
reach a wider audience than was likely to peruse the whole of the legislative proceedings,
George Jesse chose to spare his audience the very worst. To an ellipses in a passage he
extracted regarding experiments where puppies were intentionally drowned, Jesse
appended a footnote: ‘This portion of evidence is omitted here, because though it ought
to have had great weight with the Royal Commissioners as proving the demoralizing
result on the mind of these practices, the details are too loathsome for general readers’.77
Though the briefest perusal of Jesse’s extracts may cause one to wonder how Jesse could
have been at all protective of the sensitivity of his readers, it is clear that he was aware he
trod a thin line between exciting the compassion of his readers and making them sick.
It was also a problem that such graphic expositions as were likely to comprise the
texts of antivivisectionists could excite morbid fascination in some readers. Cobbe
commonly referenced this as ‘schadenfreude’, or the taking of pleasure in the form of a
77 Jesse, Extracts, p. 43.
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thrill at witnessing the pain of others. There was, though, and is little that can be done
about this problem, as there is no escaping it when the plight of a sufferer needs to be
exposed so that that individual may gain the support of others. It does, however, prompt
one to ask whether censorship of such information, such as practised by George Jesse in
suppressing the details of the intentional drowning of puppies, was done more for the
benefit of the audience or the subject, as much now as in the nineteenth century.
Victorian antivivisectionists and physiologists both struggled to communicate on
behalf of animals. The sufferings of the animal subjects of vivisection could only be
imagined, rather than proven, since animals could not speak for themselves, and since
vivisections were not generally performed in public. Both of these factors increased the
poignancy of the plight of these animals. Faced with impending legislation against
vivisection, physiologists needed to offer an alternative interpretation of the reality of
vivisection to the one presented by antivivisectionists. Physiologists claimed that they
had a better right to define and interpret animal experiences than antivivisectionists,
because most antivivisectionists were not educated in the science of animals’ bodies.
Antivivisectionists claimed that compassion, rather than scientific education, was the
most important qualification for speaking on behalf of animals. Both physiologists and
antivivisectionists cautioned against relying upon appearances as a means of determining
whether or not an animal was suffering. The particular barriers to knowledge of the
experiences of the animal subjects of vivisection - the voicelessness of these animals, and
the secrecy with which vivisections were often performed - made this debate a rich site





Horse Sense: Understanding the Working Horse in Victorian London
The animal subjects of vivisection were not only without a voice, but they were kept
hidden from the sight of anyone who might speak out against their suffering. Not all
animal suffering, however, was done in secret in the nineteenth century. In this chapter I
will consider texts that focus upon horses, who were particularly visible to the public
during this period. The exploitation of horses in the nineteenth century was as crucial to
Victorian society as the animals themselves were accessible to view; horses provided
labour to pull carriages and especially cabs, a most important means of transportation in
the nineteenth-century city. Coral Lansbury even argues that ‘generally, in the nineteenth
century, if people were asked for the most obvious instance of cruelty to animals, then
[the] spectacle of a beaten and exhausted horse would have answered’.1 Working horses
were not alone in their labour - nor, often, in their suffering, since horses had to be
driven. Drivers who made a living by providing hackney carriage transportation were
among the lowest class of workers, and certainly the least popular. Cab drivers were an
oppressed group of people in the nineteenth century, and they were viewed with all the
more disdain because of the visible suffering of the horses they drove. In my final
chapter I will examine texts by authors who attempted to understand and speak out for
the working horse in the nineteenth century, juxtaposing these texts with others that try to
understand the experiences of the driver, and to make sense of his position and his role.
I suggest that complex network of relationships surrounding the Victorian
working horse, especially within the urban space, represented the opposite end of the
1 Lansbury, Old Brown Dog, p. 63.
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spectrum of animal suffering with regard to vivisection; the suffering of horses was
public, widespread, and arguably widely accepted, as opposed to vivisection, which was
practised by only a small number of people, mostly as secretively as possible. While any
benefits that resulted from vivisection were harder to locate and define, those reaped from
the exploitation of horses were immediate and undeniable. Perhaps most importantly in
terms of the way that people expressed their understanding of the experiences of horses,
ordinary people were not wholly innocent of the suffering of the horse. This was much
unlike the case of vivisection. Thus, the authors of the texts I examine about horses
would have had to negotiate a complex and public network of responsibility and blame,
of which they would have been very likely to have been a part.
In 1873, Chambers’s Journal of Popular Literature, Science, and Arts published a
short article entitled ‘The Horse Question’. The article discussed the crucial economic
necessity of these animals, which was a problem because they were, according to the
author, exceedingly scarce in England, as well as highly expensive to buy, feed, and
maintain.2 As Clay McShane and Joel A. Tarr have argued in their study of urban horses
in nineteenth-century America, during this century horses were valued for their extreme
utility, and thoroughly exploited and commodified as ‘living machines’.3 McShane and
Tarr offer, as evidence of the economic (as opposed to sentimental) nature of the
relationship between horse and animal in nineteenth-century America, the fact that horse
owners almost always dispatched of their horses by killing them or having them killed as
2 W. Chambers, ‘The Horse Question’, Chambers’s Journal of Popular Literature, Science, and Arts 50
(1873), p. 673.
3 Clay McShane and Joel A. Tarr, The Horse in the City: Living Machines in the Nineteenth Century
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007). For a study of the economics of British horse
work in the nineteenth century, see F.M.L. Thompson, ‘Nineteenth-Century Horse Sense’,
Economic History Review, New Series, 29 (1976), pp. 60-81.
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soon as the cost of their maintenance began to outstrip their productive value.4 There is
no reason to think that in Victorian England, horses were any less important as economic
and productive units than they were in America. W. Chambers’ 1873 article certainly
seems to suggest that the high expense and necessity of horses in Victorian England
would have required them to be commodified in the way that McShane and Tarr describe.
There was, however, in Victorian Britain, also much popular and heated discussion of the
plight of the exploited horse.5 It is arguable that ‘the horse question’ was more than a
question of economics, but that the inescapable necessity of the horse’s work (and its
commodification) presented what Victorians interpreted as a moral and ethical problem
with no simple solution. It was difficult to avoid the necessity of taking a horse-drawn
cab, for example, when one needed to move about London, but it was also difficult for
many people to resist acknowledging and advocating the reform of circumstances that
caused the horse’s suffering, especially since Victorian British culture afforded the horse
with a great deal of moral and cultural significance.6
It is no surprise that Victorians were interested in methods of communicating with
horses, for both economic and ethical reasons, particularly in the context of driving (and
taming) them. Horse-driving, for Victorians, was both a science and an art.7 In popular
periodical literature, Victorians called for reforms of the driving of horses and other
4 McShane and Tarr, Horse in the City, p. 18.
5 This chapter will focus upon popular discussion of the suffering of working horses, as well as the roles
and circumstances of drivers and riders of horses, in Victorian Britain (and London in particular).
I do not, however, mean to imply that there was no parallel movement for the reform of the
treatment of horses at the same time in America.
6 On the Victorian ‘cult of the horse’ and its manifestation in literature, see Gina M. Dorré, Victorian
Fiction and the Cult of the Horse (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
7 Two late-Victorian periodical articles illustrate this trend most effectively: A. Kerr, ‘Scientific and
Humane Horse Taming’, Illustrated Naval and Military Magazine, 4 (1890), p. 117; Henry C.
Merwin, ‘The Art of Driving’, Harper’s New Monthly Magazine, 93 (1896), pp. 513-18. While
the latter article is largely concerned with style and technique, the author considers humane
treatment of the horse to be part of these.
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exploitative practices by referencing and encouraging readers to try to understand horses.
The goal of the amelioration of the suffering of working horses, however, was fraught
with debate over the assignment of blame, and it was impossible in many circumstances
to consider what steps might be taken toward ethical reform of drivers’ actions without
considering the economic factors that contributed to the dilemma. Cab drivers were seen
driving miserable-looking horses in the streets every day, but they were miserably poor
themselves, and took orders from the people who hired their cabs. Victorian periodical
authors embraced the problem of the cab driver along with the plight of the horse,
debating and attempting to define his position, role, and statuses as interloper, abuser,
responsible party and vulnerable victim. Upper-class abuse of horses was also disdained
in the Victorian periodical press, as authors and activists sought to inform, educate, and
persuade against exploitation for the sake of fashion, as well as discussing issues of
responsibility and ignorance. Communication is a significant theme across the different
spheres of reform advocacy. This chapter will examine how authors of popular English
periodical texts and pamphlets tried to understand and promote understanding of the
suffering involved in the exploitation of the work of horses in the mid- to late- nineteenth
century.
In 1892, George H. Hutt authored a poem to honour a recently retired London
police constable’s career. John Pegg, over the course of three decades, had secured some
1300 convictions against the perpetrators of cruelty to animals, mostly working horses.
Hutt’s poem, narrated by a horse, is suggestive of the possibility of determining the
suffering of an animal through close attention and empathic imagination, and assertive of
the necessity of authorizing responsible humans like Pegg to translate their observations
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and interpretations into language, by which legal actions may be taken to stop or to
ameliorate the suffering. The poem suggests that animals can and do try to communicate
with humans, though these communications may not be noticed: ‘Before we had your
kindly aid/Our pleading proved in vain/And often with a heavy load/We’ve struggled on
in pain’.8 It is arguable that Hutt meant to imply that Pegg had utilized his rational and
creative faculties to detect a horse’s suffering, and that he possessed a kind of sensitive
cleverness - possibly the result of a good moral upbringing or education - that allowed
him to see what others might miss, or else ignore: ‘Dear Mr. Pegg, you’ve proved our
friend,/No one can that deny/By oft detecting cruelty/While others passed it by’. This
empathic knowledge was put to use during Pegg’s career as he used his own voice to
express the suffering of animals he observed, since they could not speak for themselves.
Given his position of authority, Pegg was very effectively able to ‘speak up’ for abused
horses: ‘Your life has been devoted to/The ailments of my race/And when the tongue was
void of speech,/Yours kindly took its place’. These lines could suggest either that Pegg
had spoken in proxy for the horse, or that he had spoken out against abuses other humans
had observed, but of which they had refused or neglected to speak. It is possible that
Hutt intended to imply that Pegg’s voice both supplied speech to the horse’s tongue,
which was ‘void of speech’, and also ‘took the place of’ the human voices that remained
silent when they should have been put to use to do the same.
Hutt’s equine narrator describes the rifts in communications between horse and
human master. Hutt implied that such rifts, more often than not, were the fault of human
vices. He gave the example of how a man, when drunk, would be more likely to fail to
consider that a horse had similar needs to his own: ‘Sometimes a drunkard held the
8 George H. Hutt, ‘A Horse’s Letter to Ex-Police Constable 365, John Pegg’ (London: 1892[?]).
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reins,/And muddled, did not think/That I as well as he required/A cool refreshing drink’.
Sometimes humans misunderstood horses, interpreting a response to pain as bad temper:
‘Again I’ve stood hour after hour/Til corns have made me kick,/And blamed for vicious
temper been/Belaboured with a stick’. Sometimes, Hutt argued, people did not possess
enough moral sense to distinguish suffering from laziness: ‘drivers in their
ignorance/Have vowed that we did shirk/And though we have been weak and ill/Have
urged us on to work’. According to Hutt, however, Pegg always had the sharp sense of
the humanitarian to guide his judgment and to help him to interpret the communications
of suffering animals: ‘’Tis you and only such as you/Who mark the mute appeal/Of us
poor helpless quadrupeds/When indisposed we feel’. According to the poem, many
humans, excepting Pegg’s fellow humanitarians, failed to decipher the stances and
expressions of animals and thus failed to recognize their pain, whether because they were
not smart enough or because they did not care enough to try. This insensitivity would
have reinforced the already formidable barriers to communication between human and
animal.
Hutt styled Pegg as having been entirely immune to the constraints of this barrier.
The narrator of the poem addresses Pegg, of course, in human language (thus enabling a
host of other readers to share in the ‘communications’). This could hardly be otherwise,
though the choice of a horse as narrator is suggestive of Pegg’s special interpretive talent.
At one point, however, the narrator departs from general communications about bad
treatment at the hands of humans to directly complain about a specific ailment he had,
when there was no one there to understand: ‘I’ve had the horrid toothache, Pegg/And fast
I could not go,/But as a medicine received/A cruel, stinging blow’. This ingenious
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strategy meant to encourage the reader to think about the excruciating pains of a
toothache, but then also to imagine what it would be like not to be able to express this
suffering in language to anyone.
Interestingly, Hutt’s narrator actually addresses Pegg in ‘horse language’, and
even includes a translation: ‘So horses, mules, and asses, too,/Their wishes to you
give/By neighing “Honhy, honhy, hon!”/Which means “Long may you live!”’ These
lines were certainly written to praise Pegg and not to mock him; this intention is easily
discerned from the context of the rest of the poem. In fact, while at first glance the lines
may seem to have been written solely for a light comic effect, upon further consideration,
they function as the crucial punctuation of a task that would have been otherwise
incomplete. This is because the narrator needed to speak in human language. Without
the neighing at the end, the poem would have almost undermined the praise heaped upon
Pegg for his ability to decipher the communications and feelings of horses without human
language. While the body of Hutt’s poem does the primary work of expression, it is only
in the neighing that the horse speaks back to Pegg, thus reminding other readers that
communication with animals is not so easy as the rest of the poem suggests. This can
also be seen as an attempt to prevent the reader from pitying the narrator solely as a
fictional character, quite different from ordinary animals who were unable to speak, and
so especially worthy of consideration. This was a trap into which, as Coral Lansbury
argues, nineteenth-century activists who wrote animal fiction often fell, despite the very
best of intentions and the most supreme talents: ‘horses that spoke to each other . . . made
an actual horse seem a very inferior and deficient kind of animal. It then became possible
to make the fictional animal the privileged species and the real animal an anomalous
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species without rights or status.9 The problem is that whereas animals do not use
language, an attempt to ‘give’ them a false language in order to explore the possibility of
what an animal might feel is almost too far removed from reality to encourage serious
thought about real animals.
By closely observing a horse’s response to environmental changes, one could
surmise what caused a working horse the most trouble, what made him uncomfortable,
what gave him ease. One did not necessarily need to transform a real animal into a
fictional character with a voice in order to convey a certain sense of transparency with
regard to the common troubles a horse might experience: ‘it is not so much the paving as
the change from one sort to another which is so puzzling to the horses, the sudden break
from granite to asphalt, or macadam to wood, requiring an instant change in the step to
which not every horse is equal, though by some the knack is caught in a week or so’.10 It
is important to notice that this author, W.J. Gordon, went further than to scrutinize
behaviour; in fact, no mention is made of what actions he had seen horses perform, or
what mistakes he had seen them make, that led him to draw this conclusion. The point,
rather, was to encourage the reader to try to imagine the work of pulling a carriage (in
this case, an omnibus), from a horse’s perspective. It can be assumed that Gordon had
seen horses stumble and trip at such moments as pavement has changed, and noted
patterns that have brought him to his conclusions. It is interesting to consider how much
more of a horse’s ‘feeling’ would have been accessible while riding the carriage as it is
pulled, if a rider but paid attention to the source of various bumps, shaking, wobbling,
9Coral Lansbury, The Old Dog: Women, Workers, and Vivisection in Edwardian England (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 182.
10W. J. Gordon, ‘The Horse World of London: The Omnibus Horse’, Leisure Hour, XLI (Nov. 1891), p.
30.
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starts, and jerks about. Riding in the carriage of a cab, it would have been particularly
easy to feel the movements of the horse, if one only took the time to consider the motions
of the carriage as the connected with the bearer of its burden. In an omnibus, it would
have taken more imaginative work to make the connection. Still, particularly if one had
ever ridden on a horse’s back, the feelings of the horse were not entirely inaccessible to a
rider. It is easy to imagine what may have signaled to Gordon that a horse was ‘puzzled’.
It is not even that difficult to imagine for oneself what ‘puzzled’ might have felt like to
the rider in a carriage or omnibus pulled by a horse who was currently feeling this way.
Another way to access the experience of the working horse is simply to touch the
horse. While not always practicable, if the horse is not one’s own, touching a horse’s
body is arguably the most direct way to understand what a horse was feeling, including
the scars of past experiences. The author of an 1875 Blackwood’s article on bits and
bearing reins considered a quotation from Sir Francis Head, of forty years earlier, still to
be relevant, with regard to determining the damage done by bearing reins and other types
of oppressive restraints: ‘if the reader will pass his hand down the back sinews of one of
our stage-coach or post-chaise horses, he will soon feel (though not so keenly as they do)
what is the fatal consequence.’11 The body of a horse would arguably feel much different
depending upon what social, cultural and economic forces had ‘shaped’ the horse’s body.
These changes, especially if they are grossly unnatural or unhealthy, can certainly
communicate the feelings of a horse and help to foster understanding. The horse’s body
can ‘speak’ to a person in this way. Until the arrival of the automobile and other modern,
mechanical modes of transportation, the human hand was never far from the horse -
11 Sir Francis Head, Bubbles from the Brunnens of Nassau, by an Old Man (London, 1834). Quoted. in
‘Horses, Bits, and Bearing Reins’, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 117 (1875), p. 742.
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nurturing or abusing - constraining, compelling, and ultimately, shaping. Quoting Sir
Francis Head, the author of the Blackwood’s article referenced the way that the human
hand could read the response of the horse’s body to detect the history of the changes that
other human hands had made to the same body. Thus, the hand was used to understand
the effects upon the horse of the hand, and of many different hands.
W.J. Gordon emphasized the humanity of exercising patience toward such horses
when they displayed less than perfect temperament. He asked his reader to try to
consider the effects of heavy toil, distress, and discomfort upon their personalities.
Interestingly, Gordon utilized the concept of forgiveness, which, with its moral and even
religious connotations, arguably meant to suggest a very human-like capacity for
responsibility in the horse: ‘Surely a little touchiness can be forgiven after a worrying trip
through noisy London in rain or snow or fog, varied at all sorts of irregular intervals with
sudden stops and starts on greasy asphalt, the start . . . being for a full load a pull of
between three and four tons’.12 Gordon’s references to subtle nuances of personality,
such as the word ‘touchiness’ suggested to his reader that horses had very complex
personalities with many levels of emotion. His description of a trip through London as
‘worrying’ is suggestive of the kinds of emotions ordinarily associated with humans
rather than animals. Gordon’s implication that a horse could be worried, and even that a
horse could be ‘a little touchy’, communicated that the horse had some significant
capacity for a wide range of feelings. Gordon’s reader would likely have imagined that
the behaviours of such a horse were easily influenced by feelings, in ways that involved
choices regarding such things as temptation, resistance, and even self-discipline.
12 Gordon, ‘Omnibus’, p. 30.
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Gordon’s application of moral possibility to the horse was hardly new in 1892, or
unusual for a nineteenth-century non-fiction text. In fact, the whole of the nineteenth
century abounds with literature that specifically discusses the virtues and vices of
horses.13 Curiously, it was far less common for other domestic animals to be portrayed as
possessing vices in terms of making moral choices (though the virtue of the dog was very
commonly extolled). This may have been because of the difficulty involved in
persuading such a strong animal as the horse to consistently follow human orders
regarding movement and constraint of movement for many hours at a time. It is arguable
that the force of a horse encouraged Victorians to interpret this animal’s actions, as
indicative of a moral will. Victorians afforded the horse with the ability to make ‘right’
and ‘wrong’ choices and to perform ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ actions. Significantly, Gordon
retained this moral paradigm, urging his readers not to misinterpret a horse’s response to,
for example, exhaustion or nervous unease (states of mind and body with which any
human could relate), as the commission of ‘bad’ acts that deserved punishment. If
humans deserved mercy because they were imperfect, than so did horses, who were also
imperfect.
Victorians recognized that even though horses could not understand human
language, they could determine well enough what was required of them by the signals
they were given in human language. Horses, of course, were trained to respond to
different signals in different ways.14 If a horse did not satisfactorily respond to a prompt
13 It is interesting to note that the ‘moral status’ popularly afforded to the horse allowed authors to depict
the cooperative, give-and-take relationship between horse and human as potentially fair or unfair,
so that the horse functioned (at least ideally) as a unit within moral economy and a broadly ideal
system of justice: the horse was not merely abused, he was ‘cheated’. See, for example, E.I.
Sears, ‘The Horse, How he is Cheated and Abused’, National Quarterly Review, 27 (173), p. 346.
14 Not only was it considered that horses responded to human language signals, but also that British drivers
of horses who had been trained in an indigenous language of the Empire would need to learn that
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in the manner that was expected, force was likely to have been applied to reinforce the
command. Henry Curling, in his 1851 tract ‘A Lash for the Lashers’, argued that horses
could feel not only the sting of the whip, but also that of a harsh tone in the voice of a
driver. Far from requiring a lash to be compelled to follow orders, horses could detect
changes in vocal patterns indicative of displeasure in their performance. Curling argued
that horses, just like humans, understood when they were being scolded, and would
respond with increased efforts whenever reasonable. ‘A hard word is as instantly and
keenly felt by a horse as by a human being. The willing brute will attempt to improve an
effort the instant he is spoken to’.15 The implication is that whenever cross words were
unreasonably administered, they only served to hurt a horse’s feelings, just as they would
do to a human, and brought no positive result. Liberal scolding, according to Curling, did
not inspire horses to be eager to serve. Despite the fact that horses do not understand
human language, Curling believed them sensitive enough to comprehend the meaning of
a scolding, and the difference between a kind and an unkind word, since these were felt,
rather than processed in units of words. Thus, human language could communicate
feelings to a horse, as well as foster or break down relationships between horse and
driver.
In addition to encouraging readers to imagine from the horses perspective the
effects of the use of hard language and physical force, authors of Victorian periodical
texts also tried to get people to think about the needs and desires that horses might have
indigenous language order to effectively communicate with their horses. Matthew Horace Hayes’
A Guide to Training and Horse Management in India. With a Hindustanee stable vocabulary
went through four editions between 1874 and 1885 (Calcutta: T.S. Smith, 1874, 1875, 1878,
1885).
15 Henry Curling. A Lashing for the Lashers: Being an Exposition of the Cruelties, Practiced upon the Cab
and Omnibus Horses of London (London: N. Wright, 1851), p. 4.
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had when they were not working. C. Forbes, in an 1853 article in Notes and Queries,
pleaded that after a hard day’s work, the driver of a horse should ‘give him a roll’.16
Forbes argued that horses needed refreshment as much as do humans. He cited various
texts from ancient and foreign cultures to demonstrate how well horses enjoyed being let
loose to roll about on the ground, and how effectively this assisted a horse in recovering
strength and spirits after protracted exertion. It is interesting to note that although
humans could certainly relate to the need for rest and reflection, Forbes considered
refreshment in terms of the horse’s difference. In order to do so, both author and reader
were required to trawl their own experiences of ‘refreshment’ in order to harvest a sort of
template feeling upon which they could reflect, while considering the reality of an
experience very different than their own. Observation helped to fill in the blanks, and the
testimony of other humans who had witnessed what they believed to have been horses
refreshing themselves helped to establish the tangible possibility of such difference.
An 1875 article in Chambers’s Journal of Popular Literature, Science, and Arts
constructed a similar argument to Forbes’ in Notes and Queries. The author if this article
argued that the horse should be allowed to enjoy its own faculties, as it was wrong to
deprive him of their use just because they were not always required for human service.
The faculty in question was the horse’s eyesight: ‘We have never been able to understand
why horses should be tied up in a darkened apartment, within a limited allowance of space for
movement, with their heads towards a dead wall. The horse loves the light. He has good
eyesight, and likes to look about him. And why should he not have this simple enjoyment?’17
16 C. Forbes. ‘ “Give Him a Roll”—A Plea for the Horse’. Notes and Queries, 8 (24 September 1853), p.
287.
17 ‘Horses, and Treatment of Horses’, Chambers’s Journal of Popular Literature, Science, and Arts, 52
(1875), p. 291.
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Since it harmed no one for the horse to have more use of his eyes, the author argued that
horse should have this use. It is very interesting that the author of this article made the
claim that the horse ‘liked’ to look about him. This statement implies the possibility of
knowing or sensing what is pleasant to the horse, and what the horse enjoys.
Consequently, it also implies the possibility of recognizing when a horse is suffering.
Although the author of this Chambers’s article was not likely to have been challenged
over the means by which he arrived at the knowledge of how a horse felt, and whether a
horse ‘liked to look about him’, it is important to note that in the Victorian debate over
vivisection, it was exactly this sort of assumption that was rigorously questioned. Here,
we are fortunate to see the subtle work accomplished by empathy, as a reasonable means
of speaking up for others, even if knowledge of another’s interior experience could never
be absolute or proven.
Henry Curling suggested, as a remedy for those drivers of cab and omnibus horses
who abused their horses, that these drivers place themselves, quite literally, in similar
circumstances to those which their horses endure every day. After a disclaimer meant to
reserve religious and traditional notions of discontinuity between mankind and animal,
Curling went on to follow, in practice, the trend toward continuity that was such a
hallmark of Victorian science and culture:
Far be it from us to place a human on par with a brute beast . . . nevertheless, if we might
suggest a slight trial, in order to convince a cab-driver how greatly he acts against sense
and humanity, and at the same time prove our case to him feelingly, we would merely ask
any cab or omnibus-driver, given to misusage of the whip, to place himself in charge of a
common truck, and drag it up Holborn Hill; then, whilst he labours at the dead pull, let
him imagine for a moment the effect upon himself of what he is so partial to; let him
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imagine a series of strong jerks fretting his jaws, and a continued compliment of heavy
lashes over his bare loins. He will then, perhaps, be able to appreciate the effects of his
own system, and how at last it whips the spirit of a horse quite out of the animal.18
Curling attempted to take force and coercion out of the practical equation of his proposed
experiment, relegating violence to the imagination of the cab or omnibus-driver, lest his
suggestion portray such drivers as ones who should be enslaved and treated ‘like
animals’. Yet what driver would have agreed to participate in such a trial, and which of
these was likely to have believed, beforehand, that the tasks assigned to their horses were
not so very arduous as Curling represented them to be? Curling’s fictitious proposal was
but a short step away from wholesale animalization of the cab and omnibus drivers. His
readers, who were unlikely to be cabmen themselves, were meant to imagine how a
driver’s perspective - and practice - might change if he were given the opportunity (or, if
he were forced) to discover what it felt like to pull such a large burden up a hill, the way
that horses were made to do every day.
Poor drivers were not the only people Victorian activists wished to expose to a
horse’s perspective. In fact, in castigating wealthier members of society for their
contribution to the suffering of horses, it appears that one had less need to take care not to
degrade or animalize the subject. At an 1868 SPCA meeting, the Earl of Romney
expressed his anger at wealthy horse owners who would leave their horses to wait outside
for them as they attended engagements, fully outfitted in painful bits and bearing reins.
Here, he is quoted by Blackwood’s: ‘If I had the power, I should like to put these
[wealthy horse owners] out in the sun, half undressed and let the flies bite them, because
they would very soon be able to understand what torture they were inflicting upon those
18 Curling, Lashers, p. 9.
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poor unfortunate animals’.19 Interestingly, Curling’s proposed experiment reads very like
an exercise in the judicial punishment of criminals, while Romney’s statement sounds
more like the threat of hell. Both consider the treatment of others - animals - from the
cultural standpoint of Christian theology, yet both expand the moral franchise (the one
that instructs one to ‘do unto others . . .’) to include animals as individuals who were
entitled to consideration, whose suffering should be prevented if possible, and not
wantonly ignored.
Most scholars who have studied the position of animals in the nineteenth century
have tended to look at the ways that animals have served as surrogates for the discussion
of human relationships.20 It is easy enough to see how such statements as those about
placing the cab driver or the wealthy horse owner in the place of their horses could be
interpreted as telling a story about class dynamics and social problems among humans.
No doubt this is part of the story behind such expressions as these, despite the fact that
animals were the real subject of discussion. But must one always imagine animals to have
been only the ostensible subject of discussion? While there is certainly validity to the
claim that discussion of animals was used to express opinions about sensitive, tense, or
otherwise difficult relationships between and among humans and groups of humans, it is
surely absurd to dismiss all discussion of the welfare of animals as a cover for ‘real’
concerns about humans. Is it not just as interesting - and important - to consider the ways
in which humans have identified with animals as animals? Thus considered,
human/human relationships can also be studied in fuller depth. Further, the introduction
19 ‘Bits and Bearing Reins’, Blackwood’s, p. 745.
20 See Lansbury, Old Brown Dog; Harriet Ritvo, The Animal Estate: English and Other Creatures in the
Victorian Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); Moira Ferguson, Animal
Advocacy and Englishwomen, 1780-1900: Patriots, Nation, and Empire (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1998).
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of the animal as animal into the discussion of human culture reveals a level of complexity
in life and history that is all too easily overlooked, whether because it is difficult to
discuss or because it makes human beings feel uncomfortable in our position and forces
us to confront problems that are not easily resolved.
The Victorian British had a very real relationship with the horse, so much so that
equine ‘difference’ (as assigned by human beings) was integrated into the national
identity. The horse’s ‘spirit’ was imagined to be like the British spirit. As we have seen,
economics established this special relationship, for horses were expensive and
indispensable to Victorian Britain. It is easy to see, however, how people to whom
horses were so important would learn much about, as well as learn to cherish what they
perceived to be the horse’s traits and characteristics. Proud of their relationship with
horses, this pride was sustained and increased by attempts to elevate the horse from the
status of the animal. Blackwood’s celebrated the efforts that were being made to defend
and protect horses, consciously coining an interesting term to express just how very
special an animal they considered the horse to be: ‘We heartily rejoice . . . that a voice
has at last been raised on behalf (to coin a word) of suffering horsehood.’21 Less an
animal than a humane spirit lodged in a horse, ‘horsehood’ was also a vulnerable
condition. To find oneself in a state of horsehood was to lack language or any means to
demand consideration, while retaining many humane qualities, as well as the ability to
suffer from lack of consideration. To be a horse (otherwise, to suffer in a state of
horsehood) was to need someone to understand your needs and to speak for you so that
they could be met.
21 ‘Bits and Bearing Reins’, Blackwood’s, p. 743.
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Forbes, the author who pleaded for working horses to be allowed to roll
themselves on the ground for refreshment, strengthened his case for the consideration of
horses’ feelings and experiences by using a term to identify them that emphasized their
closeness to human beings. Forbes described horses as ‘English Houyhnhnms’. Cleverly
mined from British literature, the idea of the English Houyhnhnm emphasized the
national identity of British horses. This term served to chide the English for not
extending to horses the same consideration as had been extended to them in classical
cultures, and continued to be extended to them in foreign cultures in the nineteenth
century. This term also served to blur the species boundary between human and horse
until it more closely resembled a racial difference. It was perhaps even meant to suggest
that horses (as Swift’s Houyhnhnms) were in some ways superior to humans, and that
human beings might do well to emulate some equine traits. In Swift’s text, Houyhnhnms
were wiser than other races and not given to petty fighting; Forbes praised
‘Houyhnhnms’ implicitly for their endurance and fortitude. It is possible that he also
intended to contrast the horses’ character against that of the drunkard who denied his
horse refreshment, while engaging in less salubrious (and less wise) acts of refreshment
than a horse would have chosen.
‘Horses and Horsiness’ is the title of a strange and interesting Victorian exercise
in the cultural analysis of the English relationship with horses, which was published as an
article in 1865 in Temple Bar. The article suggests that the love of horses was a British
cultural phenomenon. The author explained: ‘our natural horsiness has shared in the
progress and development of most of our arts’.22 It seems that the author did not expect
readers at first to have known exactly what he meant by using the term ‘horsiness’. In
22 ‘Horses and Horsiness’, Temple Bar, 14 (1865), p. 446.
306
fact, the concept of ‘horsiness’, as expounded by the author, is quite complex, arguably
because the relationship of the English to the horse was also complex. First, the author
mentions the English obsession with equine sports. Then, he discusses a trend that a
twenty-first century historian might call the ‘democratization’ of horse-riding. While the
article pokes a bit of fun at those upwardly mobile individuals who took up riding in
order to appear as members of a superior class, the author does not seem to have been
overtly hostile to the practise. Instead, he seems to have been interested in the way that
horses, in terms of economics and leisure in particularly, came to be bound so closely
with the English sense of identity. The author expresses a sense of wonder at the wealth
of fictional literature concerning horses and their caretakers, and laments the decline of
the quality of English horses, and the concomitant rise in their price. The author implies
that such changes were likely to cause an upheaval in the English sense of pride and
country and in the general understanding of what it meant to be English.
Another article published in Temple Bar during the same year demonstrates the
relationship between the description of human character and that of the character of the
horse. The author of this article, entitled ‘High Horses’, explored a kind of reverse
anthropomorphism, whereby humans were believed to share the characteristics of horses.
The traits expounded by the author are almost entirely negative (mostly a critique of
gendered behaviours), and rhetorically separated from the horse-as-animal from the first
line: ‘There are three kinds of horses bestridden by men, not counting the four-footed
beast standing godfather to the rest’.23 Of these three, namely, hobby-horses, stalking-
horses, and high-horses, the last and its many variations forms the topic of most of the
article. Equine references propel almost every line of the discussion. References abound
23 ‘Temper, Pride, and other High Horses’, Temple Bar, 15 (1865), p. 348.
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to bits and bearing reins, hard mouths and bridles, saddles, and even neighing. For
example: ‘home is the place where the high horse of temper has his ordinary airing
ground,—where he shows off his paces unchecked by bit or rein, uncurbed by the
presence of strangers, and unweighted by the pressure of the properties—where he is just
a ramping, plunging, hard-mouthed devil that runs away with the family coach.’24
Horses, indeed, made very easy surrogates for the discussion of human relationships, and
they did not serve so only through discussion of their finer qualities and pleas for their
welfare. Further, the portrayal of humans as horses, and human vices as having limitless
rhetorical parallels in equine behaviour, displays the veritable wealth of cultural
information that existed about the character of horses. Despite whether this information
was verifiable (or accurate), it shows that Victorians imagined themselves to have had a
very close relationship with the horse, and not only with his purportedly nobler qualities.
Arguably all of the cultural information about horses contained in such articles as
those published in Temple Bar would have been based on middle- or upper-class
knowledge of horses. While cabmen and other lower-class individuals may have had
their own library of terms to express their perceptions of the character of the horse, and
while their relationships with horses may have differed considerably from those of people
of the middle or upper classes, little of this world has survived that was not filtered
through the interpretations of authors of a higher class than cab drivers. Many reports,
like Henry Curling’s, accused cabmen of gross inhumanity toward their horses. Some,
however, described cabmen as exhibiting tender affection toward their constant equine
companions.25 The most interesting depictions of the relationship between cabman and
24 ‘High Horses’, Temple Bar, 15 (1865), p. 348.
25 See James Greenwood, The Wilds of London. (London: Guildford, 1874), pp. 108-110.
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horse conflate the identity of the two. These intended, of course, to degrade the cabman
rather than to elevate the horse. Functioning as almost a counterpart to Blackwood’s
‘horsehood’, Punch coined the term ‘Cabmanity’ to revile the sympathies of those who
supported charities organized to benefit members of this race of beings, who were clearly
separate from the rest of humanity.26 In an 1853 article entitled ‘Saint Cabbie’, Punch
portrayed the cabman as a human with a horse’s head.27 Written to mock sympathy for
the cabmen whose fares had recently been regulated to sixpence a mile, the article
proposed the erection of a memorial statue to commemorate the sufferings of ‘Saint
Cabbie’: ‘An aureole, made of dirty straw, should shine round his head’.28 Punch thus
conflated the personality of the cabman with that of the horse he drove, and placed him in
closer connection with the space and objects associated with the horse than with the
culture of humanity.
Perhaps more helpfully than was intended, a later article in Punch of 1868
spoofed ‘A Cabman’s Complaint’. Though still mocking the plight of the cabman and
those who have sympathy for it, the author of this fictitious cabman’s poetic invective
represented that cabmen complained about being treated like horses: ‘Drivers? Blest if
we are! We’re druv!’.29 It is hardly unbelievable that the cabmen might have felt this
way. A glance back at another 1854 Punch article, which again focused upon the Cab
Act that had roused such indignation in cab drivers and the strike that had been their
response, reveals another instance of the Victorian periodical text addressing the cabman
26 ‘Friends of Cabmanity’, Punch, 25 (1853), p. 32.
27 See Appendix 1; from ‘Saint Cabbie’, Punch, 25 (1853), p. 112.
28 ‘Saint Cabbie’, Punch, 25 (1853), p. 112. The Cab Act of 1853 regulated the cabman’s fare to a sixpence
per mile (before which time they had only been required to carry some recognized book of fares).
This provoked outrage among the cab drivers, which culminated in a general strike that brought
much of London to a veritable standstill.
29 ‘A Cabman’s Complaint’, Punch, 54 (1868), p. 209.
309
as if he were a horse. The title of the article, ‘Steady, Cabbie, Steady’, conflates the
angry cabman with the restless horse. It seems the cabman, himself a provider - or means
- of transportation, may as well have been his horse, as he was simply viewed as another
creature that needed to be tamed to do his job without causing problems.
Intending to highlight what he perceived as the selfish culpability of cabmen,
Henry Curling described the way in which cabmen themselves associated their own
bodies with those of their horses. If their horses suffered from the lash, the cabmen
argued that they did as well, since it was all their exertion forced the horse to move.
Curling recounted a conversation he held with a cab driver, and how that driver
responded to his upbraiding: ‘ “you must have flogged a good many shillings out of that
horse in the course of the day.” “And if I have,” he returned, “I suppose I’ve earned
them. My arm’s as stiff as if I’d been thrashing in a barn.”.’30 Although the driver may
have responded to Curling’s remonstrance about his horse’s suffering with a statement of
cold indifference, both his reply and Curling’s decision to quote his reply indicate that the
cabman and his horse were in some way perceived as a single physical unit. For Cabbie,
it was all in a day’s work; he was required to suffer, as was his horse. For Curling, the
cabman who abused his horse perverted that oneness into a fractured abomination. The
cabman, so intimately connected to his horse as to feel pain in the shared act of moving
the cab to transport the rider, ignored and denied the indications of his horse’s pain and
suffering, despite the fact that he was very likely the individual who could read them
best.
Not every text that associated the body of the cabman with that of his horse was
written to speak out against cab drivers. A charitable periodical of the 1870s entitled The
30 Curling, Lashers, p. 14.
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Cabman included in every issue a discussion of the way a horse’s body worked -
alongside a discussion of the way that the cabman’s body worked. A different part of the
horse’s body was highlighted for discussion every month (for example, the eye, or the
hoof). 31 Often, the horse’s anatomy was introduced in terms of how it differed from that
of the human, thus prompting the reader, who was expected to be a cabman, to compare
and contrast a part of his own body to the corresponding part of his horse’s body. This
instruction often informed a subsequent discussion of how and why the horse should be
treated and cared for in a certain way. Clearly, the hope was that if cab drivers were
more educated about the horse’s body, they would understand their horses better and be
less likely to abuse them, especially out of frustration and ignorance.
The authors of The Cabman also featured articles that were arguably aimed to
prevent the cabman from abusing his own body, as well. These articles discussed the
anatomy and physiology of the human, specifically concerning particular ailments to
which cabmen were prone, such as asthma and dyspepsia (and not the least,
intemperance). These articles describe the reasons why cabmen were prone to these
particular ailments, and suggest preventative and curative measures to combat such
quotidian evils. Reading these articles, one gets a sad sense of how very different indeed
were the lives of the cabmen from their fellow Victorians, and of how truly grim was the
cabman’s lot. Paired together with the articles about the body of the horse, the anatomy
and physiology lessons resemble a description of a world of difference that likely would
have been difficult for anyone who was not a cabman to understand - difficult, indeed, for
31 London Cabman’s Mission. The Cabman: A Monthly Journal and Review Issued from the London
Cabman’s Mission Hall, King’s Cross (London: 1874-76).
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the cabman to understand - and one in which the bodies of the cabman and his horse were
inextricably bound, even if the cabman was ignorant or resentful of that tie.
Certainly the outside world associated the cabman and his horse most intimately.
The Cabman reminded its readers that the personality of a horse was a veritable window
into the character of those who drove him: ‘You can judge the character of a man by the
character of his horse.’32 The actions of humans upon horses in their charge were viewed
as tending to write themselves upon the character of a horse, as if through the medium of
the horse’s body: ‘What are designated “hard mouthed” and “pulling” horses are made so
by hard, unfeeling hands, want of knowledge and of sympathy for this useful creature, or
indolence in attending to its requirements’.33 True enough, the horse’s body reflected
unfeeling treatment received at the hands of humans. But whose fault was it? Were the
driver’s hands the instruments of the riders that paid him, or did the driver get in the way
of the relationship that wealthier people imagined that they themselves would have had
with the beloved horses of England, if not for these inhumane (but absolutely essential)
interlopers? In the meagre cultural space that existed for him between his horse and his
riders, the cabman found himself an awkward fit.
As the driver mediated the space between the horse and the rider in his carriage,
and as driver and horse became rhetorically interchangeable, the space that was occupied
by the driver himself became almost negligible. Thus, a cabman encroached upon the
space that was viewed as belonging to the rider. He was unwelcome in this space, but he
could not keep away, and could not keep to himself. Punch represented the cabman as
constantly transgressing the space between himself and the people in his carriage: ‘We
32 The Cabman (April 1875), p. 27.
33 The Cabman (December 1874), p. 27.
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can scarcely wonder at the easy familiarity of a cab-driver, for there is no one who seems
so utterly incapable of keeping his distance’.34 The cabman was viewed as making this
space uncomfortable for his passengers by his persistent invasion of the carriage.
Interestingly, he was represented as unable to keep to himself, which actually suggests
that the social space allotted to the cabman was too small for him to occupy comfortably.
Perhaps the cabman was too cramped in this space, and felt a need to stray and to share
that from which his passengers would have liked to keep him excluded. It is almost as if
the passengers felt like that he was touching them.
It is easy to see how touching might be unavoidable, especially as the cabman
might very well have been opening doors or handling luggage. Certainly some amount of
touching would have been necessary to collect a fare. Even if the cabman was not
directly touching his passengers, however, they still seem to have been acutely aware of
his closeness, and to have felt it intrusive. There even seems to have been awareness
among passengers that they were breathing the same air as the cabby. The odour of
tobacco often contributed to this awareness. During the mid-1850s, Punch presented its
readers with a series of mock memoirs, ostensibly authored by cabmen at different times
of the year, complaining of seasonal trials and offering tips to their colleagues, such as
the following, entered for January, 1854: ‘If you drives a night-cab, get inside when on
the stand, pull up the winders, and smoke. Bacca airs the vehicle, and you can, if
objected to, say it was the last fare’.35 If a cabman sat in his carriage, in January, with the
windows up, it would have been at least partly because he was trying to escape the cold.
What is more interesting, though, is that the author of this ‘memoir’ seems to have
34 ‘What is a Cabman’s Mile?’ Punch, 13 (1847), p. 200.
35 ‘Monthly Memoirs of a Cabman’, Punch, 26 (1854), p. 133.
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imagined that the cabman usurped this space in the absence of passengers. That he would
have pretended he did not do it, and would have faulted the ‘last fare’ is an indication that
a cabman would have been aware of the offence given by the smell of his tobacco smoke.
It further suggests that a cabman was also likely to have been aware that his passengers
did not like to imagine themselves sitting in a place that had been frequently and recently
occupied by him. It is interesting to speculate the about what led the author to have
placed this particular suggestion in the mouth, as it were, of his fictitious cabman. Had
he seen cabmen at their stands, shutting up in their carriages, smoking away the cold and
boredom while waiting for employment? Had he been told, as he alighted into a reeking
carriage, that the last passenger was to blame for the offensive odour? Perhaps this
author even placed himself in the position of the cabman; during moments of
unemployment, to whom (besides the master from whom he had rented) did the cab
belong, if not to himself? For what reason should the cabman have abstained from
occupying the carriage, which afforded him comfort, if no one was paying him to do so?
The Punch author implied that the space within the carriage was the cabman’s
responsibility (one with which he could not be trusted), but also acknowledged that the
cabman had authority over this space. He grudged the cabman this authority, especially
since it was one which his social betters had to occupy, at least if they wished to travel
anywhere in the city. As I will discuss shortly, the cabman was also grudged authority
over his horse, and it was considered unfortunate that it was necessary to entrust him with
the responsibility for the welfare of this animal in his charge.
The authority that a cabman exercised over his cab (which extended somewhat to
those who ride in it - and, of course, to his horse) was presented as having been
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commonly abused. The cabman was seen as a bully who would use any and all means at
his disposal to extort money from his passengers, and who would use whatever force was
necessary to squeeze as much income as possible from a failing horse, even to the point
of driving the horse to death. One poem in Punch from 1853 mocks the idea that cabmen
were vulnerable people who deserved public assistance. The poem addresses the ‘poor’
cabman as a kind of ironic ideal: ‘You who have bullied half the world’.36 Of course,
actual cabmen were hardly the target audience for Punch. The author of the poem
arguably believed that his poem would reach such individuals of middling status as were
unlikely to have owned carriages, but who were wealthy enough not to walk - and to not
want to be seen walking. For these people, hiring a cab was one of the only options, and
certainly the most convenient available. At night, particularly, hiring a cab was much
safer than walking the streets to get about the city. The cabman was, then, a kind of
intermediary person between the individual of middling rank and the rough streets they
might wish to avoid in order to avoid dangerous encounters with lower-class people. In a
way, the cabman represented the lower-class people, and the streets in which he could
walk relatively without fear. Coarse in appearance (because of his poverty), and
probably in manners, he wielded the power of the streets. In the incarnation of the
cabman, individuals of middling rank found the streets peculiarly inescapable.
Women were considered particularly vulnerable to the bullying of cabmen. In
addition to the concern of interface with an individual from whom one might have wished
to shy away in the street, the rough cabman also presented a middle-classed woman with
an oblique sexual threat. While there does not seem to have been a direct fear that a
36 ‘The Public’s Address to His Cabman (Imitated from the Arab’s Address to His Steed)’. Punch, 25
(1853), p. 44.
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woman risked sexually violation by a cabman while travelling alone (likely because they
were licensed and regulated; cabmen were required to carry a license from 1838, while
hackney carriages had been licensed since the seventeenth century), women were, in
effect, the captives of the drivers whose cabs they boarded - perhaps with much luggage,
and perhaps with children. Indeed, if one imagines the worst a cabman could do to a
woman in this circumstance who argued with him, such a woman might have found
herself in quite a predicament if she were to have been set down, with her children and
belongings, alone in a rough part of the city. It seems women were aware of this threat,
and it was suggested that because of it women were willing to pay higher fares: ‘There is
no wonder that the female has a greater horror of the cab-driver than the male entertains.
She seldom or never finds him a chivalrous enemy. He looks upon her and her children,
and her band-boxes, and the maid-servant that is within her gates, as a spoil and a prey;
and when her husband travels with her, his charges sensibly decrease’.37 Interestingly,
this author did not revile cabmen and their claim to charity, in the fashion of Punch.
Instead, this author argues that society had a particular duty to cabmen, since it had
placed them in such a position of mutual distrust with regard to those upon whom they
depended for their living, and to whom they needed to turn for assistance in the poverty
that their living afforded them. It is small wonder that satirists were so enamoured of the
subject of the cabman; he was at once dangerous and vulnerable, dwelling as he did in the
transgressive space between the rough streets of the city and the comfortable, middle-
classed homes to and from the safety of which he perpetually conveyed occupants.
37 ‘Our Duty Towards Our Cabmen’, Chambers’s Journal of Popular Literature, Science, and Arts, 34
(1860), p.268.
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Despite how easy it might have been to mock the idea that the roguish cab driver
could actually have been vulnerable, arguably few would have seriously disputed the
assertion that poverty and discomfort were endemic to cabmen. But what, if any,
responsibility did the class from which they earned their living bear for the circumstances
or the quality of cabmen’s lives? It seems that no remonstrance or expression of disdain
spoken against the cabman in Victorian periodical literature lacked its corresponding
expression of compassion for his plight and poverty. The cabman was as much pitied as
he was reviled. As with any ‘other’ perceived to be threatening or dangerous, it was
safest to pity the cabman from a distance. Of course, if one needed to travel by cab, it
was impossible to avoid him. Once inside his carriage, it was best to put aside thoughts
of charity. Even if one could afford to pay a cabman well for his services, it was
regarded by some as irresponsible to do so, for the sake of those who could not afford to
do the same:
Fast young men who have plenty of money to spare, do not know, and perhaps
would not care if they did know, how much extortion and evil-speaking they are
indirectly responsible for, when they fling down their extra shillings at the railway
station . . . whenever the extra money is given as a part of the fare, munificence
of this kind is not only not generosity, but is absolute meanness as respects those
who, poorer than the donor, have yet occasion to make use of the same sort of
conveyance.38
To overpay a cabman, under ordinary circumstances, then, was to take the easy way out
for oneself, rather than to help someone else. This would encourage the cabmen to bully
38 ‘Our Duty’, Chambers’s, p.269.
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others for more money, using threats and insults and to try to extract the same fare they
might have gotten from a wealthier passenger who was able to spend more liberally.
There was definitely some general agreement about what was due to a cabman for
his services. However, forty years after the 1853 Cab Act, the problem of regulating cab
fares persisted. While regulation fares had not increased very much, it seems that
cabmen expected to be paid more than what was standard. By the early 1890s, other
modes of transportation presented the cab with more and more competition. The author
of an article in Leisure World of 1891 explained that cabmen expected their standard fare
to be supplemented, and that the tension over this extra money persuaded passengers in
the 1890s to explore other options:
It is not the sixpence a mile that people object to, or even a shilling a mile, but the
‘living margin’; and so long as a cabman has to depend more or less on charity—
for that is what the voluntary addition to his fare amounts to—so long will the
crowd flock to railway, tramway, omnibus, and railway omnibus, in which they
know exactly what they have to pay, and can pay it without injuring any delicate
sensibilities.39
People understood that a cabman could not live upon his earnings except in poverty, yet
they could not accept being charged whatever he thought was fair for his services, as
cabmen (frequently rough characters to begin) were known to employ tactics of bullying
and extortion in order to obtain as much money as possible from their passengers. The
space of the cab was an awkward one; as much as it brought members of different classes
together, it erected barriers to understanding and fomented suspicion and resentment.
39 W.J. Gordon, ‘The Horse World of London: The Cab Horse’, Leisure Hour, XLI (Dec. 1891), p. 112.
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The cabman was a means to a horse, but he also came between the horse and the rider,
and so occupied an uncomfortable position. He was shunned, reviled, and animalised,
despite his measure of authority over both horse and rider, and despite his very legitimate
claim to the compassion of his passengers. The cabman did not fit very will into the
social space of the cab, as there was nowhere within this space where his passenger could
accept his presence, particularly because of the authority he exercised over this space -
and over his horse.
It seems that a passenger in a Victorian cab would have preferred to look through
the cab driver to the horse. The horse performed the service, the horse was non-
threatening, and the horse’s vulnerability had no taint of authority or power. The
passenger could do little to help an individual cab horse. A member of the public could
alert the police if they witnessed particular cruelty to a horse, but in ‘ordinary’ troubling
circumstances a horse worked and travelled under the practical authority of his driver.
Essentially, the driver stood between the rider and horse and was viewed as a sort of
interloper and intruder.
There does seem to have been an ideal concept of how travel by horse was ‘meant
to be’, and of the relationship that was supposed to exist between horse and rider. These
did not simply correspond to the mode of riding espoused by the upper class, for the
owners of private carriages were excoriated for their treatment of horses at least as much
as cabmen. The ideal seems to have somewhat resembled the paradigm of the sportsman
and his horse, but sportsmen were also known for abusing their horses, especially since
the excitement of the chase could make them oblivious to their horses’ circumstances.
More accurately, the ideal relationship between horse and rider was imagined as one that
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was fostered by the circumstances of the every-day country rider on horseback. The
author of an 1862 article in Chambers’s described this idyllic relationship between the
horse and solitary rider, whose means of communication with the horse comprised only
the gentle ‘snaffle-bit’: ‘by such connection, there is so great a reciprocity of feeling, that
the horse and his rider become for the time a kind of united being.’40 Without the evil
pomp of the gag bit and bearing rein, and without the pesky mediation of such interlopers
as cabmen and coachmen, horse and rider were able to relate to one another perfectly. Of
course, eventually economics would probably intervene, and it was likely that the horse
would be sold as age depleted his value. At least when a horse was sold from such ideal
circumstances, the seller would bear no responsibility for any unnatural wear to the
horse’s body, nor for an ill temperament, nor for a ‘hard mouth’ gained from rough usage
and abuse. It is arguable that a horse with such a perfect master would have been far
slower to age than other horses. However, it is far from a certainty that many such
owners existed.
Over the course of his lifetime, a Victorian horse was likely to move through
many different spheres of human society, and to make contact with people of diverse
backgrounds and classes. Anna Sewell presented her character Black Beauty as moving
easily from the service of one class of masters to that of others of distinctly different
status, and Black Beauty’s wealthier masters are not always the best or kindest. 41
Sewell did, however, allow for her famous character a level of vaguely upward mobility
40 ‘Horses and their Treatment’, Chambers’s Journal of Popular Literature, Science, and Arts, 52 (1875),
p. 290.
41 Anna Sewell, Black Beauty: his Grooms and Companions. The Autobiography of a Horse. Translated
from the Original Equine by Anna Sewell (London: Jarold & Sons, 1877). See also Ellen B. Wells
and Anne Grimshaw (eds), The Annotated Black Beauty (London: J.A. Allen, 1989); Moira
Ferguson, ‘Black Beauty and His Friends: Icons of Englishness and Empire’, in Animal Advocacy,
pp. 75-104.
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near the end of her novel that would have been sadly unlikely for a Victorian horse. As
they aged or were injured, or as they began to display ‘bad temperament’, horses lost
value and were sold for less and less money to people with lower and lower standards,
and were destined to be eventually slaughtered for meat and other resources that could be
got from their corpses. While it would not have been visibly apparent to an observer on
the street that a ragged, worn-out cab or omnibus horse had ever been anything else, it
was merely a short step to wonder whether such a horse had ever seen ‘better days’.
Though a low-born horse would not have started his career in the service of the highest
echelons of society, a well-bred horse could only lose value as it aged, and so was as
likely as any to end his days in lowly occupation. A horse was an expensive animal, and
so would be kept in service for as long as possible, despite the fact that as he aged his
potential for creating revenue would invariably decline until he was only fit for
performing the most menial of tasks.
This bleak trajectory of a horse’s life also established an inescapable, if not
immediately apparent, connection between the wealthiest of horse owners and the
lowliest of cabmen. The horse that pulled the fancy private carriage was the same horse
that would one day drag the humble cart or cab. Even under the lash of the poorest
driver, such a horse might still carry the scars he gained in service to wealthier masters.
The most notorious of these scars, and the ones that were argued to contribute most to a
decline in a horse’s value and quality of life, would have been suffered through the use of
the bearing rein and accompanying gag-bit. Blackwood’s 1874 article ‘Horses, Bits and
Bearing Reins’ directly relates the use of the bearing rein with the transfer of a horse
from carriage to cab work. The author of this article argued that once the bearing rein
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was applied to a horse, it would be only a relatively short time ‘until, with temper and
mouth both ruined, he passes into the hands of a bus-driver or cabman’.42 It is interesting
to think of the horse’s body as a space where members of diverse classes left their marks,
each meant to communicate a message or else physically coerce a response from the
animal. All that would have been visible to an observer (or a rider), of course, would
have been the cabman’s wretched old horse, and it would be easiest to associate the
horse’s suffering with the cabman. Texts such as ‘Horses, Bits, and Bearing Reins’
suggest that wealthier people may not always have felt their consciences clear of blame
for the condition of cab horses, especially if they had ever sold horses that had been
‘ruined’ in their households into similar service.
E.F. Flower, an outspoken opponent of the use of the bearing rein for carriage
horses, suggested in a letter to The Times in 1874, that the use of the bearing rein was not
often enough criticized, despite the fact that it was a common sight and recognizably
cruel: ‘there is one most cruel and barbarous practice going on all around us, of little or
no notice is taken, possibly because the perpetrators are in the higher classes of society,
which really makes it much worse, as they ought to know better. This stupid and cruel
practice is the use of the gag or bearing-rein for carriage horses’.43 Flower claimed that
because the bearing rein was mostly used by the upper classes, the RSPCA tended to be
weak in their denunciation of its use and were reluctant to bring charges against people
who used it, even when cruelty was painfully apparent. A response from the RSPCA,
denying the accusation, was published the day after Flower’s. In this response, George
Fleming claimed, ‘the use of the “bearing rein” has not been unnoticed by [the RSPCA],
42 ‘Bits and Bearing Reins’, Blackwood’s, p. 744.
43 E.F. Flower, ‘Cruelty to Horses’, letter to The Times (12 August 1874), p. 6.
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and that, though the perpetrators are chiefly in the higher classes of society, they have not
been spared censure’.44 In this letter, Fleming also communicated a sense of helplessness
and resignation:
‘Until horse-owners care to take an interest in their four-footed slaves, and
subordinate the silly whims of their coachmen to their own superior intelligence, I
fear that admirers of the noble creature will continue to be subjected to the
annoyance and pain they experience in witnessing splendid horses made
ridiculous and almost inefficient by this pernicious invention’.45
Clearly, Fleming believed that coachmen were directly responsible for the pain caused to
horses by the bearing rein, and their employers only indirectly responsible. Further,
Fleming described the pain of a horse in bearing rein using terms that were somewhat
disconnected from the experience of the horse. In Flower’s scenario, while the horse is
made ‘ridiculous and almost inefficient’ by the bearing rein, it is the admirer of horses
who, in observing this spectacle, experiences pain. Fleming also claimed that this pain
was much less for the carriage horse than to the wagon- and draught-horses that were also
employed in the service of the same people. Again, the coachman is offered as
responsible, this time for setting the bad example: ‘Of course the waggoner or drayman
only follows the example set him by my Lord’s coachman, but both are ignorant of, or
indifferent to, the inconvenience and pain the stupid contrivance causes the unfortunate
animals intrusted to their management’.46 Fleming made it seem as if there were so many
people whose treatment of horses needed to be monitored, that it was hardly surprising
that the employer could not keep track. His solution required that the coachman be
44 George Fleming, ‘Cruelty to Horses’, letter to The Times (13 August 1874), p. 6.
45 Fleming, ‘Cruelty’, p. 6.
46 Fleming, ‘Cruelty’, p. 6.
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closely regulated in his treatment of horses, as he suggests that other employees in the
same household would follow the coachman’s example.
The coachman was often reviled as a kind of upstart who would abuse the horses
in his charge when left to his own devices. It was suggested that coachmen mostly used
the bearing rein because they liked to show off, rather than because they had been
instructed to use it: ‘Unfortunately, in our complex social system, [the horse] is
comparatively seldom under the direct guidance of its master or proprietor; but is handed
over to a servant—some “Master Jeames”—whose chief concern, possibly, is to shew off
in livery in an enviably splendid “turn-out”’.47 Thus, the offence of his employers was
downgraded from abuse to a kind of gullible neglect. The coachman, of course, would
have been more readily visible to observers than the riders in the coach, and it would
have been possible to surmise that the riders in the coach, who were not be easily seen,
were not wholly aware, or were completely unaware of what was happening to their
horse. In this position, the coachman became a buffer between the outside world and his
employers, and a target for blame. It is but a short step to imagine that this might have
been part of his duty. Imagined in this way, the outside world knocked at the window of
the carriage to try to relay the unpleasant information about the pain suffered by their
horse, but the riders inside remained safe in their ignorance.
Flower was quoted by Blackwood’s in 1875 as saying that in addition to the pain
inflicted upon horses with the bearing rein, ‘it is a severe penance to any man who loves a
horse to walk along the fashionable streets or the Park, and to witness the sufferings of
horses from this absurd and cruel practice’.48 Flower considered it intensely hypocritical
47 ‘Horses and their Treatment’, Chambers’s, p. 290.
48 E.F. Flower, quoted in ‘Bits, and Bearing Reins’, Blackwood’s, p. 744.
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that the elite members of a society that almost unanimously disparaged the treatment of
cab horses regularly engaged in such a practice as the use of the bearing rein, especially
since, as we have seen, the use of the bearing rein was known to wear out well-bred
horses very quickly, so that they would soon be sold for lower service, such as cab work.
He highlighted the hypocrisy of individuals who professed to support the cause of animal
welfare and reform while continuing to allow their coachmen to employ the bearing rein.
He hinted at the reluctance of the RSPCA to denounce the practice of using the bearing
rein for fear of offending their most important supporters: ‘Little does the benevolent
dowager who sits absorbed in the pages of the last tract of the “Society for Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals”, know of the sufferings of the two noble animals by whom she is
leisurely drawn along the “Lady’s Mile”.’49 Yet Flower did not accuse such a person of
intentional or wanton cruelty. Rather, he explained that ‘the pain which is inflicted upon
their horses, proceeds almost exclusively from a want of knowledge on the part of the
owners, and not from any disregard of the suffering of the animal.’50 It is easy to see how
wealthy women especially may have been viewed as ‘excused’ from the blame for such
ignorance, as it could well pass for a kind of naivety, though it urgently required remedy
through education.
Flower imagined that even when a woman was confronted with the spectacle of a
horse suffering in bearing rein, she might have been taught by society (which prized the
sight) to interpret what she saw as something other than suffering. He argued (not
unconvincingly even to the twenty-first century reader, which may suggest the
pervasiveness of this interpretation) that the woman could be persuaded that because a
49 E. F. Flower, quoted in ‘Bits and Bearing Reins’, Blackwood’s, p. 744.
50 E. F. Flower, quoted in ‘Bits and Bearing Reins’, Blackwood’s, p. 742.
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horse looked more fashionable in bearing rein, he was as proud to wear the device as the
owner was proud of the way he looked. This would provide a specious explanation for
why the horse in bearing rein looked and acted differently than one that was loosed from
it: ‘She probably fancies that the high prancing stem, and the toss of the head which
scatters flakes of foam at every step, are expressions of pride and satisfaction at their
task, when in fact they are occasioned by pain, and a vain attempt to obtain momentary
relief from their suffering’. 51 It seems that by the 1870s, horses in this condition were
either imagined to look proud solely because the bearing rein was designed to make them
look to be displaying pride like a human (with their heads held high), or because people
were so accustomed to associating this condition with horses possessed by the upper
classes. The latter would perhaps account for the association of pride with the tossing of
the head and foaming at the mouth, for these actions can hardly be said to resemble any
human display of pride. It seems that the bearing rein at once attempted to stamp the
horse with an image of human pride in forcing the head to be held high, and also invented
an image of a kind of false equine pride, that was actually synonymous with a horse’s
response to the pain of wearing the device.52 It is certain that in the case of the bearing
rein, practical empathy was in some way impeded by a learned interpretation of this
response, but it is equally certain that this interpretation was liable to break down with
any attempt at interrogation, as is proven by the many endeavours that were made to re-
51 Flower, quoted in ‘Bits and Bearing Reins’, Blackwood’s, p. 744.
52 It is interesting to note that Victorian fashion constructed the image of the corseted woman in a way that
was not wholly dissimilar. If a horse’s response to the pain caused by the bearing rein could be
viewed as a demonstration of the horse’s ‘pride’, so could a woman’s suffering (or even fainting)
in a corset be construed as feminine ‘delicacy’. Gina Marlene Dorré has made a compelling study
of the parallels between the cultural functions of the fashions of the bearing rein and the corset,
and between the movements to oppose these fashions. See ‘Horses and Corsets: Black Beauty,
Dress Reform, and the Fashioning of the Victorian Woman’, Victorian Literature and Culture, 30
(2002), pp. 157-178.
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educate society and thus to establish (or re-establish) a line of natural communication
with the horse that was undistorted by fashion.
Though they did not own private carriages in order to use bearing reins, it seems
that middle-class women were not exempt from the accusation of contributing to the
abuse of horses through ignorance. In this quote from a Chambers’s article on omnibus
horses, the problem again is fashion versus common sense. Rather than be seen walking,
a woman might pay a small sum to ride a very short distance on an omnibus, which, of
course, would cause the team of horses to be made to frequently repeat the action of their
most strenuous tasks, stopping and starting with their burden of several tons.
Interestingly, though Gordon assumed that such a woman would have likely been
ignorant of the pain she caused to the horses at the front of the omnibus, he did not
excuse her ignorance in the same way that Flower somewhat excused the naivety of the
upper-class woman in her carriage. Rather, Gordon equated the ignorance of the woman
who used the omnibus in order to avoid walking a short distance for the sake of fashion
with a frivolous and injurious stupidity. For Gordon, this kind of fashionable
carelessness was a veritable destructive force: ‘Think of it, ye exigent women, who rather
than walk a yard will stop an omnibus twice in a minute, the sudden stopping and
starting, so often unnecessary, taking more out of a horse than an hour’s steady tramp on
the level, and being the chief cause of the London horse’s poor expectation of life.’53 It is
likely that a large omnibus, full of people, would have facilitated this kind of ignorance
even more than the carriage and coachman between a rider and horse would have done.
In order to see suffering and confront its possible causes, even in such visible creatures as
53 Gordon, ‘Omnibus’, p. 29.
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those horses used for transport in the streets, one needed to look for it, rather than to give
in to the temptation to look away.
Despite their visibility, it was not a simple matter for an observer to witness the
extent of the use and abuse of horses, even those employed for public transport. Gordon
explained that it was difficult to arrive at the number of London cab horses. First, one
needed to consider that not all horses worked in cab service all the time. Some, for
example, were made to pull coal part-time, or to work in other kinds of hauling or
industrial transport work.54 This meant that the cab horse seen on the street might have
an entirely different job to do some days; the conditions of which could be better or
worse. It also meant that a cab horse might be made to last longer hours than his driver;
such a horse may have another job to do before or after a cabman begins or quits his shift.
Such would have been the case with night cabs; Gordon explained that the horses
employed to pull night cabs were invariably engaged in some other kind of work during
the day.55
Henry Curling suggested that although the suffering of the cab horse was highly
visible, by 1851 people had hardened themselves so much to this spectacle that they
believed that there was little help for it. Of the abuse inflicted daily upon horses by
cabmen, Curling said that ‘except from the circumstance of its being by custom
familiarized to the public eye, they could not endure the sight of such cruelty’.56 The
frequency with which cab horses were seen to be in pain was likely to overwhelm the
discretion of a single observer (perhaps even a policeman) who could not confront a
multitude of cabmen, each doing like the other. A certain (and, Curling would likely
54 Gordon, ‘Cab’, p.12.
55 Gordon, ‘Cab’, p.12.
56 Curling, Lashers, p. 9.
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argue, an unreasonable) level of suffering thus became acceptable. No doubt the feeling
that one could not confront the individual actions of so many was compounded by a sense
of complicity in people who hired cabs, perhaps every day. It would have been much
easier simply to accept that there was little that one could do to rectify the situation (as
one person’s boycott of cabs was unlikely to bring about great change), and to try to
make one’s way without thinking too much about it. There was also an awareness that
the cabman’s poverty contributed to his treatment of horses, and whether one believed
that a cabman applied his lash because of his poverty or his rough temperament, this was
the fault of a flawed system that could not be remedied by denying the cabman one’s fare
- especially when one really needed transportation in a hurry.
Night cabs were presented by the Victorian periodical press as having been almost
an entirely different species of business than the cabs that were frequently seen in the
streets during the day. Night cabs seem to have been viewed as less respectable than day-
time cabs, but much more necessary because people did not want to walk about during
the dark. They were often more expensive than daytime cabs. The men who drove night
cabs seem to have been viewed as slightly sinister for working at indecent hours (Sunday
cabs were also viewed as somewhat improper, though very convenient for church-goers).
It is arguable that this reputation was helped by the fact that night cabs appeared to be
part of the night, shabby and shrouded in darkness. Certainly the driver of a night-time
cab was able to inflict more damage upon the horse in his charge, with less impunity,
because his actions would have been less visible in the darkness. It also would have been
harder for an observer to detect the condition of a horse in the dark.
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In his 1851 tract, Curling claimed to have confronted a night-time cabman about a
particularly frightful instrument with which he had been driving his horse: ‘He excused
himself by saying it was his night whip, an instrument he owned he dare not use in the
day, but absolutely necessary to make use of against the horse in question.’57 The ‘night
whip’ would not have been so visible during the dark as to be easily seen by riders and
passers-by, and it also seems that horses of the poorest condition were put to night work:
‘The night-cabs are worked by the worst description of horses: there is scarcely one of
them that is not spavined or partially blind, or both. To see one whose fore-legs are not
looped and palsied from falling down and breaking his knees, is an exceptional
curiosity.’58 Thus, the driver night cab was presented as taking advantage of the darkness
to utilize horses of the very worst condition.59 These horses, because of their relative
weakness, would have had to have been forced to pull a cab by more brutal methods than
their counterparts of the daytime. Also, as we have seen, night cab horses may well have
been engaged in other service during the day, which work was likely to have been less
public. Both passenger and cabman of the night-cab were portrayed as a little desperate,
and the cabman possibly as rapacious. The representation of the night-time cab presents a
useful contrast to that of the daytime cab, in that it confirms that despite the fact that the
public were hardened to the suffering and abuse of cab horses in poor health and
condition, there was definitely a limit to what would be tolerated. That this limit could be
exceeded during the night-time shows that there was a level of dependence upon public
57 Curling, Lashers, p. 13.
58 ‘Cabs and Cabmen’, Chambers’s Journal of Popular Science and Literature, 38 (1862), p. 333.
59 In its description of ‘night-cab work’, Curling’s tract is particularly evocative of the kind of Victorian
exposé journalism of the underworld discussed by scholars such as Seth Koven and Judith
Walkowitz. See Seth Koven, Slumming: Sexual and Social Politics in Victorian London
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Judith Walkowitz, City of Dreadful Delight:
Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1992).
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cabs that could stretch appropriate boundaries in the right circumstances. The provision
or concealment of visual information about the treatment and condition of cab horses was
crucial in determining a level of acceptable suffering in the cab horse, as perceived by the
public and weighted by their need for this mode of transportation.
While it is true that those who wrote about the suffering of working horses did not
have to overcome the problem of visual access, as did antivivisectionists, the visibility of
the working horse in the street did not grant a clear picture of the horse’s life and
circumstances, nor did it necessarily make plain what steps would need to be taken in
order to ameliorate the horse’s suffering. In order to understand the circumstances
surrounding the suffering of horses, it was necessary to engage with a whole network of
associations, which included connections between and among individuals of the most
disparate classes. These connections were potentially as uncomfortable as they were
undeniable. Most especially one could not hope to understand the suffering of the horse
without considering the circumstances of the driver of the horse. Unfortunately, the most
common conditions in which horses were driven (especially in urban spaces) - those of
the cab and cab driver - were also the most likely to breed suffering.
Some tried to blame the suffering of the poor cab horse entirely upon the cab
driver. Cab drivers were a very unpopular sort of people and proved a very convenient
scapegoat. Cab drivers were indeed often guilty of abusing the animals in their charge.
The brutality of cab drivers, however, was a thin explanation for the suffering of horses,
as cab drivers themselves lived and worked in conditions of dire poverty and discomfort.
Further, the horses they drove often bore the scars of forms of the more intense abuse
(than neglect and overwork) that they had suffered at the hands of wealthier people who
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used acutely harmful methods of restraint and compulsion, such as the bearing rein.
Though their horses looked younger and healthier, people of fashion were known to
cause the worst kind of suffering to horses when they employed the use of bearing reins
in the fitting of their horses to fancy carriages.
Though the cab driver would have seemed to the casual observer to have been the
obvious source of the suffering of horses, the circumstances surrounding the suffering of
horses was really much more complicated. This is reflected in the diversity of popular
texts that were written about the issue. Historically, the situation provides insight into the
figure of the observer in the nineteenth century, precisely because the situation required
the observer to perform a great deal of work in order to work through problems that were
not immediately evident. In order to produce a text that was likely to encourage positive
change, it was necessary for an observer of suffering in this instance to look deeply into
what was visible, and perhaps to look twice, or three times, in order to achieve more than
a superficial understanding of the suffering that occurred. The development and use of
such skills of observation (detection) became an interest in themselves during the
nineteenth century and beyond. Victorians applied the imagination to the fragments of
empirical data that were available to achieve a deeper understanding of the experiences of
vulnerable individuals. The work of empathy was meant to provide an ‘inside’
knowledge of others’ sufferings, as opposed to settling for the limited and sometimes
misleading information that the senses alone could provide.
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Conclusion
It is helpful to study the advocacy of humans and animals alongside one another, because
it emphasizes how vulnerable humans are often considered to lack a ‘voice’ - the ‘other’
is epitomized by the animal ‘other’. It also reminds one that the interior experience of
another individual is as knowable and ultimately unknowable in another human as it is in
an animal. In fact, if one is to attempt to study empathy (as the real experience of
witnessing the suffering of someone else that would provoke one to speak out on behalf
of that individual), it is crucial to study both animals and humans as subjects, as the
differences between animals (who necessarily lack a voice) and humans tend to highlight
the uses and benefits of empathy as a tool, as well as its problems.
To say that people had agency when they spoke up for others, and did not act
solely as the result of the pressure of forces exerted upon them, is certainly not to say that
they did not use this agency to achieve their own ends. The reason that it is easier to
reduce the advocacy of one group or individual on behalf of another to the outcome of
various forces, rather than to consider that these were people making choices, is that the
motivations behind the making of such choices are impossible to absolutely prove.
Historians may often make good guesses about the motivations behind the advocacy of
one group by another, however, and often they have come to the conclusion that such
motivations have been selfish. It is quite possible, and even probable, that the primary
goal of many of the authors of the texts I have examined in this thesis was not always the
advancement of the best interests of their subjects. Further, we can have little idea how
the subjects themselves were affected by the attempts that others made to speak for them.
Empathy, as such, may be used as a genuine means to express the perceived sufferings of
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others in order to bring about an end to those sufferings, or else the struggle for sameness
in difference may be rerouted to achieve the selfish ends of the person who has attempted
to access and express knowledge of someone else’s interior experiences.
Why, then, should we even bother to study how people have spoken on behalf of
others? The study of empathic discourse and the representation of empathy through the
texts by which individuals meant to speak for others, is as fraught with problems as is our
own use of empathy. Yet this parallel offers some promise: despite the problems we may
encounter in trying to understand the struggle to understand, the study of the historical
development of an ethical discourse characterized by empathy can help us to understand
the ways in which we represent the experiences of vulnerable individuals today. Linda
Alcoff suggests, in her article ‘The Problem of Speaking for Others’, that despite the
apparent pitfalls of trying to speak on behalf of someone else, it is better to make the
attempt than to refuse to even try because of the risk of misrepresentation and the fear of
imposing the self upon the other. Though empathy and representation are rife with
problems, Alcoff argues:
adopting the position that one should only speak for oneself raises similarly
problematic questions. For example, we might ask, if I don’t speak for those less
privileged than myself, am I abandoning my political responsibility to speak out
against oppression, a responsibility incurred by the very fact of my privilege? If I
should not speak for others, should I restrict myself to following their lead
uncritically? Is my greatest contribution to move over and get out of the way?1
1 Linda Alcoff, ‘The Problem of Speaking for Others’, Cultural Critique, 20, (1991), p. 8.
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Alcoff positions the stakes of speaking for others against what she argues is the only
other option, which is silence. Silence, when one is in a position to speak, is an act and an
expenditure of agency - the result of a choice made on behalf of others.
The representation of the reality of another is only the expression of an
interpretation, which may not reflect anything like the real experience of the subject,
whether because of intentional dissimulation, ignorant (or arrogant) imposition, or simple
misunderstanding. Still, it is arguable that despite the problems inherent in speaking for
others, in many situations it is preferable to take the risk, as opposed to saying nothing.
The study of the history of speaking for others is equally problematic, and arguably just
as important. As historians, we understand that the experiences of many individuals,
especially of those who were less able to speak for themselves, are ultimately
irrecoverable. In order to seek what it is that we can recover, we must look beyond the
information provided about such individuals by those who were in positions of power or
privilege, as this information is invariably less than trustworthy. Yet the problems we
face in using sources written by the privileged to uncover the history of those who were
less able to speak for themselves are an apt reflection of the problems we face when we
try to speak for others today. Awareness of the problems of empathy and the pitfalls of
representing the experiences of others does not solve these problems. I hold with Alcoff
that we should explore these problems in as much detail as possible. It is crucial to for
scholars to explore the role that empathy has played in the history of ethical expression.
My solution to the problem of studying the attempts of nineteenth-century authors
to represent the interior experience of others without disregarding the historical agency of
these individuals has been to examine how they were enabled to formulate a discourse of
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empathy, rather than to consider why they chose to speak on behalf of the groups that
they did. This has also helped me to avoid becoming ensnared in a constant analysis of
the motivations behind every text that I have studied. Instead of engaging in a more
conventional analysis of the social, cultural, and political forces that may have acted upon
the authors of the texts that I study, I have focused upon the factors that enabled them to
express and to understand the plights of others in the way that they did. I believe that
placing historical figures within the context of factors that enabled or constrained their
behaviours or expressions provides an alternative to the presentation of these individuals
as veritable slaves to the pressures of their historical circumstances. It is possible to study
humanity in history.
Victorians developed an ethical discourse characterized by empathy as a means of
thinking through ‘the problem of speaking for others’. For Victorians, empathy did the
work of producing the knowledge that was necessary to make progress in debating
important social and ethical issues. Empathy afforded meaning to the unknowable realm
of the experience of ‘other’. Victorians established a multiplicity of sites for the
articulation of such meaning through the authorship of texts intended to represent the
sufferings and experiences of vulnerable individuals. Empathy did the work of ultimately
allowing Victorians to bypass barriers to understanding, and the introduction of the word
‘empathy’ at the turn of the century signalled the significant investment that Victorians
made in this work.
. The emergence of a Victorian ethical discourse based upon empathic
‘knowledge’ is traceable through strategies that authors used to express the inaccessible.
This was especially important if the facts available in a particular situation were scant or
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scarcely observable. The authors of these texts attempted to overcome almost every sort
of empirical obstacle in order to acquire knowledge of their subjects. Whether the
barriers were natural, geographical, or man-made; whether they were the barriers of
bodies that were hidden, diseased, or otherwise oppressed or challenged, empathy could
help to overcome these barriers. Whether their subjects literally had no voice, or were
unwilling or unable to use their voices; whether the subjects’ voices were liable to be
dismissed or mistrusted, the authors of the texts I have studied provided their subjects
with voices, and found that these voices could still be considered to represent the
subjects’ own. For good or ill, at least their subjects were not absolutely doomed to
silence.
The authors of the texts that I have studied rose to the challenge of speaking for
others by utilizing the particular strategy of expressing an understanding of the invisible,
interior experience of the other through the presentation of his or her navigation of
elements of the unseen. Each writer faced particular obstacles to visual observation in
the course of their investigations, and each presented his or her reader with a means of
overcoming these by pairing reason with the imagination. None of the suggestions
offered by these writers regarding the experiences of their subjects could ever have been
proven to be absolutely accurate; however, the ambiguity of the circumstances of the
subject was often presented as the most pernicious factor to be considered. The
vulnerability of the subject augmented the significance of possibility. Further, the
inability of the vulnerable subject to speak for himself or herself increased the urgency of
the presentation of possibility.
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Each of the authors of the different texts I have examined communicated a certain
lack of faith in the empirical information that was readily available to them. Their
impressions of circumstances seem to have been formed with great care, rather than on
the basis of appearances or hasty prejudice (at least this is the way that the authors have
represented their impressions, which indicates that they were all somewhat skilful at
crafting the communication of their perceptions). The texts demonstrate that these
authors possessed an awareness of the malleability of perception, along with a wish not to
be duped, or to allow others to be duped, by appearances into a false complacency (or, as
in the case of the physiologists who testified in favour of vivisection, into a false sense of
indignation). I argue that this mistrust of appearances is characteristic of the nineteenth-
century observer.2 Further, I argue that this is indicative of the shift away from a culture
that defined the relationship between subject and object wholly in terms of
commonalities.
This was in contrast to the way that eighteenth-century individuals perceived the
world outside themselves, especially with regard to ethics and the relationship between
subject and object. William Reddy describes the eighteenth century as an age that
believed that the best ethical (as well as social, and political) direction was guided by
feeling, or a ‘sense’ of right and wrong.3 Though Reddy’s book is primarily about
France, he does make somewhat regular use of the works of British thinkers to support
his claims (the above citation references Reddy’s reading of a passage written by the third
2 I would argue that the Victorian interest in magic and mesmerism, far from contradicting this argument, is
further proof of the nineteenth-century fascination with the malleability of perception. See Alison
Winter, Mesmerism: Powers of Mind in Victorian Britain, for a study of this phenomenon
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
3 William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 156.
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earl of Shaftesbury in 1711), and I am convinced that the eighteenth-century British, as
well as the French, placed their faith in the association between the senses and the
feelings as the best means of finding their way in their lives and their world. In the texts I
have studied, I have found compelling evidence of how this trend of associating the
senses with feelings (especially with the kind of feelings that would move someone to
work for the reform of treatment of vulnerable individuals) and the discernment of truth
was somewhat reversed in the nineteenth century. It seems very reasonable that it should
have done so in light of the changes in the understanding of perception that occurred
during this time.
Beginning in the Romantic era of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century,
the role of the imagination of the observer came to be privileged over strictly empirical
data in the understanding of perception. This enabled people to embrace broad
possibilities of perception. For example, the authors of the reports on the conditions of
child labour that I examine in the first chapter of this thesis advance the attempt to ‘see’ a
system; rather than looking exclusively for people to blame, the commissioners and
inspectors who reported to the child labour commissions submitted their own testimony
to form part of a web of subjective judgment in order that decisions might be made to
adjust that system in a way that would best address and ameliorate the sufferings of child
labourers. The authors of the texts that I have studied embraced the possibilities offered
by the prospect of the imagination in communicating an ethical imperative to some
number of readers who lacked the benefit of the same access or information that the
author had. In each case, the authors discussed the empirical obstacles that they had to
overcome in order to gain access or information about the subjects, and endeavoured to
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demonstrate the imaginative means by which they managed to overcome these obstacles.
The texts read almost as a roadmap to guide readers in their employment of the
imagination to formulate a perception of the subject and the subject’s experience.
The texts I have examined have taught me, however, that while the significance
attached to the imagination as an element of perception in the nineteenth century may
have encouraged people to embrace new opportunities for understanding and
communication, it also deprived them of a certain sense of security in an unassailable
sense of moral direction. If, in the eighteenth century, one could trust one’s empirical
perceptions and the feelings informed by these, in the nineteenth century, people seem to
have been acutely aware that their feelings could be manipulated by the manipulation of
their perceptions. If, as Reddy argues, the eighteenth century was characterized by faith
in a natural ‘sense’ of right and wrong, in the nineteenth century, people seem to have
been very aware that things were not always as they seemed. The authors of the texts I
have studied seem to have been vigilant against those who would manipulate or obscure
empirical information regarding vulnerable subjects, and also against the temptation to
make hasty judgments about the circumstances of such subjects based upon simple
appearances.
One reason that Victorians were eager to lead and to educate others seems to
have been to combat the influence of those who might wish to advance a different
perception of the experiences of the subject in question. Victorians seem to have been
driven to urge others to look beyond empirical impressions in order to find the ‘truth’ of
particular circumstances. In other words, the nineteenth century saw the ‘sense’ of right
and wrong replaced with an emphasis upon the moral imagination. Of course, the moral
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imagination required education in order that it might formulate perceptions in accordance
with cultural or religious standards. This would explain why the evangelical movement
of the nineteenth century produced so many texts devoted to the communication of the
plights of vulnerable groups of individuals. Ebenezer Davies’ anti-slavery text is but one
particularly good example of many of these.
There was a great deal of popular literature written in the nineteenth century for
the purpose of educating the moral imaginative faculties of children. I consider that it
would have been beyond the scope of my thesis to study children’s poems and stories in
detail, but the examination of such texts in light of nineteenth-century attitudes toward
ethics and the imagination would make a very interesting study. I believe that the genre
of sensation fiction merits its own study in light of nineteenth-century developments in
ethical expression. It is likely that there was enough sensation fiction produced during the
nineteenth century that sought to educate the moral imagination as well as to entertain to
warrant a study of these texts alone.
Another possibility for research that I would like to propose is the study of the
way that different groups throughout history have gained popular consideration as
opposed to being groups the advocacy of whom cut against the grain of conventional
‘wisdom’. I believe that no such study could be made without a foundational analysis of
the development of the concept of empathy. During the nineteenth century, many groups
that were championed as worthy of protection against vulnerability to exploitation and
abuse eventually came to be afforded a measure of protection. Though we still struggle
to achieve equality for all humans, it is arguable that our culture values humanity as the
ultimate or ‘natural’ group that we might call ‘ourselves’. Of course, this wasn’t always
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the way. Divisions based upon race, sex, religion, and nationality have placed certain
human beings outside of the circle of consideration in many historical circumstances, and
these divisions were defended fiercely; they were believed to be quite ‘natural’. It is
interesting to me that despite how self-reflective we have become regarding the social
construction of ‘natural’ differences, we continue to insist that the line we have
constructed between humans and animals is ‘natural’. Is it possible to historicize the
boundaries we have constructed - and deconstructed - between and among privileged and
unprivileged groups? What convinces people to begin to include members of a formerly
excluded group into their circle of consideration? By what means do have opponents of
such movements attempted to reinforce notions of natural difference?
I am convinced that to find answers to these questions (or at least to better
understand the questions) we must look to the history of empathy and the history of the
moral imagination that we have inherited from the nineteenth century. I believe that this
was the very beginning of our self-awareness regarding the social construction of our
values, as well as the source of our awareness that our perceptions are often easily
influenced. We know that we are not always perfectly self-aware. The nineteenth-
century moral imagination bequeathed to us an insecurity about appearances that reminds
us of everything we do not know, as well as an ambition to try to know the impossible. If
this anti-empiricist legacy has been often challenged in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, it has never been wholly forgotten. It is what drives us to continue to struggle
against complacency regarding the hidden suffering of the ‘other’, despite the fact that
the exploitation of others can often provide great benefits to the privileged. As the
Victorians troubled themselves to imagine what they did not know about the
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circumstances of others, they learned to locate the ‘other’ within themselves, and to
cultivate a crucial, if uncomfortable, ‘sameness’ in difference.
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